Brown et al v. Price et al
Opinion & Order. Signed on 7/26/2017 by Judge Marco A. Hernandez. (sss)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
LEON BROWN, et al.,
NORMAN GARY PRICE, et al.,
Robert S. Banks, Jr.
SAMUELS YOELIN KANTOR LLP
111 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 3800
Portland, Oregon 97204-3642
Lawrence R. Cock
CABLE, LANGENBACH, KINERK & BAUER, LLP
Suite 3500, 1000 Second Avenue Building
Seattle, Washington 98104-1048
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1 - OPINION & ORDER
OPINION & ORDER
Nathan T. Alexander
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 6100
Seattle, Washington 98104
Attorneys for Defendants Norman Gary Price, Christina Price, Ronald
Robertson, Kathryn Robertson, Timothy Feehan, Kimberly Feehan,
RP Capital, LLC, Strategic Capital Alternatives, LLC, and
SCA Holdings LLC
Adam S. Heder
HARRIS BERNE CHRISTENSEN LLP
5000 Meadows Road, Suite 400
Lake Oswego, Oregon 97035
INVESTOR DEFENSE LAW LLP
445 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 3100
Los Angeles, California 90071
Attorneys for Intervenors
HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
Plaintiffs1 bring this putative class action against Defendants2 alleging a variety of claims
based on the general assertion that Defendants failed to provide objective, non-conflicted
investment advice when they failed to advise Plaintiffs of their connections to Aequitas
companies while soliciting and selling Aequitas investments to Plaintiffs. Similar claims by
other investors are pending in arbitration proceedings before the Financial Industry Regulatory
Plaintiffs are eleven individuals, one trust, and one trustee.
Defendants are twelve individuals, and four LLCs. They are alleged to be investment
advisor representatives or brokers, the principals and control persons of two non-party registered
investment advisory firms, a broker-dealer, and "material aiders and control persons who
operated investment advisory platforms that were directly and materially involved with both
Aequitas and the other defendants in the scheme to sell the Aequitas Investments." Compl. ¶ 2,
2 - OPINION & ORDER
On June 7, 2017, I granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) jointly sought by
Plaintiffs and Defendants Norman Gary Price and RP Capital, LLC ("the RPC Defendants"),
which enjoined the pending FINRA arbitrations from proceeding. ECF 27. That Order was
based upon my finding that the Plaintiffs and RPC Defendants had tentatively reached an
agreement to settle all of the class action claims for the benefit of all class members under a
"limited fund" class action. Because allowing the FINRA arbitrations to proceed would
potentially deplete the limited fund available for settlement, I agreed with Plaintiffs and the RPC
Defendants that the arbitrations should be enjoined. The TRO was entered over the objections of
Plaintiffs and the RPC Defendants then jointly moved for an order preliminarily enjoining
any party from further engaging in arbitrations, or in lawsuits in state or federal courts, against
the RPC Defendants arising out of the purchase, sale, or renewal of investments in Aequitas
Management, LLC, or any other Aequitas investment, including five specifically named pending
arbitrations before FINRA (Nassar, Reiss, Fluegel, Martens, and Wu). Mtn. for Prel. Injunc.,
ECF 33. Plaintiffs seek the injunction until the Court rules on the parties' anticipated joint
motion for final approval of the class action settlement in the fall of 2017. Oral argument on the
preliminary injunction motion occurred on July 7, 2017. At that time, and over the opposition of
Intervenors, I orally granted the motion but I stated that a written Opinion & Order would follow.
See July 7, 2017 Minute Order of Proceedings, ECF 58. Additionally, I ordered that the
The motion by eight of these investors to intervene in this case was granted on June 7,
2017. ECF 23. These investors are referred to as "Intervenors."
3 - OPINION & ORDER
preliminary injunction would be in effect on the same terms as the TRO until this written
Opinion was filed.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The plaintiff "must establish that
irreparable harm is likely, not just possible[.]" Alliance For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The court may apply a sliding scale test, under which "the
elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one
element may offset a weaker showing of another." Id. Thus, a party seeking an injunction may
show greater irreparable harm as the probability of success on the merits decreases. Id. (noting
also that the relevant test in the Ninth Circuit is described as the "serious questions" test where
the likelihood of success is such that "serious questions going to the merits were raised and the
balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff's favor") (internal quotation marks and brackets
In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction courts "must balance the
competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief." Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Univ. of Haw. Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) ("To
determine which way the balance of the hardships tips, a court must identify the possible harm
caused by the preliminary injunction against the possibility of the harm caused by not issuing it").
