Ellis v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
20
Opinion and Order. For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of theCommissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). IT IS SO ORDERED. See attached order for further details. Signed on 9/19/18 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (jy)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
JACOB E.,1
3:17-cv-01748-BR
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
BRUCE W. BREWER
Law Offices of Bruce W. Brewer, PC
P.O. Box 421
West Linn, OR 97068
(503) 621-6633
Attorney for Plaintiff
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
RENATA GOWIE
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
(503) 727-1000
1
In the interest of privacy and pursuant to the
recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial
of the last name of the nongovernmental parties. The same
designation will be used to identify nongovernmental parties'
family members if named in this case.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL W. PILE
Acting Regional Chief Counsel
JEFFREY R. McCLAIN
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 615-2945
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Jacob E. seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's
application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act.
This Court has jurisdiction to
review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
I.
Prior Administrative History
Plaintiff protectively filed his application for SSI
benefits on November 7, 2011.
Tr. 15.
disability onset date of June 1, 2004.
Plaintiff alleges a
Tr. 15, 544.
Plaintiff’s
application was denied initially and on reconsideration.
An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on November 27,
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
2013.
Tr. 15, 32-76.
testified.
Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE)
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the
hearing.
On December 12, 2013, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Tr. 15-26.
Appeals Council.
Plaintiff requested review by the
On May 15, 2015, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Tr. 1-6.
See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).
On July 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court
for review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Tr. 612.
That case
was assigned to the Honorable Ann L. Aiken.
On September 22, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion
for Remand and agreed the court should reverse the decision of
the ALJ, remand this matter pursuant to Sentence Four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), and allow a further hearing on Plaintiff’s
claim.
On October 3, 2016, Judge Aiken issued an Order (Tr. 616)
for Remand, entered a Judgment (Tr. 619), and remanded this case
for a de novo hearing.
II.
Current Administrative History
On December 19, 2016, following remand by this Court, the
Appeals Council vacated the decision of the Commissioner and
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
remanded this case to an ALJ for further proceedings.
Tr. 627-
29.
On June 2, 2017, a different ALJ held further proceedings on
Plaintiff’s application.
testified.
Tr. 544, 564-86.
Plaintiff and a VE
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the
hearing.
On July 5, 2017, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Tr. 544-47.
Plaintiff did not file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision,
and, therefore, the Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction.
20 C.F.R. § 404.984(b) and (c).
The decision of the ALJ became
the final decision of the Commissioner on September 5, 2017.
See
20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d).
On November 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this
Court for review of the Commissioner’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on June 3, 1979.
Tr. 556.
Plaintiff was
thirty-eight years old at the time of the last hearing in July
2017.
Plaintiff has at least a high-school education.
Tr. 556.
The ALJ found Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work
experience.
Tr. 556.
In his initial application Plaintiff alleges disability due
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
to “marginal intellectual functioning, epilepsy, depression, and
dyslexia.”
Tr. 78.
Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.
After carefully reviewing the
medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.
See Tr. 549-55.
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate his
inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).
42
See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11
(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).
It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]
but less than a preponderance.
Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d
at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for evaluating a claimant’s
testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and
resolving ambiguities.
Cir. 2009).
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006).
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.
The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity (SGA).
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I).
See also Keyser
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
The
criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are
enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed
Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
The
claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite his limitations.
§ 416.920(e).
20 C.F.R.
See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p.
“A
‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a
week, or an equivalent schedule.”
SSR 96-8p, at *1.
In other
words, the Social Security Act does not require complete
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885
F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work he has done in the past.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
See also
Here the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of
a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (or the
grids) set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.
If the Commissioner meets this burden,
the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1).
ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since November 7, 2011, Plaintiff’s
application date.
Tr. 546.
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of “a learning disorder, minor motor seizures[,] and
alcohol abuse in claimed partial remission.”
Tr. 546.
At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.
Tr. 546.
The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform the full range of work at all exertional levels.
Tr. 548.
The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff has the following
nonexertional limitations:
He should “avoid exposure to hazards,
such as moving machinery and heights”; he is “capable of
understanding short, simple instructions, but he would be unable
to sustain work with more complex instructions”; he would
“benefit from working in a repetitive, predictable environment
with no changes in duties”; and his “tasks should be wellstructured, easily learned, and with minimal speed demands.”
