Boen v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
15
Opinion and Order. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. Signed on 06/25/2014 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 18 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
KIMBERLY R. BOEN,
Plaintiff,
6:13-CV-01152-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,1
Defendant.
RICHARD F. MCGINTY
McGinty & Belcher, PC
P.O. Box 12806
Salem, OR 97309
(503) 371-9636
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1
Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be
substituted for Michael J. Astrue as Defendant in this case. No
further action need be taken to continue this case by reason of
the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 405.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
S. AMANDA MARSHALL
United States Attorney
ADRIAN L. BROWN
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
(503) 727-1003
DAVID MORADO
Regional Chief Counsel
LARS J. NELSON
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 615-2909
Attorneys for Defendants
BROWN, Judge.
Plaintiff Kimberly R. Boen seeks judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications
for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
This Court has juris-
diction to review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court REVERSES the
Commissioner’s final decision and REMANDS this matter pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative
proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for SSI and
DIB on April 3, 2009, and alleged a disability onset date of
November 19, 2007.
Tr. 159, 163.2
initially and on reconsideration.
The applications were denied
An Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) held a hearing on November 17, 2011.
Tr. 47-83.
was represented by an attorney at the hearing.
Plaintiff
Plaintiff and a
vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing.
The ALJ issued a decision on December 7, 2011, in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Tr. 30-41.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d),
that decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on
June 26, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on February 13, 1975.
was 36 years old at the time of the hearing.
high-school education.
Tr. 51.
Tr. 84.
Plaintiff
Plaintiff has a
Plaintiff has past relevant work
experience as an accounts-receivable clerk, cashier, fast-food
worker, and title clerk.
Tr. 39.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to anxiety, depression, and
2
Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on November 26, 2013, are referred to as "Tr."
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
“severe pain.”
Tr. 179.
Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.
After carefully reviewing the
medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.
See Tr. 35-38.
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her
inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).
42
See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Substantial evidence is
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11
(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).
It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]
but less than a preponderance.
Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d
at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving
ambiguities.
2009).
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006).
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.
The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I).
See
also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairments or combination of impairments.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648
F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
F.3d at 724.
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648
The criteria for the listed impairments, known as
Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
The
claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
(SSR) 96-8p.
20 C.F.R.
See also Social Security Ruling
“A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a
day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule."
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
SSR 96-8p,
at *1.
In other words, the Social Security Act does not require
complete incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.
416.920(a)(4)(iv).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
416.920(a)(4)(v).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
Here the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the
testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.
If the Commissioner meets this burden,
the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),
416.920(g)(1).
ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
in substantial gainful activity since her November 19, 2007,
alleged onset date.
Tr. 32.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of obesity, chronic pain syndrome, depression,
anxiety, meralgia paresthetica “due to obesity,” and degenerative
joint disease of the left ankle post-injury and repair.
Tr. 32.
The ALJ found Plaintiff's bipolar disorder, vomiting, “status
post laparoscopic cholecystectomy to treat chronic calculus
cholecystitis,” “trochanteric/hip bursitis,” lumbar disc
herniation, and “essential hypertension” are not severe
impairments.
Tr. 32.
At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments do not
meet or equal the criteria for any impairment in the Listing of
Impairments.
Tr. 33.
sedentary work.
The ALJ found Plaintiff can perform
Tr. 34.
The ALJ found Plaintiff can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs; stoop, kneel, crouch, and
operate foot controls; and frequently balance.
The ALJ found
Plaintiff should never crawl; have concentrated exposure to
vibration or hazards; or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
Tr. 34.
The ALJ concluded Plaintiff is “limited to unskilled
work with superficial interaction with the public and co-workers
and no close cooperation or coordination.”
Tr. 34.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is not capable of
performing her past relevant work.
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 321.
