Meech v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 20

Opinion and Order. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. IT IS SO ORDERED. See attached order for details. Signed on 12/6/18 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (jy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
DETRA DIANE M. , 1
Plaintiff,

3:17-cv-01971-BR
OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
LISA R.J. PORTER
JP Law P.C.
5200 S.W. Meadows Rd., Ste 150
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
[phone]

Attorney for Plaintiff
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
RENATA GOWIE
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
[phone]

In the interest of privacy this Opinion uses only the
first name and the initial of the last name of the nongovernmental party or parties in this case. Where applicable,
this Opinion uses the same designation for a nongovernmental
party's immediate family member.
1

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL W. PILE
Acting Regional Chief Counsel
LISA GOLDOFTAS
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
[phone]
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Detra Diane M. seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which the Commissioner denied
Plaintiff's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)
under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's

final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow,

the Court AFFIRMS the decision

of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed her

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

application for DIB and SSI benefits.

Tr. 16. 2

Plaintiff

alleges a disability onset date of July 22, 2014.

Tr. 16.

Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on
reconsideration.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a

hearing on January 19, 2017.

Tr. 16, 37-64.

Plaintiff and a

vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing.

Plaintiff was

represented by an attorney at the hearing.
On March 7, 2017, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Council.

Tr. 30.

Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals

On October 13, 2017, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request to review the AL~s decision, and the AL~s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Tr. 1-3.

See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this
Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on June 23, 1978.

Tr. 28.

Plaintiff

Error! Main Document Only.Citations to the official
transcript of record filed by the Commissioner on June 11, 2018,
are referred to as "Tr."
2

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

was thirty-six years old on her alleged disability onset date.
Tr. 28.

Plaintiff attended school through the ninth grade.

Tr. 28, 42-43.

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a

cashier and stock clerk.

Tr. 45.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), severe anxiety, depression, ~inability
to accept change," and avoidance disorder.

Tr.

67.

Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's
summary of the medical evidence.

After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ's summary of the
medical evidence.

See Tr. 22-27.

STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
(9th Cir. 2012).

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110

To meet this burden, a claimant must

demonstrate her inability "to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A).

42

The ALJ must develop the record when

there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

McLeod v. Astrue,

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.

640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayes v. Massanari,
276 F.3d 453, 459-60

(9th Cir. 2001)).

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).

See also Brewes v. CommT of Soc.

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

42

Sec. Admin.,

Substantial evidence is

"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
(quoting Valentine v. CommT Soc.
(9th Cir. 2009)).

Molina,

674 F.3d. at 1110-11

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

It is more than a mere scintilla [of

evidence] but less than a preponderance.

Id.

(citing Valentine,

574 F.3d at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for evaluating a claimant's
testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and
resolving ambiguities.
(9th Cir. 2009).

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591

The court must weigh all of the evidence

whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's
decision.
Cir. 2008).

Ryan v. CommT of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

Commissioner's findings if they are supported by inferences
reasonably drawn from the record.
1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).

Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d

The court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.

The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA).
416.920(a) (4) (i).
F.3d 721, 724

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (i),

See also Keyser v. CommY of Soc. Sec.,

648

(9th Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically
severe impairment or combination of impairments.
§§

20 C.F.R.

404.1509, 404.1520(a) (4) (ii), 416.920(a) (4) (ii).

Keyser,

See also

648 F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

20 C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(a) (4) (iii), 416.920(a) (4) (iii).

648 F.3d at 724.

See also Keyser,

The criteria for the listed impairments, known

as Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, he must
assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC).

The

claimant's RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§§

404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

( SSR)

96-Bp.

See also Social Security Ruling

"A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a

day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule."
at *l.

20 C.F.R.

SSR 96-8p,

In other words, the Social Security Act does not require

complete incapacity to be disabled.

Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec. Ad.min., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.
416.920(a) (4) (iv).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (iv),

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, he must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

the national economy.
416.920(a) (4) (v).

20 C.F.R.

§§

See also Keyser,

404.1520(a) (4) (v),
648 F.3d at 724-25.

Here

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant
number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant
can perform.

Lockwood v. CommT Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068,

1071 (9th Cir. 2010).

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden

through the testimony of a VE or by reference to the MedicalVocational Guidelines (or the grids) set forth in the
regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 2.

If

the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not
disabled.

20 C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(g) (1), 416.920(g) (1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since July 22, 2014, Plaintiff's
alleged disability onset date.