Tr. 548.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded transferability of job skills
is not an issue because Plaintiff does not have past relevant
work experience.
Tr. 556.
Based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, the ALJ found at Step Five that Plaintiff can perform the
following occupations that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy:
“Cleaner, Commercial/Institutional,”
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
“Cleaner/Housekeeping,” and “Hospital Cleaner.”
Tr. 556-57.
Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore,
is not entitled to benefits.
Tr. 557.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) failed to
provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s
testimony and (2) improperly discounted the medical opinions of
examining and nonexamining psychologists.
The Commissioner, however, contends the ALJ (1) offered
clear and convincing reasons as to why Plaintiff’s subjective
statements were not entirely reliable and (2) provided specific
and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
record for rejecting the psychologists’ opinions.
I.
The ALJ did not err when he discounted Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to identify the part of
Plaintiff’s testimony that he found were not credible and failed
to identify the evidence that allegedly undermined Plaintiff’s
testimony.
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ violated the standard
of SSR 16-3p by using the alleged inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s
testimony to infer Plaintiff is not a truthful person.
The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the
intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of [his] symptoms
are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
evidence in the record.”
A.
Tr. 549.
Standards
In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two
requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom
testimony:
The claimant must produce objective medical evidence
of an impairment and must show the impairment or combination of
impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree
of symptom.
799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986).
The claimant,
however, need not produce objective medical evidence of the
actual symptoms or their severity.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.
If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is
not any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject
the claimant's testimony only if he provides clear and convincing
reasons for doing so.
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th
Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.
1995)).
General assertions that the claimant's testimony is not
credible are insufficient.
Id.
The ALJ must identify "what
testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the
claimant's complaints."
Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).
SSR 16-3p clarifies that ALJs “must limit their
evaluation to the individual’s statements about his or her
symptoms and the evidence in the record that is relevant to the
individual’s impairments.”
Oct. 25, 2017).
2017 WL 5180304, at *11 (republished
In addition, SSR 16-3p provides the ALJ “will
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
not assess an individual’s overall character for truthfulness in
the manner typically used during an adversarial court
litigation.”
Id.
Thus, SSR 16-3p eliminates the use of the term
“credibility” in symptom assessment and stresses “subjective
symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s
character.”
Id., at *2.
The ALJ must make findings that are sufficiently
specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ
did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony and to
“reasonably discern the ALJ’s path.”
F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2015).
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806
If the ALJ’s finding is specific,
clear, and convincing, and supported by substantial evidence in
the record, the court may not engage in second-guessing.
See
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ may consider the medical history, medical
source opinion evidence, and “statements about treatment” by a
medical source.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(ii), 416.912(b)(ii).
“Medical source” refers both to “acceptable medical sources” and
other health-care providers who are “not acceptable medical
sources.”
416.902.
See SSR 06-03p.
See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502,
Medical sources classified as “not acceptable” include,
but are not limited to, nurse practitioners.
SSR 06-03p, at *2.
Factors the ALJ should consider when determining the weight to
give an opinion from these sources include the length of time the
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
source has known the claimant, the number of times and frequency
that the source has seen the claimant, and the consistency of the
source’s opinion with other evidence in the record.
SSR 06-03p,
at *4.
B.
Analysis
The ALJ noted Plaintiff commenced treatment with
Terrance James, FNP, a nurse practitioner, in April 2012 when
Plaintiff was approximately 33 years old.
Tr. 549.
James
assessed Plaintiff with “absence seizure” and prescribed an antiseizure medication.
Tr. 452, 549.
At the time of his treatment
Plaintiff stated he had not seen anyone for his alleged disabling
seizures “since his teens” even though Plaintiff alleged a
disability onset date of June 1, 2004.
Tr. 451, 549.
The ALJ
noted in November 2012 Plaintiff reported to James that he had
“done well on medication, had “no issues with seizures,” and only
experienced seizures when he ran out of his medications.
Tr. 549-50.
The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medical records from
James “are strong persuasive evidence that [Plaintiff’s] seizures
are not particularly limiting when h[e] takes appropriate
medications as prescribed.”
