Faries v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 21

Opinion and Order. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). IT IS SO ORDERED. See attached order for details. Signed on 4/2/19 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (jy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
LETICIA R. F.,1
Plaintiff,

3:18-cv-00630-BR
OPINION AND ORDER

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
JAMIE M. EVANS
Evans & Evans, PC
610 S.W. Broadway, Suite 405
Portland, OR 97205
[phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
RENATA GOWIE
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
[phone]
In the interest of privacy
first name and the initial of the
governmental party in this case.
uses the same designation for the
immediate family member.
1

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

this Opinion uses only the
last name of the nonWhere applicable, this Opinion
nongovernmental party's

MICHAEL W. PILE
Acting Regional Chief Counsel
MARTHA A. BODEN
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
[phone]
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff Leticia R. F. seeks judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration in which the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's
applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title
II of the Social Security Act.

This Court has jurisdiction to

review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court REVERSES the
decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for further
proceedings.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
On October 30, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed her

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

application for DIB benefits.

Tr. 39, 169-70.2

Plaintiff

alleges a disability onset date of September 10, 2010.
169.

Tr. 39,

Plaintiff=s application was denied initially and on

reconsideration.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a

hearing on March 9, 2017.

Tr. 39, 59-76.

Plaintiff and a

vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing.

Plaintiff was

represented by an attorney at the hearing.
On May 2, 2017, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he found
Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled to
benefits.
Council.

Tr. 39-51.

Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals

On February 9, 2018, the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff=s request to review the ALJ=s decision, and the ALJ=s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Tr. 1-3.

See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this
Court seeking review of the Commissioner=s decision.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on August 11, 1964.

Tr. 169.

Plaintiff

was forty-six years old on her alleged disability onset date.

Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on August 30, 2018, are referred to as "Tr."
2

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff has more than a high-school education.

Tr. 66.

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a data-entry
clerk and accounting clerk.

Tr. 50.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to fibromyalgia, psoriatic
arthritis, bilateral neuropathy in her legs and feet, low lumbar
pain, edema, myofascial pain dysfunction syndrome, and upper
back and neck pain.

Tr. 77.

Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ=s
summary of the medical evidence.

After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ=s summary of the
medical evidence.

See Tr. 41-49.

STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
(9th Cir. 2012).

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110

To meet this burden, a claimant must

demonstrate her inability Ato engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.@
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

42

The ALJ must develop the record when

there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.

McLeod v. Astrue,

640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari,
276 F.3d 453, 459B60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).

42

See also Brewes v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

Substantial evidence is

Arelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.@

Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm=r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).

It is more than a mere scintilla [of

evidence] but less than a preponderance.

Id. (citing Valentine,

574 F.3d at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for evaluating a claimant=s
testimony, resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and
resolving ambiguities.
(9th Cir. 2009).

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591

The court must weigh all of the evidence

whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's
decision.
Cir. 2008).

Ryan v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th
Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than

one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

Commissioner=s findings if they are supported by inferences
reasonably drawn from the record.
1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).

Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d

The court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.

The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA).

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

See

also Keyser v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically
severe impairment or combination of impairments.
§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at

724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant=s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are
enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed
Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant=s residual functional capacity (RFC).

The

claimant=s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§ 404.1520(e).

20 C.F.R.

See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p.

AA

>regular and continuing basis= means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a
week, or an equivalent schedule.@

SSR 96-8p, at *1.

In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete
incapacity to be disabled.

Taylor v. Comm=r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885
F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.

See also

Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.

Lockwood v.

Comm=r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony
of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (or
the grids) set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.

If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff did not engage in
substantial gainful activity beginning September 10, 2010,
Plaintiff=s alleged disability onset date, through December 31,
2014, the date she was last insured.

Tr. 41.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of osteoarthritis/psoriatic arthritis, borderline
obesity, and a history of lower-extremity edema and neuropathy.
Tr. 41.
At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.

Tr. 43.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform sedentary work with the following limitations:

only

occasional balancing, crawling, kneeling, stooping, crouching,
or climbing; inability to use her lower extremities for any
pushing and pulling activities (i.e., unable to operate foot
pedals); and avoid exposure to vibrations, moving machinery,
unprotected heights, and similar hazards.

Tr. 45.

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is able to perform
her past relevant work as a data-entry clerk and accounting
clerk.