4 - OPINION & ORDER
I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Intervenors raise two arguments in support of their position that Plaintiffs and the RPC
Defendants are not likely to succeed on the merits. First, they contend that Plaintiffs and the
RPC Defendants cannot meet their burden without a final executed settlement agreement in
place. Second, they argue that the request for injunctive relief, or any proceedings in this case,
violates a stay of litigation entered in a related case. As part of the second argument, Intervenors
contend that the RPC Defendants are judicially estopped from asserting that the stay of litigation
is inapplicable here.
A. Final Settlement Agreement
Intervenors state that no similar case has allowed an injunction before the filing of a
motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. They suggest that without evidence
of a finalized, global settlement, Plaintiffs cannot establish that a settlement exists or will exist. I
In support of the motion for preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs (including Plaintiff
representatives and the plaintiff class as further defined), and the RPC Defendants included a
copy of a Stipulation of Settlement between Plaintiffs and the RPC Defendants, between
Plaintiffs and other Defendants named in this case or in a related case pending in King County,
Washington, Brown, et al. v. Price, et al., King County Superior Court No. 16-2-19544-0-SEA,
("the King County case"), and between Plaintiffs and two non-parties not named in either this
case or the King County case. Alexander P.I. Decl., Ex. A, ECF 35. The Stipulation of
Settlement is comprehensive, detailed, and will resolve all of the claims among the parties to the
Stipulation. Additionally, during oral argument on the preliminary injunction motion, counsel
5 - OPINION & ORDER
for the "Bean/Bishopp" Defendants in this case represented that the parties there were very close
to achieving settlement of all claims asserted against those Defendants.
In addition, the TRO and preliminary injunction record shows that counsel for Plaintiffs
and the RPC Defendants and others have been extensively involved in settlement negotiations for
months. Intervenors argue that the length of effort without an executed agreement supports their
position that there is no evidence that a complete and final agreement will be achieved. I take a
different view. The record demonstrates the complexity of the negotiations which involve many
people, a variety of claims, insurance companies, personal liabilities, and related lawsuits. Thus,
the lack of a final, executed settlement agreement is likely based on the nature of the negotiations
and does not necessarily suggest that a settlement is unlikely. While the relevant authority may
be distinguished because in those cases a motion for preliminary approval with an attendant
settlement agreement was pending before a request for injunctive relief was made, Intervenors
point to no authority holding that such a motion is required before injunctive relief is
appropriate. Finally, as I indicated at the hearing and in the July 7, 2017 Minute Order of
Proceedings, I invited Intervenors to move to set aside the preliminary injunction if a motion for
preliminary approval with a supporting settlement agreement is not filed within thirty days.
B. Litigation Stay
In March 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit against
Aequitas Management, LLC, four other Aequitas-related entities, and three individuals (all
owners of Aequitas Management and executives of entity defendants, one of whom is the
founder of the Aequitas group of companies). The case, SEC v. Aequitas Management, LLC, et
al., No. 3:16-cv-00438-PK, has been assigned to Judge Papak of this Court. Generally, the SEC
6 - OPINION & ORDER
alleges that the defendants violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in connection with
the offer and sale of certain securities. SEC v. Aequitas Mgmt., No. 3:16-cv-00438-PK, Compl. ¶
7 ECF 1.
In April 2016, Judge Papak appointed Ronald Greenspan as Receiver in the SEC v.
