Farley v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
24
OPINION AND ORDER. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED. See formal OPINION AND ORDER. Signed on 6/27/2016 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
SEAN L. FARLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Kathryn Tassinari
Mark A. Manning
Harder, Wells, Baron & Manning, P.C.
474 Willamette Street, Suite 200
Eugene, OR 97401
Attorneys for plaintiff
Janice E. Hebert
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, Oregon 97201
Jeffrey E. Staples
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A
Seattle, Washington 98104
Attorneys for defendant
Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER
Case No. 6:15-cv-00643-AA
OPINION AND ORDER
AIKEN, Judge:
Plaintiff Sean Farley brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").
The Commissioner denied plaintiffs
application for Title II and Title XVI benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's
decision is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2011, plaintiff applied for Title II disability benefits. Tr. 126. On July 19,
2011, plaintiff applied for Title XVI benefits. Tr. 222. Both applications allege plaintiffs disability
began in January 2006. Tr. 218, 222. Plaintiff argues he is disabled because of hemophilia,
Hepatitis Band C, severe arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, and extreme high blood
pressure. Tr. 239. Plaintiffs applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 168-170,
175. On June 12, 2013, plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at a hearing held by
an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 21. On July 23, 2013, the ALJ ruled plaintiff was not
disabled. Tr. 18. In the July 2013 decision, the ALJ considered only whether Farley was disabled
in the period since the final denial of a prior disability application on October 13, 2010. Tr. 21. On
February 13, 2015, the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review, rendering the ALJ's
decision final. Tr. 1. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based upon proper legal
standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Gutierrezv. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports
and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's" decision. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459
Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER
(9th Cir. 2001 ). A rational decision by the ALJ must be affirmed, even if the evidence is susceptible
to more than one interpretation, because "the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001).
THE ALJ'S DECISION
The
initial
burden
proof
rests
upon
the
claimant
to
Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th
establish disability.
Cir. 1986).
of
To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
. . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S. C.
§
423 (d) (1) (A) .
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether a person is
disabledundertheAct. Bowenv. Yuckert,482U.S. l37, 140(1987);20C.F.R. §404.1520. At step
one, the ALJ found plaintiffhad not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since October 13, 2010.
Tr. 24. At step two, the ALJ classified plaintiff's hemophilia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine as severe. Tr. 24. At step three, the ALJ
found plaintiff's medically severe impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one
of the listed impairments the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial
gainful activity. Tr. 25.
The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1567 (b)
and 416. 967 (b),
subject to the
following limitations: "lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time,
no more than frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 10
pounds[, and] no more than frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching,
crawling, and climbing
with his right hand."
. with no more than occasional fingering
Tr. 25.
Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Based on the RFC and the testimony
of a vocational expert,
perform past
relevant
the ALJ found plaintiff was unable to
Tr.
work.
29.
Using plaintiff's
age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded plaintiff
could perform jobs available in the national economy and therefore
was not disabled.
Tr. 30.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ made five errors in concluding he is
not disabled.
Pl.'s Br. (doc. 17) at 12.
The plaintiff challenges
the ALJ's adverse credibility determination, the ALJ's choice to
assign little weight to the opinion of a treating physician, the
ALJ's failure to discuss hemophilic arthropathy or severe arthritis
at
step
two,
and
the
ALJ' s
application
of
a
presumption
nondisability based on a 2010 denial of disability benefits.
of
The
plaintiff also disputes whether the defendant met her burden of
proving plaintiff can work at step five.
I.
1
Plaintiff's Credibility
Plaintiff
convincing
argues
reasons
for
the
ALJ
rejecting
severity of his symptoms.
failed
Pl. 's Br.
clear
and
testimony concerning
his
to
the
at 14.
provide
When a claimant's
medically documented impairments reasonably could be expected to
produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record
contains no affirmative evidence of malingering,
reject
the
claimant's
1
testimony about
the
"the ALJ
severity of
This last argument is based solely on the first four alleged errors and therefore is not
discussed separately in this opinion.
Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER
can
symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons
for doing so."
1996) .
Smolen v.
