Colton et al v. Central Curry School District Number 1
Filing
15
OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion to dismiss 12 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. See formal OPINION AND ORDER. Signed on 9/22/2015 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
COLTON PEARSON, SCOTT PEARSON,
and MANDY PEARSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CENTRAL CURRY SCHOOL DISTRICT
#1, DENNIS JOHNSON, in his
individual and official
capacity, and GREG BROWN, in
his individual and official
capacity,
Defendants.
Justin Steffen
Steffen Legal Services, LLC
2027 SE Jefferson St, Ste 205
Milwaukie, OR 97222
Attorney for plaintiffs
Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER
Case No. 6:15-cv-1353-AA
OPINION AND ORDER
Kate Wilkinson
Oregon School Boards Association
PO Box 1068
Salem, Oregon 97308
Attorney for defendants
AIKEN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiffs Colton ("Colton"), Scott ("Scott"), and Mandy
("Mandy")
Pearson filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
Defendants Central Curry School District ("CCSD"), Dennis Johnson
("Johnson"), and Greg Brown ("Brown"), alleging violations of the
First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
and related violations of state law.
The allegations in the
complaint stem from a confrontation between Colton and Brown
during a high school football game in Reedsport, Oregon.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (6).
For the reasons below, defendant's motion is granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Colton played football for Gold Beach High School, which is
operated by the District.
Pl's Compl.,
~
2.
At the time of the
incidents at issue, Johnson was the superintendent of CCSD.
Compl.,
~
2.
~
4.
Scott and Mandy are Colton's parents.
Pl's Compl.,
On October 10, 2014, Gold Beach played a football game
against Reedsport High School, in Reedsport, Oregon.
Compl.,
~
2.
Brown was acting as an assistant coach.
Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER
Pl's
Pl's
During the game, Colton went to the sidelines to take some
ibuprofen.
Pl's Compl.,
left the game.
at him.
~
3.
Brown was angry that Colton had
Brown followed Colton to the sidelines, yelling
As Scott and Mandy watched, Brown punched Colton in the
side of the head with a closed fist.
Colton was wearing his
helmet and did not sustain serious physical injury.
Brown
pleaded no contest to harassment and disorderly conduct for his
assault of Colton.
~
Pl's Compl.,
5.
He is currently in a
diversion program related to those charges.
In the spring of 2015, plaintiffs sent Johnson a tort claim
notice as required by Or. Rev. Stat.
§
30.275.
Pl's Compl.,
~
6.
Shortly after Johnson and CCSD received the notice, Colton was
suspended from school for allegedly using his cellular phone in
class.
The suspension was rescinded a few days later.
Johnson described Brown as only slapping Colton.
Compl.,
~
4.
Pl's
Plaintiffs assert that Johnson downplayed the
assault and was hesitant to punish Brown because Brown and
Johnson are close personal friends.
Plaintiffs further allege
that CCSD has taken no action to address the assault or to ensure
that it does not happen again.
Pl's Compl.,
~
7.
Plaintiffs allege that when Brown attacked Colton, Brown (1)
subjected Colton to an unreasonable seizure, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and (2) committed a battery, in violation of
state law.
Pl's Compl.,
~
Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER
9, 12.
Plaintiffs also bring a state-
law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Brown and Johnson.
Pl's Compl.,
~~
15-16.
Finally, plaintiffs
assert that in attempting to suspend Colton, Johnson was
retaliating against them for filing this lawsuit, in violation of
their First Amendment rights.
Pl.'s Compl.
~
19.
Plaintiffs allege that CCSD is liable on the Fourth
Amendment claim because it has a pattern, practice or custom of
failing to properly screen and train coaches.
Pl.'s Compl.
~
9.
They further contend that CCSD is liable on the First Amendment
claim because it either has a pattern, practice, or custom of
retaliating against students who exercise their civil rights or
failed to properly train its administrators.
Pl.'s Compl.
~
19.
Plaintiffs seek non-economic damages, punitive damages,
reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief.
Pl.'s Comp.
~
21.
STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), a complaint is construed in
favor of the plaintiff, and its factual allegations are taken as
true.
Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998
Cir. 2010).
(9th
"[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss,
the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences
from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief."
572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678
(2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"[O]nce a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
"[G]enerally the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is limited to the complaint[.]"
Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998.
DISCUSSION
I. Venue
Defendants initially argue that because all defendants are
located in Curry County and "almost all the alleged events" took
place in Curry County, this case should be dismissed or, at a
minimum, transferred to the Medford Division of the District of
Oregon.
