Beeman v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 21

Opinion and Order. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 2/12/19 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (jy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
AMANDA BETH B.,1
Plaintiff,

3:18-cv-00051-BR
OPINION AND ORDER

v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
BETSEY R. SHEPHERD
425 Riverwalk Manor Drive
Dallas, GA 30132
[phone]
Attorney for Plaintiff
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
RENATA GOWIE
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
[phone]
In the interest of privacy this Opinion uses only the
first name and the initial of the last name of the nongovernmental party. Where applicable, this Opinion uses the
same designation for the nongovernmental party's immediate
family member.
1

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL W. PILE
Acting Regional Chief Counsel
MICHAEL HOWARD
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
[phone]
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Amanda Beth B. seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which the Commissioner denied
Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB)
under Title II of the Social Security Act.

This Court has

jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed her initial application for
DIB benefits on February 21, 2014.

Tr. 10.2

disability onset date of June 7, 2013.

Plaintiff alleged a

Plaintiff=s application

Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on July 10, 2018, are referred to as "Tr."
2

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

was denied initially and on reconsideration.

An Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on May 25, 2016.

Tr. 10, 39-87.

Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified.

Plaintiff was

represented by an attorney at the hearing.
On November 14, 2016, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.

Tr. 10-25.

On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff requested review of the
hearing decision by the Appeals Council.

Tr. 176.

On November 6, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff=s
request to review the ALJ=s decision, and the ALJ=s decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner.

Tr. 1-3.

See

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).
On January 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this
Court seeking review of the Commissioner=s decision.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on November 14, 1983, and was 29 years
old on her alleged disability onset date.

Tr. 24.

Plaintiff

has obtained a G.E.D. and completed some community-college
courses.

Tr. 24, 46, 67.

The ALJ found Plaintiff is able to

perform her past relevant work as a customer-service
representative and a telemarketer.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 23.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to multiple sclerosis,
anxiety, and severe depression.

Tr. 99.

Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ=s
summary of the medical evidence.

After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ=s summary of the
medical evidence.

See Tr. 16-23.

STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
(9th Cir. 2012).

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110

To meet this burden a claimant must

demonstrate her inability Ato engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.@
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

42

The ALJ must develop the record when

there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to
allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.

McLeod v. Astrue,

640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari,
276 F.3d 453, 459B60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
4 - OPINION AND ORDER

42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

See also Brewes v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

Substantial evidence is

Arelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.@

Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm=r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).

It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence

but less than a preponderance.

Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for evaluating a claimant=s
testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and
resolving ambiguities.
(9th Cir. 2009).

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591

The court must weigh all of the evidence

whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's
decision.
Cir. 2008).

Ryan v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the
Commissioner=s findings if they are supported by inferences
reasonably drawn from the record.
1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).

Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d

The court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner.
F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.

The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commis-

sioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I).

See

also Keyser v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically
severe impairment or combination of impairments.
§§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at

724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant=s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are
enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed
Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant=s residual functional capacity (RFC).
6 - OPINION AND ORDER

The

claimant=s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§ 404.1520(e).

20 C.F.R.

See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p.

AA

>regular and continuing basis= means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a
week, or an equivalent schedule.@

SSR 96-8p, at *1.

In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete
incapacity to be disabled.

Taylor v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885
F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.

See also

Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.

Lockwood v.

Comm=r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony
of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set
7 - OPINION AND ORDER

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 2.

If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since June 7, 2013, her alleged
date of disability onset.

Tr. 14.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of multiple sclerosis (MS) and obesity.

Tr. 14.

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.

Tr. 15.

perform light work.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to
The ALJ also found Plaintiff is able to

lift and to carry 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds
frequently, is able to stand, walk, and sit about six hours in
an eight-hour workday, and can "occasionally balance."

The ALJ

found Plaintiff should avoid even moderate exposure to extreme
heat.

Tr. 16.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is able to perform

her past relevant work as a customer service representative and
a telemarketer.

Tr. 23.

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

Alternatively, at Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff can
perform other work in the national economy such as office
helper, storage facility rental clerk, and price marker.
Tr. 24-25.
disabled.

