Gildersleeve v. Rosenblum et al
Filing
38
OPINION AND ORDER: The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 2 is denied. The court does, however, issue a Certificate of Appealability on petitioner's argued claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Signed on 1/5/2017 by Judge Michael W. Mosman. (kms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
DAVID ERNEST GILDERSLEEVE,
Case No. 3:15-cv-01178-MO
Petitioner,
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
ELLEN ROSENBLUM, et al.,
Respondents.
Anthony D. Bornstein
Assistant Federal Public Def ender
101 S.W. Main Street, Suite 1700
Portland, Oregon 97204
Attorney for Petitioner
Frederick M. Boss, Deputy Attorney General
Samuel A. Kubernick, Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, Oregon 97310
Attorneys for Respondent
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
MOSMAN, District Judge.
Petitioner brings
U.S.C.
2254
§
this
challenging
convictions from 2001.
habeas
the
corpus
case
legality
of
pursuant
four
to
28
state-court
For the reasons that follow, the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is denied.
BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2001, Mary Finzel was driving her BMW when
petitioner approached her with a firearm,
the vehicle, and stole her car.
instructed her to exit
Officer Pippen responded to the
incident, ultimately colliding with the BMW.
A second patrol car
stopped in front of the BMW to prevent petitioner from driving
away,
and petitioner exited the vehicle with a
waistband.
handgun in his
He turned toward the police with the pistol raised,
Officer Pippen fired two shots,
fatal injury.
one of which inflicted a
Respondent's Exhibit 103, p. 11.
non-
Law Enforcement
personnel took petitioner into custody, and the Multnomah County
Grand Jury charged him with Attempted Aggravated Murder,
Degree Robbery with a Firearm,
Felon in Possession of a Firearm,
and Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle.
At
trial,
petitioner
First
Respondent's Exhibit 102.
claimed
that
another
person
stole
Finzel's car, but got out of the car, left the door open and the
keys
in
it,
and
made
his
way
to
a
nearby
telephone
booth.
Petitioner claimed he happened upon the situation by chance and
decided to steal the vehicle, having no knowledge of the earlier
carjacking.
He claimed to have discovered a gun in the car that
the perpetrator of the carjacking left behind, and that although
he
took
the
firearm,
he
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
neither
attempted
to
shoot
Officer
Pippen,
nor brandished the firearm.
Trial Transcript Vol.
IV,
pp. 64-77.
The jury convicted petitioner of all charges,
11-1 verdict as to Attempted Aggravated Murder.
Vol.
VI,
pp.
10-11.
including an
Trial Transcript
The trial court found petitioner to be a
Dangerous Of fender under Oregon law and sentenced him to 30 years
in prison.
Respondent's Exhibits 101, pp. 39-44.
Petitioner took a direct appeal where he succeeded on the
portion of his
sentence.
(2005
challenge pertaining
remanded
the
sentenced
case
As a result,
for
petitioner
a
Dangerous
Of fender
the Oregon Court of Appeals
resentencing,
to
the
202 Or. App. 215, 121 P.3d 663
State v. Gildersleeve,
(per curiam).
to
total
1
of
and
130
the
trial
months
in
court
prison.
Petitioner appealed the 130-month sentence, but the Oregon Court
of
Appeals
decision,
affirmed
the
trial
court's
decision
in
and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
a
written
State v.
Gildersleeve, 230 Or. App. 348, 215 P.3d 117 (2009), rev. denied,
347 Or. 290, 219 P.3d 592 (2009).
Petitioner next filed for post-conviction relief
Marion County.
trial
attorney
("PCR")
in
Relevant to this proceeding, he claimed that his
was
ineffective
eyewitness Kathy Krech.
concerning
the
testimony
of
At trial, Krech testified that she saw a
dark object in petitioner's hand, and saw him "motion up towards
the police officer
it was
shocking to me that he would
raise his hand up in their direction,
being anything."
Trial
1
Petitioner petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review of the portion
of the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision denying relief, but the Oregon
Supreme Court denied review.
