Appler Swain v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
19
Opinion and Order. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. Signed on 08/27/2015 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 19 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
GINGER APPLER SWAIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
TIM WILBORN
Wilborn Law Office, P.C.
P.O. Box 370578
Las Vegas, NV 89137
(702) 240-0184
Attorney for Plaintiff
Billy J. Williams
Acting United States Attorney
RONALD K. SILVER
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
(503) 727-1003
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
6:14-CV-01113-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
DAVID MORADO
Regional chief Counsel
COURTNEY GARCIA
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104-7075
(206) 615-2934
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Judge.
Plaintiff Ginger Appler Swain seeks judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Following a review of the record, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her applications on March 16, 2010, and
alleged a disability onset date of January 31, 2010.
Tr. 192. 1
The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on January 12,
1
Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on November 18, 2014, are referred to as "Tr."
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
2012.
Tr. 45-79.
attorney.
At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an
Plaintiff and a vocational expert
(VE) testified.
The ALJ issued a decision on October 25, 2012, in which he
found Plaintiff was not disabled.
Tr. 20-33.
That decision
became the final decision of the Commissioner on May 13, 2014,
when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.
Tr. 1-5.
See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).
On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court
seeking review of the Commissioner's decision.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on February 1, 1969, and was 41 years old
on her alleged onset date.
Tr. 50.
She completed the sixth grade.
Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a
caregiver, a cashier, and a prep cook.
Tr. 52-53.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to "webbed fingers since
birth, psoriasis in all joints, bursitis,
[and] osteo-arthritis."
Tr. 234.
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her
inability ''to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . .
. has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
§
423(d) (1) (A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F. 3d
453, 459-60 (9ili Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).
42
See also Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is
"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
Molina,
674 F.3d. at 1110-11
(quoting Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).
It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]
but less than a preponderance.
Id.
(citing Valentine,
574 F.3d
at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving
ambiguities.
2009) .
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Ryan v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner's findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006) .
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724
Keyser v. Comm'r of
(9th Cir. 2011).
See also
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R.
§§
404.1520, 416.920.
Each step is potentially dispositive.
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (I), 416.920(a) (4) (I).
See
also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
Stout v. Comm'r Soc.
Sec Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
See also 20
C. F.R. §§ 404 .1520 (a) (4) (ii),
416. 920 (a) (4) (ii); Keyser,
648 F. 3d
at 724.
At Step Three the Commissioner must determine whether a
claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the listed
impairments and are so severe that they preclude substantial
gainful activity.
The claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§§
404 .1520 (a) (4) (iii), 416. 920 (a) (4) (iii).
F.3d at 724.
20 C.F.R.
See also Keyser,
648
The criteria for the listed impairments, known as
Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC).
The
claimant's RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§§
404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
(SSR)
96-8p.
See also Social Security Ruling
"A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a
day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule.''
at *1.
20 C.F.R.
SSR 96-8p,
In other words, the Social Security Act does not require
complete incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
The assessment of
a claimant's RFC is at the heart of Steps Four and Five of the
sequential analysis when the ALJ is determining whether a
claimant can still work despite severe medical impairments.
An
improper evaluation of the claimant's ability to perform specific
work-related functions "could make the difference between a
finding of 'disabled' and 'not disabled.'''
SSR 96-8p, at *4.
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work he has done in the past.
416.920(a) (4) (iv).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (iv),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
416.920(a) (4) (v).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (v),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
Here the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Cir. 2010).
616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the
testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.
If the Commissioner meets this burden,
the claimant is not disabled.
416. 920 (g) (1).
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(l),
ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has engaged in
substantial gainful activity (SGA) since her January 31, 2010,
onset date.
Tr. 22.
Although the ALJ noted Plaintiff's earnings
were above the SGA level during some months of the relevant
period, Plaintiff's average monthly earnings were just below SGA
levels.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments
including bilateral congenital hand deformities ("status post
childhood surgical repair"), psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis,
osteoarthritis, nonobstructive coronary artery disease,
hypertension, bilateral hip pain, obesity, eczema,
hyperlipidemia, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical and
lumbar spine.
Tr. 23.
At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff's impairments do not
meet or equal any listed impairment.
Tr. 24.