Aequitas case. Id., ECF 156. As part of his April 14, 2016 Order Appointing Receiver, Judge
Papak stayed certain litigation (hereinafter "the Litigation Stay"). Id. ¶¶ 20-24. The Litigation
Stay provides that other than the SEC v. Aequitas case and any other action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce that unit's police or regulatory powers and actions of the SEC
related to the SEC v. Aequitas case, the following proceedings are stayed until further order of the
All civil legal proceedings of any nature, including, but not limited to, bankruptcy
proceedings, arbitration proceedings, foreclosure actions, default proceedings, or
other actions of any nature involving: (1) the Receiver, in his capacity as
Receiver; (b) any Receivership Property, wherever located; (c) any of the
Receivership Entity; or (d) any of the Receivership Entity's past or present
officers, directors, managers, agents, or general or limited partners sued for, or in
connection with, any action taken by them while acting in such capacity of any
nature, whether as plaintiff, defendant, third-party plaintiff, third-party defendant,
or otherwise (such proceedings are hereinafter referred to as "Ancillary
Id. ¶ 20. The Litigation Stay makes clear that "[a]ll Ancillary Proceedings are stayed in their
entirety, and all Courts having jurisdiction thereof are enjoined from taking or permitting any
action until further Order of this Court." Id. ¶ 22.
Following this, the Litigation Stay provides that notwithstanding the stay, it does not
apply to certain proceedings:
7 - OPINION & ORDER
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ancillary Proceedings shall not include civil legal
proceedings upon claims that have accrued or are accruing exclusively to parties
other than the Receiver on behalf of the Receivership Estates and brought against
third party professionals, registered advisors, and others in which the Receivership
Entity has no direct or indirect ownership interest. Proceedings against such third
parties are not subject to the stay of litigation. The stay of litigation does,
however, enjoin any claims brought in such proceedings (including, but not
limited to, cross-claims or third party claims) against (a) the Receiver, in his
capacity as Receiver; (b) any Receivership Property, wherever located; (c) any of
the Receivership Entity; or (d) any of the Receivership Entity's past or present
officers, directors, managers, or general or limited partners.
Id. ¶ 23. Then, in the final paragraph of the Litigation Stay, Paragraph 24 requires the Receiver
to investigate the impact of Ancillary Proceedings brought against registered investment advisors
in which the Receivership Entity has an ownership interest. Id. ¶ 24. The Receiver must include
in the report it is required to file with the Court pursuant to Paragraph 39 of the Order Appointing
Receiver, a recommendation to the Court as to whether Ancillary Proceedings brought against
registered investment advisors in which the Receivership Entity has an ownership interest should
remain subject to the Litigation Stay. Id. The rest of Paragraph 24 enjoins discovery from the
Receiver in proceedings authorized by Paragraph 23. Id.
An understanding of the terms of the Litigation Stay is incomplete absent the definitions
of "Receivership Defendants," "Receivership Entity," and "Receivership Estates"/"Receivership
Property." "Receivership Defendants" are the five entity defendants in the SEC v. Aequitas case.
Id. at p. 1. The "Receivership Entity" is a subsidiary and/or a majority-owned affiliate of a
Receivership Defendant as set forth in Exhibit A to the Order Appointing Receiver. Id. ¶ 1.
Exhibit A lists forty-three separate entities but the Order states that they shall be referred to
collectively as "Receivership Entity" in the singular. Id. "Receivership Estates" or "Receivership
Property" are the "property interests of the Receivership Entity" which include, but are not
8 - OPINION & ORDER
the monies, funds, securities, credits, effects, goods, chattels, lands, premises,
leases, claims, rights and other assets, together with all rents, profits, dividends,
interest or other income attributable thereto, of whatever kind, which the
Receivership Entity own, possess, have a beneficial interest in, or control directly
or indirectly ("Receivership Property" or, collectively, the "Receivership Estates").
Id. ¶ 6A.
Intervenors argue that the instant case violates the Litigation Stay because in contrast to
their own FINRA arbitrations4, they assert that the claims here name parties affiliated with
Private Advisory Group (PAG) which Intervenors refer to as an "Aequitas entity," and allege the
liability of these parties based on their involvement with or control of PAG. In support,
Intervenors cite to Paragraphs 5, 21, 24-27, 29 of the Complaint in this case. There, Plaintiffs
allege that various Defendants were owners of PAG, were "control persons," or were
officers/executives of PAG. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 21, 24-27. Paragraph 29 expressly states that PAG
itself is not named as a party because the Litigation Stay bars all actions against entities owned
by Aequitas and PAG is such an entity. Id. ¶ 29.
