Curry v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Filing
20
Opinion and Order. The Court REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. Signed on 05/11/2015 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 19 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb) Modified on 5/12/2015 correcting signature date of Opinion and Order (bb).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
ROBERT W. CURRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
DREW L. JOHNSON
SHERWOOD J. REESE
1700 Valley River Drive
Eugene, OR 97405
(541) 434-6466
Attorneys for Plaintiff
S. AMANDA MARSHALL
United States Attorney
RONALD K. SILVER
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 727-1044
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
6:14-cv-00881-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
DAVID MORADO
Regional Chief Counsel
LISA GOLDOFTAS
Special Assistant United States Attorneys
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 615-3703
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Judge.
Plaintiff Robert W. Curry seeks judicial review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff’s application
for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Act
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the
Act.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Following a thorough
review of the record, the Court REVERSES the final decision of
the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for further
administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and
Order.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB on January 21, 2010,
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
and his application for SSI on April 26, 2010.
Tr. 13.1
His
applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.
An
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on September 12,
2012.
Tr. 28.
attorney.
At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an
Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified at
the hearing.
Tr. 28.
The ALJ issued a decision on October 10, 2012, in which he
found Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits.
Tr. 13-22.
That
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on
April 1, 2014, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review.
Tr. 1-3.
See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,
106-07 (2000).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on August 5, 1967; was 45 years old on
the date of the hearing; and has a high-school diploma with one
year of college.
Tr. 166, 191.
Plaintiff has prior relevant
work experience as a salesperson of books, personal attendant,
hair stylist, and receptionist.
Tr. 64.
Plaintiff alleges disability since July 1, 2008, due to
anxiety, depression, sleep apnea, personality disorder,
myocardial infarction, bipolar disorder, high blood pressure, and
1
Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on October 8, 2014, are referred to as “Tr.”
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
diabetes.
Tr. 185, 191.
Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.
After carefully reviewing the
medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.
See Tr. 15-23.
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden a claimant must demonstrate his
inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
See also Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161
(9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence that
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”
Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 (quoting Valentine v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)).
It
is "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence but less than a
preponderance.
Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving
ambiguities.
2009).
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006).
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Keyser v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
See also
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920.
Each step is potentially dispositive.
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I).
See also Keyser, 648
F.3d at 724.
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
Stout v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
See also 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the Commissioner must determine whether a
claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the listed
impairments and are so severe that they preclude substantial
gainful activity.
The claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
The
criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are
enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed
Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
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The
claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§ 416.920(e).
20 C.F.R.
See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p.
“A
'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a
week, or an equivalent schedule."
SSR 96-8p, at *1.
In other
words, the Social Security Act does not require complete
incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885
F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
The assessment of a claimant's
RFC is at the heart of Steps Four and Five of the sequential
analysis when the ALJ is determining whether a claimant can still
work despite severe medical impairments.
An improper evaluation
of the claimant's ability to perform specific work-related
functions "could make the difference between a finding of
'disabled' and 'not disabled.'"
SSR 96-8p, at *4.
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work he has done in the past.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
See also
Here the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of
a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set
forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 2.
If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant
is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1).
ALJ’S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2008, his alleged
onset date.
Tr. 15.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of methamphetamine addiction and “affective disorder
(bipolar disorder NOS versus major depression).”
Tr. 15-16.
At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments do not
meet or equal the criteria for any impairment in the Listing of
Impairments.
Tr. 17-18.
In his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC
the ALJ found Plaintiff has the functional capacity to perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels.
The ALJ, however,
found Plaintiff is restricted to semi-skilled tasks that involve
a structured work setting in which he is required to have no more
than superficial contact with the public, no close contact with
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
anyone he does not know well, and no teamwork or collaboration
with coworkers.
Tr. 18-21.
At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform
his past relevant work as a book salesperson, personal attendant,
hair stylist, or receptionist.
Tr. 21.
At Step Five, however, the ALJ found Plaintiff is capable of
performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy, including work as a commercial or institutional
cleaner, industrial “sweeper/cleaner,” and packager.
Tr. 21-22.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled and,
therefore, is not entitled to benefits.
Tr. 22.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) improperly
evaluated the materiality of Plaintiff’s substance abuse;
(2) failed to cite legally sufficient reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff’s testimony; (3) improperly omitted sleep apnea from
the list of severe impairments at Step Two and in his assessment
of Plaintiff’s RFC; (4) cited legally insufficient reasons to
reject the opinion of Judy Josephson, Family Nurse Practitioner
(FNP); and (5) cited legally insufficient reasons to discredit
the testimony of Patti N. Curry, Plaintiff’s sister.
Plaintiff
also contends the Commissioner erred when she failed to properly
consider the opinion of Plaintiff’s alcohol-and-drug counselor,
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
Karen L. San Giovanni, even though Counselor Giovanni’s opinion
was only presented to the Appeals Council after the hearing
before the ALJ.