Tr. 18.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of "mental health conditions described variously as
depression, anxiety, PTSD, and intellectual disability
disorders."

Tr. 18.

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.

Tr. 19-22.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the
following nonexertional limitations:

"[S]he is limited to

simple, routine tasks, SVP 1 or 2 type tasks, with no public
contact, and superficial contact with coworkers."

Tr. 20.

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is unable to
perform her past relevant work.

Tr. 28.

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff can perform other jobs
that exist in the national economy such as janitor, laboratory
helper, and warehouse worker.

Tr. 29.

found Plaintiff is not disabled.

Accordingly, the ALJ

Tr. 29-30.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) failed to
apply the Listing criteria to Plaintiff's impairments,
(2) failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for
discounting Plaintiff's symptom testimony,

(3) improperly

rejected the testimony of third-party lay witnesses,

(4) failed

to provide clear and convincing evidence for rejecting the
opinions of medical providers, and (5) failed to incorporate all
medical findings into Plaintiff's RFC.

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

I.

The ALJ did not err at Step Three when he found Plaintiff's
impairments do not meet Listing requirements.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to apply the
Listing requirements of 12.04 (bipolar and related disorders),
12.05 (intellectual disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessivecompulsive disorders), and 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related
disorders) to Plaintiff.
A.

Standards

As noted, at Step Three the claimant is disabled if
the Commissioner determines the claimant's impairments meet or
equal one of the listed impairments that the Commissioner
acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful
activity.

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser,

§§

404.1520(a) (4) (iii), 416.920(a) (4) (iii).

648 F.3d at 724.

Step Three "streamlines the

decision process by identifying those claimants whose medical
impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found
disabled regardless of their vocational background."
Yuckert,

Bown v.

482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987).
"To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must

establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a listed
impairment relevant to his or her claim.

To equal a listed

impairment, a claimant must establish symptoms, signs, and

10 - OPINION AND ORDER

laboratory findings at least equal in severity and duration to
the characteristics of a relevant listed impairment.

11

Tackett

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in

original).

See also Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th

Cir. 2014).
B.

Analysis

To satisfy the criteria of the Listings, Plaintiff's
mental disorders must result in "extreme limitation of one, or
marked limitation of two 11 areas of mental functioning.

20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, at 12.00F2.
As noted, at Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff's
medically determinable impairments do not meet or medically
equal one of the Listed Impairments.

Specifically, the ALJ

provided a detailed analysis as to why Plaintiff's mental
impairments or combination of impairments do not meet or
medically equal the severity of a listed impairment.

Tr. 19-22.

The ALJ cited evidence in the record and found Plaintiff has
moderate limitations in each of the four areas of mental
functioning:
information;

(1) understanding, remembering, or applying
(2) interacting with others;

(3) concentrating,

persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing
oneself.

Tr. 20-21.

11 - OPINION AND ORDER

For example, Kenneth C. Dudley, Ph.D.,

performed a neuropsychological examination of Plaintiff in March
2013.

Tr. 565-74.

Although Dr. Dudley opined Plaintiff would

struggle to learn information, he also concluded Plaintiff would
be able to retain and to apply that information.

Tr. 573-74.

Plaintiff alleged she does not get along well with others, and
Dr. Dudley noted she "will experience difficulties in
interpersonal relationships and functioning."

Dr. Dudley,

however, concluded "these [factors] did not rise to a level
where they were felt to interfere with social or occupational
functioning."

Tr. 573.

The ALJ also found Plaintiff does not meet the Listing
requirements of listing 12.05 for intellectual disorders.

Based

on Plaintiff's own testimony and function report, the ALJ found
Plaintiff could participate in standardized testing of
intellectual functioning and is not dependent on others for her
personal needs.

Tr. 21, 49-50, 244.

Richard M. Kolbell, Ph.D.,

an examining psychologist, also noted Plaintiff is "independent
in all basic and advanced" activities of daily living.

Tr. 388.

Listing 12.05 also requires a full-scale or comparable IQ score
of no higher than 75.
1, listing 12.05B.

20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix

The ALJ found Plaintiff does not meet this

listing requirement because her full-scale IQ score is 77.

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 21-22, 571.
Although Plaintiff cites other evidence in the record
in opposition to the ALJ's determination, Plaintiff does not
identify any specific error in the ALJ's finding at Step Three.
"Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld."
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

679 (9th Cir. 2005).