It is clear that Paragraph 20 of the Litigation Stay prohibits proceedings against PAG.
Aspen Grove Equity Solutions, LLC is one of the forty-seven entities comprising the
Receivership Entity. SEC v. Aequitas, No. 3:16-cv-00438-PK, Ord. App. Receiver, Ex. A. It
Intervenors assert that their FINRA arbitrations do not violate the Litigation Stay
because they name RP Capital, a non-Receivership Entity, and individuals in their capacities as
employees or agents of RP Capital. Intervenors offer no argument for why RP Capital would be
a Receivership Entity or Receivership Property in this case when it is not asserted to be a
Receivership Entity or Receivership Property in the FINRA arbitrations. The definitions of
Receivership Entity and Receivership Property do not depend on the type of proceeding. Thus,
Intervenors' position that this proceeding, at least as to RP Capital, violates the Litigation Stay is
9 - OPINION & ORDER
holds more than sixty-percent of the membership units of PAG. Id., Jan. 31, 2017 Report of
Receiver, ECF 365 at 9. As such, PAG is property of the Receivership Entity under the
"Receivership Property" definition. Because Paragraph 20 prohibits proceedings against any
Receivership Property, any proceedings against PAG are barred by the Litigation Stay.
Notably, however, PAG is not part of the Receivership Entity and Intervenors' reference
to it as an "Aequitas entity" is inaccurate in the context of the Litigation Stay.5 While Paragraph
20 bars proceedings against any of the Receivership Entity's past or present officers, directors,
managers, etc. when sued in connection with actions taken in that capacity, it does not bar
proceedings against officers, directors, managers, etc. of Receivership Property. Here,
Defendants are named as owners, officers, executives, etc. of Receivership Property PAG and
proceedings against them are not prohibited by Paragraph 20 of the Litigation Stay. As Plaintiffs
and the RPC Defendants state: "Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit do not belong to the Receiver.
And no Receivership Entity directly or indirectly owns any of the defendants. Hence, this
lawsuit is excluded from the definition of 'Ancillary Proceeding' and is expressly authorized by
paragraph 23 of the Order Appointing Receiver." Joint Reply in Sup. of Mtn. 2, ECF 56.
Intervenors fail to establish that this case is an "Ancillary Proceeding" as a result of the claims
Additionally, Intervenors' assertion at page five of their Opposition to the Preliminary
Injunction Motion, ECF 53, that the Receiver himself has stated that PAG is a Receivership
Entity and that actions against PAG or against its control persons in their capacity as such violate
the Litigation Stay, is completely without support. In the cited January 31, 2017 Report of
Receiver in the SEC v. Aequitas case, the Receiver does conclude that proceedings against PAG
violate the Litigation Stay. Jan. 31, 2017 Report of Receiver at p. 16. However, nowhere does
the Receiver state that PAG is Receivership Entity or that proceedings against employees or
controls persons of PAG violate the Litigation Stay. Instead, it is apparent that the basis for the
Receiver's conclusion that a class action complaint filed against PAG in the Western District of
Washington violated the Litigation Stay is the Receiver's earlier statement that PAG constitutes
Receivership Property. Id. at pp. 9, 16.
10 - OPINION & ORDER
alleging that Defendants are liable because of their "affiliation" with PAG.
Next, while Paragraph 23 expressly allows this action by allowing legal proceedings
against third party professionals, registered investment advisors, and others in which the
Receivership Entity has no direct or indirect ownership interest, that paragraph indicates that the
Litigation Stay still applies to certain claims within such excepted proceedings. But, none of
prohibited claims are at issue in this lawsuit because like Paragraph 20, Paragraph 23's
enjoinment of certain claims within the allowed excepted proceedings against third parties are
restricted to claims against the Receiver, Receivership Property, Receivership Entity, or the
Receivership Entity's past or present officers, etc. For the reasons previously explained,
Defendants here do not fall within those categories.
