Sights v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
32
Opinion and Order: The Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed. Signed on 9/26/2016 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (cw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
GAIL ANN SIGHTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Alan Stuart Graf, P.C.
208 Pine Street
Floyd, Virginia 24091
Attorney for plaintiff
Janice E. Hebe1t
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney's Office
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Po1tland, Oregon 97201
Sarah L. Martin
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Office of General Counsel
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MIS 221A
Seattle, Washington 98104
Attorneys for defendant
Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER
Case No. 6:15-cv-00717-AA
OPINION AND ORDER
AIKEN, Judge:
Plaintiff Gail Ann Sights brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance
Benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affi1med.
BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2012, plaintiffprotectively filed for DIB. 131-39. She alleges disability beginning
April 12, 2012, 1 due to learning disability, memmy loss, varicose veins, back problems, dyslexia,
and seizures. Tr. 67, 156. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 16. On April
22, 2014, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 30. Plaintiff,
represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert ("VE"). Tr. 30. On June 5, 2014, the ALJ
issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. 25. On February23, 2015, the Appeals Council declined review,
making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. I. Plaintiff then filed a
complaint in this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affi1m the Commissioner's decision if it is based upon proper legal
standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Beny v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Gutierrezv. Comm 'rofSoc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir.
1
Plaintiff originally asserted a disability onset date ofNovembcr 23, 2011, the day she
was in a car accident that caused her back pain and other problems. Tr. 36, 152. At the hearing,
she amended her onset date to April 12, 2012, the day she left her most recent job. Tr. 37.
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2014) (internal quotations marks omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports
and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion." Aiayes v. lvfassanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459
(9th Cir. 2001 ). Ifthe evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation but the Commissioner's
decision is rational, the Commissioner must be affirmed because "the court may not substitute its
judgement for that of the Commissioner." Edlund v. lvfassanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001).
COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
The initial burden ofproofrests upon the plaintiff to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler,
782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate an
"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically dete1minable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for dete1mining whether
a person is disabled. Brown v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At
step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 12, 2012,
the alleged disability onset date. Tr. 18; 20 C.F.R. §§ 04.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ
found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease and seizure disorder.
Tr. 18; 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520(a)(4)(ii), ( c). At step t!n·ee, the ALJ determined plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the
listed impairments "that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial
gainful activity." Tr. 20; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. l 520(a)(4)(iii), (d).
The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC")
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to perfmm light work as defined in 20 C[.]F[.]R[. §] 404.1567(b) except the claimant
is further limited to no more than occasional climbing ofropes, scaffolds, and ladders.
The Claimant would also need to avoid more than occasional exposure to moving
machine1y, unprotected heights, and similar hazards.
Tr. 20; 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(e). At step four, the ALJ concluded plaintiff was capable of
performing past relevant work as a sorter and ticket taker. Tr. 25; 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
(f). Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff had not been under a disability from April 12, 2012,
through the date of his decision. Tr. 25.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues theALJ eJTed when he (I) gave little weight to plaintiffs subjective symptom
testimony; (2) rejected certain medical opinions by plaintiffs treating physicians; and (3) found
plaintiffs carpal tmmel syndrome was not a severe impairment.
I.
Plaintiff's Subjective Symptom Testimony
"In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ
must engage in a two-step analysis." i\10/ina v. Astme, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). First,
the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged. Id. If the claimant meets this first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can
reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear,
and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. "General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must
identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence unde1mines the claimant's complaints."
Beny, 622 F.3d at 1234 (citingLesterv. Chater, 81F.3d821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff states she has "sharp" pain in the "middle ofher back" and in her "lower back." Tr.
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206. She experiences the pain "all day [and] night long." Tr. 206. She stopped working in April
2012 because her pain "became aggressively worse and finally was too much" to permit her to keep
working. Tr. 38. The pain was so severe she could not move and was "crying a lot" at work. Tr. 198.
"Standing or walking hnrts for any long period of time." Tr. 39. She is able to go shopping, but not
"for a ve1y long time because then it starts hurting [her] back." Tr. 41. She can walk for "[m]aybe
a block" before she needs to rest. Tr. 45. She participated in a three-mile charity walk but "was in
a lot of pain" by the end. Tr. 45. She is in pain "all day." Tr. 199.