Tr. 550.
The ALJ also found other medical evidence contravened
Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations.
Tr. 552-53.
For example, the ALJ noted Plaintiff was examined in
March 2012 by Daniel L. Scharf, Ph.D., an examining psychologist.
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 411.
Dr. Scharf noted although Plaintiff has intellectual
functioning in the low-average range and has difficulties with
speed, information processing, and adaptive behavior, Plaintiff
is able to understand and to remember instructions and to sustain
concentration and attention.
Tr. 414.
Dr. Scharf also noted
Plaintiff was able to maintain attention throughout the two-hour
examination even though he “may have mild difficulties with
persistence.”
Tr. 416.
An ALJ may discount a claimant’s symptom
testimony that is unsupported by the medical evidence, including
an examining psychologist’s report.
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue,
539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ also noted Plaintiff stopped working at his
last job as a janitor for reasons other than his impairments.
Tr. 554.
Plaintiff testified he obtained his janitorial job
through Oregon Vocational Rehabilitation Department (VRD) and
lost this job when he was fired for not “doing my job correctly,”
for “missing hours,” and for showing up for work intoxicated.
Tr. 38, 413, 527, 555.
Plaintiff contends this information is
“immaterial unless tied to the rejection of particular testimony”
and was “erroneously used [by the ALJ] to make the implied
finding that Plaintiff is not a truthful person.”
18.
Pl.’s Brief at
The Ninth Circuit, however, has held a poor work history
can show a claimant does not have a propensity to work and
constitutes a clear and convincing reason to reject a claimant’s
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
symptom testimony.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th
Cir. 2002).
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discredited Plaintiff’s testimony because the ALJ
provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial
evidence in the record for doing so.
II.
The ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions of the
psychologists.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he discounted the
medical opinions of Leslie Carter, Ph.D., and Robinann Cogburn,
Ph.D., both examining psychologists, and Mary Lee Nichols, Ph.D.,
a nonexamining psychologist.
A.
Standards
“In disability benefits cases . . . physicians may
render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render opinions on
the ultimate issue of disability — the claimant's ability to
perform work.”
2014).
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir.
“In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [courts]
have . . . developed standards that guide [the] analysis of an
ALJ's weighing of medical evidence.”
Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Specifically, the
court must “distinguish among the opinions of three types of
physicians:
(1) those who treat the claimant (treating
physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant
(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).”
F.3d at 1012.
Garrison, 759
“As a general rule, more weight should be given to
the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors
who do not treat the claimant.”
Id.
Although the opinion of a
treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of an
examining physician, the opinion of an examining physician is
entitled to greater weight than that of a nonexamining physician.
Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.
“The weight afforded a nonexamining
physician's testimony depends ‘on the degree to which [he]
provide[s] supporting explanations for [his] opinions.’”
Id.
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)).
“If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted
by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by
providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence.”
Id.
Even when contradicted, a treating
or examining physician's opinion is still owed deference and will
often be “entitled to the greatest weight . . . even if it does
not meet the test for controlling weight.”
F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007).
Orn v. Astrue, 495
An ALJ can satisfy the
“substantial evidence” requirement by “setting out a detailed and
thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725.
conclusions.
“The ALJ must do more than state
He must set forth his own interpretations and
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct.”
Id.
(citation omitted).
B.
Analysis
Here the medical opinions of Drs. Carter, Cogburn, and
Nichols conflict with the medical opinion of Dr. Scharf.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to provide specific and
legitimate reasons for accepting the medical opinion of
Dr. Scharf over the opinions of the other doctors.
1.
Dr. Carter
Plaintiff was given a psychological evaluation by
Dr. Carter on April 21, 2014.
Tr. 525.
Dr. Carter diagnosed
Plaintiff with the following:
expressive/receptive language
disorder; cognitive disorder; social-anxiety disorder; major
depressive disorder; functional limitations in reading, writing,
and math; personality disorder; seizure disorder; and
psychosocial stressors.
Tr. 538.
Dr. Carter opined Plaintiff is
unable to work for 30% of an eight-hour workday in the following
areas because of his inability to understand, to remember, and to
carry out detailed instructions; to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods; to perform activities within
a schedule and to maintain regular attendance; to sustain an
ordinary routine and to complete a normal workday and workweek
without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms; to
maintain socially appropriate behavior; to travel to unfamiliar
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
places; and to set realistic goals.
