Pierce v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
18
Opinion and Order. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 4/27/18 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (jy)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
TINA PIERCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
MARTIN R. COHEN
P.O. Box 1229
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
(503) 635-5805
Attorney for Plaintiff
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
RENATA GOWIE
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
(503) 727-1003
MICHAEL W. PILE
Acting Regional Chief Counsel
ERIN F. HIGHLAND
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 615-2495
Attorneys for Defendant
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
3:17-cv-00903-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
BROWN, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Tina Pierce seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's
applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title
II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
This Court has
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and
SSI benefits on July 11, 2013.
Tr. 11.1
Plaintiff alleges a
disability onset date of October 22, 2011.
Tr. 11.
Plaintiff’s
applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.
An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on November 17,
2015.
Tr. 11, 37-64.
Plaintiff, a vocational expert (VE), and a
medical expert testified.
Plaintiff was represented by an
attorney at the hearing.
1
Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on November 2, 2017, are referred to as "Tr."
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
On December 16, 2015, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Tr. 11-22.
Appeals Council.
Plaintiff requested review by the
On April 13, 2017, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Tr. 1-4.
See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).
On June 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on September 18, 1966.
Tr. 20.
Plaintiff was forty-five years old on the alleged disability
onset date.
Tr. 20.
Plaintiff has limited education.
Tr. 20.
The ALJ found Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a
caregiver and shipping-receiving clerk.
Tr. 20.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to arthritis, “trapped
nerves” in her shoulders, bulging disk in her neck, bone spurs,
degenerative disc disease, chronic pain, panic attacks, and
depression.
Tr. 87, 129.
Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.
After carefully reviewing the
medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.
See Tr. 14-19
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her
inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).
42
See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11
(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).
It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]
but less than a preponderance.
at 690).
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d
The ALJ is responsible for evaluating a claimant’s
testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and
resolving ambiguities.
Cir. 2009).
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006).
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.
The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commis-
sioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA).
416.920(a)(4)(I).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I),
See also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648
F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509,
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d
at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
F.3d at 724.
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648
The criteria for the listed impairments, known as
Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
The
claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
(SSR) 96-8p.
See also Social Security Ruling
“A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a
day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule.”
at *1.
20 C.F.R.
SSR 96-8p,
In other words, the Social Security Act does not require
complete incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
work she has done in the past.
416.920(a)(4)(iv).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
416.920(a)(4)(v).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
Here the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the
testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines (or the grids) set forth in the regulations at 20
C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 2.
If the Commissioner
meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).
ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2011, Plaintiff’s
alleged disability onset date.
Tr. 14.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine,
obesity, and torn meniscus in both knees.
Tr. 14.
At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.
Tr. 18.
The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform sedentary work with the following limitations:
lifting
and/or carrying up to ten pounds occasionally and less than ten
pounds frequently, standing and/or walking up to two hours in an
eight-hour workday, and sitting up to six hours in an eight-hour
workday.
The ALJ found Plaintiff is able occasionally to climb,
to stoop, to crawl, and to reach overhead.
The ALJ also found
Plaintiff must avoid exposure to vibrations.
Tr. 17.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is unable to
perform her past relevant work.
Tr. 20.
At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform other
jobs that exist in the national economy.
Tr. 20-21.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled.
Tr. 22.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) failed to
include Plaintiff’s migraines as a severe impairment at Step Two,
(2) discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony,
(3) improperly rejected the lay-witness testimony of Plaintiff’s
sister, and (4) failed to include all of Plaintiff’s impairments
in the hypothetical to the VE.
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
II.
The ALJ did not err at Step Two in his analysis of
Plaintiff’s severe impairments.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Two when he failed
to include Plaintiff’s migraine headaches as a severe impairment
and failed to include the resulting limitations of Plaintiff’s
migraines in his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC and hypothetical
to the VE.
The Commissioner, in turn, contends the ALJ concluded
Plaintiff had a combination of severe impairments and thereby
resolved Step Two in Plaintiff’s favor.
Thus, any failure to
find and to include any impairment related to Plaintiff’s
migraines did not prejudice Plaintiff.
A.
Standards
The inquiry for Step Two is a de minimis screening
device to dispose of groundless claims.
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 153–54 (1987)(Step Two inquiry intended to identify
claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is
unlikely they would be found disabled).
See also Webb v.
Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)(Step Two impairment
“may be found not severe only if the evidence establishes a
slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an
individual's ability to work.”).
Emphasis in original.
The claimant bears the burden to provide medical
evidence to establish at Step Two that she has a severe
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1512.
