Watson v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 23

Opinion and Order - The Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed. Signed on 7/17/2019 by Judge Michael H. Simon. (mja)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

SANDRA, W.1,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:18-cv-1019-SI
OPINION AND ORDER

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy
Commissioner for Operations, performing the
duties and functions not reserved to the
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
George J. Wall, 825 NE 20th Avenue, Suite 330, Portland, Oregon 972432. Of Attorneys for
Plaintiff.
Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney, and Renata Gowie, Assistant United States Attorney,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204;
Michael Howard, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
Social Security Administration, 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A, Seattle, WA 98104. Of
Attorneys for Defendant.
Michael H. Simon, District Judge.
Plaintiff Sandra W. seeks judicial review of the final decision by the Social Security
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for Social Security Disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416
1

In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last
name of the non-governmental party in this case. Where applicable, this opinion uses the same
designation for a non-governmental party’s immediate family member.
PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER

and 423. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Because Plaintiff’s date last insured was June 30, 2019, Plaintiff must establish
disability on or before that date in order to be entitled to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits. After carefully reviewing the ALJ’s decision and the evidence in the record,
the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on the proper
legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see
also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). “Substantial evidence” means
“more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039
(9th Cir. 1995)). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039).
Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th
Cir. 2005). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner’s
interpretation is a rational reading of the record, and this Court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193,
1196 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may
not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495
F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). A reviewing court, however, may not affirm the
Commissioner on a ground upon which the Commissioner did not rely. Id.; see also Bray, 554
F.3d at 1226.
PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Application
Plaintiff was born on August 12, 1964 and was 49 years old at the alleged disability onset
date. Plaintiff has at least a high school education, is able to communicate in English, and
previously worked as a retail store manager and a salesperson. AR 35. Plaintiff previously filed
for DIB on January 20, 2006. A determination that Plaintiff was not disabled, made on February
9, 2006, became administratively final when Plaintiff did not appeal that determination. AR 21.
Plaintiff filed a second DIB application as well as an SSI application on December 18, 2007. Id.
Both applications were denied on March 26, 2008 and became administratively final when
Plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff filed a third application for DIB on July 25, 2011. Id. This
application was also denied and, on appeal, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that
Plaintiff was nod disabled in a written opinion on November 14, 2013. That decision became
administratively final when Plaintiff did not appeal the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff filed her current application for DIB and SSI on October 3, 2014, alleging
disability beginning November 15, 2013. The claims were denied initially on January 13, 2015
and upon reconsideration on July 23, 2015. Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before
an ALJ. A hearing was held on March 29, 2017. Plaintiff testified and was represented by
counsel. An impartial medical expert, Dr. Ronald Devere, MD and an impartial vocational
expert, Dr. Robert Gaffney, also testified. On May 8, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision
denying Plaintiff’s applications. AR 38. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, but the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 4, 2018, making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of that
decision.

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B. The Sequential Analysis
A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for
determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.”
Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 (DIB), 416.920 (SSI); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Each step is
potentially dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five-step sequential
process asks the following series of questions:
1.

Is the claimant performing “substantial gainful activity?” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). This activity is work involving
significant mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay
or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. If the claimant is performing
such work, she is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not performing
substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two.

2.

Is the claimant’s impairment “severe” under the Commissioner’s
regulations? 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An
impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it significantly
limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a). Unless expected to result in death,
this impairment must have lasted or be expected to last for a continuous
period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. If the
claimant does not have a severe impairment, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe
impairment, the analysis proceeds to step three.

3.

Does the claimant’s severe impairment “meet or equal” one or more of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so,
then the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of
the listed impairments, the analysis continues. At that point, the ALJ must
evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess and determine the

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claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). This is an assessment
of work-related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular
and continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed by his or her
impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(b)-(c), 416.920(e),
416.945(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC, the analysis
proceeds to step four.
4.

Can the claimant perform his or her “past relevant work” with this RFC
assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform
his or her past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five.

5.

Considering the claimant’s RFC and age, education, and work experience,
is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v),
404.1560(c), 416.960(c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or
she is disabled. Id.

See also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. at 953; see also
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41. The
Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100. At step five, the
Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966
(describing “work which exists in the national economy”). If the Commissioner fails to meet this
burden, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however,
the Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54;
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099.

