Vaile v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
18
OPINION & ORDER: The ALJ's decision that Vaile is not disabled is based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed on August 21, 2013 by Judge James A. Redden. (eo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
ANGELLA D. VAILE,
Plaintiff,
6:12-cv-00572- RE
OPINION AND ORDER
V.
·cAROLYNW. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
REDDEN, Judge:
Plaintiff Angella D. ("VAILE") brings this action to obtain judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying
her claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income benefits
("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed and this
matter is dismissed .
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Vaile filed her applications for SSI and DIB on February 26, 2008, alleging disability
since January 1, 1998, due to "left side stroke, I'm confused/lost, my mind checks out, part of the
time I don't know what I'm doing, diabetic, hypertension, GERD, back pain." Tr. 95. Vaile was
46 years old on her alleged onset date. Her application was denied initially and upon
reconsideration. A hearing was held on June 15, 2009. At the hearing, Vaile amended her
disability onset date to December 1, 2004. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found her
not disabled. Vaile's request for review was denied, making the ALJ's decision the final decision
of the Commissioner.
ALJ's DECISION
The ALJ found Vaile had the medically determinable severe impairments of alcohol
abuse, status post cerebrovascular accident ("CV A"), diabetes, and degenerative disc disease of
the lumbar spine. Tr. 20.
The ALJ found that Vaile's impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Tr. 13.
The ALJ determined that, considering alcohol abuse, Vaile "is mentally unable to sustain
a normal work schedule on a regular and continuing basis." Tr. 21.
The ALJ determined that, without considering alcohol abuse, Vaile retained the residual
functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a reduced range of light work, lifting and carrying 20
pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, sitting for approximately six hours in an eight
hour day, and walking and standing for four hours in an eight hour day. She can occasionally
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
perform postural activities. She cannot climb ladders, stairs, ramps, and scaffolds, and should
avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. Tr. 23.
At step four, considering alcohol abuse, the ALJ found Vaile could not perform her past
relevant work, but if alcohol abuse was not considered, Vaile was capable fo performing past
relevant work as a contract administrator and procurement clerk, as actually and generally
performed. Tr. 26-27.
Vaile argues that the ALJ erred by: ( 1) failing to properly evaluate her alcohol abuse; (2)
improperly weighing the treating physician's opinion; and (3) improperly relying on the
vocational evidence.
DISCUSSION
I. Drug and Alcohol Abuse
The Act and the Commissioner's regulations prohibit payment of benefits when drug and
alcohol use is a material factor in a claimant's disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C);
1382c(a)(3)(J), 20 C.F.R. § 416.935. An ALJ must conduct a drug and alcoholism analysis
("DAA analysis") by determining which of the claimant's disabling limitations would remain if
the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b). Ifthe remaining
limitations would not be disabling, then the claimant's substance abuse is material and benefits
must be denied. Id., Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 745 (9 1h Cir. 2007). The claimant bears the
burden of proving her substance abuse is not a material contributing factor to her disability. I d.
Vaile argues that the ALJ' s finding that she experiences "alcohol abuse" is insufficient to
meet the regulatory requirement that "alcoholism" deprives a claimant of her right to disability
benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a). The DAA process was implemented by the
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Contract with America Advancement Act (Pub.L. No. 104-121 ), enacted "to discourage alcohol
and drug abuse, or at least not to encourage it with permanent government subsidy." Ball v.
Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001). The label used by the ALJ is not relevant because
the ALJ analyzed the issue of functional limitations arising from the substance abuse.
Vaile argues that her alcohol use does not rise to the level of alcohol abuse or alcoholism.
This argument fails because the ALJ properly considered her functional limitations both with and
without the effects of substance abuse. Tr. 22-27.
Vaile argues that her symptoms may be side effects from prescribed medications. The
ALJ is not obligated to consider a claimant's assertion of medication side effects unless it is
supported by objective evidence. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). Vaile
does not point to any objective evidence of medication side effects.
II. Medical Opinions
Disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(l);
416.927(e)(1). If no conflict arises between medical source opinions, the ALJ generally must
accord greater weight to the opinion of a treating physician than that of an examining physician.
Lester v. Chater, 81 F .3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In such circumstances the ALJ should also
give greater weight to the opinion of an examining physician over that of a reviewing physician.
!d. But, if two medical source opinions conflict, an ALJ need only give "specific and legitimate
reasons" for discrediting one opinion in favor of another. !d. at 830. The ALJ may reject
physician opinions that are "brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).
A. Donna Kruse, M.D.
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Dr. Kruse completed forms in which she found Vaile "severely limited" and "sedentary."
Tr. 722-60; 353-56; 751-54; 729-32.
The ALJ gave Dr. Kruse's opinion "little weight." Tr. 26. The ALJ noted Dr. Kruse's
opinion was not supported by her own treatment records, and was based upon Vaile's selfreports, which were found not fully credible. !d. The ALJ articulated specific and legitimate
reasons to give greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Bello, as described below.
B. Sergio Bello, M.D.
Dr. Bello testified at the hearing after reviewing the medical record. Dr. Bello opined that
Vaile retained the ability to perform a light level of exertion with the restrictions identified by the
ALJ in the RFC. The ALJ noted that Dr. Bello's opinion was consistent with the opinion of
examining physician Mark Thibert, M.D. Tr. 26, 347.
The evidence could result in "more than one rational interpretation," and the ALJ's
conclusion to grant more weight to Drs. Thibert and Bello than Dr. Kruse must be upheld.
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9 1h Cir. 2005).
Vaile has the burden of proving that her substance abuse is not material to her disability.
Parra, 481 F.3d at 745. The ALJ offered clear and convincing, and specific and legitimate,
reasons to give Drs. Thibert and Bellas's opinions greater weight than Dr. Kruse's.
III. Vocational Expert
Vaile argues that the ALJ erred by posing a hypothetical to the Vocational Expert ("VE")
which included a "sit stand option." Tr. 78. Vaile contends that this functional limitation created
a conflict between the VE's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT").
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
The VE testified that an individual with Vaile's RFC could perform Vaile's past relevant
work, and that her testimony did not "differ from the information found in the DOT Tr. 77-78.
An ALJ must inquire whether aVE's testimony is consistent with the DOT, and if not, obtain a
reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9 1h
Cir. 2007). Where there is no conflict, the ALJ may rely on the VE testimony. The DOT does
not contain information about sit/stand options, and so cannot conflict with the VE testimony on
this issue.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons; the ALJ's decision that Vaile is not disabled is based on correct legal
standards and supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ·2 \ day of August, 2013.
(~(df&
~~~A. REDDEN
r t a t e s District Judge
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
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