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
at Step Three because the medical records do not reflect
Plaintiff meets the requirements of Listings 12.04, 12.05,
12.06, or 12.15 and the ALJ's determination is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
II.

The ALJ did not err when he found Plaintiff's testimony was
not fully credible.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's symptom
testimony.
A.

Standards

The ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine
whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or
symptoms is credible.

"First, the ALJ must determine whether

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'"
Colvin,

Garrison v.

759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)).

The

claimant is not required to show that his "impairment could
reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he]
has alleged;

[he] need only show that it could reasonably have

caused some degree of the symptom."
(quoting Smolen v. Chater,

Garrison,

759 F.3d at 1014

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)).

A claimant is not required to produce "objective medical
evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity
thereof."

Id.
If the claimant satisfies the first step of this

analysis and there is not any affirmative evidence of
malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about
the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear
and convincing reasons for doing so."
1014-15.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at

See also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

883 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of
malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may
only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings
as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for
each.").

General assertions that the claimant's testimony is

14 - OPINION AND ORDER

not credible are insufficient.
750 (9th Cir. 2007).

Parra v. Astruer 481 F.3d 742,

The ALJ must identify "what testimony is

not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's
complaints."

Id.

(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, 834

(9th Cir. 1995)).
B.

Analysis

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff's testimony regarding her
symptoms on the ground that Plaintiff's testimony was not
consistent with the medical evidence.

Tr. 23.

Plaintiff alleged she is unable to work due to mental
issues as a result of her PTSD, anxiety, and depression.

She

asserted she has difficulty being around others and would have
difficulty interacting appropriately with supervisors.
Plaintiff also contended she has difficulty understanding and
remembering instructions and concentrating.

Plaintiff testified

she could not work due to "unexplained persistent headaches,"
and she was unable to get of bed for a year beginning in 2014
due to these headaches.

Tr. 19, 475.

An ALJ may consider medical reports of improvement
when evaluating a claimant's credibility.
Soc. Sec. Admin. 169 F.3d 595, 599-600

Morgan v. Commrr of

(9th Cir. 1999).

The

ALJ, however, noted evidence that Plaintiff's treatment did not

15 - OPINION AND ORDER

support Plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of her
impairments.

For example, the ALJ noted that Pamela Miller,

Ph.D., Plaintiff's treating psychologist, recommended primarily
conservative treatment, including deep-breathing exercises,
physical exercise, and "gratitude practice," and Plaintiff was
not on any psychiatric medications after a year following her
alleged disability onset.

Tr. 24,

604, 654, 829-30, 832, 835,

945, 849.
The ALJ also found Plaintiff's mental symptoms "waxed
and waned" and noted the record included references to numerous
situational stressors as the primary cause of these symptoms
such as the fact that she lost custody of her son and that she
left her employment at WalMart because of a "medical emergency"
in her family.

Tr. 25, 45, 532.

Evidence of inconsistent

reporting supports a finding that Plaintiff's allegations are
not fully credible.

See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680

( 9th Cir. 2005) .
Again, Plaintiff does not identify any specific error
in the ALJ's finding.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discounted Plaintiff's symptom testimony and found it
was not fully credible because the ALJ provided clear and

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
record for doing so.
III. The ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting lay-witness
testimony.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
reasons that are germane to the lay-witness statements of Alfred
Bolte, Plaintiff's friend, regarding Plaintiff's limitations.
A.

Standards

Lay-witness testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms
is competent evidence that the ALJ must consider unless he
"expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives
reasons germane to each witness for doing so."
236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lewis v. Apfel,

The ALJ's reasons for

rejecting lay-witness testimony must also be ''specific."

Stout

v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.
2006).

Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to address each

lay-witness statement or testimony on an "individualized,
witness-by-witness-basis.
Germane reasons for discrediting a witness's testimony
include inconsistency with the medical evidence and the fact
that the testimony "generally repeat[s]" the properly
discredited testimony of a claimant.
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427

See also Williams v. Astrue,

493 F. App'x 866 (9th Cir. 2012).
B.

Analysis

Bolte stated in his Third-Party Report that Plaintiff
has "blackouts and anxiety" that limit Plaintiff's ability to
work.

Tr. 251.

Plaintiff points to one instance reflected in

Plaintiff's treatment records that indicates Plaintiff
"sometimes will go into black out rages when she gets 'pushed
too far.'"

Tr. 702.