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C. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through June 30, 2019. Thus, Plaintiff must establish disability on or before that date. The
ALJ then conducted the sequential analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of disability. AR 24. At step two,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis; cognitive
disorder; and mental health problems with a history of diagnoses including attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and bipolar disorder. AR 25. At step three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. AR 26.
The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to:
Perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b), except she cannot more than occasionally stoop or
balance; she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she cannot
be exposed to extremes of heat or cold, unprotected heights, or
workplace hazards; she is limited to frequent fine fingering; and
finally, she can perform simple, entry-level work in a routine
environment, involving not more than occasional interaction with
the public.
AR 28.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work.
AR 35. At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability because there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,
including room cleaner and photocopy machine operator. AR 36.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in (1) improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding fatigue, and (2) improperly rejecting the opinion of treating and examining physicians
including Dr. Barbara Hills, MD, Dr. Ruth Whitham, MD, and Dr. Ghadah Altowajiri, MD.
A. Plaintiff’s Testimony
There is a two-step process for evaluating a claimant’s testimony about the severity and
limiting effect of the claimant’s symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009).
“First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of
an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). When doing so, “the claimant
need not show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the
symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree
of the symptom.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).
“Second, if the claimant meets this first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the
ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). It is “not sufficient for the ALJ to make only general findings; he must
state which pain testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not
credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). Those reasons must be
“sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily
discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46).

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ implicitly rejected Plaintiff’s testimony regarding fatigue
because Plaintiff’s reported degree of fatigue is inconsistent with the light exertional RFC that
the ALJ imposed. Plaintiff testified that her fatigue makes her limbs feel heavy and she sits or
lies down once or twice each day for an hour. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding her symptoms of pain and fatigue supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s
RFC should be reduced to less than light work.
The regulations define light work as lifting no more than 20
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. . . . A job is also in this category when
it involves sitting most of the time but with some pushing and
pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls, which require greater
exertion than in sedentary work; e.g., mattress sewing machine
operator, motor-grader operator, and road-roller operator (skilled
and semiskilled jobs in these particular instances). . . . [T]he full
range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a
total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday. Sitting may
occur intermittently during the remaining time.
Titles II & Xvi: Determining Capability to Do Other Work-the Med.-Vocational Rules of
Appendix 2, SSR 83-10 (S.S.A. 1983) (emphasis added).
Defendant argues, and the Court agrees, that the ALJ’s decision to impose a light
exertional level RFC is consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her fatigue. A light
exertional level would allow Plaintiff, consistent with her testimony, to sit for an hour or two per
day. The ALJ did not reject Plaintiff’s testimony, but instead formulated an RFC that
accommodates Plaintiff’s need to sit for an hour or two every day. On this point, the ALJ did not
err.
B. Medical Opinion Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given more weight to the opinions of her
treating physician and two examining physicians. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts
in the medical record, including conflicts among physicians’ opinions. Carmickle, 533 F.3d
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at 1164. The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of three types of physicians:
treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. Garrison v. Colvin,
759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). Generally, “a treating physician’s opinion carries more
weight than an examining physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more
weight than a reviewing physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.
2001). If a treating physician’s opinion is supported by medically acceptable techniques and is
not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the treating physician’s opinion is
given controlling weight. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). A treating doctor’s opinion
that is not contradicted by the opinion of another physician can be rejected only for “clear and
convincing” reasons. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). If a
treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by the opinion of another physician, the ALJ must
provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for discrediting the treating doctor’s opinion. Id.
In addition, the ALJ generally must accord greater weight to the opinion of an examining
physician than that of a non-examining physician. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. As is the case with the
opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for
rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502,
506 (9th Cir. 1990). If the opinion of an examining physician is contradicted by another
physician’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “specific, legitimate reasons” for discrediting the
examining physician’s opinion. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). An ALJ may
reject an examining, non-treating physician’s opinion “in favor of a nonexamining, nontreating
physician when he gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so, and those reasons are
supported by substantial record evidence.” Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995),
as amended (Oct. 23, 1995).

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Specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s opinion may include its reliance
on a claimant’s discredited subjective complaints, inconsistency with medical records,
inconsistency with a claimant’s testimony, inconsistency with a claimant’s daily activities, or
that the opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bray, 554
F.3d at 1228; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008); Andrews, 53 F.3d at
1042-43. An ALJ errs by rejecting or assigning minimal weight to a medical opinion “while
doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion
is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive
basis” for the ALJ’s conclusion. Garrison¸ 759 F.3d at 1013; see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1286
(noting that an ALJ effectively rejects an opinion when he or she ignores it).
“An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and
thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation
thereof, and making findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725). In
other words, “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own
interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick, 157 F.3d
at 725 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). “[T]he opinion of a nonexamining medical advisor cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the
rejection of the opinion of an examining or treating physician.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); but see id. at 600 (opinions of
non-treating or nonexamining physicians may serve as substantial evidence when the opinions
are consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record).
The ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Dr. Hills, a treating physician. The ALJ
noted that Dr. Hills’s treatments notes are inconsistent with her “extreme assessment” of Plaintiff