A general
Chater,
assertion
the
80 F.3d 1273, 1281
claimant
insufficient;
what
not
the ALJ must "state which .
credible
is
and
evidence
suggests
the
(9th Cir.
credible
is
testimony is not
complaints
credible." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F. 3d 915, 918
are
not
(9th Cir. 19 93) .
The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the
reviewing
court
to
conclude
that
the ALJ did not
discredit the claimant's testimony."
748,
750
(9th Cir. 1995).
arbitrarily
Orteza v. Shalala,
50 F.3d
If the "ALJ's credibility finding is
supported by substantial evidence in the record,
not engage in second guessing.
[the court]
may
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
959 (9th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons for
finding plaintiff not credible.
First, the ALJ fairly concluded
plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with the treatment record.
Tr.
26.
While an ALJ cannot reject the severity of subjective
complaints solely on the lack of objective evidence,
look to the medical record for inconsistencies.
an ALJ may
See Morgan v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1999).
Further,
impairments
medication
or
that
treatment
can
are
be
controlled
effectively
not
disabling
for
determining eligibility for benefits.
Admin.,
439 F.3d 1001,
1006
(9th Cir.
Warre v.
2006).
purposes
Comm'r Soc.
with
of
Sec.
At the hearing,
plaintiff asserted his carpal tunnel and back problems were among
the issues preventing him from working.
Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 46-47.
Specifically,
plaintiff
asserted he
needed
to
shift
positions
every
ten
to
fifteen minutes, could not walk all the way around the block where
he lived, and could not help with household chores.
However,
Tr. 47-49.
objective medical evidence shows mild findings for his
back and wrist ailments.
Physical exams in December 2012, January
2013, and April 2013 all indicate normal gait and station.
1035, 1040, 1044.
The same exams indicate plaintiff, save for some
tingling and numbness
results.
Tr.
in his hand,
Tr. 1035, 1039, 1043.
had normal neurologic exam
An October 2011 evaluation of his
carpal tunnel showed "good range of motion in his right wrist,
thumb, and digits" with mild conditions.
plaintiff's
shoulder,
hemophilia,
except
to
the
Tr. 1080-81.
extent
it
was fairly characterized as manageable.
Further,
impacted
his
Tr.
The
27.
plaintiff worked as a roofer from 1997 to 2006, and while he said
he missed work because of his hemophilia,
his absences did not
prevent him from working entirely and his disease was under fairly
good control with treatment.
Tr. 44-45.
Because the mild clinical
findings and work history conflict with plaintiff's representations
about the impact of some of his afflictions on his ability to work,
the ALJ permissibly considered
them in determining whether to
credit plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony.
Second,
the ALJ fairly concluded the plaintiff's testimony
about the severity of his symptoms was inconsistent with his selfreported activity level.
Daily activities may serve as a basis for
discrediting a claimant when they "contradict claims of a totally
debilitating impairment." Molina v.
Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER
Astrue,
674 F. 3d 1104,
1113
(9th Cir.
January
2 012) .
2006
and
Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of
maintained
through
all
the
stages
of
his
application that his disability persisted for the entire period
from
2010
to
application,
2013.
Tr.
44-45.
At
various
stages
of
his
plaintiff either represented a severely restricted
existence or offered vague responses unhelpful to a process of
determining his disability.
In his Function Report dated August
10, 2011, plaintiff asserted his entire day consisted of "try[ing]
to get up take shower sit and rest."
Tr. 279.
[sic]
He also says
he "can't walk much can't move fingers or wrists ankels knees can't
cut or bang body parts do to bleeding."
prompted
to
describe
transportation,
280-81,
283.
how
he
helps
[sic]
with
Tr.
chores,
meals,
plaintiff offers variations of "depends."
Despite these representations,
moving boxes in March or April of 2011,
When
and
Tr.
plaintiff reported
fixing cars in December
2010, and recreating on sand dunes in January 2011.
856.
278.
Tr. 601, 859,
The ALJ reasonably concluded engaging in these moderately
demanding physical activities was inconsistent with plaintiff's
symptom testimony.
Plaintiff also conceded he was laid off from his last job and
that he worked for "six or seven months" after the alleged onset of
his disability in January 2006.
Tr. 46.