The ALJ found
Plaintiff has the RFC to perform less than a full range of light
work and can lift or carry ten pounds frequently and twenty
pounds occasionally, can sit for six hours during a normal eighthour work day, with normal breaks, and can stand or walk for
about two hours during a normal eight-hour work day.
She can
frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, kneel, and crouch.
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
She can occasionally stoop and crawl.
ropes or scaffolds.
She cannot climb ladders,
She is able to handle and finger bilaterally
frequently, but she needs to avoid concentrated exposure to
workplace hazards such as unprotected heights and unguarded
moving machinery.
Tr. 25.
At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform
any of her past relevant work.
Tr. 31.
At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff is able to perform work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy such
as electronics worker, cashier, and storage-facility clerk.
Tr. 32.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by (1) improperly rejecting
portions of the medical opinions of examining physician Raymond
P. Nolan, M.D., Ph.D., and treating physician Jennifer Ranton,
M. D.;
(2) improperly rejecting lay-witness testimony;
(3)
improperly finding at Step Five that Plaintiff is able to perform
light work; and (4) failing to find that Plaintiff's occupational
base is significantly eroded.
I.
The ALJ did not err when weighing the medical evidence.
Disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner.
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e) (1); 416.927(e) (1).
20
If there is not a
conflict between medical source opinions, the ALJ generally must
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
accord greater weight to the opinion of a treating physician than
to the opinion of an examining physician because the treating
physician has a greater opportunity to know and to observe the
patient as an individual.
Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th
Cir. 2007).
See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995).
Similarly, the ALJ also must give greater weight to
the opinion of an examining physician than to the opinion of a
reviewing physician.
Id.
The ALJ may not reject a physician's
contradicted opinion without providing specific and legitimate
reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing
so.
Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1066.
If a
treating or examining physician's opinion is not contradicted by
another physician, the ALJ may only reject it for clear and
convincing reasons.
Id.
(treating physician); Widmark v.
Barnhart, 454 F. 3d 1063, 1067 (9'h Cir. 2006) (examining
physician).
The opinion of a nonexamining physician by itself is
insufficient to constitute substantial evidence for rejecting the
opinion of a treating or examining physician.
Widmark, 454 F.3d
at 1066 n. 2.
The ALJ may reject physician opinions that are "brief,
conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings."
Bayliss v. Barnhart,
A.
427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).
Opinion of Dr. Nolan, Examining Physician
Dr. Nolan examined Plaintiff on August 7, 2010.
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 315-
16.
He found Plaintiff "certainly would have difficulty with
repetitive hand/finger activities in reference to the metacarpal
phalangeal complaints."
Tr. 316.
Dr. Nolan found Plaintiff is
able to sit for six hours in an eight-hour day and to walk or to
stand for two hours in an eight-hour day.
Id.
Dr. Nolan found
Plaintiff could frequently lift or carry up to ten pounds and
lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally.
An ALJ may discount a medical source opinion to the extent
that it conflicts with the claimant's activities.
Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,
1999).
Morgan v.
601-02 (9th Cir.
Here the ALJ gave "limited weight" to Dr. Nolan's opinion
on the ground that Plaintiff worked after her alleged onset date
for nine out of 20 months at SGA levels at a medium-exertion
level job that required frequent handling, fingering and feeling.
Tr. 31.
The ALJ incorporated Dr. Nolan's restrictions in
Plaintiff's RFC except for the limitation regarding repetitive
hand/finger activities.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by assuming Plaintiff
performed her caregiver job with "frequent" manipulative
activities as the job is classified in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT)
2
•
Plaintiff, however, contends her
caregiver job as she actually performed it did not require
2
Dictionary of Occupational Titles App'x C (4th ed.
1991) (available at 1991 WL 688702).
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
abilities in excess of those described by Dr. Nolan, specifically
as to Plaintiff's ability to manipulate.
Social Security Regulations identify two sources of
information that may be used to define a claimant's past relevant
work as actually performed:
a properly completed vocational
report (SSR 82-61) and the claimant's own testimony (SSR 82-41).
See also Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001).
In support of her position Plaintiff points to letters
submitted by her co-workers in which they assert Plaintiff "gets
sent home due to pain, bloating and emotional upheaval"; "she has
been sent home for the pain she endures"; "she bloats up, can't
bend due to pain"; and she "can't perform [job duties like
helping residents shower and change] as needed."