Tr. 50.

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled.
Tr. 50-51.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) failed to
obtain and to consider her medical records for the period
September 2010 through July 2012 related to Plaintiff's alleged
disability; (2) failed to discount properly Plaintiff's symptom
testimony by providing clear and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record for doing so; and (3) failed
to consider properly the lay-witness statements of Plaintiff's

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

husband. Plaintiff also contends the Appeals Council should have
remanded Plaintiff's claim to the ALJ for reconsideration in
light of the new evidence that Plaintiff submitted to the
Appeals Council.
I.

The ALJ erred by failing to obtain and to consider
medical records from September 2010 to July 2012 related
to Plaintiff's alleged period of disability and did not
give proper weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's treating
physicians.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to obtain and to consider

relevant medical records from Mollie Thompson, M.D., Plaintiff's
treating rheumatologist, and Ryan Fisher, D.C., Plaintiff's
treating chiropractor, related to Plaintiff's treatment from
September 2010 through July 2012 before determining that
Plaintiff is not disabled.

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ

improperly gave little weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's
treating physicians.
The Commissioner contends, however, the ALJ's development
of the record was reasonable, that the ALJ properly weighted the
opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians, and that the ALJ's
determination that Plaintiff is not disabled was correct.
A.

Medical Records
1.

Standards

The ALJ must obtain the claimant's "complete medical

10 - OPINION AND ORDER

history for at least the 12 months preceding" the claimant's
application date for benefits "unless there is a reason to believe
that development of an earlier period is necessary."
§ 404.1512(b)(1).

20 C.F.R.

The ALJ also must develop the record when

there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to
allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.

McLeod v. Astrue,

640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari,
276 F.3d 453, 459B60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
2.

Analysis

As noted, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of
September 10, 2010.

Tr. 39.

Plaintiff, however, provided the ALJ

with information regarding her treatment by medical providers
dating back to 2009.

Tr. 200-10.

Plaintiff specifically indicated

Dr. Fisher began treating her in January 2009 and Dr. Thompson
began treating her in December 2011.

Tr. 202, 209.

Plaintiff

contends the doctors' diagnoses, treatments, and evaluations of
Plaintiff during that period support her allegations regarding her
symptoms, pains, and limitations and her husband's testimony
regarding Plaintiff's limitations.
The Social Security Administration, however, only
requested records from providers beginning from July 2012 through
December 2014.

Tr. 295, 343, 447, 452, 458, 467, 488.

reviewing the records obtained, the ALJ stated:

11 - OPINION AND ORDER

After

[Plaintiff's] date last insured is December 31,
2014. Accordingly, the period at issue in this
decision is from September 10, 2010 (alleged onset
date) through December 31, 2014.
Tr. 47.

The ALJ concluded:
The medical record does not support the severity of
[Plaintiff's] alleged physical limitations. The
record contains no evidence dated prior to July 10,
2012. Accordingly, there is no medical evidence
concerning [Plaintiff's] alleged impairments from
September 10, 2010, through July 9, 2012.

Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, the ALJ found the period of disability

was from September 2010 through December 2014 despite the fact that
the records before the ALJ were only from July 2012 through
December 2014 and the ALJ did not cite to any record before 2012 to
support his findings.
Based on this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred
because he did not obtain nor review Plaintiff's medical records
dated before July 2012 relating to Plaintiff's period of alleged
disability.
B.

Medical Opinions
1.

Standards

AIn disability benefits cases . . . physicians may
render medical, clinical opinions, or they may render opinions
on the ultimate issue of disability C the claimant's ability to
perform work.@
2014).

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir.

AIn conjunction with the relevant regulations, [courts]

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

have . . . developed standards that guide [the] analysis of an
ALJ's weighing of medical evidence.@

Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Specifically, the

court must Adistinguish among the opinions of three types of
physicians:

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating

physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant
(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor
treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).@
F.3d at 1012.

Garrison, 759

AAs a general rule, more weight should be given to

the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors
who do not treat the claimant.@

Id.

Although the opinion of a

treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of an
examining physician, the opinion of an examining physician is
entitled to greater weight than that of a nonexamining
physician.

Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.

AThe weight afforded a

nonexamining physician's testimony depends >on the degree to
which [he] provide[s] supporting explanations for [his]
opinions.=@

Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)).

