Inari Medical, Inc. v. McCaskey

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS: This Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF 11 . This case is dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See the attached Opinion and Order for further details. Signed on 5/10/2024 by Judge Karin J. Immergut. (jy)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

INARI MEDICAL, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:24-cv-00356-IM
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS

MELISSA McCASKEY,
Defendant.
Leslie Boro and Sarah J. Ryan, Jackson Lewis P.C., 200 S.W. Market St., Suite 540, Portland,
OR 97201. Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Taylor Duty and Joseph James Haddad, JJH Law, PC, 1640 NW Irving St., Portland, OR 97209.
Tamara Freeze, Workplace Justice Advocates, PLC, 400 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 560,
Irvine, CA 92618. Attorneys for Defendant.
IMMERGUT, District Judge.
This matter arises out of an attempt to preclude the California courts from resolving an
employment dispute. In January 2024, Defendant Melissa McCaskey sent Plaintiff Inari Medical,
her former employer, a demand letter claiming that Plaintiff had violated several provisions of
California law. In response, Plaintiff initiated the instant action. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that
(1) California law does not apply to the claims Defendant outlined in her letter, (2) Oregon law
PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

applies to those claims, and (3) venue for the threatened suit must be in Oregon, not California.
Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF 1 ¶¶ 12–31. After this suit began, Defendant sought a right-to-sue
letter through the California Civil Rights Department (“CCRD”).
Defendant now moves to dismiss this suit, advancing three independent arguments. See
Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF 11. First, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because
Plaintiff cannot satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 4–
6. Second, Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to pursue forward-looking declaratory relief. Id. at
6–8. Third, this is an inappropriate vehicle for a declaratory judgment because the instant action
is a “reactive suit.” Id. at 9–11.
This Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss only on Defendant’s third ground. Applying
the discretionary Brillhart factors, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s suit is the kind of “reactive
declaratory action” that federal courts “should generally decline to entertain.” Gov’t Emps. Ins.
Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). This Court does not reach
Defendant’s other two contentions.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The facts below are drawn from the Complaint, declarations submitted by both parties,
and matters of public record subject to judicial notice. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2009); Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2003); Warta v. Porter, McGuire, & Kiakona, LLP, 622 F. Supp. 3d 971, 981 (D. Haw.
2022). Although the parties submitted declarations in support of their briefing, there is no
disagreement on the facts relevant to jurisdiction.
Plaintiff is a company that develops and sells medicals devices. Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 1. It is
incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in California. Id. ¶ 4a. Defendant
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worked for Plaintiff as an account manager. Id. ¶ 7. She is domiciled in Oregon. Id. ¶ 4b.
Defendant resigned from Plaintiff on July 14, 2023. Id. ¶ 7.
On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff received a demand letter from Defendant. Id. ¶ 1. The
letter accused Plaintiff of engaging in various violations of California law, including of
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Id. ¶ 6. On February 26, 2024,
Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email to Defendant “confirming [Plaintiff’s] intent to file
imminently.” Id. ¶ 1; see Declaration of Leslie Boro (“Boro Decl.”), ECF 16 ¶ 2; Declaration of
Xinyue Liu (“Liu Decl.”), ECF 18 ¶¶ 2, 8 (Defendant’s attorney stating that she “intends to bring
claims against Plaintiff” Inari Medical).
The next day, Plaintiff initiated the instant suit. Compl, ECF 1. In its Complaint, Plaintiff
seeks a declaration holding that: (i) California law does not apply to the claims Plaintiff outlined
in her demand letter; (ii) Oregon law applies to those claims; and (iii) venue for the threatened
suit is proper in Oregon and not California. Id. ¶¶ 12–31.
Three days thereafter, on March, 1, 2024, Defendant filed an agency complaint with the
CCRD alleging that Plaintiff had violated FEHA. Boro Decl., ECF 16 ¶ 4. Under California law,
such agency complaints are prerequisites to FEHA suits in California state court. See
Beddingfield v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Case No. 23-cv-05896-EMC, 2024 WL 1521238, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2024) (discussing California law).
On April 1, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss under both Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). She contends that: (i) Plaintiff cannot prove the
amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction; (ii) Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing to pursue declaratory relief; and (iii) this Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Brillhart factors. See Mot.,

