Folken v. Voya Insurance and Annuity Company
Filing
46
OPINION & ORDER: Folken's motion for summary judgment 31 is granted. The Hamiltons' motion for summary judgment 37 is denied. Folken's motion to strike the Schable Declaration 45 is denied as moot. Folken is directed to p repare an appropriate judgment and submit it to the Court, after conferring with the Hamiltons, within fourteen days of the date of this Opinion & Order. See 16-page opinion & order attached. Signed on 8/23/2016 by Judge Marco A. Hernandez. Copy of this opinion & order mailed to Hamiltons. (mr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MICHELLE FOLKEN,
No. 3:15-cv-01796-HZ
Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
Cross-Claim Plaintiff, Cross-Claim
Defendant,
v.
VOYA INSURANCE & ANNUITY
COMPANY,
Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff,
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
JIMMY LEE HAMILTON, as Power of
Attorney for Helen Katherine Hamilton;
and HELEN KATHERINE HAMILTON,
Third-Party Defendants, Cross-Claim
Plaintiffs, Cross-Claim Defendants,
///
///
1 - OPINION & ORDER
OPINION & ORDER
Andrew J. Myers
PEACHY & MYERS, P.C.
Attorney at Law
401 E. 3rd Street, Suite 105
The Dalles, Oregon 97058
Attorney for Michelle Folken
Jimmy Lee Hamilton
Helen Katherine Hamilton
2709 Shady Hill Court
Grapevine, Texas 76051
Appearing Pro Se
HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
This is an interpleader action in which the insurer, having deposited life insurance policy
funds in the Court's registry, has been dismissed from the case and the remaining parties,
Michelle Folken and Jimmy and Helen Hamilton, assert cross-claims against each other seeking a
declaration that each is the rightful beneficiary of those funds.
The policy was issued to Phillip Fugate, who died in 2015. When he died, his wife
Doreen Fugate became the beneficiary of the policy. Michelle Folken is Phillip's daughter and
Doreen's stepdaughter. Helen Hamilton is Doreen's mother. Jimmy Hamilton has a Uniform
Statutory Power of Attorney for Helen Hamilton. Folken and the Hamiltons filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, I grant Folken's motion and deny the
Hamiltons' motion.
BACKGROUND
Phillip Fugate purchased an annuity from Voya in 2008. Voya Ans., Ex. 1, ECF 1-3 at
10-18. It paid him certain sums of money during his lifetime and provided that if he died before
2 - OPINION & ORDER
all sums had been paid, the unpaid portion would be paid by Voya to a beneficiary designated by
Phillip. Phillip designated his wife Doreen as the beneficiary of the annuity. Id. Phillip died on
January 10, 2015, before Voya had paid all sums. As beneficiary, Doreen then had the ability to
request either a lump sum payment or a life expectancy deferral option. Compl., Ex. 1, ECF 1-3
at 20-24. She was also able to designate a new beneficiary. Id.
Shortly after Phillip's death, Doreen met with her accountant, Kenneth L. Onstott, to
discuss her options regarding the annuity. Onstott Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 33. During that appointment,
Doreen told Onstott that it was her wish to name Folken as the new beneficiary of the annuity.
Id. Doreen and Onstott reviewed the forms necessary to make the beneficiary designation but did
not execute the documents at that time. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
Shortly thereafter, Doreen suffered a heart attack and was admitted as a patient to Oregon
Health & Sciences University (OHSU). Wallace Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 35. While there, Doreen
completed the form to request the annuity's life expectancy deferral option. Compl., Ex. 1. In
the section entitled "New Beneficiary Designation," Doreen named Michelle Folken as the new
designated beneficiary. Id. She indicated that Folken was her daughter, not her stepdaughter. Id.
And, under the "Beneficiary Type" column, she checked the box for "Contingent" instead of
"Primary." Id.
After completing the form, Doreen asked her friend Etta Myers to take the form and
deliver it to Onstott's office in The Dalles. Myers Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 36. Myers did so. Id. ¶ 4.