AIf a treating or examining doctor's opinion is
contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject
it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are
supported by substantial evidence.@

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

Id.

When a treating or

examining physician's opinion is contradicted, it still is owed
deference and will often be Aentitled to the greatest weight
. . . even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.@
Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007).

An ALJ can

satisfy the Asubstantial evidence@ requirement by Asetting out a
detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting
clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and
making findings.@

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725.

more than state conclusions.

AThe ALJ must do

He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors',
are correct.@
2.

Id. (citation omitted).
Analysis

As noted, the ALJ did not mention nor discuss
Dr. Fisher's 2009 treatment records nor did he address Dr. Fisher's
November 2014 opinion that Plaintiff's impairments affected her
ability to sit, to stand, and to carry and to handle objects.
Tr. 345.

Similarly, the ALJ did not evaluate Dr. Thompson's

records dated from 2011 that included her examination, diagnosis,
and treatment of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's report of symptoms.

As

noted, the opinions of Drs. Thompson and Fisher, Plaintiff's
treating physicians, are entitled to great weight, and the ALJ may

only reject them by providing specific and legitimate reasons
that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
14 - OPINION AND ORDER

Ryan

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
In support of his determination that Plaintiff is not
disabled, the ALJ cited only to the 2015 medical opinions of Martin
Kehrli, M.D., and Peter Bernardo, M.D., state-agency consultants
who merely reviewed the limited medical records before the ALJ.
The ALJ gave the opinions of Dr. Kehrli and Dr. Bernardo "some
weight" on the ground that they had reviewed the records from
treating sources even though they did not have the opportunity to
review recent medical records nor to review Plaintiff's medical
records that pre-dated 2012.

Tr. 48.

Based on the nonexamining

opinions of Drs. Kehrli and Bernardo, the ALJ found Plaintiff had
some physical limitations in her ability to lift, to carry, to
stand, to sit, and to walk during an eight-hour workday.

Tr. 48.

As noted, the opinions of Drs. Thompson and Fisher,
Plaintiff's treating physicians, are entitled to great weight, and
the ALJ may only reject them by providing specific and legitimate

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the
record.

Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198.
Based on this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred

by relying on the opinions of nonexamining physicians and
failing to provide legally sufficient reasons supported by the
record for failing to give "great weight" to the opinions of
Plaintiff's treating physicians.
15 - OPINION AND ORDER

II.

Evidence submitted by Plaintiff to the Appeals Council
should also be considered by the ALJ on remand.
Plaintiff also contends evidence submitted to the Appeals

Council with her request for reconsideration demonstrates
Plaintiff has functional limitations that preclude working, and
the Appeals Council should have remanded this matter to the ALJ
to reconsider his decision in light of this evidence.
The Commissioner, in turn, contends the evidence submitted
to the Appeals Council did not undermine the ALJ's decision,
and, therefore, the Appeals Council properly declined to remand
this matter to the ALJ for consideration of that evidence.
A.

Standards
The district court does not have jurisdiction to

review a decision of the Appeals Council denying a request for
review of an ALJ's decision because the Appeals Council decision
is not a final agency action.

Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011).

When, however, a

claimant “submits evidence for the first time to the Appeals
Council, which considers that evidence in denying review of the
ALJ’s decision, the new evidence is part of the administrative
record, which the district court must consider in determining
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence.”

Brewes, 682 F.3d 1157, 1159-60, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

2012).
B.

Analysis
On September 1, 2017, Plaintiff requested review of

the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council.

Plaintiff also

submitted to the Appeals Council the August 25, 2017, medical
report of Dr. Thompson, one of Plaintiff's treating physicians.
Tr. 12-22.

In addition, on October 20, 2017, Plaintiff

submitted to the Appeals Council a copy of a Discharge
Application for the Department of Education completed by
Dr. Thompson on September 25, 2017, in which Plaintiff sought to
discharge her student loans based on her total and permanent
disability.

Tr. 8-11.

Plaintiff argues these records are

relevant to her disability claim.

Tr. 12.

As noted, on February 9, 2018, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review and indicated there was
not any reason to review the ALJ's decision.

Tr. 1.

With

regard to the medical evidence submitted by Plaintiff, the
Appeals Council stated:

"The Administrative Law Judge decided

your case through December 31, 2014.

This additional evidence

does not relate to the period at issue.