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not
Tr. 25.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) failed to
provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s
testimony, (2) failed to provide clear and convincing evidence
for rejecting the medical opinions of Plaintiff’s treating
providers, (3) improperly rejected lay-witness testimony, and
(4) failed to include all of Plaintiff’s limitations when he
assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and posed hypothetical questions to the
VE.
I.

The ALJ did not err when he found Plaintiff=s testimony was
not fully credible.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide

clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff=s symptom
testimony.
A.

Standards
The ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine

whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

symptoms is credible.

AFirst, the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment >which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.=@

Garrison v.

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Lingenfelter
v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035B36 (9th Cir. 2007)).

The claimant

is not required to show that his Aimpairment could reasonably be
expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged;
[he] need only show that it could reasonably have caused some
degree of the symptom.@

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014 (quoting

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)).

A

claimant is not required to produce Aobjective medical evidence
of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.@

Id.

If the claimant satisfies the first step of this
analysis and there is not any affirmative evidence of
malingering, Athe ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about
the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear
and convincing reasons for doing so.@

Garrison, 759 F.3d at

1014-15. See also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883
(9th Cir. 2006)(A[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering
based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find
an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to
credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.@).
10 - OPINION AND ORDER

General assertions that the claimant's testimony is not credible
are insufficient.
2007).

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir.

The ALJ must identify "what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints."

Id.

(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
B.

Analysis
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff=s testimony regarding

her symptoms on the grounds that Plaintiff=s testimony was
inconsistent with the medical and other evidence in the record.
Tr. 17.
Plaintiff testified she experiences severe fatigue,
vertigo, nausea, vomiting, headaches, and incontinence during MS
relapses.

Tr. 16.

Plaintiff testified these symptoms cause her

to have attendance problems with work, make it difficult to take
a bus to work, and cause her to lose her balance while standing.
Id.

Plaintiff testified there are times when she "feels fine

and suddenly wakes up and does not feel well," she has
difficulty sleeping, and she "occasionally takes naps during the
day, maybe once every two weeks."

Tr. 16-17.

The ALJ noted the record reflects Plaintiff generally
has normal gait, strength, muscle tone, and balance, which are
not entirely consistent with Plaintiff's allegations.

Tr. 20.

The ALJ also found although the record reflects Plaintiff has
11 - OPINION AND ORDER

some limitations, the record also indicates "significant
improvement with medication and reflect[s] a generally stable
course."

Tr. 20.

For example, the ALJ noted Plaintiff reported

increased symptoms in June 2013 that were treated with
medications, and Plaintiff reported resolution of her right arm
and hand pain and improved function in her right upper extremity
after taking the medications.

Tr. 18, 336-43.

Then in November

2013 Plaintiff reported "doing very well," that she felt
"empowered," and that she was finishing school.

Tr. 18, 346.

Similarly, in March 2016 Plaintiff reported "urge incontinence"
related to her MS, but "overall relatively stable course."
Tr. 19, 564.

Plaintiff noted her bladder symptoms had worsened

during the past year and that she had two episodes per week of
incontinence with mild stress incontinence, but she stated this
was "not overly bothersome."

Id.

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff's activities reflect a
greater capacity for functioning than alleged, and Plaintiff's
symptoms did not consistently cause debilitating limitations.
Tr. 21.

For example, Plaintiff is able to prepare meals, to

perform household chores, to shop, to use public transportation,
and to travel to Arizona by car and by airplane.

The ALJ took

into account that Plaintiff attended community college off and
on, was on the honor's list, and told medical providers that she
12 - OPINION AND ORDER

"did well in school."

In addition, although she did not engage

in substantial gainful employment, Plaintiff worked since her
alleged onset date.

Tr. 21, 67, 197-98, 275-76, 466.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discounted Plaintiff=s symptom testimony and found it was
not fully credible because the ALJ provided clear and convincing
reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for
doing so.
II.

The ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinions of
Plaintiff's treating providers.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he discounted the

medical opinions of Stanley Cohan, M.D., Plaintiff's treating
neurologist, and Leah Gaedeke, Plaintiff's treating nurse
practitioner (NP).
A.

Standards
1.

Medical Opinions

AIn disability benefits cases . . . physicians may
render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render opinions
on the ultimate issue of disability C the claimant's ability to
perform work.@
2014).

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir.