However, Doreen died on March 26, 2015. Upon learning of Doreen's death, Myers returned to
Onstott's office, picked up the beneficiary form, and delivered it to Doreen's residence where it
could be addressed by Doreen's family. Id.
3 - OPINION & ORDER
Shortly after Doreen's funeral, Folken went to Doreen's home to begin cleaning and
organizing things. Folken Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 34. At that time, she found a "to do" list created by
Doreen. Id. The list includes an item which reads: "Make call to Voya, ask if I can roll
remaining over into another annuity and draw stipen[d] thru lifetime and remaining balance goes
to Michelle." Folken Decl., Ex. 1.
Folken gave Voya the death certificates for Phillip and Doreen and the beneficiary
designation form that Doreen completed before her death. Voya initially denied any claim by
Folken because Voya did not receive the beneficiary designation form while Doreen was still
alive. Voya also received a claim from Helen Hamilton, in a letter from Jimmy Hamilton, in
which he represented that he had power of attorney for Helen and that Helen was the legal heir to
Doreen's estate. After Folken sued Voya in state court, Voya brought a counterclaim against
Folken, asserted third-party claims against the Hamiltons, removed the action to this Court, and
interpleaded the funds into this Court's registry.
STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and
identifying those portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting
former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
4 - OPINION & ORDER
issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific facts"
showing a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927-28
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the
pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v.
Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).
If the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim as to the existence of a material
issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support
his claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Folken argues that under the form completed by Doreen before her death, Folken is
Doreen's intended beneficiary of the annuity funds. The Hamiltons contend that Helen Hamilton
is the true and correct beneficiary.
In a 2007 case, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered a claim by an insured's former
wife who contended she was the designated beneficiary of a life insurance policy. Sackos v.
Great-West Life Assur. Co., 213 Or. App. 298, 160 P.3d 1026 (2007). Although the decedent
had named his former wife as the beneficiary when they were married, they had divorced and the
decedent later submitted forms to the insurance company indicating that he wanted to change the
5 - OPINION & ORDER
beneficiary to a girlfriend. For some reason, the insurance company took no action. When the
decedent died, his former wife claimed the life insurance benefits. Then, the insurance company
discovered the change of beneficiary forms in its files. Both the former wife and the girlfriend
claimed to be the rightful beneficiary.
The policy required that any beneficiary designation change be "recorded." The court
determined that the decedent's having submitted the new beneficiary form to the insurer was not
equivalent to that form being "recorded." Id. at 304-05, 160 P.3d at 1030-31. But, the court
nonetheless rejected the former wife's argument that she was therefore entitled to relief as a
matter of law. The court explained that "[i]n Oregon, it has long been the law that a change of
beneficiaries of a life insurance policy is not necessarily defeated by a failure to conform to the
requirements of the policy. The overriding question is whether the decedent intended to
accomplish such a change." Id. at 305, 160 P.3d at 1031.
In its discussion, the Sackos court discussed two Oregon Supreme Court cases addressing
the issue of a decedent's intent. In Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Burkholder, a life insurance policy
provided that a change of beneficiaries did not take effect until endorsed by the company at its
home office. 131 Or. 537, 283 P. 739 (1930). The decedent tried to change beneficiaries by
writing the name of his fiancée in a blank space on a copy of the policy provision pertaining to
beneficiaries. When the decedent died, his estate contested the addition of the fiancée's name as a
beneficiary on the ground that the addition had never been endorsed by the insurer at its home
office. The court held that, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the endorsement, the change in
designation of the beneficiary was effective. The decedent's intentions were not in dispute. Id. at
552, 283 P. at 744. The court acknowledged that the decedent had not followed the "technical
6 - OPINION & ORDER
method" prescribed by the policy. Id. But, this was not determinative. Id. Instead, the court
found a "clear and unmistakable designation, under the hand of the decedent, that he wished [the
fiancée] to receive the proceeds of his insurance policy[.]" Id. This evidence was "supplemented
by the testimony of [the fiancée]" as to the decedent's intention that he intended to make her the
beneficiary. Id.