Even though the period
under review-October 2010 to June 2013-included no gainful work by
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's representation that he was disabled
beginning in 2006
"ordinary
conflicts with this work history.
techniques
Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER
of
credibility
evaluation,"
Applying
the
ALJ
permissibly concluded this conflict undermined the credibility of
plaintiff 1 s symptom testimony.
Smolen
1
80 F.3d at 1284.
However 1 the ALJ 1 s analysis of plaintiff 1 s credibility also
included errors.
First 1 the ALJ erred in concluding plaintiff 1 s
story about how he began dating his girlfriend suggested he was not
credible.
Tr.
28.
Plaintiff
testified
that
he
dated
his
girlfriend for a time in high school 1 and she got back in touch
years later when she found his phone number.
ALJ summarizes
[plaintiff]
the
story as
Tr. 51; 58-59.
" [the girlfriend]
The
randomly called
and started coming over all the time" and concludes
"the testimony [is] almost nonsensical and not entirely reliable. 11
Tr.
28.
considers
The
ALJ provides
plaintiff 1 s
no
entirely
further
explanation
plausible
story
of
why he
"nonsensical. 11
Accordingly 1 plaintiff 1 s statements about his girlfriend are not a
convincing reason to disbelieve his symptom testimony.
ALJ 1 s
assertion
that
television habits were
convincing
nor
plaintiff 1 s
poker 1
computer
Next 1 the
game
1
and
inconsistent with disability is neither
supported
by
substantial
evidence.
Tr.
28.
Sedentary activities like watching television and playing computer
games are fully consistent with plaintiff / s
testimony.
See Fair v. Bowen 1 885 F.2d 597 1
subjective symptom
603
(9th Cir. 1989)
(performance of "home activities . . . not easily transferable to
what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace 11 is not
a clear and convincing reason to discredit symptom testimony) .
The
ALJ could not reasonably use these two pieces of testimony
to
impugn plaintiff 1 s credibility.
Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER
Even
when
an ALJ
commits
legal
error,
decision where that error is harmless.
courts
uphold
the
"We have long recognized
that harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act
context."
Molina, 674 F. 3d at 1115.
An error is harmless if it is
"inconsequential to the ultimate nondisabili ty determination," id. ,
or "if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned," even if the
agency "explains its decision with less than ideal clarity," Alaska
Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation v.
(quoting Bowman Transp.,
419 U.S. 281,
286
Inc.
(1974)).
EPA,
540 U.S.
461,
497
(2004)
v. Ark.-Best Freight System,
Here, the ALJ provided several clear
and convincing reasons to discredit the plaintiff's testimony.
Carmickle v.
(9th Cir.
Comm'r of Soc.
2008)
Inc.,
Sec. Admin.,
533 F.3d 1155,
See
1162-63
(upholding adverse credibility finding when ALJ
rested finding on four reasons, two of which were not supported by
substantial evidence) .
The ALJ' s
credibility determination is
affirmed.
II.
Dr. Taylor's Opinion
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ improperly gave little weight to
the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Jason Taylor. Pl.'s Br. at
16.
There are three types of medical opinions in social security
cases:
those from treating, examining and non-examining doctors.
Lester v. Chater,
81 F.3d 821, 830
(9th Cir. 1995).
The medical
opinion of a treating physician is entitled to "special weight"
because
the
physician
"has
a
greater
opportunity
to
know and
observe the patient as an individual." Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F. 2d
759,
761
(9th Cir.
1989)
Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER
(citations
omitted).
If
a
treating
doctor's opinion is contradicted by a non-examining physician, an
ALJ may reject it only by providing specific and legitimate reasons
that are supported by substantial evidence.
427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)
31) .
Bayliss v. Barnhart,
(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-
The contrary opinion of a non-treating medical expert does
not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a
treating physician's opinion.
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
752 (9th Cir. 1989).
Relying on the opinions of nonexamining physicians, the ALJ
concluded plaintiff could lift 10 pounds no more than frequently
and 20 pounds no more than occasionally.
Tr. 25, 28, 142, 165.
Dr. Taylor's opinion recommends plaintiff lift 10 pounds no more
than occasionally and never lift 20 pounds.
Tr. 982.
Dr. Taylor
also asserts plaintiff would be unable to maintain a regular work
schedule more than twice a month.