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ECF 11 at 4–11; see also Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
B. The Standard Governing Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Before delving into the merits, it is important to clarify the standard by which this Court
must evaluate the Motion to Dismiss. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 (9th
Cir. 2014) (looking to the substance of a motion to dismiss to determine whether it falls under
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6)). The issues of diversity jurisdiction and Article III standing fall squarely
under Rule 12(b)(1). Whether the same is true of dismissal under the Declaratory Judgment Act
is not so clearcut. As one treatise has noted, the Brillhart doctrine “does not fit neatly into any of
the categories of motions enumerated in Rule 12(b).” 63 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 51 (2012).
That said, the weight of authority seems to favor treating Brillhart as a matter of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). District courts in this Circuit have tended to do so. See,
e.g., Blumenkron v. Eberwein, No. 3:12–CV–351–BR, 2013 WL 786211, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 1,
2013); Exit 282A Dev. Co. v. Worrix, No. 3:12–CV–939–BR, 2013 WL 786443, at *2 (D. Or.
Mar. 1, 2013); St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Biosense Webster, Inc., CASE No. CV 14–1326–
SVW–AGR, 2014 WL 12686383, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2014); Owners Ins. Co. v. Monte
Vista Hotel, No. CV 09–8095–PCT–MHM, 2010 WL 2643554, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2010)
(Murguia, J.). Further, the Supreme Court has described dismissal under Brillhart as concerning
“the duty of the federal courts to determine legal issues governing the proper exercise of their
jurisdiction.” Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 497–98; see also Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282 (“Brillhart makes
clear that district courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an
action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter
jurisdictional prerequisites.” (emphasis added)).

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In keeping with this Circuit’s district courts and the Supreme Court’s Brillhart
precedents, this Court will construe Defendant’s Motion as one for dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
LEGAL STANDARDS
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
this limited jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
a defendant may move to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. When a motion to
dismiss attacks subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the court assumes the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1073 (citation omitted). When a motion to dismiss attacks subjectmatter jurisdiction by disputing the truth of the complaint’s allegations, “the district court may
review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment.” Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the complaint . . . .” Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671
F.3d 969, 975 n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Although Defendant offers three grounds for dismissal, this Court adopts only one: that
dismissal is proper as a matter of this Court’s discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007) (“[A] federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience
to a case on the merits.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kelly v.
Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274, 280 n.3 (3d Cir. 2017); Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC,
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943 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 2019); Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir.
2003) (per curiam); Trustgard Ins. Co. v. Collins, 942 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2019). This Court
does not reach Defendant’s other two grounds for dismissal.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added).
“Consistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the
sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment
. . . .” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288.
In exercising that discretion, district courts apply the Brillhart factors. Id. at 289–90. The
three factors are whether withholding declaratory relief and dismissing the action would (1)
avoid needless determination of state law issues; (2) avoid duplicative litigation; and (3)
discourage forum-shopping. R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins., 656 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir.
2011). These factors are not exhaustive. Id. Courts evaluate the factors “under the circumstances
existing at the time [Brillhart] was raised rather than at the time of [the complaint’s] filing.” Am.
Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Krieger, 181 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
This Court holds that each factor favors the withholding of Plaintiff’s requested
declaratory relief and dismissal of this matter.
First, retaining jurisdiction over this matter would require this Court to determine issues
of California and Oregon law, including statutory and contract interpretation. See generally
Compl., ECF 1; Mot., ECF 11 at 12–13. This Court would need to resolve how, under California
law, the presumption of extraterritoriality applies to California statutes. Compl., ECF 1 ¶¶ 12–17.

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This Court would also need to resolve whether and if so how, under Oregon law, Oregon statutes
can override contractual choice of law provisions. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. And this Court would need to
resolve issues of state “public policy.” Id. ¶¶ 24–25. The fact that the Complaint presents these
involved questions of state law counsels strongly in favor of dismissal. In fact, the Ninth Circuit
has “recognized that needless determination of state law issues alone may support” remand or
dismissal under Brillhart. R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 975 (emphasis added) (citation omitted);
see Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming
dismissal under Brillhart solely because “both the federal and state actions involve[d] the same
purely state law issue”); Cal. Specialty Insulation, Inc. v. Allied World Surplus Lines Ins., No.
21-55648, 2022 WL 1125672, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2022) (affirming dismissal under
Brillhart on solely this factor). Therefore, the first Brillhart factor favors dismissal.
Second, this case threatens duplicative litigation. Defendant intends, and has begun the
process, to pursue state court litigation that will involve not only the threshold issues Plaintiff
wishes this Court to resolve but also the underlying employment law claims on the merits.
Before either a California or Oregon court, Plaintiff can raise the same arguments as it has here
(albeit as affirmative defenses), and “[t]he state court[s] [are] equally capable of deciding the
issue[s].” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, CV 15–83–BU–BMM, 2017 WL 617924, at *5 (D.
Mont. Feb. 15, 2017). Indeed, in its Complaint, Plaintiff so concedes. See Compl., ECF 1 ¶¶ 17,
22, 31. Further, a declaratory judgment will not “settle all aspects of the controversy” between
the two parties here. Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225 n.5 (citation omitted). Even were this Court to
retain jurisdiction, a different court in either Oregon or California ultimately would need to
resolve the underlying issues on the merits. There is less risk of that occurring if this matter
continues through either state court system.