As a result of these errors, Plaintiff contends
the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, and,
therefore, the Commissioner failed to carry her burden to prove
at Step Five that Plaintiff retains the ability to perform other
work in the national economy.
I.
Drug and Alcohol Analysis
A claimant is not considered disabled if drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination
of disability.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J).
See also Monan v.
Astrue, 377 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2010).
Substance abuse
is a material factor when the claimant’s limitations would not be
disabling if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol.
C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b).
20
Thus, if the claimant is found to be
disabled and there is medical evidence of substance abuse, the
ALJ must determine whether drug addiction or alcoholism “is a
contributing factor material to the determination of disability.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a).
To assess the materiality of drug or alcohol abuse of a
claimant,
an ALJ must first conduct the five-step inquiry without
distinguishing the separate impact of alcoholism or
drug addiction. If the ALJ finds the claimant is not
disabled under the five-step inquiry, the claimant is
not entitled to benefits. If the ALJ finds the
claimant is disabled and there is medical evidence of
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
[his or her] drug addiction or alcoholism, the ALJ
should proceed under § 404.1535 or § 416.935 to
determine whether the claimant would be disabled if [he
or she] stopped using alcohol or drugs.
Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation omitted).
746-47.
See also Parra, 481 F.3d at
In effect, the ALJ must make a second five-step
sequential inquiry to “evaluate which of [the claimant’s] current
physical and mental limitations, upon which [the ALJ] based [the]
current disability determination, would remain if [the claimant]
stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determine whether any or
all of [the claimant’s] remaining limitations would be
disabling.”
F.3d at 474.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2).
See also Parra, 484
In other words, if the ALJ finds a claimant is
disabled, the ALJ must perform the sequential five-step inquiry a
second time to determine whether drug addiction or alcoholism “is
a contributing factor material to the determination of
disability.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a).
In such
determinations, the claimant bears the burden to prove that drug
addiction or alcoholism is not a contributing factor material to
the disability.
2001).
Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir.
See also Missell v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-8226-PCT-JAT, 2014
WL 2048082, at *8 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2014).
The ALJ may not find a claimant is not disabled by reason of
his substance abuse without conducting the second five-step
sequential analysis set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a) and
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
416.935(a).
See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955.
v. Astrue, 479 F. App’x 59, 60 (9th Cir. 2012).
See also Esslinger
Accordingly,
although the ALJ may make reference to a claimant’s substance
abuse as relevant to corollary matters (e.g., evidence
inconsistent with a claimant’s testimony) without conducting the
drug-and-alcohol analysis, the ALJ may not find a claimant is not
disabled or discredit testimonial or medical evidence merely
because the claimant is more functional in the absence of
substance abuse.
See Esslinger, 479 F. App’x at 60.
Here the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony, the opinion
of FNP Judy Josephson, and the testimony of Patti Curry on the
basis that Plaintiff is more functional than that evidence
indicated when he is compliant with his medication regimen and
abstinent from methamphetamine and marijuana abuse.
Defendant
agrees the ALJ’s rejection of the noted testimony on the basis of
Plaintiff’s improved functioning was improper, but Defendant
contends the ALJ’s analysis was proper because it included
Plaintiff’s noncompliance in taking medication.
The ALJ’s
rationale, however, did not distinguish between Plaintiff’s
noncompliance in taking his medication and his substance abuse
and treated those two issues as though they went hand-in-hand.
The ALJ, therefore, impermissibly considered the effect of
Plaintiff’s substance abuse without conducting the separate fivestep sequential analysis specifically addressing Plaintiff’s drug
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
and alcohol abuse as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a) and
416.935(a).
The Court finds this error is not harmless because
Plaintiff’s substance abuse and noncompliance with taking his
medication were central to the ALJ’s reasoning in his decision to
discredit the testimony of Plaintiff, FNP Josephson, and Patti
Curry.
Moreover, the effect of Plaintiff’s substance abuse on
his functional capacity was an important aspect of the opinion of
Counselor San Giovanni that was first submitted to the Appeals
Council.2
Thus, the Court cannot conclude the ALJ’s consideration of
Plaintiff’s substance abuse absent completion of the separate
drug-and-alcohol analysis was “‘inconsequential to the ultimate
nondisability determination.’”
See Treichler v. Comm'r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014)("An error is harmless
if it is 'inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination,' or 'if the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned,' even if the agency 'explains its decision with less
than ideal clarity.'")(quoting Alaska Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004),
2
The Court must evaluate all of the evidence
including new evidence submitted to and considered
Council after the ALJ has issued his opinion. See
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1162-63
2012)(citing Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1452
1993)).
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
in the record,
by the Appeals
Brewes v.
(9th Cir.
(9th Cir.
and Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ
erred when he failed to conduct the separate drug-and-alcohol
analysis and yet, nevertheless, concluded Plaintiff was more
functional and, therefore, not disabled when abstinent from
substance abuse.