Id.
The ALJ failed to provide specific,
discredit Dr. Taylor's opinion.
The ALJ found Dr. Taylor's opinion
inconsistent with his own treatment notes.
the ALJ questioned Dr.
legitimate reasons to
Tr. 28.
Taylor's opinions regarding plaintiff's
hemophilia and hepatitis
C,
finding Dr.
Taylor
following the claimant for right shoulder pain."
finding is contrary to the record.
shoulder pain
treatment
plan
at
the
for
Specifically,
beginning
plaintiff's
"was primarily
Tr. 28-29.
This
While Dr. Taylor acknowledged
of
his
note,
hemophilia,
he
formulated
incorporated
reference a treatment note from a hematology fellow,
a
by
Dr. Meghan
Liel, and indicated that plaintiff would be referred to orthopedics
Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER
for his shoulder problems.
Dr.
Tr. 963, 967-68.
The record indicates
Taylor treated plaintiff's hemophilia.
Therefore,
the ALJ
improperly concluded it was inconsistent for Dr. Taylor to speak to
the severity of that condition.
Beyond this misunderstanding about
Dr. Taylor's treatment of the plaintiff, the ALJ does not point to
any specific examples of such inconsistencies,
apparent
in
the
record.
Further,
objective
elsewhere in the record supports Dr.
plaintiff's
visit
with
a
physical
and I
find none
medical
evidence
Taylor's opinion.
therapist
in
revealed atrophy in his right shoulder muscles,
First,
February
2012
crepitus in his
joints, and a decreased range of motion in his right shoulder; the
visit culminated in a diagnosis of a clinical joint deformity.
965-66.
Second,
Tr.
an MRI in December 2008 revealed a diagnosable
shoulder impingement.
Tr. 840.
Contrary to the ALJ's conclusion,
Dr. Taylor's opinion is not inconsistent with his own treatment
notes or the medical record.
I cannot conclude the ALJ's error in weighing Dr.
opinion was harmless.
The scope of Dr.
Taylor's
Taylor's treatment of
plaintiff allowed Dr. Taylor to express an opinion on plaintiff's
RFC.
He observed a relationship between plaintiff's hemophilia and
joint disease throughout his medical evaluation.
Drs.
Taylor
decreased"
and
range
Liel' s
of
clinical
motion
and
observations
swelling
Tr.
of
a
980-981.
"markedly
in plaintiff's
right
shoulder support crediting Dr. Taylor's opinion as to plaintiff's
ability to lift.
Tr. 963, 968.
I agree with the ALJ that it is unclear what led Dr. Taylor to
Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER
conclude that plaintiff will miss two or more days of work per
month.
Tr. 29.
On remand,
the ALJ also should reconsider this
aspect of Dr. Taylor's opinion, keeping in mind an ALJ's duty to
develop the record to resolve ambiguities in the medical evidence.
Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459-60.
III. The Role of Hemophilia in the Step Two Analysis
Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ's omission of hemophilic
arthropathy from the step two analysis.
Pl.'s Br. at 18.
Step two
is "a de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless
claims."
of
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290.
impairments
may be
found
"An impairment or combination
not
severe
only i f
the
evidence
establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal
effect on an individual's ability to work."
Webb v. Barnhart, 433
F.3d
and
683,
omitted)
686
(9th
Cir.
2005)
(emphasis in original) .
(citation
quotation
marks
At step two, the ALJ is bound to
consider all relevant medical evidence and may find an impairment
nonsevere
only
if
medical evidence."
the
nonseverity
is
"clearly established by
(quoting SSR 85-28) .
While the ALJ recognized the purported connection between
plaintiff's hemophilia and shoulder pain,
the ALJ concluded the
shoulder impairment was "non-severe" because it had "not yet lasted
12 months."
Tr.
27,
24.
On the other hand,
plaintiff's hemophilia to be severe but manageable.
the ALJ found
Tr. 24, 27.
The ALJ also mentioned plaintiff's "other symptoms and complaints
that appear periodically throughout the record
but
not
limited to a
history of
Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER
alcohol
. includ[ing]
and substance abuse,
hepatitis C,
hypertension,
and depression" and concluded "these
conditions, considered singly or in combination, have caused only
transient and mild symptoms" and were not severe.