At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff can perform jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
Tr. 321.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) improperly
failed to include in Plaintiff’s RFC limitations identified by
Bill Hennings, Ph.D., reviewing psychologist and (2) improperly
gave “no weight” to the August 2010 opinion of treating
psychologist Todd Overman, Ph.D.
I.
The ALJ erred when he failed to include in his assessment of
Plaintiff's RFC the limitations assessed by Dr. Hennings.
A nonexamining physician is one who neither examines nor
treats the claimant.
Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.
"The opinion of a
nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial
evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an
examining physician or a treating physician."
Id. at 831.
When
a nonexamining physician's opinion contradicts an examining
physician's opinion and the ALJ gives greater weight to the
nonexamining physician's opinion, the ALJ must articulate his
reasons for doing so.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999).
A nonexamining
physician's opinion can constitute substantial evidence if it is
supported by other evidence in the record.
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
Id. at 600.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he did not include a
limitation in Plaintiff’s RFC for Plaintiff’s assessed
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.
Specifically, Plaintiff points out that Dr. Hennings opined in
his June 2009 Psychiatric Review Technique (PRT) form that
Plaintiff has moderate “difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace.”
Tr. 378.
Similarly,
Dr. Hennings noted in the “Summary Conclusions” section of his
Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA) that
Plaintiff is moderately limited in her “ability to maintain
attention and concentration for extended periods.”
Tr. 382.
The
ALJ, however, did not include any limitations on concentration,
persistence, or pace in Plaintiff’s RFC.
Defendant, however, asserts Dr. Hennings’s limitations on
Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were properly
incorporated in the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to unskilled
work.
Specifically, Defendant notes the term “unskilled work” is
defined in the Social Security Regulations as “work which needs
little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on
the job in a short period of time.”
416.968(a).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a),
In addition, Defendant notes Dr. Hennings stated in
the “Functional Capacity Assessment” portion of Plaintiff’s MRFCA
that Plaintiff “would be capable of understanding, remembering
and carrying out simple, routine tasks and directions with no
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
indication for the need or special supervision of difficulty
adhering to a schedule.”
Tr. 384.
The Court rejected this
argument in Berjettej v. Astrue, 09–CV–892–BR, 2010 WL 3056799
(D. Or. July 30, 2010).
In that case the Court adopted the
reasoning of a number of courts in the District of Oregon and the
Ninth Circuit:
The District of Oregon and the Ninth Circuit [have
held] PRTF findings relating to concentration,
persistence, or pace must be included in the
hypothetical posed to the VE in some manner, and
that a hypothetical that includes a limitation to
"simple" work does not address deficiencies in
concentration, persistence, or pace. Abrego v.
Commissioner, No. CIV. 99-6173-JO, 2000 WL 682671,
at *2-3 (D. Or. May 25, 2000) (ALJ's PRTF finding
that plaintiff was often limited by deficiencies
of concentration, persistence, or pace not
included in hypothetical which included "simple
repetitive" types of jobs (citing Newton v.
Chater, 92 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1996)); Clemens v.
Massanari, No. CV 00-6204-KI, 2001 WL 34043764, at
*11 (D. Or. May 17, 2001) (ALJ's PRFT finding that
claimant had deficiencies of concentration,
persistence, or pace often resulting in failure to
timely complete tasks not included in hypothetical
limiting claimant to "simple, unskilled tasks"
because it did not inform VE of deficiencies of
concentration, persistence, or pace); cf. Davis v.
Massinari, No. Civ. 00-6211-FR, 2001 WL 34043759,
at *8-9 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2001), aff'd, 71 Fed.
Appx. 664 (9th Cir. 2003)(hypothetical which
included moderate limitations in nearly all mental
activities requiring sustained concentration and
persistence, including maintaining attention and
concentration for extended period; understanding,
remembering, and carrying out detailed
instructions; and sustaining an ordinary routine
without special supervision, satisfied finding by
ALJ in PRTF that claimant experienced deficiencies
in concen-tration, persistence, or pace often
resulting in failure to complete tasks (citing
Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1996));
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
Williams v. Apfel, No. CIV. 00-6150-KI, 2001 WL
204811, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2001)(hypothetical
that claimant limited to unskilled or semi-skilled
work due to difficulties with concentration and
attention satisfied the ALJ's finding on the PRTF
(citing Brachtel v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 417 (8th Cir.
