Slaughter v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 19

Opinion and Order. The Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner, DENIES the Commissioner's Motion 14 to Remand for further administrative proceedings, and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the immediate calculation and award of benefits. Signed on 02/22/2016 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 20 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

LYNDY M. SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

BRENT WELLS
Harder Wells Baron & Manning, PC
474 Willamette Street
Suite 200
Eugene, OR 97401
[phone]
JAMES W. MOLLER
8655 S.W. Citizens Drive
Suite 104
Willsonville, OR 97070
[phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

6:14-CV-01778-BR
OPINION AND ORDER

BILLY J. WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
JANICE E. HEBERT
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
[phone]
DAVID MORADO
Regional Chief Counsel
SARAH L. MARTIN
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/A 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
[phone]
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Judge.
Plaintiff Lyndy M. Slaughter seeks judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications
for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB) under Titles XVI and II of the Social Security
Act.
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint
in which she seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision and the
Commissioner's Motion to Remand (#14) for further administrative
proceedings on the ground that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
erred at Step Five.
Following a review of the record, the Court REVERSES the
Commissioner's decision, DENIES the Commissioner's Motion to
2 - OPINION AND ORDER

Remand for further administrative proceedings, and REMANDS this
matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the
immediate calculation and award of benefits.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on October 6, 2010,
Tr. 7, 92.1

and her application for SSI on March 9, 2011.

Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of June 3, 2007.

Her

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration.

An

ALJ held a hearing on April 12, 2013.

Tr. 35.

At the hearing

Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified.

Plaintiff was

represented by an attorney.
On May 16, 2013, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.

Tr. 10-28.

On September 3, 2014, that decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.

Tr. 1-4.

See

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on August 24, 1980.
was 32 years old at the time of the hearing.

1

Tr. 76.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff went to

Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on June 22, 2015, are referred to as "Tr."
3 - OPINION AND ORDER

school through the eleventh grade.

Tr. 928.

Plaintiff has past

relevant work experience as a caregiver and nurse’s aid.

Tr. 20.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to attention-deficit
disorder (ADD), anxiety disorder, borderline personality
disorder, major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
panic disorder, and lumbar degenerative disc disease.

Tr. 12.

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.

After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.

See Tr. 15-19.

STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her

inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
§ 423(d)(1)(A).

42 U.S.C.

The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.

McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
4 - OPINION AND ORDER

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).

42

See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

Substantial evidence is

“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”

Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).

It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

but less than a preponderance.

Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving
ambiguities.
2009).

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.

Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.

Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.

Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006).

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.

The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I).

See

also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically
severe impairments or combination of impairments.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser, 648

F.3d at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
F.3d at 724.

20 C.F.R.

See also Keyser, 648

The criteria for the listed impairments, known as

Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).

The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
6 - OPINION AND ORDER

regular and continuing basis despite her limitations.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
(SSR) 96-8p.

See also Social Security Ruling

“A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a

day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule."
at *1.

20 C.F.R.

SSR 96-8p,

In other words, the Social Security Act does not require

complete incapacity to be disabled.

Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.
416.920(a)(4)(iv).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
416.920(a)(4)(v).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.

Here the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2010).

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the

testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.

If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is not disabled.

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),

416.920(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her June 3, 2007, alleged
onset date.

Tr. 12.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of attention-deficit disorder (ADD), anxiety
disorder, borderline personality disorder, major depression,
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder, lumbar
degenerative disc disease, a history of endometriosis, and a
history of alcohol and substance abuse.

Tr. 12.

The ALJ found

Plaintiff’s bursitis, degenerative disc disease of the cervical
spine, carpal-tunnel syndrome, and stroke to be “non-medically
determinable impairment[s].”

Tr. 13.

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically
determinable impairments do did not meet or medically equal one
of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.

Tr. 13.

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform “medium less than a full range of work.”

Tr. 14.

The

ALJ found Plaintiff can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,
and climb.

Tr. 14.

The ALJ also found Plaintiff can “perform

simple, repetitive, routine tasks requiring no more than
occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

general public.”

Tr. 14.

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could not perform
her past relevant work.

Tr. 20.

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

Tr. 21.

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) improperly
rejected the opinion of examining psychologist Ryan Scott,
Ph.D.,2 and (2) found at Step Five that Plaintiff could do other
jobs that exist in the national economy.
In her Motion to Remand the Commissioner concedes the ALJ
erred at Step Five when he found Plaintiff is limited to work
involving simple one- or two-step work instructions but
concluded, nevertheless, Plaintiff could perform work that exists
in the national economy that requires Reasoning Level 2.