Tr. 24.
Despite
this long list of nonsevere impairments, the ALJ did not discuss
plaintiff's severe arthritis or hemophilic arthropathy at all in
the step two analysis.
The ALJ's discussion of plaintiff's hemophilia raises serious
questions about whether the ALJ's decision at step two rested on a
complete and correct understanding of the record.
the ALJ was not whether the hemophilia,
The question to
standing alone,
caused
plaintiff's disability, but rather whether the hemophilia, together
with other
severe
or
nonsevere
problems,
"significantly limit
[plaintiff's] ability to perform basic work activities."
§§
404.1520(c),
416.920(c).
By
omitting
any
20 C.F.R.
discussion
of
arthritis and the potential for hemophilia to cause joint pain, the
ALJ failed to consider all relevant evidence at step two.
Also,
the ALJ's conclusion the shoulder impingement was not
severe was not supported by medical evidence.
Despite objective
medical evidence plaintiff's shoulder was significantly compromised
in February 2012, the ALJ used the date of a formal diagnosis made
during surgery in April 2013 as the onset date.
Further,
Tr. 963-68; 24.
the ALJ reasoned that because the shoulder surgery was
"successful" the impingement could not contribute to a finding of
disability.
Tr.
27.
substantial evidence.
This
conclusion
is
not
supported
by
Dr. Garry Vallier operated on plaintiff's
shoulder on April 15, 2013.
Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 1002-1003.
The ALJ supported his
finding the surgery "successful" by citing generally to 7 9 pages of
medical records from North Bend Medical Centers, of which only one
two-page note records an interaction after the surgery.
1031-1109.
as
the
Though it transcribes a post operative visit, insofar
note
discusses
plaintiff's
shoulder
identical to a note from before the surgery.
and Tr.
support
Tr. 27,
1033 -34.
his
condition,
it
is
Compare Tr. 1031-1032
The records cited by the ALJ simply do not
conclusion
the
surgery
successfully
resolved
plaintiff's shoulder impingement.
I cannot conclude the errors at step two were harmless.
The
inclusion of arthritis or hemophilic arthropathy in the list of
severe or nonsevere impairments could change the formulation of the
RFC and what jobs are available to the plaintiff.
RFC,
In assessing an
an ALJ is bound to consider limitations and restrictions
imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those deemed
not severe.
2005)
See Burch v.
(citing
404 .1545 (a) (2).
Social
Barnhart,
Security
Likewise,
400 F.3d 676,
Ruling
(9th Cir.
20
96-Sp);
683
C.F.R.
§
an assessment of the plaintiff's RFC
will be more accurate with medical evidence of the current state of
his shoulder impingement.
IV.
Presumption of Non-Disability
Finally,
plaintiff
asserts
the
ALJ
erred
in
finding
the
plaintiff did not meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of
continuing non-disability.
Pl.'s Br. at 12.
If a claimant makes
a second attempt to receive benefits after an earlier denial, the
claimant is presumed to be not disabled for the period between the
Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER
claims.
Lester,
81 F.3d at 827.
A plaintiff can overcome that
presumption if he shows both changed circumstances and greater
disability since his last claim.
693
(9th Cir.
1988).
Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691,
The ALJ cone 1 uded there were no changed
circumstances in this case.
Tr. 21.
That conclusion was error;
medical evidence supports a conclusion plaintiff's hemophilia and
related limitations impacted him differently after the May 2010
denial.
However, the error was harmless because the ALJ went on to
make a determination of plaintiff's rights under the Act with a
full five-step analysis.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED.
remand,
the
explicitly
ALJ
must:
determines
(1)
perform
whether
and
a
step
when
two
analysis
plaintiff's
On
that
hemophilic
arthropathy, severe arthritis, and/or shoulder pain became severe
medically
determinable
giving Dr.
evidence,
impairment(s);
(2)
reformulate
the
RFC
Taylor's opinion due weight considering all medical
including
Dr.
Liel's
treating providers; and (3)
note
and
IT IS SO ORDERED.}
"·~
day ofJ1'.ify, 2016.
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge
Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER
evidence
from
conduct a new step five analysis to
determine if plaintiff is disabled.
Dated this
other
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