1997)), aff'd, 42 Fed. Appx. 935 (9th Cir. 2002));
Swenson v. Commissioner, No. CIV. 99-6188-KI, 2000
WL 486753, at * (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2000)
(hypothetical which included limitation that
person could not concentrate on complex tasks
supported by substantial evidence where ALJ
completed PRFT finding claimant often had
deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or
pace); see Thomson, 2001 WL 213758, at *11
(Commissioner conceded that ALJ's failure to
include mental limitations assessed by state
agency non-examining physician who concluded that
claimant was moderately limited in certain mental
activities in hypothetical to VE, and ALJ's
failure to include own PRTF finding that claimant
experienced deficiencies of concentration,
persistence, or pace often resulting in a failure
to timely complete tasks in work settings or
elsewhere, required reversal; matter remanded so
that ALJ could consider claimant's functional
limitations of concen-tration, persistence, and
pace and degree of such limitations). . . .
Accordingly, the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to
the VE here does not include all of plaintiff's
limitations and is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Id., at *7 (quoting Mudgett v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-485-CL, Findings
and Recommendation at 11-13 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2008), adopted
May 1, 2008).
Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ erred when he
failed to address Dr. Hennings's opinion as to Plaintiff's
moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace and did not include such limitations in Plaintiff's RFC or
in his hypothetical to the VE.
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
Accordingly, the Court remands this matter to the ALJ for
consideration of Dr. Hennings's opinion as to Plaintiff's
functional limitations of concentration, persistence, and pace
and the degree of such limitations.
II.
The ALJ erred when he gave “no weight” to the opinion of
Dr. Overman.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he gave "no weight" to
the opinion of Dr. Overman, treating psychologist.
An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion when it is
inconsistent with the opinions of other treating or examining
physicians if the ALJ makes "findings setting forth specific,
legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial
evidence in the record."
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957
(9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751
(9th Cir. 1989)).
When the medical opinion of an examining or
treating physician is uncontroverted, however, the ALJ must give
"clear and convincing reasons" for rejecting it.
F.3d at 957.
Thomas, 278
See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-32 (9th
Cir. 1995).
On August 8, 2010, Dr. Overman completed a Mental Impairment
Questionnaire in which he diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar
disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Tr. 411.
Dr. Overman opined Plaintiff had a “very poor” ability to work
eight hours per day and/or forty hours per week and would need to
work at a reduced pace.
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 414.
Dr. Overman opined Plaintiff
was “extremely limited” in her ability to maintain regular
attendance, to accept instructions, to respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors, to get along with coworkers or peers,
and to “deal with normal work stress.”
Tr. 416-17.
Dr. Overman
also opined Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to
maintain attention “for [a] two hour segment,” to work in
coordination with others, to complete a normal workday and/or
work week, to perform at a consistent pace “without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods,” to ask simple
questions, to respond appropriately to changes “in a routine work
setting,” and “to be aware of normal hazards and [to] take
appropriate precautions.”
Tr. 416-17.
Dr. Overman stated
Plaintiff had “extreme” difficulties in maintaining social
functioning and marked restriction of activities of daily living.
Tr. 417.
Dr. Overman indicated Plaintiff had “three episodes of
decompensation within 12 months, each at least two weeks long,”
and “a residual disease process that has resulted in such
marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental
demands or change in the environment would be predicted to cause
the individual to decompensate.”
Tr. 418.
The ALJ gave “no
weight” to Dr. Overman’s opinion on the ground that, among other
things, it was not supported by evidence in the record.