The second case cited in Sackos, Edwards v. Wolf, 278 Or. 255, 563 P.2d 717 (1977),
involved a decedent who named his father as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy but who
then amended the policy by substituting his wife as beneficiary. Although he sent the
amendment to the insurer, he retained a copy of the unamended policy naming his father. The
decedent and his wife ultimately divorced, and the decedent remarried. The decedent showed his
second wife his copy of the unamended life insurance policy, which named his father as
beneficiary, and asked whether that designation met with her approval. She agreed. When the
decedent died, the first wife asserted that she was the only properly named beneficiary.
Relying on Northern Life Insurance, the Edwards court concluded that any defects in the
process for changing the designation of beneficiary back to the decedent's father were not
controlling. Id. at 260-261, 563 P.2d at 719-20. Instead, "maximum effect should be given to
the insured's intention to change the beneficiary of his insurance policy." Id. The court held in
favor of the decedent's father because it was undisputed that the decedent wanted his father to
receive the proceeds of the policy. Id. at 262, 563 P.2d at 720.
Sackos, while following the law from Northern Life Insurance and Edwards,
distinguished those cases because in Sackos, unlike in the cited cases, there were issues of fact
regarding the decedent's intent. 213 Or. App. at 307, 160 P.3d at 1032. As the Sackos court
7 - OPINION & ORDER
explained, the decedent had filed two different forms indicating that he intended to change the
beneficiary from his former wife to his girlfriend. Id. The former wife, however, relied on the
fact that the decedent told his sister, one of his sons, and his former wife herself, that he intended
the former wife to remain the beneficiary. Id. Given the conflict in the evidence, a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to the decedent's intentions which could not be resolved on summary
judgment. Id.
Folken argues that even though Voya did not receive Doreen's designation form before
Doreen died, under Northern Life Insurance, Edwards, and Sackos, she is still the rightful
beneficiary because the evidence in the record establishes as a matter of law that Doreen intended
that Folken be the annuity's designated beneficiary. Folken relies on Onstott's statement that
Doreen told him she wanted Folken to be the beneficiary of the annuity. She also cites to the
form Doreen completed which Doreen signed and had notarized, naming Folken as a beneficiary.
Additionally, she cites to the "to do" list which Folken states is in Doreen's handwriting, and
which was found in Doreen's home, expressly stating that Doreen intended to ask Voya to have
the "remaining balance go[] to Michelle."
Folken contends that the fact that Doreen indicated she was her daughter rather than her
stepdaughter is not of any legal significance. She also cites to evidence supporting the
conclusion that Doreen and Folken were close and that Doreen considered Folken to be her
daughter. Folken Decl. ¶ 3 (Folken was ten years old when her father married Doreen; she was
extremely close to her father and Doreen; Doreen considered Folken to be her daughter and
frequently introduced her as such); Onstott Decl. ¶ 3 (did not know until this action was filed that
Folken was Doreen's stepdaughter as opposed to her daughter; had provided services to Phillip
8 - OPINION & ORDER
and Doreen for at least five years and Doreen had always referred to Folken as her daughter);
Wallace Decl. ¶ 3 (close friend of Phillip's and Doreen's states she knew Folken was Doreen's
stepdaughter but describes Doreen's and Folken's relationship as "extremely close"; Doreen had
no children of her own and considered Folken to be her daughter and Folken's son Caiden to be
her grandson; Doreen loved Folken and Caiden very much).
Finally, Folken argues that the fact that Doreen checked the box for Folken to be a
contingent beneficiary as opposed to a primary beneficiary is also legally insignificant. Folken
notes that Doreen selected no other beneficiary, contingent or primary. Compl., Ex. 1. Folken is
the only beneficiary. She argues that as a result, she takes even as a contingent beneficiary.
