Hakanson v. Boise, Inc et al

Filing 49

ORDER: Denying Motion to Strike or Dismiss 44 ; Granting Motion to Remand 42 . Signed on 12/21/2011 by U.S. District Judge Michael R. Hogan. (jw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
CARL HAKANSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. lO-6094-HO

v.

ORDER

BOISE, INC. an Oregon corporation,
and ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PULP &
PAPER WORKERS, LOCAL #396,
Defendants.
Plaintiff, Carl Hakanson,

filed this action in the Circuit

Court for the County of Marion alleging intentional infliction of
emotional

distress

interference

with

(lIED),

wrongful

economic

relations

discharge,
and

intentional

defamation

against

defendants Boise, Inc. and the Association of Western Pulp & Paper
Workers Association, Local 396 (the Union).

Defendants remcved the

action to this court asserting the state law claims are preempted
by federal law.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on preemption
under the Labor Management Relati.ons Act (LMRA) and its statute of
limitations.

Plaintiff responded to the motions to dismiss, but

also filed an amended complaint.

The court denied the initial

motions to dismiss as moot.

The amended complaint asserted claims

for

Union and Boise,

IIED against

both the

w.r:ongful

discharge

against Boise, and defamation against the Union.
Plaintiff also moved to remand asserting that federal law did
not apply.

The issue with respect to the applicability of federal

law was the same issue with respect to the renewed motions to
dismiss.

The court determined that all claims were preempted under

the LMRA, but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that preemption
only applied to Boise:
However, the district court erred when it held Hakanson's
state law claims against the Union are preempted by the
LMRA. Hakanson contends the Union defamed him when it
encouraged Dorsey to file a police report which stated
that
Hakanson
had
been
the
aggressor
in
their
altercation. Although "statements that are made in
grievance proceedings established by a
[collective
bargaining agreement] . . . . are privileged and may not
support a state tort claim," Hyles v. Mensing, 849 F.2d
1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988), we find no authority for the
proposition that the statements the Union encouraged
Dorsey to make to the police were statements made "in
grievance proceedings." Hyles provides that statements
are privileged if they are made by witnesses in the
course of grievance hearings. The district court erred
when it extended the Hyles rule to cover any and all
statements made while the Union's representation of
Dorsey representation was ongoing.

2 - ORDER

Plaintiff now renews his motion for remand.

Defendant Union

responded by moving. to strike or al ternati vely to dismiss.'
Because the only remaining claims are the non-preempted state
law claims, plaintiff asserts the court should now remand the case
to Marion County.

The lIED claim is based on the Union encouraging

Dorsey to report plaintiff's actions as criminal and to pursue a
civil action.

The defamation claim is based on the same conduct of

allegedly reporting the false claims.
Defendant Un.ion argues, appa.rently, that the Ninth Circuit did
not find the claims against it weren't preempted, but only that
is possible they aren't.

For instance, the Union maintains that

the current allegations regarding preempted claims against former
defendant Boise are so intertwined that they cannot be separated.
Further,

the Union contends that the Ninth Circuit pointed to

allegations

regarding the police report as a

preempted state law claim.
preempted allegations

In addition,

"potential" non-

the Union argues that

remain intertwined with allegations that

"may" independently support a claim under state law.
However, the Ninth Circuit did not reverse because there "may"
be

a

"potential"

state

law

claim

against

the

Union.

It

unequivocally held that plaintiff's "state-law defamation. and lIED

'The Union seeks to strike all preempted allegations and have
plaintiff replead, or have the court determine that the preempted
allegations are too intertwined to be separated from the state law
claims against the Union and dismiss. The Union agrees that to the
extent any non-preempted claims remain, the court should remand.
3 - ORDER

claim arising from the defamation, are not preempted by the LMRA."
While

this

intertwined

court

with

did

determine

interpretation

of

that

the

the

claims

collective

agreement, the Ninth Circuit opinion is clear.

were

bargaining

It would serve no

useful purpose to require plaintiff to amend the complaint prior to
ordering a remand.

While the Union correctly points out that it is

enti tIed

the

to

have

federal

courts

determine

the

scope

of

preemption before remanding the state claims, the federal courts
have already determined such scope.
The

mot~on

to dismiss the claims against Boise as preempted

has been granted by this court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
The only remaining claims are the non-preempted claims against the
Union and plaintiff's motion to remand those claims back to state
court are granted and the Union's motion to strike or dismiss is
denied.
Plaintiff also seeks costs, contending there was no reasonable
basis

for

previously

the

Union

found

the

to

seek

claims

removal.
preempted

Given
by

that

federal

this
law,

court
it

is

difficult to see how defendant did not have a reasonable basis for
seeking removal.

Plaintiff's requests for costs are denied.

In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's remand to this court,
plaintiff I s

lIED

and

defamation

remanded to state court.

4 - ORDER

claim

against

the

Union

are

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,

defendant Union's motion to

strike or dismiss (#44) is denied and plaintiff's renewed mction to
remand (#42) is granted .

DA'I'ED this

5 - ORDER

.J-

OL-I --day of December, 2011.