AIn conjunction with the relevant regulations, [courts]

have . . . developed standards that guide [the] analysis of an
ALJ's weighing of medical evidence.@

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Specifically, the

court must Adistinguish among the opinions of three types of
physicians:

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating

physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant
(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor
treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).@
F.3d at 1012.

Garrison, 759

AAs a general rule, more weight should be given to

the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors
who do not treat the claimant.@

Id.

Although the opinion of a

treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of an
examining physician, the opinion of an examining physician is
entitled to greater weight than that of a nonexamining
physician. Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.

AThe weight afforded a

nonexamining physician's testimony depends >on the degree to
which [he] provide[s] supporting explanations for [his]
opinions.=@

Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d)(3)).

AIf a treating or examining doctor's opinion is
contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject
it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are
supported by substantial evidence.@

Id.

Even when contradicted,

a treating or examining physician's opinion is still owed
deference and will often be Aentitled to the greatest weight
. . . even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.@
14 - OPINION AND ORDER

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007).

An ALJ can

satisfy the Asubstantial evidence@ requirement by Asetting out a
detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and
making findings.@

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725.

more than state conclusions.

AThe ALJ must do

He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors',
are correct.@
2.

Id. (citation omitted).
Medical Sources

Medical sources are divided into two categories:
"acceptable medical sources” and "other sources."
§§ 404.1513, 416.913.

20 C.F.R.

Acceptable medical sources include

licensed physicians and psychologists.
§§ 404.1513(a), 416.913(a).

20 C.F.R.

Medical sources classified as

“other sources" include, but are not limited to, nurse
practitioners, therapists, licensed clinical social workers, and
chiropractors.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d).

With respect to “other sources,” the Social Security
Administration notes:
With the growth of managed health care in recent
years and the emphasis on containing medical
costs, medical sources who are not acceptable
medical sources, such as nurse practitioners,
physician assistants, and licensed clinical
social workers, have increasingly assumed a
greater percentage of the treatment and
15 - OPINION AND ORDER

evaluation functions previously handled primarily
by physicians and psychologists. Opinions from
these medical sources, who are not technically
deemed acceptable medical sources under our
rules, are important and should be evaluated on
key issues such as impairment severity and
functional effects, along with the other relevant
evidence in the file.
SSR 06-03p, at *3.

Factors the ALJ should consider when

determining the weight to give an opinion from those "important"
sources include the length of time the source has known the
claimant, the number of times and frequency that the source has
seen the claimant, the consistency of the source's opinion with
other evidence in the record, the relevance of the source's
opinion, the quality of the source's explanation of his opinion,
and the source's training and expertise.

SSR 06-03p, at *4.

On

the basis of the particular facts and the above factors, the ALJ
may assign a not-acceptable medical source either greater or
lesser weight than that of an acceptable medical source.

SSR

06-03p, at *5-6.
The ALJ, however, must explain the weight assigned to
such sources to the extent that a claimant or subsequent
reviewer may follow the ALJ's reasoning.

SSR 06-03p, at *6.

“The ALJ may discount testimony from . . . ‘other sources’ if
the ALJ ‘gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.’”
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Turner v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010)).
B.

Analysis
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to provide specific

and legitimate reasons for rejecting the medical opinions of
Dr. Cohan and NP Gaedeke.
On October 6, 2015, Dr. Cohan and/or NP Gaedeke
completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff's limitations.3
Tr. 539-41.

They opined Plaintiff would not be able to

"physically withstand any aspect of gainful employment" as a
result of her MS flares that had occurred intermittently since
2006.

Tr. 541.
The ALJ gave the opinions of Dr. Cohan and

NP Gaedeke "little weight" on the grounds that they were
"conclusory and fail[ed] to contain information regarding
[Plaintiff's] specific abilities on a function-by-function
basis," were not supported by the medical record, relied heavily
on Plaintiff's subjectively reported symptoms, and were not
supported by Plaintiff's activities.

Tr. 22.

For example,

Dr. Cohan noted Plaintiff's MS impaired her ability to grasp
repetitively.

Tr. 540.

The ALJ, however, found there was not

The Statement bears Dr. Cohan's printed name, but it
appears to have been completed and signed by NP Gaedeke.
Tr. 22.
3

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

any evidence in the record of a significant decrease in grip
strength or manipulative difficulties, and, in fact, Plaintiff
had full grip strength in February 2015.