The ALJ found plaintiffs impahments could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged.
Tr. 21. However, the ALJ dete1mined plaintiffs statements regarding the purported intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her impaim1ents were not entirely credible. Tr. 21.
The ALJ first concluded the "obj ectivc medical evidence of]] record is inconsistent with
[plaintiffs] alleged pain level." Tr. 23. An ALJ may consider inconsistencies between subjective
symptom testimony and objective medical evidence in determining whether to credit that symptom
testimony. See Johnson v. Shala/a, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (listing identification of
"several contradictions between claimant's testimony and the relevant medical evidence" among
clear and convincing reasons supporting rejecting ofpain testimony). Here, the ALJ provided several
clear, specific examples of inconsistency between objective medical evidence and plaintiffs
proclaimed pain level. For example, the ALJ noted that during one doctor's visit plaintiff asserted
"I 0/1 O" pain in her central back, but the physician observed plaintiff only displayed "some mild
discomfort" when sitting, transitioning, or standing during the examination. Tr. 21-23, 278. TheALJ
also cited a different doctor's notation of a discrepancy between plaintiffs subjective pain
allegations and herappearance. Tr. 22-23, 427 ("I note that she rates her pain scale at a 9. She does
Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER
not look overtly uncomfortable until she tries to get offthe bench in the room and then she winces.").
Plaintiff cites Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that
"it is improper as a matter oflaw for an ALJ to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground
that it is not fully con-oborated by objective medical findings." But the ALJ did not discredit
plaintiffs pain complaints due to absence of medical evidence, she found those complaints
inconsistent with the doctors' objective observations. The ALJ rationally considered assertions of
9/10 and 10/10 pain inconsistent with demonstrating only mild to moderate discomfort.
The ALJ also found plaintiffs pain testimony inconsistent with her reported activities of
daily living ("ADL"). An ALJ may consider "whether the claimant engages in daily activities
inconsistent with the alleged symptoms" in evaluating the credibility of symptom testimony.
Lingenfelterv. Astrue, 504F.3d1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, theALJ noted plaintiff completed
a three-mile charity walk, took partial responsibility for household chores, made short groce1y store
trips, threw a Frisbee to her grandson's dog, visited with her neighbors, and perfmmed 2-3 hour
stretches of yard work. Tr. 23-24.
Plaintiff attempts to explain her ability to engage in these activities by asserting her pain
waxes and wanes. Pl. 's Br. 8-9. There is ample evidence ofwaxing and waning pain in the record.
For example, Dr. Gittins wrote plaintiffs self-reported pain levels "wax and wane." Tr. 348. In a
questioru1aire, Dr. Beckstrand noted likely "flareups" ofpain. Tr. 463. Dr. Weller stated in January
2012 that plaintiff reported "her pain is often worse first thing in the morning[.]" Tr. 270. In April
2012, plaintiff told Dr. Gittins her pain levels were "mild in the morning" and progressively
worsened throughout the day. Tr. 315. And at the hearing, plaintiff testified some days are worse
than others in terms of pain. Tr. 4 7.
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However, plaintiff repeatedly alleges she is always in pain. In a June 2012 pain and fatigue
questionnaire, plaintiff reported "pain all the time and it is all day and night long." Tr. 206. In an
adult function report filled out the same month, plaintiff stated she was "in pain all day" and she
"go[ es] to bed ... in pain[,] sleep[ s] 3-4 [hours]," and then is up every hour due to pain. Tr. 199. In
short, even accepting that plaintiffs pain waxes and wanes, plaintiff repeatedly stated her pain is
severe even during the "waning" periods. The ALJ permissibly found plaintiffs ADLs inconsistent
with these allegations of constant pain.