Tr. 282-83.
Co-workers also note Plaintiff is in pain "due to her hips," she
"has stomach issues where her stomach is bloated and has a very
hard time walking, bending over and lifting at times"; and "[h]er
ankles and legs swell .
Tr. 284-85.
[and she] is unable to walk."
None of Plaintiff's co-workers, however, indicate
Plaintiff has significant manipulative limitations.
The Commissioner specifically points to the April 2010 Work
History Report in which Plaintiff describes her caregiver job as
requiring eight hours a day of "handle, grab or grasp big
objects" and eight hours a day of "write, type or handle small
objects."
Tr. 242.
Plaintiff describes the job as "cook [,]
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
provide activities of daily living [,] shower [,] pass medication
. answer phones [,] call family member, set up appointment[,]
work with hospice."
Tr. 242.
Thus, based on Plaintiff's self-
completed vocational report, she performed the caregiver job at a
heavy level with several hours of gross- and fine-hand
manipulation.
Tr. 242.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when
he rejected part of Dr. Nolan's opinion because the ALJ provided
legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence in
the record for doing so.
B.
Opinion of Dr. Ranton, Treating Physician
In May 2012 Dr. Ranton completed a Residual Functional
Capacity Report in which she stated she had been Plaintiff's
treating physician since 2007.
Tr. 561.
Dr. Ranton opined
Plaintiff could sit up to six hours and stand or walk up to two
hours in an eight-hour work day.
Tr. 563.
Dr. Ranton reported
Plaintiff suffers chronic pain ftbut probably not as severely as
she describes and arthritis alone cannot explain all of her
complaints."
Tr. 562.
Dr. Ranton opined Plaintiff suffered
bilateral ankle and foot pain, most likely due to alcoholic
peripheral neuropathy, with congenital joint deformities in both
hands and bilateral hip pain.
Tr. 562.
Dr. Ranton concluded
Plaintiff's lower-extremity complaints (below her hips) were
primarily nocturnal and would not limit her ability to work, but
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
she "would have difficulty with repetitive hand and finger
activities.
0
Tr. 562.
Dr. Ranton opined Plaintiff could handle,
feel, and grasp occasionally, but never finger.
Tr. 30, 564.
Dr. Ranton attached to her opinion the December 2008 report
of examining rheumatologist William P. Maier, M.D.
Tr. 559-60.
Dr. Maier found Plaintiff has good grip and fist capabilities,
good range of motion of elbows, shoulders, spine, hips, and
knees, and "relatively mild psoriatic arthritis involving small
joints of the hands.
0
Tr. 560.
The ALJ may discredit physician opinions that are
conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record or objective
medical findings.
Batson v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359
F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here the ALJ noted the
limitations included in Dr. Ranton's report were contradicted by
Plaintiff's demonstrated ability to continue working at nearly
substantial gainful activity levels at a strenuous job that
Plaintiff described as requiring frequent to constant hand and
finger manipulation.
Tr. 30.
See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 601-02.
The ALJ also noted a recent hand x-ray did not show any
significant degenerative changes.
Tr. 31.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when
he rejected part of Dr. Ranton's opinion because the ALJ provided
legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence in
the record for doing so.
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
II.
Lay-Witness Testimony
The ALJ has a duty to consider lay-witness testimony.
C.F.R.
§§
20
404.1513(d), 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3), 416.913(d).
See also Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Friends and family members in a position to observe the
claimant's symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify
regarding the claimant's condition.
915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d
See also Stout v. Comm'r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ may not
reject such testimony without comment and must give reasons
germane to the witness for rejecting her testimony.
Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996).
Nguyen v.
Inconsistency with
the medical evidence may constitute a germane reason.
F.3d at 512.
Lewis, 236
The ALJ may also reject lay testimony when it
repeats the limitations expressed in the claimant's testimony
and/or reports that the ALJ properly found were not credible.
Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir.
2009).
Here, therefore, the reasons the ALJ provided for
rejecting Plaintiff's testimony apply equally to the reports from
Plaintiff's coworkers.
See id. at 694.
The Court notes
Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's
testimony was not fully credible as to her symptoms and
limitations.
Tr. 28.
The ALJ also noted the lay testimony was inconsistent with
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
the medical evidence, which is a germane reason to reject lay
testimony.
2005).
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.