Tr. 521-24.
She further
concluded Plaintiff would be absent three days a month and offtask 20% of an eight-hour workday as a result of his impairments.
Id.
The ALJ gave Dr. Carter’s opinion “little weight” on
the ground that her conclusions were inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s test results.
The ALJ noted Plaintiff was able to
sustain concentration and attention during the two-hour
examination with Dr. Scharf, the scores that Plaintiff obtained
on intellectual tests administered by Dr. Scharf were “generally
consistent” with the scores obtained during other testing, and
Plaintiff showed average performance and academic scores at or
near expected levels.
Tr. 416, 552.
Accordingly, the ALJ gave
Dr. Scharf’s assessment greater weight.
Tr. 552.
The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s presentation and
behavior at the hearing and other examinations were inconsistent
with Dr. Carter’s assessment.
Tr. 554.
The ALJ indicated
Plaintiff was “reasonably articulate,” “made good eye contact,”
and “responded appropriately, although hesitantly” during the
hearing.
Id.
The ALJ also cited portions of the record that
reflected Plaintiff’s “thoughts" during other examinations "were
logical and goal directed,” that Plaintiff did not display any
"signs of major psychopathology,” and that Plaintiff was “able to
engage in appropriate social interaction.”
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 413, 416, 554.
The ALJ further found Plaintiff’s activities of daily
living were inconsistent with Dr. Carter’s assessment that
Plaintiff had marked limitations in social functioning and
activities.
Tr. 554.
The ALJ noted Plaintiff is independent in
his personal care, able to prepare simple meals, able to clean
his room and do laundry, and able to use public transportation
and occasionally shop.
Tr. 314-15, 554.
Plaintiff even stated a
desire to move out of his parents’ home and live on his own if he
received benefits.
Tr. 554-55, 571, 772.
The ALJ also pointed
out that Plaintiff was able to interact with family members and
others, including authority figures.
Tr. 317.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discounted Dr. Carter’s opinion because the ALJ provided
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence
in the record for doing so.
2.
Drs. Cogburn and Nichols
In October 2012 Dr. Cogburn interviewed Plaintiff and
performed psychological tests.
Tr. 493-500.
Dr. Cogburn noted
Plaintiff’s intellectual abilities are “in the average range,”
but Plaintiff’s “cognitive difficulties are likely to lead to
limitations in work skills, communication, and possibly selfdirection” and “[h]is personality functioning is likely to give
rise to limitations in interpersonal skills and communication.”
Tr. 499.
19 - OPINION AND ORDER
On November 8, 2012, Dr. Nichols performed a review of
Plaintiff’s records.
Tr. 501.
Dr. Nichols opined Plaintiff’s
“[c]oginitive deficits and problematic personality features may
lead to significant difficulties in competitive employment.”
Id.
The ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinions of
Drs. Cogburn and Nichol regarding Plaintiff’s “cognitive
deficits” and “problematic personality features” on the ground
that their opinions were inconsistent with the overall medical
evidence, including test results.
Tr. 551.
The ALJ found
Dr. Cogburn’s assessment of Plaintiff’s personality issues as
“suggestive” of deficits in interpersonal functioning” to be
equivocal.
Id.
The ALJ noted Dr. Cogburn recommended Plaintiff
“is likely to succeed most easily in an occupation where tasks
are well structured, easily learned, repetitive, predictable, and
where speed demands are minimal.”
Tr. 499.
Dr. Nichols also
noted Plaintiff “will do best in occupations where tasks are well
structured, easily learned, repetitive, predictable, and where
speed demands are minimal.”
Tr. 501.
The ALJ specifically
accounted for these job restrictions in his assessment of
Plaintiff’s RFC by limiting Plaintiff to jobs that do not involve
complex instructions and that are repetitive, predictable, wellstructured, easily learned, and have minimal speed demands.
Tr. 548.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
20 - OPINION AND ORDER
when he gave little weight to the opinions of Drs. Cogburn and
Nichols because the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons
supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2018.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge
21 - OPINION AND ORDER
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