Additionally, she states that it is apparent that designating Folken as the contingent beneficiary
without selecting a primary beneficiary, was an oversight. If Doreen intended for her estate to be
the primary beneficiary as the Hamiltons contend, selecting Folken would serve no purpose as
there would be no scenario under which Folken could ever take as a beneficiary.
The Hamiltons fail to create any material issues of fact in opposing Folken's motion and
fail to establish their right to relief as a matter of law in support of their own motion. First, they
address the Declaration of Etta Myers. Myers is the wife of the pastor of the church in Wamic
that Doreen and Phillip attended. Myers Decl. ¶ 1. She met Folken when Folken was four or
five years old and when Phillip was still married to his first wife. Id. ¶ 2. She met Doreen later,
after Doreen and Phillip were married. Id. When Doreen and Phillip were first married, they
moved to California. Id. They moved back about five years ago and it was not until then that
Myers got to know Doreen well. Id. When Doreen was hospitalized at OHSU in March 2015,
Myers and her pastor husband visited Doreen there three times. Id. ¶ 3. At one of those visits,
9 - OPINION & ORDER
Doreen asked Myers to deliver the beneficiary designation form she had now completed, to
Onstott in The Dalles. Id. Myers did so. Id. ¶ 4.
The Hamiltons state that although Myers knew Doreen well for five years, Myers does
not state that she ever heard Doreen express an intention to give Folken the annuity proceeds.
But, this does not create an issue of fact. There is no indication in Myers's Declaration that
Doreen and Myers discussed the proceeds of the policy as opposed to the delivery of the
beneficiary form, or that Doreen made a contrary statement of intent to Myers. An absence of
evidence from Myers that Doreen expressly told her she wanted Folken to be the beneficiary does
not raise a dispute as to any of Myers's statements or negate any inferences from those
statements.
Next, the Hamiltons discuss Onstott's Declaration. They state that just because Onstott
states that Doreen referred to Folken as her daughter, "while kind, does not make Michelle a
daughter or an heir." Defs.' Resp. 2, ECF 41. Although the Hamiltons are correct, meaning that
Doreen's reference to Folken as her daughter does not make her a daughter or an heir, the point is
irrelevant. The question is whether Doreen intended to make Folken the beneficiary of the
annuity. Folken could be anybody - a friend, a co-worker, or any other non-relative, and still be a
designated beneficiary. Thus, it does not matter that Folken is not a daughter or an heir. And,
the Hamiltons' statement does not contradict Onstott's representation that while meeting with
him, Doreen referred to Folken as her daughter. The Hamiltons also argue that because Onstott
was in contact with Doreen only once a year, his knowledge of Phillip and Doreen or of Folken is
very limited. But, this also does not detract from Onstott's statements that while meeting with
Phillip and Doreen annually for at least five years, Doreen referred to Folken as her daughter.
10 - OPINION & ORDER
Next, the Hamiltons point out that even though Wallace knew Doreen for thirty years,
Wallace never states that Doreen told Wallace she wanted Folken to receive the annuity or any
other property of her estate. Instead, they talked about what Doreen wanted to do with Phillip's
possessions. Wallace Decl. ¶ 5. However, the fact that Wallace does not affirmatively state that
she and Doreen spoke about what would happen if Doreen died is not sufficient to create an issue
of fact regarding Wallace's statements. It also does not suggest that Doreen did not intend Folken
to be the designated beneficiary. Wallace states that when she was talking to Doreen, Doreen
"never spoke about things as though she was going to pass away." Id. And, "[b]ased upon the
nature of our conversation," Wallace believed that "Doreen was fully expecting to recover." Id.
With that, the only reasonable inference is that Doreen spoke to Wallace about what to do with
Phillip's things and there was no need for her to discuss what to do with her own things. None of
the evidence cited by the Hamiltons conflicts with Wallace's statements in her Declaration or
allows for a contrary inference.