339 Or. 610, 127 P.3d 651 (2005).
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Transcript Vol.
immediate
III,
p.
aftermath
of
civilian eyewitness,
132.
the
According to petitioner,
incident,
Krech
Catherine Malone,
was running away and they shot him?"
had
"My god,
asked
in the
another
did you see he
Although counsel attempted
to elicit Krech's statement from Malone as impeachment evidence,
the
trial
court
did not
allow it where
counsel
had not
asked Krech whether she had made the statement to Malone.
164-69.
As a result,
first
Id at
during petitioner's PCR action he alleged
that trial counsel "failed to recall Kathy Krech and Catherine
Malone in order to lay the foundation for introduction of Krech's
statement to Malone."
The
PCR
court
Respondent's Exhibit 115, p. 6.
concluded
that
al though
counsel
failed
to
provide professional skill and judgment with respect to Krech's
contemporaneous
[errors]
would
statement,
have
"petitioner has
had
the
probability
affecting the outcome of the case."
pp. 21-23.
failed
to
not proved that any
of
substantially
Respondent's Exhibit 161,
The PCR court also found petitioner was not credible,
sustain
contemporaneous
his
statement
burden
attributed
turned the tide in this case."
Petitioner
of
appealed,
proof,
to
Krech
and
that
the
would
"not
have
Id at 21.
but
the
Oregon
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed the PCR court's decision without opinion, and the Oregon
Supreme Court denied review.
Gildersleeve v. State, 265 Or. App.
477, 334 P.3d 992, rev. denied, 356 Or. 516, 340 P.3d 47 (2014).
Petitioner filed this 28 U.S.C.
June
26,
2015
in
which
he
§
raises
2254 habeas corpus case on
12
grounds
for
relief.
Respondent asks the court to deny relief on the Petition because
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
petitioner
failed
to
fairly
present
many
of
his
claims
to
Oregon's state courts, and the state courts reasonably denied the
claims he did properly raise.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
An
application
for
a
writ
of habeas
corpus
shall
not
be
granted unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted
in
a
decision
that
was:
( 1)
unreasonable application of,
"contrary
to,
or
involved
an
clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or
( 2)
"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
§
2254(d).
correct,
A
court's
the
fact
burden
of
are
presumed
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
28
A
bears
of
the
§
petitioner
findings
rebutting
U.S.C.
and
state
28 U.S.C.
2254 (e) (1).
state
court
decision
established precedent
if
is
the
"contrary
state
court
to
clearly
applies
a
rule
that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's]
cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are
materially
indistinguishable
from
a
decision
of
[the
Supreme]
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that]
precedent."
Under
the
Williams
v.
"unreasonable
Taylor,
529 U.S.
application"
362,
clause,
a
405-06
(2000).
federal
habeas
court may grant relief "if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle
from
[the
but
that
principle
unreasonably
applies
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
Supreme Court's]
to
the
decisions
facts
of
the
prisoner's
clause
case."
requires
incorrect
§
or
2254 (d)
Id
the
at
413.
state
The
court
erroneous.
decision
at
Id
"unreasonable application"
410.
to
be
more
Twenty-eight
than
U.S.C.
"preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where
there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree that
the state court's decision conflicts with
precedents.
It goes no
[the Supreme]
farther."
Harrington
raises
grounds
v.
Court's
562
Richter,
U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
II.
Unargued Claims
Al though
Petition,
petitioner
12
for
relief
in
his
he chooses to present argument on only whether trial
counsel was ineffective with respect to his handling of Krech's
contemporaneous statement.
Petitioner does not argue the merits
of his remaining claims, nor does he address any of respondent's
arguments
denied.
as
to
why
relief
on
the
unargued
claims
should
be
As such, petitioner has not carried his burden of proof
with respect to these unargued claims.
279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002)
See
Silva
v.
Woodford,
(petitioner bears the burden of
proving his claims).
III. Failure to Introduce Krech's Contemporaneous Statement
Petitioner asserts
Krech' s
prior,
that
trial
contemporaneous
counsel
statement
failed to
that
introduce
would
seriously undermined the credibility of her trial testimony.
have
He
argues that the PCR court's decision is objectively unreasonable
where
the
prejudicial
impact
of
counsel's
error
is
severe,
especially in the context of a non-unanimous guilty determination
on the Attempted Aggravated Murder charge.