The

Commissioner moves the Court to remand this matter for further
proceedings on that issue.

2

In his Opening Brief under “Statement of the Issues”
Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred when he failed to address
the medical opinion of David Truhn, Psy. D., evaluating
psychologist. Although Plaintiff failed to address this issue in
his Opening Brief, she presented argument on this issue in her
Reply.
9 - OPINION AND ORDER

I.

The ALJ erred when he rejected Dr. Scott’s opinion and
failed to address Dr. Truhn’s opinion.
An ALJ may reject an examining or treating physician's

opinion when it is inconsistent with the opinions of other
treating or examining physicians if the ALJ makes "findings
setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are
based on substantial evidence in the record."

Thomas, 278 F.3d

at 957 (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.
1989)).

When the medical opinion of an examining or treating

physician is uncontroverted, however, the ALJ must give "clear
and convincing reasons" for rejecting it.
957.

Thomas, 278 F.3d at

See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-32.
A.

Dr. Scott
On April 1, 2013, Dr. Scott conducted a comprehensive

psychological evaluation of Plaintiff.

Dr. Scott noted “there

were some validity concerns in regards to [Plaintiff’s MMPI]
evaluation,” but Plaintiff’s possible “over reporting” may
indicate “significant or multiple medical conditions.”

Tr. 929.

Dr. Scott also noted Plaintiff’s responses to the Personality
Assessment Inventory (PAI) “suggested that she may have endorsed
items that presented an unfavorable impression though this was
still a valid administration.”

Tr. 930.

Dr. Scott found

Plaintiff’s “general cognitive ability is within the average
range,” and her ability “to sustain attention, concentrate, and
exert mental control is in the average range.”
10- OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 931, 932.

Dr. Scott, however, also noted Plaintiff “appear[s] to have
substantial mental health issues” including a major depressive
disorder, PTSD, a panic disorder, and a borderline personality
disorder.

Tr. 932-33.

Dr. Scott opined Plaintiff

would likely have marked impairment in social
interaction, particularly the ability to interact
appropriately with the general public, respond to
criticism appropriately from supervisors and get
along with coworkers or peers without distracting
them with behavioral extremes. She also would
have marked difficulties in working in
coordination with others or in proximity with
others without being distracted by them and it
would also likely interfere with her ability to
complete a normal work day and work week without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms.
Her mental health issues also would likely cause
marked impairment in understanding and remembering
detailed instructions and the ability to carry out
these detailed Instructions. She would also
likely have moderate limitations in remembering
work-like procedures and remembering short and
simple instructions as wall as carrying out these
short and simple instructions. She would also
have moderate impairment in performing activities
within a schedule. She noted that she has
significant difficulty in leaving the house to get
to places and will avoid leaving the house. She
would also likely have marked limitations in
traveling to unfamiliar places or using public
transportation.
Tr. 933.
The ALJ rejected Dr. Scott’s opinion on the grounds
that Dr. Scott expressed possible concerns about the validity of
the MMPI, Dr. Scott only met with Plaintiff one time, and
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living “do not support the degree
of limitation suggested in Dr. Scott’s report.”

11- OPINION AND ORDER

Tr. 20.

The record, however, reflects although Dr. Scott
expressed “validity concerns” related to Plaintiff’s MMPI, he
also noted responses such as those given by Plaintiff “may occur
in individuals with genuine severe psychological difficulties.”
Tr. 929.

As noted, Dr. Scott indicated Plaintiff’s responses to

the PAI “suggested that she may have endorsed items that
presented an unfavorable impression,” but Dr. Scott also
concluded it was “still a valid administration” of that test.
In addition, the record reflects Dr. Scott’s opinion is
not contradicted by any other treating or examining medical
source.

In fact, Dr. Scott’s opinion appears to be endorsed by

Plaintiff’s other examining medical professionals.

For example,

after conducting a Comprehensive Psychological Evaluation of
Plaintiff in February 2010, Robert Basham, Pd.D., opined
Plaintiff suffered from PTSD, a panic disorder, and a borderline
personality disorder.