But the altercation at the heart of the complaint took
place in Reedsport, which is in the Eugene Division.
LR 3(a) (3).
Venue is therefore proper because this action was filed in "a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred."
28 U.S.C.
§
1391(b) (2); Atl. Marine Canst. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for
W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 577
II. Fourth Amendment Claim
Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER
(2013).
Defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to state a Fourth
Amendment claim because they have not alleged facts supporting
the conclusion that Brown's actions amounted to a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I agree.
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches
and seizures."
U.S. Canst. amend. IV.
In the ordinary law-
enforcement setting, a plaintiff alleging an unreasonable seizure
must show that, due to the defendant's use of "some form of
physical force or show of authority," a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's shoes "would have believed that he was not free to
leave."
2001).
United States v. Summers, 268 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.
This test may apply differently in the school setting,
because "children sent to public school are lawfully confined to
the classroom."
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
But
the differences between the school and law-enforcement settings
do not relieve plaintiffs of the requirement to allege that
Brown's restraint on Colton's liberty rose to the level of a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.
Because the complaint
contains no facts to support such an allegation, 1 plaintiffs have
failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 and the
1
In their brief, plaintiffs do allege that a reasonable
football player would not feel free to leave while he was being
"berate[d]" by a coach.
Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss 3.
But because
a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint, I am unable to consider those
allegations here.
Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998.
Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER
Fourth Amendment. 2
Defendants' motion to dismiss the first claim
for relief is granted. 3
III. First Amendment Claim
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he or she engaged in
constitutionally protected activity,
(2) the defendant's actions
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in the protected activity, and (3) the protected activity
was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's
2
It is unclear whether all claims of excessive force in the
school setting are properly brought under the Fourth Amendment,
or whether some such claims should be maintained under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Preschooler II
v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1181 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2007) (analyzing claims that a teacher hit, slapped, and
body-slammed a student under the Fourth Amendment, but noting
that "'it may be possible for a school official to use excessive
force without seizing or searching the student, and that the
Fourth Amendment would not apply to such conduct'" (quoting Doe
ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dep't of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir.
2003)) ); see generally Lewis M. Wasserman, Students' Freedom from
Excessive Force by Public School Officials: A Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendment Right?, 21-FALL Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 35,
54 (Fall 2011) (explaining that "the majority of circuit courts
have held that claims of .
. wholly arbitrary applications of
force upon public school students[] must be analyzed as
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims"); id. at 82
(summarizing the arguments for analyzing such claims instead
under the Fourth Amendment).
I express no opinion on this legal
question, and hold only that plaintiffs have failed to plead a
Fourth Amendment violation because the complaint does not allege
that Colton's liberty was restrained or that a reasonable person
in Colton's position would not have felt free to leave.
3
In their response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
indicate a willingness to amend their complaint, but they have
not moved for leave to amend.
Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER
conduct.
Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770
(9th Cir. 2006).
Defendants contend plaintiffs have failed to
(1) plead facts alleging constitutionally protected speech, and
(2) allege a causal connection between constitutionally protected
speech and impermissible adverse action.
I disagree.
Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded all three elements of a
First Amendment retaliation claim.
The complaint alleges that
"[s]hortly after receiving the tort claim notice [in this
action], Defendant Johnson attempted to suspend Colton Pearson.
This suspension was motivated in whole or in part by Plaintiffs
voicing their opposition to how the events described above were
handled by Defendants."
Pl.'s Compl. ! 19.
First, filing a
lawsuit is a "mode[] of expression and association protected by
the First .
. Amendment."
Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431
(1963); see also
Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 2006)
(plaintiff stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation by
asserting that a police officer had obtained and executed a
search warrant against him to punish him for filing a lawsuit
against another police officer) .
Second, a jury could find that
the threat of suspension from school would chill a person from
ordinary firmness-whether that person is the suspended student or
the suspended student's parent-from continuing to pursue legal
claims against the school.
Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576
(1975)
("[T]otal exclusion from the educational process for more
is a serious event in the life of the
than a trivial period .
suspended child."); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237
Cir. 1996)
(lOth
(suspending a student from the football team could
constitute an "adverse action" for First Amendment purposes)
Finally, where the temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the adverse action is "very close," as alleged here,
that proximity alone is sufficient evidence of causation to
survive a motion to dismiss.
532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001).
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,
Defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is denied.
IV. Claims Against CCSD
With respect to the Fourth and First Amendment claims
against CCSD, the complaint alleges the following:
Defendant CCSD has a policy, practice, or custom of
failing to properly screen coaches and/or properly
train them to ensure they will not assault students.
