Mata v. Oregon Health Authority et al

Filing 94

OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants' Motion for Partial Reconsideration #88 is deined. Ordered by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

VICTORINA MATA,
Plaintiff,

Civ. No. 6:13-cv-485-TC

v.

OPINION and ORDER
OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY, an
agency of the State of Oregon, OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
an agency of the State of Oregon, CATHLEEN
KAUFMANN, PATRICIA WENTZ,
BEVIN HANSELL, and BRUCE GOLDBERG,
Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (ECF No. 88) pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(a), for reconsideration ofthis Court's previous Opinion and Order (ECF No.
86) denying summary judgment as to the Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief - Count Three, relating
to plaintiff's claim under ORS 659A.230. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for

Partial Reconsideration (ECF No. 88) is DENIED.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The basis for the motion now before this Court (ECF No. 88), is that Defendants believe
that the Plaintiff's ORS 659A.230 claim was not addressed by Judge Coffin's original Findings
and Recommendations (ECF No. 79) concerning the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 65), and therefore was also not addressed in this Court's most recent
Opinion and Order (ECF No. 86).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) permits a court to reconsider and amend a previous order. Marcus v.

Oregon, 2012 WL 5955762 (D. Or. Nov. 25, 2012). A motion for reconsideration is proper if it
(1) demonstrates why the Court should reconsider its prior opinion and (2) sets forth facts or law
of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision. Donaldson v.

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 947 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Haw. 1996).
For summary judgment motions, a court must grant summary judgment ifthere are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonably jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air., Inc., 281 F.3d
1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The Court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Allen

v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Jesinger v. Nevada Federal
Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994)). If the moving party shows that there are no
genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate
facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see Fed. R.
Civ. P (56)(c).
2 - OPINION AND ORDER

ORS 659A.230 provides as follows:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge, demote, suspend or
in any manner discriminate or retaliate against an employee with regard to promotion,
compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment for the reason that the
employee has in good faith reported criminal activity by any person, has in good faith caused a
complainant's information or complaint to be filed against any person, has in good faith
cooperated with any law enforcement agency conducting a criminal investigation, has in good
faith brought a civil proceeding against an employer or has testified in good faith at a civil
proceeding or criminal trial.

DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that this Court did not address Plaintiffs ORS 659A.230 claim in its
previous Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. On the contrary,
this Court clearly and specifically addressed Plaintiffs ORS 659A.230 claim as follows:
ORS§ 659A.230 prohibits employers from discharging, demoting, suspending or in any
manner discriminating or retaliating against an employee with regard to promotion,
compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment for the reason that the
employee has in good faith reported criminal activity by any person, has in good faith caused a
complainant's information or complaint to be filed against any person, has in good faith
cooperated with any law enforcement agency conducting a criminal investigation, has in good
faith brought a civil proceeding against an employer or has testified in good faith at a civil
proceeding or criminal trial.
To establish a retaliation case under Oregon's whistleblowing statutes, Plaintiff must
show that (1) she was engaging in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment
decision, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision." Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1986).
As to the first element, I agree with Judge Coffin's findings that plaintiff has
presented evidence to support the conclusion that she was engaged in a protected activity
when she made internal and external reports of wrongdoing based on an objectively
reasonable belief that a violation of law had occurred. (ECF No. 86 at p. 7 and ECF No. 79 at
p. 10).
This Court also noted in its Order:

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff alleges that she reasonably believed Defendants' enrollment
misrepresentations and accounting irregularities were violations of Federal or Oregon law,
rule or regulation. Plaintiff further alleges that these misrepresentations and irregularities
evidenced mismanagement, and/or were an abuse of the Agency's authority to use taxpayer
money in ways the Agency was not entitled. (ECF No. 42 at p.5). Plaintiff alleges that beginning
in September 2010, she made these complaints and concerns known to her managers and
also reported them to other state agencies including the Oregon Secretary of State's Audit
Division, the Oregon Department of Justice' Fraud Unit, individual State legislators, and to
the media. (ECF No. 42 at p.5). In February 2012, plaintiff filed a formal Complaint with the
Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries (BOLI) and the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (ECF No. 86 at p. 3).

This Court's stance is even echoed in its discussion of Plaintiffs First Amendment claim
against defendants Kaufman and Wentz:

Plaintiff's [alleged] acts of reporting no-bid contracts and possible wrongdoing and
fraud to the Secretary of State, DOJ, and the media, as well as leaking what she believed to
be wrongfully withheld public records to the media, were certainly not a part of her job
duties and thus constituted private speech. It follows that if the plaintiff's allegations are
true, the defendants certainly would not have taken the adverse employment action of
constructively terminating the plaintiff absent her engaging in her speech that she made
externally as a private citizen. (ECF No. 86 at pp. 10-11 ).
This Court also clearly stated in its conclusion that Plaintiffs ORS 659A.230 claim
"remains viable." (ECF No. 86 at p. 12).

Based on the standard of review for summary judgment as described above and in this
Court's previous Order, the Court should view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In this case, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence. Genuine issues of
material fact remain in this case for Plaintiffs ORS§ 659A.230 (First Claim for Relief- Count
Three) to survive summary judgment and this motion for reconsideration.

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial
Reconsideration (ECF No. 88) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 17th day ofNovember, 2015.

""----

Michael J. McShane
United States District Judge

5 - OPINION AND ORDER