I agree with Plaintiffs and the RPC Defendants that the Litigation Stay does not apply.
Defendants in this case are not part of the Receivership Entity and are not Receivership Property.
Their affiliation with PAG does not make them an officer, partner, etc. of a Receivership Entity.
Accordingly, this lawsuit is exempt from the definition of "Ancillary Proceeding" under
Paragraph 20 and is expressly authorized under Paragraph 23 of the Litigation Stay.
Intervenors argue that the RPC Defendants previously argued in the King County case
that the claims there violated the Litigation Stay and thus, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
those Defendants are estopped from making the inconsistent argument here. In support,
Intervenors rely on a motion to stay filed by a number of the defendants in the King County case,
including the RPC Defendants. Hyndman TRO Decl., Ex. C, ECF 18-1. However, the King
County judge never ruled on the motion. Instead, the parties stipulated to a stay and the
defendants struck their motion to stay. Hyndman TRO Decl., Ex. B at 26-30. Thus, the King
11 - OPINION & ORDER
County judge never evaluated the merits of the arguments regarding whether the claims in that
case were subject to the Litigation Stay.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel is "designed to protect the integrity of the courts" by
precluding "a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second
advantage by taking an incompatible position." Risetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94
F.3d 597, 600, 601 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not designed to protect the interests of individual parties.
Id. It is an equitable doctrine invoked at the discretion of the court and "the determination to
invoke it is 'driven by the specific facts of the case.'" Kinnee v. Shack, Inc., No 07-1463-AC,
2008 WL 4899204, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2008) (quoting Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361,
1368 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Several factors are relevant to application of the doctrine. Id. at *4. First, the party's later
position must be "clearly" inconsistent with its prior position. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532
U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001). Second, courts look to whether the party has actually succeeded in
persuading a court to accept the party's earlier position. Id. Third, courts consider whether the
party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id. These factors are not exhaustive. Id.
Additional factual considerations may be relevant in "specific factual contexts." Id. at 751.
Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit, a party's intent may play a meaningful role. Kinnee, 2008 WL
4899204, at *5 (discussing cases).
The application of judicial estoppel is not warranted here. First, because Plaintiffs have
never taken a position on the Litigation Stay, the doctrine cannot apply to them. Second, the fact
that the King County judge never ruled on the motion for stay means that in that case, the RPC
12 - OPINION & ORDER
Defendants did not "persuade a court to accept" their position. Third, the context in which the
stay is sought in this case weighs in favor of rejecting the judicial estoppel argument. The RPC
Defendants note that in the King County case, they argued the Litigation Stay applied because
that case would have required them to defend themselves and then seek indemnification from
PAG, a Receivership Entity. In contrast here, there is no expectation of litigation because the
parties are moving directly to settlement. The Litigation Stay does not suggest that the claims in
this case are without merit or could not eventually be brought. At some point, this case could
move forward. Settlement achieves resolution of these claims sooner rather than later. The
position taken by the RPC Defendants here is to facilitate settlement which should be
encouraged. Finally, I find that exercising my discretion in favor of not estopping the RPC
Defendants on the stay issue will not provide them with an unfair advantage and will not impose
an unfair detriment on Intervenors.
II. Other Winter Factors
The remaining Winter factors require me to assess whether Plaintiffs and the RPC
Defendants are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, whether the
balance of equities tips in their favor, and whether an injunction is in the public interest. In their
Stipulation of Settlement, Plaintiffs allege that their Aequitas investment losses are
approximately $120 million. Alexander P.I. Decl., Ex. A at 5. According to Plaintiffs' counsel,
the agreed upon payment of $1.2 million represents all or substantially all of the RPC
Defendants' funds available for settlement. Banks June 6, 2017 Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, ECF 16. The $1.2
million includes the balance of an insurance policy in the approximate amount of $600,000. Stip.