As to Folken's Declaration, the Hamiltons state that contrary to what Folken represents,
Folken's relationship with Phillip and Doreen was not close. Initially, the Hamiltons provided no
declaration or affidavit or any other evidence in support of this assertion. In an untimely
submission1, the Hamiltons offer the Declaration of Sue and Erin Schable who were neighbors of
Doreen's and who state that there was a lot of tension between Doreen and Folken and that they
did not hear Doreen refer to Folken as her daughter. Schable Decl. 3. But, whether the
1
The motions were fully briefed as of July 11, 2016. The Hamiltons did not seek leave
of Court for the submission of the Schable Declaration which was filed on August 15, 2016, ECF
44. While the Schable Declaration could be stricken for that reason alone, I do not do so because
I reach the same conclusion even considering the statements in the Declaration. For that reason, I
deny Folken's motion to strike the Schable Declaration as moot.
11 - OPINION & ORDER
relationship between Doreen and Folken was close or distant is not determinative of Doreen's
intent to name Folken as the beneficiary. There is no requirement that a beneficiary be a wellliked family member. Doreen could have named her garage mechanic, her neighbor, or a
waitress at the neighborhood café as a beneficiary. While the Schable Declaration creates an
issue of fact regarding the nature of the relationship between Doreen and Folken, it is not
material.
Next, the Hamiltons note that the "to do" list is not dated or signed and there is no proof
that Doreen wrote it. They imply that Folken must have forged the note: "The 'note' has been in
the sole possession of Michelle Folken who stands to profit handsomely from it. Michelle
Folken's intent is very clear. Enough said." Defs.' Resp. 3. The Schables make similar
assertions by stating that they searched through Doreen's home after her death and before Folken
arrived but found neither the "to do" list nor the beneficiary designation form. Schable Decl. 3-4.
They also state that the "to do" list is "definitely not Doreen Fugate's handwriting." Id. at 4.
Folken states in her Declaration that she recognized the "to do" list as being in Doreen's
handwriting. Folken Decl. ¶ 4. She has seen numerous examples of Doreen's handwriting over
the years, both around Phillip's and Doreen's house when Folken visited, and in cards and letters
Doreen sent to her. Id. Doreen's handwriting is very familiar to Folken. Id. In contrast, the
Schables, while stating that they were close friends and confidants of both Doreen's and Helen's,
offer no basis for being familiar with Doreen's handwriting. Schable Decl. 2. Because their
statement is conclusory and without any factual support, it is entitled to no weight. Additionally,
as explained further below, even if I do not consider the "to do" list at all, the evidence still
supports a conclusion that Doreen intended Folken to be her designated beneficiary.
12 - OPINION & ORDER
The Schables' Declaration contains further statements that are not material. They state
that they had intimate discussions with Doreen about her situation but that Doreen never gave
any intention that she wanted Folken to receive the annuity benefit. Id. 2, 3. For the reasons
explained as to similar statements by others, the lack of an express statement by Doreen to the
Schables regarding making Folken the beneficiary does not negate an intent established by other
evidence. Moreover, the Schables, despite their "intimate discussions," never state that Doreen
expressed her intent to designate Helen as the beneficiary.
The Schables also state that Doreen's focus was on keeping the money for herself so that
she could survive the loss of Phillip's pension.2 Schable Decl. 3. The suggestion is that this is
somehow inconsistent with designating Folken as a beneficiary. But, a beneficiary does not
receive the proceeds of the policy unless the policyholder is dead. There is nothing inconsistent
about the desire to receive monthly income from the policy and designating a beneficiary in the
event one dies before the policy limits are reached. Doreen's election to receive the life
expectancy deferral option is completely consistent with the intent as reported by the Schables.
Nothing about that election is inconsistent with naming a beneficiary.
