Houston v. Yoncalla School District No. 32 et al

Filing 79

OPINION and ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 73 is GRANTED with respect to punitive damages and DENIED in all other respects. Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages against YSD and DESD is STRICKEN. See formal order. Copy of order sent to Pro Se Plaintiff. Signed on 1/29/2015 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh) Modified text on 1/30/2015 to add opinion. (kf)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

Case No.

JAMES M. HOUSTON,

6:13-cv-01318-AA
OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.
YONCALLA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
32, a political subdivision
of the State of Oregon, et al.,
Defendants.
AIKEN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff
discrimination,

initially

filed

suit

alleging

gender

and

age

violations of his constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and various state law claims. Defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiff's claims asserted in his Second Amended Complaint
in their entirety. The court allowed plaintiff to file an amended
complaint with respect to his First Amendment retaliation claims
and dismissed the remainder plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff filed a

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- OPINION AND ORDER

Third Amended Complaint alleging violations of his First Amendment
rights. Individual defendants George Murdock, Lisa Frasieur, Twila
VanLoon,

David Anderson,

Defendants)

Gene Vroman,

Service District
for

(Individual

again move for dismissal of the claims against them.

Defendants Yoncalla School District

request

and Carl Cox

(DESD)

punitive

(YSD)

and Douglas Education

also move for dismissal of plaintiff's

damages

against

them.

Alternatively,

all

defendants move for dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment claims
for failure to comply with the court's previous order. The motion
is denied in part and granted in part.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff

is

a

substitute

assignments through DESD.

teacher

and

receives

teaching

Plaintiff has taught and continues to

receive teaching assignments at schools within YSD.
Plaintiff

alleges

that

DESD

and

the

YSD

School

Board

comprised of Board members who are named as defendants - retaliated
against him and sought to "chill" his free speech rights after he
provided the Board with a tort claim notice and voice numerous
complaints. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was informed
that law enforcement officers would be called to any public school
meeting he attempted to attend, and that he would be charged with
trespass if he attempted to enter DESD property.

Pl.'s Third Am.

Compl. at 12-13.
Individual Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged

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- OPINION AND ORDER

their personal participation in the deprivation of his rights and
therefore cannot sustain claims against them. Further, Individual
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity,
presumably because plaintiff does not specify how each of them
violated

h~s

constitutional rights.

When viewed in plaintiff's favor, I find that his allegat.ions
suffice to state claims against Individual Defendants.

Plaintiff

alleges that after he gave his tort claim notice to the YSD Board,
YSD's attorney notified plaintiff that law enforcement officers
would be called to any YSD public meeting that plaintiff attempted
to attend. Pl.'s Third Am. Comp. at 12. Plaintiff also alleges that
the

attorney threatened plaintiff

with

arrest

for

trespass

if

plaintiff attempted to attend YSD meetings or "set foot on DESD
property for any reason." Id. at 13. Granted, plaintiff does not
identify which

of

the

Individual

Defendants made

the

decision

regarding potential law enforcement presence and trespass charges
at public district meetings. Nonetheless, plaintiff's allegations
reasonably

imply

that

either

Murdock

(as

Superintendent

of

YSD/DESD) and/or the Board (comprised of individual Board members)
made such decisions on behalf of YSD and DESD and communicated
those decisions through their attorney.
Accordingly, I find that plaintiff sufficiently alleges First
Amendment retaliation claims against Individual Defendants at this
stage of the litigation. See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 6J,

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- OPINION AND ORDER

467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, I find that qualified
immunity does not defeat plaintiff's allegations at the dismissal
stage.

Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true,

a "reasonably

competent" district official should have known or understood that
banning plaintiff's attendance at public meetings or "chilling" his
speech in retaliation for plaintiff's complaints would violate the
First Amendment. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
Defendants next argue that plaintiff's punitive damages claims
against YSD and DESD must be dismissed, because municipal bodies including school districts -

cannot be held liable for punitive

damages. Defendants are correct. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc.,

453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)

("[W]e hold that a municipality is

immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Lytle v.
Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004)

("[T]he word "person" in§

1983 includes municipalities and other local governing bodies such
as

school

districts.").

Accordingly,

plaintiff's

prayer

for

punitive damages against YSD and DESD is stricken.
Finally,
claims

should

defendants argue that plaintiff's
be

dismissed

for

failure

to

First Amendment

follow

the

court's

previous instructions regarding amendment. Defendants maintain that
plaintiff was allowed to pursue only a retaliation claim rather
than a

First Amendment

plaintiff

included a

retaliation claim,

4

deprivation-of-speech claim.

First Amendment

Given that

claim in addition to his

defendants argue that plaintiff violated the

- OPINION AND ORDER

court's order and his claims should be dismissed as a result.
However,

such a

harsh result

clearly runs

afoul

of Ninth

Circuit directives regarding pro se litigants and alternatives less
drastic than dismissal.

See Pagtalunan v.

Galaza,

291 F.3d 639,

642-43 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, the court's previous order allowed
plaintiff to pursue his claims in former Counts II ind VI, which
included a

First Amendment claim;

"retaliation" claim,

I

cannot

though the court specified a

find that plaintiff violated the

court's order when he was granted leave to pursue those claims.
Moreover,

the court's intent was to bar untimely amendments

and dismissed or new claims based on newly-alleged facts.

Here,

plaintiff's First Amendment claim relies on the same facts that
form

the

basis

of

his

retaliation

claim.

Thus,

to

the

extent

plaintiff alleges that defendants "chilled" his free speech and
excluded him from public meetings because of the content of his
speech,

I

will allow a First Amendment claim at this time.

See

Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2010)

("A

council can regulate

the content of speech -

as long as

content-based regulations are viewpoint neutral and enforced that
way."); Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 (3rd Cir. 2011)
consideration of this case we recognize that,

("In our

though the First

Amendment's protection of freedom of expression is not inviolate,
when a public official excludes a citizen from a public meeting,
the official must not be acting in violation of that amendment.").

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- OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

defendants'

Motion

to

Dismiss

(doc.

73)

is

GRANTED with respect to punitive damages and DENIED in all other
respects. Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages against YSD and
DESD is STRICKEN.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

day of January, 2015.

Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

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- OPINION AND ORDER