of Settlement, Alexander P.I. Decl., Ex. A to 5-6. The policy is a "wasting policy," meaning any
13 - OPINION & ORDER
amount paid by the insurance company in defending claims against the RPC Defendants,
including the claims pending in the FINRA arbitrations, depletes the policy amount available for
the settlement fund. Because the total value of all claims grossly exceeds the available funds for
settlement and because even the defense of the FINRA claims, or other claims brought against
the RPC Defendants, would deplete at least the insurance policy funds, Plaintiffs demonstrate
that if the FINRA arbitrations go forward at this point, they will be harmed. Without an
injunction, Plaintiffs will likely recover nothing whereas claimants with similar claims will
receive an award simply because they were first to file. Accordingly, the settlement of claims
with the putative Plaintiff Class would be jeopardized or destroyed if the FINRA arbitrations
were allowed to proceed. Conversely, if those arbitrations are enjoined, funds that would
otherwise be spent in defense of the arbitrations will be better preserved for the investors as a
As to the balance of hardships and the public interest, these also favor Plaintiffs. The
purpose of the settlement is to ensure a fair distribution to all Aequitas investors. This injunction
allows that to happen. And, while Intervenors and other claimants could potentially receive far
less as class members than they would if allowed to proceed with their individual arbitrations,
they will nonetheless be part of the class and receive an equal distribution along with others in
the class. If the class is not certified in the end, Intervenors claimants can then proceed with their
FINRA arbitrations. Thus, this is truly a preliminary injunction in the sense that it will expire
upon the resolution of the anticipated motion for final approval of the class settlement.
Additionally, Intervenors and other claimants can object to the proposed class and settlement
during the fairness hearing. Additionally, Receiver Greenspan filed a Declaration stating that his
14 - OPINION & ORDER
goals as a Receiver in the SEC v. Aequitas case have included preservation of the maximum
funds possible for equitable distribution to Aequitas investors and creditors. Greenspan Decl. ¶
2, ECF 34. To achieve that goal, he believes it is important to prevent more aggressive investors
who were first to file lawsuits or initiate arbitration proceedings, or who were first to obtain a
hearing, from gaining a financial advantage over the other investors who have suffered a similar
loss. Id. He writes: "The injunctive relief sought by the moving parties is consistent with these
goals." Id. Overall, the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiffs' favor and the public interest
supports the injunction.
Applying the Winter factors here, Plaintiffs and the RPC Defendants have established a
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, that the balance of
equities tips in their favor, and that a preliminary injunction is in the public's interest.
III. Terms of the Injunction
The Court issues this Preliminary Injunction Order with the following terms:
The Court hereby restrains and enjoins any party from initiating or engaging in
further proceedings in any arbitration or litigation (apart from the instant
litigation) against the RPC Defendants that include allegations of wrongdoing in
any way relating to the purchase or sale of investments in Aequitas Management,
LLC or any other Aequitas entity. This preliminary injunction order shall last
until the Court rules on the parties' anticipated motion for final approval of the
proposed class action settlement ("the Preliminary Injunction Period");
The Court hereby specifically restrains and enjoins the following FINRA
arbitrations from proceeding against the RPC Defendants, including Joel Price,
15 - OPINION & ORDER
Anthony Ramirez and Aaron Douglas Maurer, during the Preliminary Injunction
• Nassar, et al. v. RP Capital, et al., FINRA Case No. 16-00943;
• Reiss, et al. v. RP Capital, et al., FINRA Case No. 16-01610;
• Fluegel, et al. v. RP Capital, et al., FINRA Case No. 16-01967;
• Martens v. RP Capital, et al., FINRA Case No. 16-03187; and
• Wu v. RP Capital, et al., FINRA Case No. 17-00594;
The Court does not restrain or enjoin the claimants in the Fluegel arbitration from
proceeding with their claims against Respondent Kristofor R. Behn;
The posting of a bond is not required because the claimants in the FINRA
arbitrations are not prejudiced by the issuance of this Preliminary Injunction
After a motion for preliminary approval is filed, the Court will set a schedule for
the filing of a motion for final approval of the proposed class action settlement
and will set a final approval hearing, anticipated to be held in October 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Marco A. Hernandez
United States District Judge
16 - OPINION & ORDER
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?