He assessed Plaintiff with a GAF of 45.3

Dr. Basham noted Plaintiff
3

Although the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V (DSM V) issued May 27,
2013, abandoned the GAF scale in favor of standardized
assessments for symptom severity, diagnostic severity, and
disability (see DSM-V 16 (5th ed. 2013)), at the time of
Plaintiff’s assessment and the ALJ’s opinion the GAF scale was
used to report a clinician’s judgment of the patient’s overall
level of functioning on a scale of 1 to 100 (see Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV 31-34 (4th ed. 2000)).
In the fourth edition, a GAF of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms
(suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals) or any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,
few friends, unable to keep a job). Id.
12- OPINION AND ORDER

was having marked difficulties with basic
emotional and psychological stability on the day
of her evaluation. She gave the impression that
she has had similar problems for years, and she
may have had them her whole life, given the
instability of her childhood family environment
. . . . She is experiencing relatively serious
psychological symptoms and must stabilize before
she is ready to have the children returned.
Tr. 473.
Similarly, on March 15, 2013, Stephen Schepergerdes,
M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined Plaintiff would not
be able to sustain “a simple routine, low stress sedentary job”
because she cannot
effectively deal with the public, or stress, or
detailed instructions. She could not take
criticism well. She [is] hypersensitive to pain
in spite of medication use - the medication would
further limit her ability to sustain alertness and
attention to detail. She would have excessive
work absences.
Tr. 920.
In addition, on February 7, 2011, Dr. Truhn, examining
psychologist, opined “[t]here is a strong probability that
[Plaintiff] may consistently experience an unstable affect and
interpersonal problems and present with numerous crisis
situations.”

Tr. 483.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred when
he failed to provide legally sufficient reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Scott’s
opinion.

13- OPINION AND ORDER

B.

Dr. Truhn
On August 18, 2010, Dr. Truhn conducted a psychological

examination of Plaintiff.

Although this examination is referred

to in the record, Dr. Truhn’s report of that examination is not
in the record.

On February 7, 2011, Dr. Truhn submitted an

Addendum to Evaluation to the Oregon Department of Human Services
addressing whether there were any changes or additions to his
August 2010 diagnosis of Plaintiff.

In his February 2011

Addendum Dr. Truhn “dropped” the diagnosis of attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

Dr. Truhn opined Plaintiff

suffers from a pain disorder and a borderline personality
disorder.

Tr. 483.

Dr. Truhn noted “[t]here is a strong

probability that [Plaintiff] may consistently experience an
unstable affect and interpersonal problems and present with
numerous crisis situations.”

Tr. 483.

Finally, Dr. Truhn noted

[s]upportive services from a day treatment program
or an apartment program may be helpful in aligning
her with a supportive therapist who is able to
monitor her use of prescription medication, as
well as monitor her suicidal thoughts and actions
and to provide consistent therapeutic contact.
Tr. 484.
The ALJ did not mention or evaluate Dr. Truhn’s
February 2011 opinion, and the Court cannot conclude from this
record that the ALJ’s failure was harmless error.

Dr. Truhn’s

opinion appears to support Dr. Scott’s opinion that Plaintiff is
unable to function in a competitive work situation consistently
14- OPINION AND ORDER

or in an ongoing manner.

In fact, Dr. Scott states in his

opinion that he reviewed Dr. Truhn’s August 2010 report and
February 2011 Addendum when forming his opinion.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred when
he failed to address Dr. Truhn’s February 2011 opinion.
II.

The ALJ erred at Step Five.
At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform other

work that exists in the national economy as an electronics
worker, bench assembler, or assembler of electronic accessories.
Pursuant to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), all of
those jobs require Reasoning Level 2.

U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

Dictionary of Occupational Titles App. C (4th ed. 1991).

The DOT

defines Reasoning Level 2 as the ability to “apply commonsense
understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or
oral instructions.

Deal with problems involving a few concrete

variable in or from standardized situations.”

Id.

The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform
only “simple, repetitive, routine tasks.”

Tr. 14.

Plaintiff

asserts the ALJ’s finding is consistent with jobs that only
require Reasoning Level 1, which is defined as the ability to
“[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or
two-step instructions.

Deal with standardized situations with

occasional or no variables in or from these situations
encountered on the job.”
15- OPINION AND ORDER

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of

Occupational Titles App. C (4th ed. 1991).

According to

Plaintiff, therefore, the ALJ erred when he found Plaintiff could
perform work as an electronics worker, bench assembler, or
assembler of electronic accessories.
Defendant concedes “the ALJ erred in articulating [as] a
basis for his finding” that Plaintiff is limited to simple,
repetitive routine tasks.

