Martinez v. Peters et al

Filing 83

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction 52 is DENIED. Signed on 11/18/2013 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (gw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
LEONEL 0. MARTINEZ,
6: 13-cv-00384-PK
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER

COLETTE S. PETERS, et al.,
Defendants.
BROWN, District Judge.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction [52]

Plaintiff

moves

the

Court

for

a

preliminary

injunction

directing defendants to cease their enforcement of certain Security
Threat Management ("S.T.M.") policies as set out under Oregon law.
Specifically,

plaintiff seeks an Order from the Court enjoining

defendants "from the practice or enforcement of [the] above S.T.M.
policies

for

disciplinary actions

against

Plaintiff

and other

prisoners without state or federal procedural due process rights

1 - ORDER

OAR 291-105-0005 through OAR 291-105-0100 and Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F3d 517, 524-525 (9th
Cir. 1996) ."
p.

Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction [52],

Moreover,

2.

plaintiff indicates defendants should "reopen

Administrative Segregation E-Black highside" as an alternative to
placing he and other prisoners in punitive segregation without
providing them with their state and federal procedural due process
rights.

Id. at 3.

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief in the Ninth Circuit,
a

party must

meet

one

of

two

alternative

tests . 1

Under

the

"traditional" standard, preliminary relief may be granted if the
court finds:

(1) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury

if the preliminary relief is not granted;

(2) the moving party has

a likelihood of success on the merits; (3) the balance of potential
harm favors the moving party; and 4) the advancement of the public
interest favors granting injunctive relief.
Department of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064, 1084

Under the alternative test,

Burlington N.R.R. v.

(9th Cir. 1991).

the moving party may meet the

burden by showing either (1) probable success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable injury, or (2)

that serious questions

are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the moving
1

Notably,
the
standards
for
issuance
of
a
temporary
restraining order are at least as exacting as those for a
preliminary injunction.
Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United
States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 650 F.2d 1004, 1008
(9th Cir. 1981).
2 - ORDER

party's favor.

Id.; Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

Coalition for Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert.

denied,

503

U.S.

985

represent two points on a

(1992).

"These

two

formulations

sliding scale in which the required

degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success
decreases."

Prudential Real Estate Affiliates v. PPR Realty, Inc.,

204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff maintains that he will suffer irreparable injury or
harm if the Court does not grant him injunctive relief at this
juncture.

Specifically, he argues he and other S.T.M. classified

inmates are subject to repetitive punishment for past misconduct
and for no misconduct "based on our race, and if they don't like
our attitude or for some other improper reason without any prior
due process rights, supra . "
4. 2

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law [53] at

He further asserts the balance of hardships favor him because

he is subject to repetitive unwarranted punishment.

He contends

that he enjoys a likelihood of success on the merits evidenced in

2

According to plaintiff, "S.T.M. officials statewide under
STM policies OAR division 69 cause plaintiff and other prisoners to
live in fear of having our programs, services, activities and
privileges and liberty taken from us by STM officials without due
process hearing and finding of guilt to a charge of misconduct
prior to placement in punitive segregation D.S.U., lockdown in own
cell with or without property with no outside exercise for 1 to 120
days at a time and deprived of other privileges without due process
hearing that all other O.D.O.C. prisoners enjoy in general
population prior · to deprivation of their liberty, property,
privileges pursuant to disciplinary actions. This is STM practice
on a regular basis." Plaintiff's Decl. In Support [54] at 3.
3 - ORDER

part by this Court's assessment, set out in the Notice of Lawsuit
directing defendants to respond to the Complaint, that "plaintiff
has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits."
he

maintains

it

is

always

in

the

public

interest

Finally,

for

prison

officials to obey the law and the Constitution.
In response to plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction,
defendants assert:

(1) plaintiff does not have a liberty interest

in not being placed under S.T.M. supervision, or being placed in
disciplinary

segregation;

(2)

plaintiff

was

not

subjected

to

deprivations that implicate due process rights; and (3) there was
good cause for plaintiff's placement on S.T.M. supervision and his
placement in segregation and all actions taken were consistent with
S.T.M. policy.

Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction [64],

p. 2 (citing Declaration of Correctional Lieutenant Douglas Yancey,
Administrator of the ODOC S.T.M. Unit [65]) .
Specifically, Yancey reports that plaintiff was transferred
from the Oregon State Prison ("OSP") to the Two Rivers Correctional
Institution on August
Segregation Unit

3,

2012

("D. S. U.")

and placed

pending a

in

the

Disciplinary

hearing on a

misconduct

report.

This report was later dismissed without prejudice pending

further

investigation.

segregation

during

the

Plaintiff

remained

investigation

and

in

was

general population on or about November 8, 2012.

administrative

returned

to

OSP

Notwithstanding

the fact a new misconduct report was not issued, Yancey avers that

4 - ORDER

"[t] hrough the

investigation into

the

sale

and trafficking of

illegal narcotics, sufficient intelligence was received to warrant
Inmate Martinez's placement under STM."

Plaintiff remained on this

status for six months, but according to Yancey, "[n]o restrictions
were placed on

[him]

while he was under the supervision of STM,

except that he was required to obtain permission from the OSP STM
Lieutenant

before

he

could change program work assignments or

change housing assignments."
Notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff widely disputes the
accuracy of Lieutenant Yancey's declaration, upon careful review of
~

the record,

the Court denies plaintiff's motion for injunctive

relief on the basis that he has failed to demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits.
Inc,

129

S.Ct.

365,

Winter v.

374

Natural Res.

(2008) (plaintiff

Def.

seeking

Council,

preliminary

injunction must demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the
merits) .
In addition, ordinarily a preliminary injunction maintains the
status quo pending a final decision on the merits.
Texas v.

Camenisch,

451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

University of

Plaintiff is asking

the court to alter the status quo by granting him, before trial,
the very relief he hopes to obtain through this action.
"mandatory

injunction,"

as

extraordinary circumstances.
Homes

of Nevada,

5 - ORDER

434

it

is

known,

is

granted

Such a
only

in

See LGS Architects, Inc. V. Concordia

F.3d 1150,

1158

(9th Cir.

2006);

Marlyn

.

'

. .

Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucas Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879
(9th Cir. 2009) (mandatory injunction, which goes beyond maintaining
the status quo, is particularly disfavored).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
Injunction [52]
DATED this

plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary

is DENIED.

~ftt"vday

of

United States District Judge

6 - ORDER