Therefore, it does not

affect the decision about whether you were disabled beginning on
or before December 31, 2014."

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 2.

In Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security
Administration the plaintiff proffered to the Appeals Council a
psychiatric evaluation and medical-source statement that had not
been submitted to the ALJ.

659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011).

The new evidence post-dated the ALJ's decision, but it was based
on treatment that occurred during the relevant disability
period.

Id.

The Appeals Council did not consider the evidence.

The Ninth Circuit found because the evaluations concerned the
plaintiff's limitations during the relevant period of
disability, the Appeals Council should have considered the
records.

Id. at 1233.

The Ninth Circuit held:

Because [the doctor's] opinion concerned his
assessment of [the plaintiff's] mental health
since his alleged disability onset date in 1999,
it related to the period before [the plaintiff's]
disability insurance coverage expired in 2004,
and before the ALJ's decision in 2006. Thus,
[the physician's] opinion should have been
considered. [Citation omitted]. Where the
Appeals Council was required to consider
additional evidence, but failed to do so, remand
to the ALJ is appropriate so that the ALJ can
reconsider its decision in light of the
additional evidence.
Id.
In Powell v. Colvin, No. 6:14-cv-01900-SI, 2016 WL
706199, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2016), the court relied on Taylor
and found:

"Although [the new materials] were dated after the

18 - OPINION AND ORDER

ALJ's decision, [the physician] indicated that he was able to
infer that [claimant's] mental limitations existed at the
present level dating back [two years prior to the ALJ's
decision.]"

Id.

The court remanded the matter to the ALJ for

consideration of the new evidence.

Id., at *4-5.

Here Dr. Thompson states in her medical report she has
been Plaintiff's treating rheumatologist since December 2011.
Tr. 17.

Based on her diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff from

that time, Dr. Thompson stated in the report submitted by
Plaintiff to the Appeals Council on September 1, 2017, that
Plaintiff's limitations existed "continuously from September
2010," the alleged onset date of Plaintiff's disability.
Tr. 21.

Thus, this Court concludes the records submitted by

Plaintiff to the Appeals Council are relevant to the period of
Plaintiff's disability claim of September 2010 through December
2014 and should be considered by the ALJ.
Based on this record and the holdings in Taylor and
Powell, the Court concludes the additional evidence that
Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council "relates to the
period" of alleged disability even though the materials postdated the ALJ's decision.

Although Dr. Thompson’s August 2017

opinion was rendered after the relevant period, it was probative

19 - OPINION AND ORDER

because it was based on Dr. Thompson's treatment of Plaintiff
since 2011.

See Tr. 21.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the

ALJ should have the opportunity to consider the records
submitted to the Appeals Council when he re-evaluates whether
Plaintiff is disabled.

REMAND

The Court must determine whether to remand this matter for
further proceedings or to remand for the calculation of
benefits.
The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or
for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely
utility of further proceedings.

Id. at 1179.

The court may

"direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully
developed and where further administrative proceedings would
serve no useful purpose."

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for
determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate
award of benefits directed."
1178 (9th Cir. 2000).

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

The court should grant an immediate award

of benefits when
(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient
reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no
20 - OPINION AND ORDER

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a
determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is
clear from the record that the ALJ would be required
to find the claimant disabled were such evidence
credited.
Id.

The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question:

Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits

if the case were remanded for further proceedings.

Id. at 1178

n.2.
As noted, the Court concludes the ALJ failed to obtain and
to review records from Plaintiff's treating physicians that predated July 2012 and did not have the opportunity to review
Dr. Thompson's August 2017 report that was submitted to the
Appeals Council.
Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ must consider the
additional evidence on remand and weigh the treating physicians'
opinions in the sequential analysis required under Social
Security Regulations.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The Court,

therefore, remands this matter to the ALJ for further
administrative proceedings for the purpose of reevaluating
Plaintiff's alleged disability.
Although Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in his
evaluation of the testimony of Plaintiff and the lay witness when
the ALJ determined Plaintiff is not disabled, the Court finds it is

21 - OPINION AND ORDER

unnecessary to address these alleged errors in light of the fact
that the ALJ will have to reconsider the record as a whole on
remand, including the testimony of Plaintiff and the lay witness.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for further proceedings
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
______________________________________
ANNA J. BROWN
United States Senior District Judge

22 - OPINION AND ORDER