For
example, although Dr. Overman indicated Plaintiff had suffered
three episodes of decompensation within 12 months, each at least
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
two weeks long, the record does not reflect Plaintiff had been
hospitalized for psychiatric care at any point before
Dr. Overman offered his opinion in August 2010.
In addition,
Dr. Hennings specifically noted the record did not reflect that
Plaintiff had experienced any episodes of decompensation.
Tr. 379.
Similarly, contrary to Dr. Overman’s finding that
Plaintiff suffers extreme limitations in her social functioning,
the record reflects Plaintiff worked as a nanny for several
months after her onset date.
The ALJ, however, also rejected Dr. Overman’s opinion on the
ground that it was not supported by his treatment notes and that
the record “suggests [Dr. Overman’s] opinion is entirely based on
[Plaintiff’s] self reports.”3
Tr. 37-38.
The record, however,
does not contain any of Dr. Overman’s treatment notes.
Defendant
contends Plaintiff had the burden to produce Dr. Overman’s
treatment records to the ALJ because claimants have the burden to
prove disability and to “bring to [the ALJ’s] attention
everything that shows [she] is disabled.”
§§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a).
20 C.F.R.
The Court agrees Plaintiff has the
burden to establish disability and notes Plaintiff’s counsel did
not state at the hearing that the record did not include
3
The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony, and Plaintiff does
not challenge that aspect of the ALJ’s opinion. Accordingly, the
ALJ did not err when relied on the fact that he rejected
Plaintiff's testimony as a basis for rejecting the opinion of
Dr. Overman.
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
Dr. Overman’s treatment notes.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner
has an affirmative “duty to fully and fairly develop the record
and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered . . .
even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”
Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003).
Celaya v.
When important
medical evidence is incomplete, the ALJ has a duty to recontact
the provider for clarification.
416.927(c)(2).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2),
Even though the burden to demonstrate a
disability lies with the claimant, "it is equally clear the ALJ
has a duty to assist in developing the record.”
Reed v.
Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2001)(quotation omitted;
citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)-(f), 416.912(d)-(f)).
Here the
ALJ specifically concluded Dr. Overman’s opinion was not
supported by his treatment records and speculated that
Dr. Overman relied on Plaintiff’s self-reports, which is
troubling in light of the fact that it does not appear
Dr. Overman’s treatment notes were before the ALJ.
The Court,
therefore, concludes the ALJ erred when he failed to develop the
record by requesting Dr. Overman’s treatment notes.
Accordingly, the Court concludes on this record that the ALJ
erred when he gave “no weight” to the opinion of Dr. Overman
because the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons
supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so.
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
REMAND
The Court must determine whether to remand this matter for
further proceedings or to remand for calculation of benefits.
The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or
for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely
utility of further proceedings.
1179 (9th Cir. 2000).
Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,
The court may "direct an award of benefits
where the record has been fully developed and where further
administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose."
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.
The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for
determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate
award of benefits directed."
Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178.
The
court should grant an immediate award of benefits when
(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally
sufficient reasons for rejecting such
evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues
that must be resolved before a determination
of disability can be made, and (3) it is
clear from the record that the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled were
such evidence credited.
Id.
The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a
single question:
Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if
the case were remanded for further proceedings.
Id. at 1178 n.2.
On this record the Court concludes further proceedings are
necessary because it is not clear whether the ALJ would have
found Plaintiff disabled if he had considered Dr. Hennings's
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
opinion as to Plaintiff's moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace and whether the ALJ would
reject Dr. Overman’s opinion if he had reviewed Dr. Overman’s
treatment records.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes a remand for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order is
required to permit the ALJ (1) to consider Dr. Henning’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace; (2) to request and to review Dr. Overman’s
treatment records; and (3) to reevaluate Dr. Overman’s opinion
based on his treatment records to determine whether Plaintiff is
disabled.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings
consistent with this Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 25th day of June, 2014.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?