Next, the ALJ noted plaintiff chose not to take prescribed medications or engage in a set of
other suggested treatments in favor ofhomeopathic remedies. Tr. 23. Electing conservative treatment
permits an inference that symptoms are not as severe as alleged. Tommasetti v. Astnie, 533 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ described a July 2012 doctor's visit in which plaintiff reported she had attended six
physical therapy sessions without noticing any significant improvements. The ALJ stated "[t]here
are no cmrnsponding treatment records in the file to support the claimant's statements that she
attended PT." Tr. 22. With respect to a June 2012 independent medical exam by Dr. Muzzana, a
chiropractor, the ALJ noted the record did not contain "a copy of the actual exam or the findings."
Tr. 22. After the ALJ issued his decision, plaintiff submitted additional evidence to the Appeals
Council. That evidence included physical therapy notes from visits in May through August 2012 and
Dr. Muzzana's examination report.
Plaintiff argues this new evidence "significantly changes" the credibility analysis. Pl.' s Br.
14. I disagree. First, Dr. Muzzana confoms plaintiff suffers from back pain and numbness/tingling
in her hand and states those symptoms stem from cerviothoracic injuries and carpal tunnel symptom.
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Tr. 472. However, Dr. Muzzana says nothing about the severity ofplaintiffs pain or how that pain
affects plaintiffs ability to work. Dr. Mnzzana's report therefore does not affect the ALJ's
evaluation of plaintiffs testimony regarding symptom severity.'
The supplemental evidence does undercut one ofthe ALJ' s reasons for discrediting plaintiffs
testimony:
the absence of the physical therapy and chiropractic examination notes is not a
convincing reason to question plaintiffs pain testimony, as those records clearly exist. However, any
e1rnr was hannless. The ALJ's decision also rested on inconsistencies between plaintiffs pain
testimony and her ADLs, treatment choices, and doctors' observations, all of which are clear,
convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiffs testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin.,
533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (when ALJ's decision rested on at least one impem1issible
consideration, "[t]he relevant inquiry ... is whether the ALJ's decision remains legally valid, despite
such error"). The ALJ's decision to discredit plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony is supported
by substantial evidence.
11.
ALJ's Rejection ofMedical Opinions
Plaintiff next argues the ALJ did not give sufficient reasons to reject the opinions of two
treating physicians, Dr. Weller and Dr. Beckstrand. The ALJ is the arbiter of conflicting and/or
ambiguous evidence in the medical record. Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156. If a treating physician's
opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, the ALJ may reject the treating opinion only by
2
Defendant argues the Commissioner was free to disregard Dr. Muzzana's opinion
because chiropractors are not acceptable medical sources. That is a misleading oversimplication
of the law. Under the regulations, only an acceptable medical course may offer evidence to
establish a medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a). But the regulations
expressly provide for the use of chiropractors' opinions in evaluating impairment severity. Id. §
416.913(d)(l).
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providing specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. Valentine v.
Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). If a treating doctor's opinion is not
contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected by the ALJ only for "clear and convincing" reasons
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Ryan v. Comm 'r ofSoc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198
(9th Cir. 2008).
First, plaintiff asserts the ALJ gave insufficiently specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Weller's
April 23,2012 report. In that report, Dr. Weller noted plaintiff was applying for disability benefits
"related especially to the thoracic pain, seizure disorder and carpal tunnel syndrome." Tr. 279. The
ALJ gave Dr. Weller's opinion little weight because Dr. Weller "fail[ed] to note why these
conditions are disabling and how they affect the claimant's actual level offunction." Tr. 24. The ALJ
also considered Dr. Weller's objective findings of thoracic tenderness and some loss of range of
motion inconsistent with total disability. Tr. 24.
Any error in giving little weight to the April 23 report was harmless. The plaintiff's properly
discredited subjective pain statements must be removed from that report. With those statements
removed, the report -
even if credited as true -
would establish only that plaintiff had some
tenderness and loss ofmotion and required further thoracic workup. The report contains no specific
limitations about plaintiff's ability to function in the workplace. Moreover, the level of pain
supported by Dr. Weller's objective clinical findings is adequately accounted for by the RFC's
limitation to light work. 3
3
The ALJ apparently inte1preted Dr. Weller's April 23 note as an opinion that plaintiff
was disabled. I find the note ambiguous on this point. Noting that a patient is applying for
disability benefits is not the same as opining that patient is disabled. However, to the extent Dr.