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
Because no Supreme Court precedent is directly on point that
corresponds to the facts of this case, the court uses the general
two-part
test
established
whether petitioner
Knowles
v.
by
received
Mirzayance,
the
Supreme
ineffective
556
U.S.
111,
Court
to
assistance
determine
counsel.
(2009).
122-23
of
First,
petitioner must show that his counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
466
U.S.
668,
686-87
(1984).
Due
evaluating counsel's performance,
presumption
that
the
conduct
Strickland v. Washington,
to
the
difficulties
courts must
falls
reasonable professional assistance."
within
indulge a
the
"wide
in
strong
range
of
Id at 689.
Second, petitioner must show that his counsel's performance
prejudiced the defense.
whether
the
petitioner
probability that,
but
The appropriate test for prejudice is
can
for
show
"that
counsel's
there
is
a
reasonable
unprofessional errors,
result of the proceeding would have been different."
the
Id at 694.
A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine
confidence
in
the
Strickland's general
outcome
of
the
trial.
Id
at
696.
When
standard is combined with the standard of
review governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus cases, the result
is a "doubly deferential judicial review."
Mirzayance,
556 U.S.
at 122.
As noted above, the PCR court concluded counsel's failure to
introduce Krech's out-of-court statement amounted to a "failure
to provide professional skill and judgment," but that the failure
"had no impact on the case."
In
reaching
this
Respondent's Exhibit 161,
decision,
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
the
PCR
concluded
p.
23.
that:
(1) petitioner's
that
there
trial;"
theory
was
and
no
( 2)
at
chance
there
trial
that
was
whatever you make of this
was
[it]
"so
completely
was
"plenty of
going
other
to
ludicrous
prevail
at
testimony besides
'My God' statement that petitioner was
turning with the gun drawn in the officer's direction when he was
shot."
Respondent's Exhibit 161, pp. 21-22.
Petitioner contends that irrespective of whether his theory
at trial was credible,
the jury could still find him not guilty
of Attempted Aggravated Murder.
While this is true, it does not
alter
introduced
the
fact
petitioner,
that
gun drawn,
confrontation.
effect,
but
the
Not
State
ample
only
did
Officer
Darcey
Pippen
testified
testify
that
petitioner lift up his shirt with his left hand,
Trial
Transcript
that
turned toward Officer Pippen during the
Elizabeth
belt of his pants,
evidence
grab his gun,
Vol.
III,
she
to
this
witnessed
reach into the
and turn to face the police.
pp.
consistent with Darcey's testimony,
83-84.
Catherine
Malone,
witnessed petitioner pull a
gun out of his waistband with his right hand.
Id at 145-46.
As noted in the Background of this Opinion, Krech testified
that she saw petitioner point his gun at the police.
132.
you
Al though petitioner claims she told Malone,
see
he
was
running
away
testified to this effect,
and
they
shot
Id at 131-
"My God,
him,"
Krech
did
never
and Malone could not be sure that it
was Krech who made this statement to her.
Id at 155.
Even where the jury's decision on the Attempted Aggravated
Murder charge was non-unanimous, the eyewitnesses were consistent
among their recollections that petitioner drew his gun and turned
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
toward the police.
None of them, including Krech, testified that
petitioner was running away when Officer Pippen shot him.
This
record supports the PCR court's decision that counsel's omission
did not
result
in prejudice.
At
a minimum,
this court cannot
conclude that the PCR court's decision was so unreasonable that
fairminded jurists could not agree with it.
Accordingly, the PCR
court's
nor
decision
is
neither
contrary
to,
an
unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons identified above,
Habeas Corpus
Certificate
of
(#2)
is denied.
Appealability
the Petition for Writ of
The court does,
on
petitioner's
however,
argued
issue a
claim
ineffective assistance of counsel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
c-~
DATED this ----2..__ day of January, 2016.
NM;l~
United States District Judge
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
of
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