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as well as inconsistent with the opinions of the medical expert Dr. Devere, and physicians Dr.
Alley, Dr. Berner, Dr. Gostnell, Dr. Hennings, and Dr. Boyd. In February 2014 Dr. Hills
examined Plaintiff and observed that Plaintiff was scattered and disorganized, but concluded that
Plaintiff had full motor strength, intact reflexes, and normal gait. AR 416. Even Dr. Hills’s
conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s disability are inconsistent. Although Dr. Hill opined in
February 2014 that she would “support [Plaintiff’s] disability” based on Plaintiff’s cognitive
issues, in October 2015, Dr. Hills refused to address Plaintiff’s disability claim. AR 479.
Additionally, when Plaintiff saw Dr. Hills in October 2015, she had been off her MS medications
for quite a while and had not seen Dr. Hills in a year and a half. AR 478. The ALJ concluded that
the medical evidence shows that Plaintiff’s MS is generally controlled and responsive to
treatment, so the fact that Plaintiff had not been taking medication in quite a while when Dr.
Hills examined her further undermines Dr. Hills’s opinion. The ALJ provided specific and
legitimate and legitimate reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Hills’ February 2014 legal
conclusion that Plaintiff was disabled because Dr. Hills’s medical opinion was inconsistent with
the treatment notes, inconsistent with Dr. Hills’s 2015 assessment, and inconsistent with the
other medical opinions.
The ALJ also gave less weight to the opinions of Dr. Altowaijri and Dr. Whitman who
jointly examined Plaintiff in November 2015. Dr. Altowaijri reviewed a report prepared by
Dr. Gostnell, but as the ALJ observed, Dr. Altowaijri appears to have reached a very different
conclusion based on Dr. Gostnell’s report than Dr. Gostnell did, or than the report itself would
suggest. Dr. Gostnell reported that Plaintiff was “calm and focused, with minimal emotional
reactions to challenges and errors . . . . she had no apparent difficulty comprehending interview
questions, although during the formal testing she often seemed to misunderstand directions . . . .

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Her thought processing was logical, coherent and linear, but somewhat ruminative. . . . She
seemed to have good insight in regard to her psychological functioning. . . . She was attentive,
persistent, and gave full effort throughout the exam.” AR 453. Dr. Gostnell performed a full
examination of Plaintiff and concluded that Plaintiff’s “neuropsychological test profile falls
mostly within normal limits.” AR 454. Dr. Gostnell noted that “[a] slight relative impairment
involving neurologically sensitive cognitive functions (working memory and visuomotor
processing) . . . both falling within the low average range, [which] suggests marginal
impairments.” AR 454. Dr. Gostnell reviewed the examination notes and conclusions from
Dr. Cogburn from 2012 and concluded that there was little change between 2012 and 2015, and
Plaintiff scored “essentially normal on both occasions.” He noted that, “[a]lthough multiple
sclerosis is certainly a risk factor for neurocognitive disorder, neither exam provided evidence of
significant cognitive loss.” AR 455. The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of Dr. Gostnell.
When Dr. Altowaijri and Dr. Whitman reviewed Dr. Gostnell’s report, they interpreted it
to have documented “impaired working memory, processing speed, calculations, speech
accuracy and spatial addition score.” AR 485. But these conclusions are inconsistent with
Dr. Gostnell’s report, which found that Plaintiff’s cognitive abilities were essentially normal and
showed no evidence of significant cognitive loss. AR 455. Furthermore, Dr. Altowaijri and Dr.
Whitman concluded that Plaintiff was disabled and unable to work, a legal conclusion that is
reserved for the Commissioner and therefore entitled to no weight. By noting that Dr. Altowaijjri
and Dr. Whitman’s conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s cognitive abilities were inconsistent with
the conclusions of Dr. Gostnell, despite the fact that they relied on Dr. Gostnell’s report, the ALJ
provided specific and legitimate reasons for giving less weight to their opinions.

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Overall, the ALJ gave less weight to the medical opinions that opined on the legal
conclusion that Plaintiff was disabled (Drs. Hills, Altowaijri, and Whitman) and more weight to
the medical opinions from physicians who are more familiar with the social security and
disability system. Dr. Hennings and Dr. Boyd formulated their opinions based on a review of the
record and their opinions were consistent with the evidence, which documents some cognitive
deficits but otherwise shows that Plaintiff remains mostly functional. Dr. Alley and Dr. Berner
are also experts in disability evaluation and provided assessments of Plaintiff’s functional
limitations that are consistent with the medical evidence in the record. In particular, their
opinions were consistent with the record evidence showing that Plaintiff has responded well to
treatment over the years. AR 33. Finally, the ALJ gave weight to the opinion of Dr. Devere, an
impartial medical expert and neurologist with expertise in multiple sclerosis. Dr. Devere testified
that Plaintiff’s normal neurological examination shows no evidence of dementia or cognitive
impairment resulting from Plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis. AR 31. It is the ALJ’s duty to weigh
conflicting medical evidence, and the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate
reasons for giving more weight to the opinions of Dr. Gostnell, Dr. Alley, Dr. Berner, Dr.
Hennings, Dr. Boyd, and Dr. Devere over the opinions of Dr. Hills, Dr. Altowaijri, and Dr.
Whitman.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 17th day of July, 2019.
/s/ Michael H. Simon
Michael H. Simon
United States District Judge

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