Tr. 22, 478.

The ALJ

also noted treatment records from Dr. Cohan's office repeatedly
reflect Plaintiff reported improvement in her conditions with
treatment, that she was doing very well physically, and that she
was alert without signs of fatigue during examinations.

Tr. 22.

Moreover, the ALJ's assessment was also supported by
the opinion of consultative examiner, Tatsuro Ogisu, M.D., who
examined Plaintiff on July 12, 2016.

Tr. 517-81.

Dr. Ogisu

found Plaintiff had full grip strength bilaterally, was alert,
and showed no signs of fatigue during the examination.

Tr. 22,

573-74.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err
when he discounted the opinions of Dr. Cohan and NP Gaedeke
because the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record for doing so.
III. The ALJ gave germane reasons for discounting lay-witness
testimony.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to provide
reasons that are germane to the lay-witness statement of Kyle
Leeson, Plaintiff’s husband, regarding Plaintiff’s limitations.
A.

Standards

18 - OPINION AND ORDER

Lay-witness testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms
is competent evidence that the ALJ must consider unless he
"expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives
reasons germane to each witness for doing so."
236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).

Lewis v. Apfel,

The ALJ's reasons for

rejecting lay-witness testimony must also be "specific."

Stout

v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.
2006).

Nevertheless, an ALJ is not required to address each

lay-witness statement or testimony on an "individualized,
witness-by-witness-basis.
Germane reasons for discrediting a witness's testimony
include inconsistency with the medical evidence and the fact
that the testimony "generally repeat[s]" the properly
discredited testimony of a claimant.
F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427

See also Williams v. Astrue,

493 F. App'x 866 (9th Cir. 2012).
B.

Analysis
In a Third-Party Function Report dated December 30,

2014, Leeson stated Plaintiff experiences fatigue, nausea,
anxiety, and balance issues that result in attendance problems
and that the stress of performance reviews triggers Plaintiff's
symptoms and MS relapses.

Tr. 23, 233-40.

He also stated

Plaintiff struggles to perform basic self-care, occasionally
19 - OPINION AND ORDER

requires help with personal hygiene, and becomes anxious in
social situations.

Tr. 237.

Leeson also noted Plaintiff has

difficulty lifting more than 40 pounds, loses her balance while
squatting or bending, can only walk a quarter of a mile on a
good day, and has trouble standing for more than five minutes
due to vertigo during an MS relapse.

Tr. 238.

Plaintiff contends the record supports Plaintiff’s
testimony and that the ALJ failed to offer a germane reason for
rejecting it.

Thus, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ could have

reached a different conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s disability
if he had properly credited Leeson’s testimony.
Although the ALJ considered Leeson's statement, the
ALJ concluded it was "not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence" and "failed to contain objective findings" to support
the extent of the limitations Leeson reported.

Tr. 23.

In

addition, the ALJ noted Leeson's statements appeared to be based
primarily on Plaintiff's subjective reports.

Tr. 23.

The Ninth Circuit has held "inconsistency with medical
evidence" constitutes a "germane reason" for justifying an ALJ's
rejection of lay testimony.

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.

In

addition, the ALJ may discount lay-witness testimony that is
similar to a claimant's subjective reports when the ALJ
determines the claimant is not a credible witness.
20 - OPINION AND ORDER

Valentine v.

Comm. Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).

As

noted, this Court has concluded the ALJ did not err when he
discounted Plaintiff's symptom testimony.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ provided
germane reasons for discounting the lay-witness statements of
Leeson.
IV.

The ALJ included all of Plaintiff's limitations in his
assessment of Plaintiff's RFC and in his hypothetical
questions posed to the VE.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to include all of

Plaintiff's limitations in his evaluation of Plaintiff's RFC and
also failed to include those limitations in the hypothetical
questions posed to the VE.
As noted, the Court has determined the ALJ provided legally
sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiff's subjective
complaints about her symptoms, properly evaluated the medical
evidence, and provided germane reasons for discounting the laywitness testimony.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did

not err in his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC or in the
limitations included in his hypothetical questions posed to the
VE.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the

21 - OPINION AND ORDER

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Anna J. Brown
___________________________________
ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge

22 - OPINION AND ORDER