An impairment or combination
of impairments is “not severe only if the evidence establishes a
slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an
individual's ability to work .”
Webb, 433 F.3d at 686.
At Step
Two the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all the
claimant's impairments on her ability to function without regard
to whether each alone is sufficiently severe.
Howard ex rel.
Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.2003).
See also
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289–90 (9th Cir.1996); 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.923.
If the ALJ determines a claimant is severely impaired
at Step Two, the ALJ continues with the sequential analysis and
considers all of the claimant's limitations.
available at 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996).
SSR 96–9p,
Step Two is “merely
a threshold determination of whether the claimant is able to
perform his past work.”
(9th Cir. 2007).
Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076
If an ALJ fails to consider limitations imposed
by an impairment at Step Two but considers them at a later step
in the sequential analysis, any error at Step Two is harmless.
Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).
See also
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005).
B.
Analysis
Plaintiff testified her migraines are related to a neck
injury she sustained in a car accident in 2009.
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 45.
Plaintiff testified her migraines have worsened since her prior
hearing in 2011 and attributed the migraines to her neck injury.
Tr. 48-51.
The medical evidence reflects Plaintiff has sought
treatment for her migraines in the emergency room on many
occasions.
The record also reflects Plaintiff’s migraines were
associated with the pain from her neck injury on many of these
occasions.
For example, at Plaintiff’s emergency room visit on
January 14, 2011, the record reflects Plaintiff had a history of
chronic headaches and chronic neck pain following the motorvehicle accident in 2009.
Tr. 533.
On July 18, 2011, treatment
records indicate Plaintiff experienced “transformed migraine from
chronic neck pain.”
Tr. 440.
On January 25, 2013, treatment
records reflect Plaintiff’s history of chronic neck pain and
migraine headaches.
Tr. 490-91.
On February 15, 2013, the
records indicate Plaintiff’s “migraine variant headache” was
“associated with neck pain.”
Tr. 497-98.
On March 1, 2013, Plaintiff was also examined by
Michael P. Sluss, M.D., a neurologist.
Tr. 409.
Dr. Sluss found
Plaintiff’s chronic migraines were related to her neck injury.
Tr. 410.
The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s migraines were not a
severe impairment by themselves, but stemmed from her neck injury
and pain.
Tr. 14, 18.
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff has a
severe impairment of degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine, which he accounted for in his assessment of Plaintiff’s
RFC.
Tr. 14, 17.
In Burch v. Barnhart the court held any error
in omitting an impairment from the severe impairments identified
at Step Two was harmless when Step Two was resolved in the
claimant’s favor.
400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005).
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
at Step Two because he found Plaintiff has severe impairments,
and, therefore, any failure to find other severe impairments at
Step Two was not prejudicial.
II.
The ALJ did not err when he found Plaintiff’s testimony was
not fully credible.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony.
A.
Standards
The ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine
whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or
symptoms is credible.
“First, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’”
Garrison v.
Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Lingenfelter
v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The claimant
is not required to show “that her impairment could reasonably be
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged;
she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some
degree of the symptom.”
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014 (quoting
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)).
A
claimant is not required to produce “objective medical evidence
of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.”
Id.
If the claimant satisfies the first step of this
analysis and there is not any affirmative evidence of
malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about
the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.”
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014-15.
See also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir.
2006)(“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on
affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an
applicant not credible by making specific findings as to
credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”).
General assertions that the claimant's testimony is not credible
are insufficient.
2007).
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir.
The ALJ must identify "what testimony is not credible and
what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints."
Id.
(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
B.
Analysis
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony on the ground
that the medical evidence does not support the severity of
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s presentation of her symptoms.
Tr. 18.
The ALJ also
concluded Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are inconsistent
with her alleged symptoms and limitations.
Tr. 19.
Plaintiff asserted she is unable to do any activities
when she is experiencing migraines, and the migraines affects her
ability to lift, to reach, to walk, or to use her hands.
Tr. 332-33.
At the hearing Plaintiff testified she is unable to
lift more than ten pounds and cannot walk more than two or three
blocks.
Tr. 54.
Plaintiff also testified she experiences pain
and numbness in her arms.
Tr. 56.
The ALJ noted imaging of Plaintiff’s cervical spine was
consistently normal.
In March 2013 Plaintiff had normal muscle
strength and tone, sensation, and coordination and intact deep
tendon reflexes.
Tr. 18, 410.
having any migraines.
Tr. 655.
In May 2013 Plaintiff denied
Following a cervical medial
branch block in January 2014, Plaintiff “reported more than 80%
relief of pre-procedural neck pain.”
Tr. 429.