Defendant CCSD has a policy, practice, or custom of
retaliating against students who exercise their civil
rights, as evidenced by the fact that Defendant Johnson
is an administrator with final decision making
authority.
In the alternative, CCSD has failed to
train its administrators properly.
Pl.'s Compl.
c:!Ic:IT
9, 19.
The "policy, practice, or custom" and
"failure to train" statements merely recite the legal standards
for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983, as articulated in
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and City
Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989).
As such, they are
"'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'"
that fall short of stating "'a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.'"
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678
U.S. at 555, 570).
(quoting Twombly, 550
The complaint alleges one fact in support of
the allegations of municipal liability-that Johnson is an
administrator with final decisionmaking authority.
But that fact
alone is insufficient to support plaintiffs' claim against CCSD,
or every successful section 1983 claim would give rise to
municipal liability.
See Bd. Of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty.,
Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)
("In the broadest sense,
every injury is traceable to a hiring decision.
Where a court
fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and
causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior
liability.")
Because plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for
municipal liability, defendants' motion to dismiss the first and
fourth claims for relief as to CCSD is granted. 4
In addition,
because plaintiffs do not object to the second and third claims
4
Plaintiffs indicated a willingness to amend their
complaint. Accordingly, dismissal of the first and fourth claims
against CCSD is without prejudice.
Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER
for relief being dismissed as to CCSD, the motion to dismiss
those claims as to CCSD is granted. 5
V. Claims Against Johnson
Defendants next move to dismiss all claims against Johnson,
asserting that plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient
to state any claim against him.
Based on plaintiffs'
clarification in their response regarding which claims are being
asserted against which defendants, defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' first and second claims as to Johnson is granted.
In
all other respects, this motion is denied.
Plaintiffs are not relying on respondeat superior liability;
they allege Johnson is directly liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and First Amendment retaliation.
claims are adequately pleaded.
Those
The complaint alleges that
Johnson and Brown are close personal friends, that the friendship
drove Johnson to intentionally downplay the assault and fail to
punish Brown appropriately despite substantial certainty that
those actions would cause the Pearsons emotional distress, and
that Johnson attempted to suspend Colton to retaliate against the
Pearsons for filing this lawsuit.
5
Those factual allegations are
Plaintiffs stipulate to the dismissal of the intentional
inflection of emotional distress claim against CCSD.
I do not
read the complaint to make a battery claim against CCSD, and
plaintiffs state that making such a claim was not their intent.
Nonetheless, for clarity, I grant the motion to dismiss both
state law claims against CCSD.
Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.
VI. Mandy and Scott's Claims
Finally, defendants challenge Mandy and Scott's
participation in this lawsuit as plaintiffs, asserting they lack
standing to sue.
To demonstrate standing under Article III of
the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must show that he or
she has suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and it is likely the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010).
Krottner v. Starbucks
Because defendants
challenge Mandy and Scott's standing, but not Colton's, I
interpret their challenge as an assertion that Mandy and Scott
have not alleged a cognizable injury.
6
The complaint adequately alleges that Mandy and Scott have
suffered injuries that are distinct from Colton's purported
injury with respect to the third and fourth claims for relief. 7
With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, the complaint specifically alleges that "[i]ntentionally
6
This issue is not well-briefed.
Nonetheless, federal
courts have an independent duty to establish subject matter
jurisdiction, regardless of whether the parties raise the issue.
United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d
960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
7
Mandy and Scott are not parties to the Fourth Amendment or
battery claims.
Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER
assaulting a person's son in front of his parents, downplaying
such assault, and punishing their son for threatening legal
action all constitute an extraordinary transgression of socially
tolerable behavior."
Pl.'s Compl.
~
16.
Those asserted injuries
are personal to Mandy and Colton and are qualitatively different
from Colton's purported injuries.
The First Amendment
retaliation claim alleges that Colton's suspension was intended
to prevent all plaintiffs, not just Colton, from proceeding with
this lawsuit.
Pl.'s Compl.
~
19.
Again, this allegation
adequately alleges injuries specific to Mandy and Scott.
Defendants' motion to dismiss Mandy and Scott's claims is denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 12) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs' first claim for violation of the
Fourth Amendment is dismissed.
Plaintiffs' second claim for
battery is dismissed with respect to Johnson and CCSD.
Plaintiffs' third claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is dismissed with respect to CCSD.
Because plaintiffs'
fourth claim for violations of the First Amendment provides a
continuing basis for federal jurisdiction, defendants' request
for remand to Curry County Circuit Court is denied.
Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this
,,,_,o
~of September 2015.
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge
Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?