Plaintiff contends this record supports

Bolte's testimony and that the ALJ failed to offer a germane
reason for rejecting it.

As a result of the ALJ's alleged

error, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ could have reached a different
conclusion regarding Plaintiff's disability if he had properly
credited Bolte's testimony.
The ALJ gave "little weight" to Bolte's statement on
the ground that this "evidence does not show more than one
episode of losing consciousness, which does not support limiting
[Plaintiff] because of this condition."

Tr. 28.

The ALJ also

noted Bolte had limited interaction with Plaintiff and his
statements are inconsistent with the medical record.

Tr. 28.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ gave
"germane" reasons for discounting the lay-witness statements of
Bolte.

18 - OPINION AND ORDER

IV.

The ALJ properly evaluated the medical-opinion evidence.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the medical opinions
of Dr. Dudley, an examining neuropsychologist, and Dr. Miller,
Plaintiff's treating psychologist, and the statements of Taunie
Leash, a social support specialist.
A.

Standards

"In disability benefits cases .

. physicians may

render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render opinions
on the ultimate issue of disability
perform work."
2014).
have .

the claimant's ability to

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir.

"In conjunction with the relevant regulations,

[courts]

. developed standards that guide [the] analysis of an

ALJ's weighing of medical evidence."

Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Specifically, the

court must "distinguish among the opinions of three types of
physicians:

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating

physicians);

(2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor
treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians)."
F.3d at 1012.

Garrison, 759

"As a general rule, more weight should be given

19 - OPINION AND ORDER

to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of
doctors who do not treat the claimant."

Id.

Although the

opinion of a treating physician is entitled to greater weight
than that of an examining physician, the opinion of an examining
physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a
nonexamining physician. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.

"The weight

afforded a nonexamining physician's testimony depends 'on the
degree to which [he] provide[s] supporting explanations for
[his] opinions."'

Id.

(quoting 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1527(d) (3)).

"If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is
contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject
it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are
supported by substantial evidence."

Id.

Even when

contradicted, a treating or examining physician's opinion is
still owed deference and will often be "entitled to the greatest
weight .
weight."

. even if it does not meet the test for controlling
Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007)

An

ALJ can satisfy the "substantial evidence" requirement by
"setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and
conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation
thereof, and making findings."

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725.

ALJ must do more than state conclusions.

20 - OPINION AND ORDER

"The

He must set forth his

own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the
doctors', are correct."
B.

Id.

(citation omitted).

Analysis
1.

Dr. Dudley

Plaintiff asserts Dr. Dudley found Plaintiff was
"impaired intellectually and also suffered from impaired memory"
and "experiences difficulties in interpersonal relationships and
functioning."

Pl.'s Brief at 30 (citing Tr. 573).

Plaintiff

contends the ALJ failed to "acknowledge that Dr. Dudley agreed
with the rest of [Plaintiff's] treating physicians."

Id.

The ALJ, in fact, gave Dr. Dudley's opinion "significant
weight."

Tr. 27.
As noted, Dr. Dudley performed a neuropsychological

examination in March 2012 and noted Plaintiff's memory
functioning was borderline and Plaintiff would struggle to learn
information.

Dr. Dudley, however, opined Plaintiff would retain

and apply any information that she learned.

Tr. 571-74.

The

ALJ concluded Dr. Dudley's opinion was supported by the clinical
findings in his report.

Tr. 27.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has

severe mental impairments, including intellectual disability
disorder, and he reasonably accounted for Plaintiff's mental
impairments in the RFC limitations to "simple, routine tasks."

21 - OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 22.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not
discount Dr. Dudley's opinion and, in fact, based his evaluation
of Plaintiff's RFC on Dr. Dudley's assessment of Plaintiff's
impairments.
2.

Dr. Miller

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ "provided little weight to
Dr. Miller's opinion that [Plaintiff] would not get along with
supervisors despite the fact that each treating provider opined
that this would be so."

Pl.'s Brief at 30.

The ALJ, however, gave portions of Dr. Miller's
opinion "significant weight."

Tr. 27.

The ALJ only discounted

Dr. Miller's opinion that Plaintiff would have substantial
difficulty getting along with supervisors on the grounds that
(1) it was inconsistent with Plaintiff's past work history and
(2) Plaintiff's positive response to mental-health treatment
suggests Plaintiff "would be able to regulate her emotions well
enough to interact appropriately with supervisors."

Tr. 27.