The ALJ noted Plaintiff testified she was a care-giver
for her father for approximately two years even though this
consisted primarily of helping him to bathe.
Tr. 44.
The ALJ
found Plaintiff is independent in her self-care; able to do
household chores and to go shopping; and she and her husband, who
is disabled, share household chores.
Tr. 19, 47, 51, 301.
The
ALJ concluded these daily activities, together with the findings
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
in Plaintiff’s medical records, indicate her ability to perform
work at the sedentary level.
Tr. 19.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discounted Plaintiff’s testimony and found it was not
fully credible because the ALJ provided clear and convincing
reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing
so.
III. The ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting lay-witness
testimony.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
reasons that are germane to the lay-witness statements of Mary
McConnaughey, Plaintiff’s sister, regarding Plaintiff’s
limitations.
The Commissioner, in turn, contends the ALJ properly
discounted the lay-witness statement of McConnaughey for the same
reasons that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony was not fully
credible.
A.
Standards
Lay-witness testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms
is competent evidence that the ALJ must consider unless he
"expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives
reasons germane to each witness for doing so."
236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Lewis v. Apfel,
The ALJ's reasons for
rejecting lay-witness testimony must also be "specific."
Stout
v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to address each lay-witness
statement or testimony on an "individualized, witness-by-witnessbasis.
If the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony
by one witness, the ALJ need only point to those reasons when
rejecting similar testimony by a different witness."
Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012)(quotation omitted).
Germane reasons for discrediting a witness's testimony
include inconsistency with the medical evidence and the fact that
the testimony "generally repeat[s]" the properly discredited
testimony of a claimant.
1218 (9th Cir. 2005).
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211,
See also Williams v. Astrue, 493 F. App'x
866 (9th Cir. 2012).
B.
Analysis
In October 2013 McConnaughey stated in her Third-Party
Function Report that Plaintiff experiences constant neck pain
radiating to her fingertips.
Tr. 306.
She also indicated
Plaintiff does not cook and cannot lift objects because of her
neck injury.
Tr. 306-07.
The ALJ noted McConnaughey,
nevertheless, indicated Plaintiff is independent as to her selfcare, can prepare meals, does household chores, uses public
transportation, and goes shopping and to doctor appointments.
Tr. 307-08.
The ALJ found McConnaughey’s testimony regarding
Plaintiff’s activities was not consistent with Plaintiff’s
alleged limitations.
Accordingly, the ALJ gave "little weight"
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
to McConnaughey's statements regarding Plaintiff's activities and
limitations.
Tr. 19.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ gave
“germane” reasons for discounting the lay-witness statements of
Alexander.
IV.
The ALJ did not err at Step Five.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the VE
did not include all of Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations,
and, therefore, the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony does not
support the ALJ’s conclusions at Step Five.
A.
Standards
As noted, at Step Five the ALJ must determine whether
the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in the
national economy.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The ALJ may
satisfy this burden through the testimony of a VE.
“An ALJ must propound a hypothetical question that is
based on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in
the record that reflects all the claimant’s limitations.”
Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001).
“The
hypothetical should be ‘accurate, detailed, and supported by the
medical record.’”
B.
Id. (quoting Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101).
Analysis
In the hypothetical posed to the VE the ALJ is required
to include only those limitations that are supported by
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
substantial evidence in the record.
See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240
F.3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2001).
“Conversely, an ALJ is not
free to disregard properly supported limitations.”
Robbins v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006).
In either
case, the VE’s opinion does not have any “evidentiary value” if
the assumptions presented in the hypothetical are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d
503, 518 (9th Cir. 2001).
At the hearing the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE
consistent with the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff, however, contends the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff
could perform other work as a callout operator and a document
preparer was based on an inaccurate hypothetical and,
accordingly, was erroneous because the hypothetical did not
include limitations caused by Plaintiff’s migraines.
As noted, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s migraines did
not constitute a severe impairment and resulted from Plaintiff’s
neck pain from the motor-vehicle accident in 2009.
Although the
medical records contain Plaintiff’s reports of her symptoms,
there is not any evidence in the record that a treating physician
identified any limitations as to Plaintiff’s functional abilities
based on her condition.
In his hypothetical to the VE the ALJ
included all of the “properly supported limitations” included in
his evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC, and the ALJ, therefore,
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
properly relied on the VE’s testimony as to the other work that
Plaintiff could perform in the national economy.
As noted, the
VE testified Plaintiff could perform work as a callout operator
and as a document preparer.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
in his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC nor at Step Five in his
reliance on the VE’s testimony that was based on the limitations
set out in the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2018.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge
19 - OPINION AND ORDER
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