In opposing Folken's motion and in support of their own, the Hamiltons make no
persuasive legal argument. They suggest that because the Burkholder case is from 1977, it is no
longer good law. According to the Hamiltons, because the insurance world of today is fraudfilled, it would not be recognized by the insurance world "of then." Actually, Burkholder, or
2
And, the Hamiltons' observation that Doreen did not express her intention regarding
leaving Folken the annuity proceeds should Doreen die, to Myers, Wallace, or the Schables is
completely consistent with her desire to receive the money during her lifetime. She did not
expect to die but instead expected to live and receive the income stream. The only person it
made sense to discuss the beneficiary issue with was Onstott.
13 - OPINION & ORDER
Northern Life Insurance as I refer to it, is from 1930, not 1977. But, regardless of the date, it
remains good law. Even if the insurance world is different as the Hamiltons suggest, the law
remains consistent: the fact that Doreen did not live long enough to actually submit the
beneficiary form designating Folken as the beneficiary of the annuity is not determinative. What
is controlling is Doreen's intent.
The Hamiltons also argue that by listing Folken as the contingent beneficiary, Doreen was
expressing her intent that her mother Helen be the primary beneficiary. That is, the omission of a
primary beneficiary and listing Folken as the contingent beneficiary can be viewed as evidence of
an intent that someone other than Folken be the primary beneficiary. According to the
Hamiltons, that "someone other" is Doreen's estate of which Helen Hamilton is the heir by virtue
of Oregon law. See Defs.' Mtn, Ex. 3, ECF 26-3 ("Small Estate Affidavit Intestate Estate"
completed by Helen Hamilton for the Estate of Doreen Fugate). What the Hamiltons' argument
overlooks is that while the omission of a primary beneficiary and the listing of Folken as the
contingent beneficiary could indicate that Doreen may have intended "someone else" besides
Folken to be the primary beneficiary of the annuity, that does not suggest that the "someone else"
was Helen or Doreen's estate. There is no evidence in the record expressing Doreen's intent that
Helen be the beneficiary.
Furthermore, the evidence establishes that checking the contingent beneficiary box was
error. It is the only reasonable conclusion from the facts. First, it makes no sense that if Doreen
had intended a primary beneficiary, she would have left the "primary beneficiary" box
unchecked. The fact that she completed the form suggests that she was quite capable of naming
beneficiaries and she certainly would have put Helen's name or her own estate as the primary
14 - OPINION & ORDER
beneficiary if that was her intent. Second, if she intended her estate to be the primary
beneficiary, there would have been no incentive to complete a beneficiary designation form in the
first place. Under Oregon law, the annuity would have passed to her estate without any further
action on her part. If Doreen had intended her estate to be the primary beneficiary, it makes no
sense to have selected Folken as a contingent beneficiary because Doreen's estate would be the
sole beneficiary of all of her assets. There would be no reason to have a contingent beneficiary at
all.
Finally, even omitting the "to do" list and assuming for the purposes of these motions that
Doreen and Folken were not close, the statement by Onstott, a neutral third party, that Doreen
told him she wanted Folken to be the new beneficiary, remains uncontradicted. The beneficiary
designation form completed by Doreen is completely consistent with the intention Doreen
expressed to Onstott. Her request to Myers that the completed form be delivered to Onstott is
confirmation that Doreen desired the form naming Folken to be tendered to Voya. Here, unlike
in Sackos, there are no material conflicts in the evidence. The evidence establishes as a matter of
law that Doreen intended Folken to be the beneficiary of the annuity.
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15 - OPINION & ORDER
CONCLUSION
Folken's motion for summary judgment [31] is granted. The Hamiltons' motion for
summary judgment [37] is denied. Folken's motion to strike the Schable Declaration [45] is
denied as moot. Folken is directed to prepare an appropriate judgment and submit it to the Court,
after conferring with the Hamiltons, within fourteen days of the date of this Opinion & Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this
day of
Marco A. Hernandez
United States District Judge
16 - OPINION & ORDER
, 2016
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