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To be sure, there is no parallel state court action currently pending—rather, there is an
action that Defendant intends to bring and for which she is pursuing a right-to-sue letter. But the
lack of a pending state court case does not fundamentally alter the Brillhart analysis. See R.R. St.
& Co., 656 F.3d at 976 (“Timing is only one consideration when deciding whether to entertain a
declaratory judgment action, and the Wilton/Brillhart factors sometimes compel a court to
decline to entertain an earlier-filed action in favor of a later-filed action.”) (citations omitted);
Huth, 298 F.3d at 802–03 (explaining that “the absence of a pending state action” does not
preclude the application of the Brillhart factors); cf. also Monster Beverage Corp. v. Herrera,
650 F. App’x 344, 346–47 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying the Anti-Injunction Act in a federal action
that was filed before the state court action was initiated). 1 As the Ninth Circuit has put it, “the
dispositive question is not whether the pending state proceeding is parallel, but rather, whether
there was a procedural vehicle available to the [defendant] in state court to resolve the issues
raised in the action filed in federal court.” Polido v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 110 F.3d 1418,
1423 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227. Because Plaintiff,
by its own admission, has such a procedural vehicle and can resolve the issues raised here in the
anticipated California state court litigation, or in a subsequently filed Oregon court case,
dismissal under Brillhart is further warranted here.

1

This Court notes that Plaintiff’s request for a declaration that “Oregon is the proper
venue for the claims asserted in [Defendant’s] Demand” is effectively a request for this Court to
preclude a state court proceeding. Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 31. The Anti-Injunction Act generally forbids
such claims for relief. See Monster Beverage Corp. v. Herrara, Case No. EDCV 13–00786–VAP
(OPx), 2013 WL 12131740, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013) (providing extensive discussion
on the Act and its application to requests for declaratory relief), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 344. Because
neither party briefed this issue, and because Brillhart suffices to resolve this case, this Court does
not definitively opine on the Anti-Injunction Act.
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Third, Plaintiff’s decision to bring suit here amounts to forum-shopping. Plaintiff brought
suit after it received a demand letter from Defendant outlining claims under California law. That
fact is critical, for “the same federalism concerns against the use of the Declaratory Judgment
Act as a forum shopping device, and the policy against having federal courts needlessly
determine issues of state law, are also present when a federal plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in
anticipation that a related state court proceeding may be filed.” Budget Rent-A-Car v. Crawford,
108 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1227; see Fin. Indem. Co. v. Brooks, 2:15-cv-06318-CAS
(AGRx), 2016 WL 626736, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016); Burlington Ins. Co. v. Panacorp,
Inc., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1143 (D. Haw. 2010). Thus, the third Brillhart factor, too, supports
dismissal.
To sum up: every Brillhart factor favors dismissal of this matter. Plaintiff is exclusively
seeking declaratory relief on involved state law questions. Its suit threatens duplicative litigation.
And Plaintiff has essentially brought this case to avoid raising a defense in what it has described
as imminent state court litigation. This suit must be dismissed.
Plaintiff resists this conclusion, but its arguments are unavailing. It contends, first, that
“there is no danger of a needless determination of state law or the creation of duplicative
litigation, and the matters presented are so narrow that an exercise of jurisdiction will fully
resolve the parties’ rights and obligations.” Plaintiff’s Response (“Resp.”), ECF 14 at 8. But this
is incorrect. It would be needless and duplicative for a federal court to opine on a state law issue
when a state court action is going to be filed, in Plaintiff’s words, “imminently.” Compl., ECF 1
¶ 1. And Plaintiff’s concession that the matters presented here are “narrow” weighs against, not
for, its position: these “narrow” issues cannot resolve the underlying employment dispute

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between Plaintiff and Defendant, while a state court could resolve both the issues raised by
Plaintiff as well as the underlying dispute.
Plaintiff next accuses Defendant of forum-shopping by pursuing suit in California. Resp.,
ECF 14 at 9. By so arguing, however, Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to resolve the
merits questions here to resolve the jurisdictional one. This Court will not “use the pretermission
of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would
have gone unaddressed.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998); see
Bakalian v. Cent. Bank of Rep. of Turk., 932 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2019).
*

*

*

In sum, the Brillhart factors cut against the exercise of jurisdiction here under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and Plaintiff offers no persuasive reason for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court dismisses this case. Plaintiff did not request leave to amend
its Complaint, so this Court will not grant such leave.
On a final note, this Court observes that Defendant failed to properly comply with the
District of Oregon’s conferral requirement. See LR 7-1(a)(1). Defendant certified in her Motion
that “the parties made a good faith effort through electronic mail and telephone to resolve the
dispute which is the subject of this Motion.” Mot., ECF 11 at 1. But Defendant’s counsel sent an
email only hours before filing her Motion. Boro Decl., ECF 16 ¶¶ 5–9. While Defendant’s
counsel may have called Plaintiff several times before filing her Motion to Dismiss, that is
insufficient under Local Rule 7-1(a)(1). See Liu Decl., ECF 18 ¶ 5. Still, this Court does not
view Defendant’s deficient conferral as reason enough for this Court to retain jurisdiction over
this matter.

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CONCLUSION
This Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 11. This case is dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kerr
Contractors, Inc., No. CV 10–78–MO, 2010 WL 2572772, at *7 (D. Or. June 22, 2010).

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2024.
/s/ Karin J. Immergut
Karin J. Immergut
United States District Judge

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