Weller opined plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ owed no deference to that opinion because it was a
statement about the ultimate issue of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(l) ("We are responsible
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Second, plaintiff challenges the ALJ' s decision to discount a questionnaire filled out by Dr.
Beckstrand. The questionnaire asks whether ( 1) plaintiffs pain would preclude her from performing
basic work activities, (2) plaintiff would need to take additional breaks due to pain, and (3) plaintiff
would be absent at least two work days per month even if employed in a low-stress, sedentary,
simple job. Tr. 463-64. Dr. Beckstand responded "yes" to each of these questions. Tr. 463-64. The
ALJ assigned little weight to the questionnaire. Tr. 24. Because the questioruiaire conflicts with other
medical evidence in the record, the ALJ was required to reject it for specific, legitimate reasons.
The ALJ's reasoning meets that standard. First, the ALJ explained Dr. Beckstrand had
questioned the reliability of plaintiff's assessment of her own pain, and noted plaintiff's pain had
appeared to be so mild on a recent visit Dr. Beckstrand declined to conduct a physical spine
examination. The ALJ rationally found those observations ofmild pain inconsistent with the severe
limitations in the questiomiaire. Second, the ALJ noted Dr. Weller found plaintiff with full thoracic
rotation on both sides with subjective pain complaints and normal neurological testing. Tr. 438.
Again, the ALJ reasonably found those clinical results inconsistent with the level oflimitation in Dr.
Beckstrand's opinion. Finally, the ALJ found the limitations assessed by Dr. Beckstrand inconsistent
with plaintiff's failure to follow prescribed treatments and with plaintiffs ADLs, specifically
referencing plaintiff's ability to do yard work, do housework, complete a three-mile walk, and care
for her autistic grandson. As explained in section I of this opinion, those findings of inconsistency
arc supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ therefore provided specific, legitimate reasons to
give little weight to the questionnaire.
for making the determination of decision about whether you meet the statutory definition of
disability. A statement by a medical source that you are 'disabled' ... does not mean that we
will dctennine you are disabled.")
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III.
ALi's Finding ofPlaintiff's Caipal Tunnel Syndrom as Not Severe
Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding her carpal tunnel syndrome non-severe
because "a finding that Plaintiff was limited in the use of her left hand could result in a difference
in the disability determination." Pl.'s Br. 17. At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ decides whether plaintiff has a medically detenninable severe impainnent or
combination ofimpairments that lasts or could be expected to last for a continuous period ofnot less
than twelve months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 404.1509. 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). Plaintiff must
prove the physical or mental impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs,
symptoms, and laboratory findings; the claimant's own statement ofsymptoms alone will not suffice.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908.
The ALJ's discussion of plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome is ve1y brief, consisting of the
following two sentences:
The claimant also has exhibited symptoms of or been diagnosed with carpal
tunnel syndrome (Ex. 4F). The objective medical evidence does not indicate that
these impaiiments have caused significant vocational limitations for at least 12
consecutive months, therefore they arc deemed non-severe.
Tr. 18.
Exhibit 4F consists of twenty-five pages of medical records. Those records show the
following: in Janumy 2012, Dr. Weller diagnosed plaintiff with "probable carpal tunnel syndrome
left upper extremity" caused by injuries sustained in a car accident in November 2011. Tr. 272.
After an evaluation at with Rehabilitation Medicine Associates, plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal
tunnel syndrome; she was prescribed use of a splint "at night, while driving, and as needed during
daytime," with a recommended surgical referral ifnumbness did not resolve within a month. Tr. 273.
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A May 2012 treatment note indicates plaintiff was "await[ing] surgical consultation." Tr. 280. No
records indicate plaintiff consulted with a surgeon or obtained fmiher interventions for carpal tunnel
syndrome. In her opening brief, plaintiff cites other records documenting numbness and tingling in
her left hand; all ofthose records take place in the six-month span betweenNovember2011 and June
2012. See Tr. 239, 322, 323, 354, 364, 472. Moreover, none of those records address severity with
any specificity or suggest specific workplace limitations. Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably screened
out plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome at step two because there is no evidence it persisted as a severe
impaitment for twelve months.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated
thi~ay of September, 2016.
AnnAiken
United States District Judge
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