The ALJ noted Plaintiff's x-rays were relatively benign.
Tr. 26-27.
Although Plaintiff had generalized pain in her hips,
knees, and ankles, the pain improved with walking and moving
around.
Tr. 27, 519.
Dr. Nolan described Plaintiff's normal
gait and her ability to walk, to hop, and to squat without
problem.
Tr. 27, 315.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when
he gave only some weight to the lay-witness statements because
the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record for doing so.
III.
The ALJ did not err at Step Five.
At Step Five in the sequential analysis the ALJ determines
whether the claimant can perform work in the national economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (v), 416. (a) (4) (v).
The ALJ may
take administrative notice of the occupational data contained
in the DOT or draw on a VE's testimony to show that a claimant
can perform work in the national economy.
§§
404.1566(d-e), 416.966(d-e).
reserved for the Commissioner.
20 C.F.R.
The decision to use a VE is
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e),
416. 966 (e).
The ALJ's questions to the VE must include all properly
supported limitations (Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
(9th Cir. 2001)), and the ALJ must ask the VE whether her
testimony is consistent with the DOT (Massachi v. Astrue, 486
F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007)).
The ALJ's failure to inquire
is harmless if the VE "provided sufficient support for her
conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts" with the DOT
or if a conflict does not arise.
Id. at 1153 n.19.
The ALJ may rely on VE testimony rather than the DOT when
the issue is "complex" (20 C.F.R.
§§
404.1566(e), 416.966(e)) or
when "the record contains persuasive evidence to support the
deviation." (Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir.
1995)).
See also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2008).
Such evidence includes available job data and a
claimant's specific limitations.
When "a claimant's exertional
limitation falls between two grid rules, the ALJ fulfills his
obligation to determine the claimant's occupational base by
consulting a vocational expert regarding whether a person with
claimant's profile could perform substantial gainful work in the
economy."
Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2000).
When there is a conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT,
however, the ALJ must elicit a reasonable explanation for the
conflict before relying on the VE's testimony.
SSR 00-4p.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he found Plaintiff is
able to stand or to walk for two hours during a normal eight-hour
work day and then found Plaintiff could perform jobs in unskilled
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
light occupations including electronics worker, cashier, and
storage-facility clerk.
Plaintiff cites SSR 83-10, which defines
the full range of light work as requiring standing or walking for
a total of approximately six hours in an eight-hour work day.
Thus, Plaintiff contends she is limited to sedentary work.
Here the ALJ asked the VE whether a person with Plaintiff's
limitations of standing or walking for no more than two hours
would be able to perform the jobs of cashier II, electronics
worker, and storage-facility clerk.
Tr. 76.
The VE responded
Plaintiff would still be able to perform these jobs, but "I would
however reduce the numbers on cashier to allow for a little more
of a sit, stand ability there."
Id.
Accordingly, the VE reduced
the number of cashier II positions by 50% to approximately
1,710,000 nationally and 17,840 regionally on the basis that 50%
of cashier II jobs are performed with limited standing and
walking.
Tr. 76.
Even if the VE did not adequately explain how Plaintiff
could perform the electronics worker and storage-facility clerk
positions with limited standing and walking, the VE, as noted,
provided an explanation for the cashier II job by reducing the
number of available jobs by 50% to accommodate Plaintiff's
limitations in standing and walking on the basis that 50% of
cashier II jobs are performed with limited standing and walking.
Tr. 76.
The cashier II jobs alone constitute a sufficient number
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
of jobs available in the national economy, and, therefore, any
error by the ALJ at Step Five was harmless.
498 F.3d 909, 911
IV.
See Lewis v. Astrue,
(9th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff's Occupational Base
SSR 96-9p provides "significant manipulative limitations"
will result in substantial erosion of the claimant's unskilled
sedentary occupational base.
Thus, Plaintiff argues her
occupational base is significantly eroded because her RFC is
properly categorized as "sedentary."
96-9P, therefore, she is disabled.
Plaintiff asserts under SSR
Plaintiff's argument fails,
however, because the ALJ properly gave little weight to
Dr. Ranton's opinion regarding Plaintiff's manipulative
limitations, and therefore, SSR 96-9p does not apply.
As noted,
the ALJ's determination of this issue is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 27th day of August, 2015.
19 - OPINION AND ORDER
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