Plaintiff fails to show how the ALJ's decision is inconsistent
with Dr. Miller's assessment.
The ALJ also relied on the opinions of state-agency
psychologists, Winifred C. Ju, Ph.D., and Bill Hennings, Ph.D.,

22 - OPINION AND ORDER

who both opined Plaintiff is not significantly limited in her
ability to accept instructions and to respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors.

Tr. 27, 75, 102.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
in his evaluation of Dr. Miller's opinion.
3.

Taunie Leash

Leash is a social service specialist who has worked
with Plaintiff and her family since 2013.

In January 2017 Leash

submitted a letter to the ALJ in which she stated she is not a
mental-health therapist, but she has observed Plaintiff's
difficulties "regulating and controlling her emotions."
Tr. 316-17.

Leash stated she has seen Plaintiff "being very

anxious, tearful and sad and then to very angry"; Plaintiff
"tends to struggle to manage herself when hearing difficult
information"; and Plaintiff "is quick to anger and while angry
will lash out verbally."

Id.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he improperly
disregarded Leash's accounts of her interactions with Plaintiff.
a.

Standards

A social services specialist is not an
"acceptable medical source" of medical evidence but is
considered "other sources."

23 - OPINION AND ORDER

20 C.F.R.

§§

404.1502, 416.902.

"[O]nly licensed physicians and certain other qualified
specialists are considered 'acceptable medical
sources.'" Molina v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.

2012) (citation, brackets, and footnote omitted).

Opinions

from "not acceptable" medical sources, however, "are important
and should be evaluated on key issues such as impairment
severity and functional effects

ff

SSR 06-03p.

The ALJ

may reject the opinion of other sources such as social workers
by providing germane reasons for doing so.
Soc. Sec.,

Turner v. Comm'r of

613 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2010).
b.

Analysis

The ALJ gave Leash's letter "little weight" and
found her observations were not "entirely reliable."

Tr. 28.

The ALJ indicated Leash's statements are generally inconsistent
with the reports of Dr. Miller and with the records of Kimberly
Humann, M.D., Plaintiff's psychiatrist, who referred to
Plaintiff in a report in May 2016 as "stable from a mental
health standpoint."

Tr. 28, 745.

The ALJ also disregarded

Leash's statement on the ground that it was inconsistent with
Plaintiff's "demonstrated level of functioning in activities of
daily living."

Id.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ gave

24 - OPINION AND ORDER

legally sufficient reasons for discounting the statements of
Leash.
V.

The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's RFC.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to consider all
of the medical evidence when assessing Plaintiff's RFC.
A.

Standards

The ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's RFC is an
assessment of the sustained, work-related physical and mental
activities the claimant can still do on a regular and continuing
basis despite her limitations.
416.920(e).

20 C.F.R.

See also SSR 96-8p.

§§

404.1520(e),

"A 'regular and continuing

basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent
schedule."

SSR 96-8p, at *1.

In other words, the Social

Security Act does not require complete incapacity to be
disabled.

Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228,

1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603
(9th Cir. 1989)).
A claimant's RFC represents the "most that an
individual can do despite his or her limitations or
restrictions" resulting from medically determinable
impairments.

SSR 96-8P, at *4.

25 - OPINION AND ORDER

See also 20 C.F.R.

§

416.945.

"The RFC must be based on all the relevant evidence in the case
recordll including medical history, medical signs, and laboratory
findings, lay evidence, recorded observations, medical-source
statements, and the effects of the claimant's symptoms.
BP, at *5 (emphasis in original).

SSR 96-

To determine a claimant's

exertional and nonexertional capacity, the ALJ must give
"careful considerationll to "any available information about
symptoms because subjective descriptions may indicate more
severe limitations or restrictions than can be shown by
objective medical evidence alone.ll
B.

SSR 96-BP, at *5-*6.

Analysis

As noted, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with
certain nonexertional limitations such as simple, routine tasks
and limited public contact.

Tr. 22.

The nonexertional

limitations are supported by the medical evidence and statements
the ALJ found credible.

Tr. 22.

In support of her position Plaintiff reiterates the
arguments made in her earlier challenges to the ALJ's analysis
of the medical evidence and witness testimony.

As the Court has

already concluded, the ALJ properly considered that evidence.
Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err

26 - OPINION AND ORDER

when he assessed Plaintiff's RFC and he accounted for all
credible limitations in his assessment.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

day of December, 2018.

ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge

27 - OPINION AND ORDER