Although Defendant notes the ALJ

appears to have adopted the opinion of reviewing psychologist
Dorothy Anderson, Ph.D., who opined Plaintiff is able to remember
and to understand “short simple 1-2 step work instructions
but not more detailed” instructions, Defendant also notes
Dr. Anderson stated elsewhere in her opinion that Plaintiff could
carry out “short and simple instructions” and “make simple
decisions.”

Tr. 134-35.

Dr. Anderson concluded in that same

opinion that Plaintiff was “limited to simple repetitive work
tasks.”

Tr. 136.

According to Defendant, therefore,

clarification is needed as to whether Plaintiff is limited to
simple, routine tasks or to one- or two-step tasks.
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ also erred at Step Five when he
failed to ask the VE whether light-level jobs existed in the
national economy that required only occasional interaction with
supervisors.

In his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC the ALJ

specifically found Plaintiff was limited to jobs involving “no
more than occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers,
16- OPINION AND ORDER

and the general public.”

Tr. 14.

At the hearing the ALJ posed a

hypothetical to the VE that included the limitation related to
occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and the
general public, and he inquired whether any medium work existed
that Plaintiff could perform.

Tr. 67.

The VE stated there were

not any medium-level jobs that would be available to an
individual with those limitations.

The ALJ then asked the VE

whether any light-level jobs existed that were consistent with
the hypothetical.

The VE responded:

at the light [level].

“Let me just double check

I believe that there's some light duty

jobs that have limited, occasional contact with coworkers and the
public.”

Tr. 68.

The VE, however, did not refer to the

limitations in the ALJ’s hypothetical restricting Plaintiff to
“no more than occasional interaction with supervisors.”

When the

VE identified three light-level jobs, he reduced the number of
those jobs existing in the national and regional economies by 25
percent to reflect the limitation of “limited public contact,”
but he did not make any mention of nor appear to take into
consideration only occasional interaction with supervisors.
Tr. 69.

Thus, the record is not clear as to whether the VE

addressed Plaintiff’s limitation to only occasional interaction
with co-workers.
On this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred at Step
Five when he concluded Plaintiff could perform the three jobs

17- OPINION AND ORDER

identified by the VE.
III. This matter is remanded for the immediate calculation and
award of benefits.
The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or
for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely
utility of further proceedings.
1179 (9th Cir. 2000).

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

When "the record has been fully developed

and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful
purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award
of benefits."

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir.

2004).
The decision whether to remand this case for further
proceedings or for the payment of benefits is a decision within
the discretion of the court.

Harman, 211 F.3d 1178.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or
for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely
utility of further proceedings.

Id. at 1179.

The court may

"direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully
developed and where further administrative proceedings would
serve no useful purpose."

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for
determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate
award of benefits directed."

Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178.

Court should grant an immediate award of benefits when:

18- OPINION AND ORDER

The

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally
sufficient reasons for rejecting . . .
evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues
that must be resolved before a determination
of disability can be made, and (3) it is
clear from the record that the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled were
such evidence credited.
Id.

The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question:

Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if

the case were remanded for further proceedings.

Id. at 1178 n.2.

The Court has determined the ALJ erred when he improperly
rejected the opinion of Dr. Scott and failed to address
Dr. Truhn’s opinion.

Those opinions are not contradicted by the

opinions of other treating or examining physicians, and the
record has been fully developed.
After giving the opinions of Drs. Scott and Truhn the weight
required by law, the Court concludes Plaintiff cannot work on a
regular and continuing basis and, therefore, is disabled.

See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b)(RFC is ability to work on
“regular and continuing basis”).

See also SSR 96-8p (“regular

and continuing basis” is “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule”).

The Court, therefore, concludes this

matter should not be remanded for further proceedings.
Schneider v. Comm’r, 223 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2000).

See

See also

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 729 ("We do not remand this case for further
proceedings because it is clear from the administrative record

19- OPINION AND ORDER

that Claimant is entitled to benefits."); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876
F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989)(if remand for further proceedings
would only delay the receipt of benefits, judgment for the
claimant is appropriate).
Accordingly, the Court remands this matter for the immediate
calculation and award of benefits to Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Commissioner, DENIES the Commissioner's Motion (#14) to Remand
for further administrative proceedings, and REMANDS this matter
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the immediate
calculation and award of benefits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge

20- OPINION AND ORDER