For this same reason the Court concludes the ALJ erred when
he discounted the testimony of Plaintiff, FNP Josephson, and
Patti Curry.3
In addition, the ALJ’s error with respect to
Plaintiff’s substance abuse necessitates reconsideration of
Counselor San Giovanni’s opinion as well because Counselor San
Giovanni specifically addressed the fluctuations in Plaintiff’s
functionality based on his sobriety.
II.
Step Two - Sleep Apnea
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
Stout v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
See also 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).
A severe impairment
“significantly limits” a claimant’s “physical or mental ability
3
Although the ALJ cited additional reasons to discount the
testimony of Plaintiff and FNP Josephson, the Court concludes
those reasons are not by themselves legally sufficient reasons to
reject the testimony of Plaintiff and FNP Josephson.
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
to do basic work activities.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.921(a), (b).
Such abilities and aptitudes include walking, standing, sitting,
lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling, seeing,
hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple instructions; using judgment; responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work
situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id.
The Step Two threshold is low:
[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if
it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal
effect on the individual that it would not be expected
to interfere with the individual’s ability to work
. . . . [T]he severity regulation is to do no more
than allow the Secretary to deny benefits summarily to
those applicants with impairments of a minimal nature
which could never prevent a person from working.
Social Security Ruling 85-28, at *2 (Nov. 30, 1984)(internal
quotations omitted).
For an impairment to be considered severe
at Step Two, the evidence must include “signs - the results of
‘medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques,’ such as
tests - as well as symptoms, i.e., [the claimant’s]
representations regarding [her] impairment.”
Ukolov v. Barnhart,
420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Ninth Circuit has held when the ALJ has resolved Step
Two in a claimant’s favor, any error in designating specific
impairments as severe does not prejudice a claimant if the ALJ
properly considers the omitted condition later in the sequential
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
analysis.
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682-84 (9th Cir.
2005)(any error in failing to identify an impairment as severe at
Step Two is harmless when Step Two is resolved in claimant’s
favor and the ALJ considers the condition in formulating his
assessment of the claimant’s RFC).
As noted, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Two when
he failed to include sleep apnea as a severe impairment.
The
only detailed note in the record regarding Plaintiff’s sleep
apnea is an April 27, 2010, chart note from Cynthia D. Rodriguez,
FNP, detailing an initial consultation regarding sleep apnea.
Tr. 335-36.
In that chart note, FNP Rodriguez found Plaintiff’s
“symptoms and clinical history are consistent with a diagnosis of
obstructive sleep apnea” and referred Plaintiff for a “free
overnight oximetry test so that we can made [sic] a diagnosis of
obstructive apnea.”
Tr. 336.
There is no medical evidence in
the record that suggests the oximetry test ever took place or
that Plaintiff was ever formally diagnosed with sleep apnea.
The ALJ declined to identify sleep apnea as a severe
impairment at Step Two because there was “no documentation of any
resulting functional limitations that would significantly affect
the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.”
Tr. 16.
Because the record does not include any evidence that
indicates Plaintiff underwent any testing for sleep apnea that
would reveal the signs of that condition, that Plaintiff was ever
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
formally diagnosed with sleep apnea, or that Plaintiff had any
functional limitations resulting from sleep apnea, the Court
concludes the ALJ’s decision to exclude sleep apnea as a severe
impairment at Step Two is supported by the record.
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ did
not err by excluding sleep apnea as a severe impairment at Step
Two.
III. Remand
The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or
for immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the
court.
Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).
issue turns on the utility of further proceedings.
The
A remand for
an award of benefits is appropriate when no useful purpose would
be served by further administrative proceedings or when the
record has been fully developed and the evidence is insufficient
to support the Commissioner’s decision.
Strauss v. Comm’r, 635
F.3d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Benecke v. Barnhart,
379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)).
The court may not award
benefits punitively and must conduct a “credit-as-true” analysis
to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Act.
Id.
at 1138.
Under the “credit-as-true” doctrine, evidence should be
credited and an immediate award of benefits directed when:
(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons
for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are not any
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
outstanding issues that must be resolved before a
determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear
from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the
claimant disabled if such evidence were credited.
Id.
The reviewing court should decline to credit testimony when
“outstanding issues” remain.
Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035
(9th Cir. 2010).
When the reviewing court finds the elements of the “creditas-true” rule have been satisfied, however, the court may only
remand for further proceedings if “an evaluation of the record as
a whole creates serious doubt that the claimant is, in fact,
disabled.”
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir.
2014).
As noted, the ALJ failed to follow the appropriate procedure
for consideration of how Plaintiff’s substance abuse affects the
disability determination.
The ALJ, therefore, must resolve the
outstanding issue concerning the effect of Plaintiff’s substance
abuse using the procedures set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a)
and 416.935(a).
As part of that analysis, the ALJ must
reconsider the testimony of Plaintiff, FNP Josephson, Counselor
San Giovanni, and Patti Curry.
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes this case
must be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion and Order.
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the final decision of
the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings
consistent with this Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2015.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
19 - OPINION AND ORDER
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