Herring v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
15
OPINION AND ORDER; Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED. Signed on 8/12/2016 by Magistrate Judge Mark D. Clarke. (jkm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
JON JEFFERY HERRING,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 6:15-cv-01453-CL
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
MARK D. CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Jon Jeffery Herring ("Plaintiff') seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's
final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). All parties have consented to allow a Magistrate Judge to enter
final orders and judgments in this case in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported
by substantial evidence, the decision is AFFIRMED.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
I
i
••
,,i
"
l
I
I
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born June 1963, and has a seventh grade education. Tr. 31. He worked as a
sanitation worker and a self-employed glass-blower. Tr. 35, 66. Plaintiff protectively filed an
application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI")
on September 22, 2011, alleging disability due to back impairments, inguinal hernias, toe
impairments, and hypertension beginning May 24, 2011. Tr. 182. Plaintiff was insured under
Title II of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2013. Tr. 219. Following a denial of
benefits, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ''). Plaintiff
appeared and testified before ALJ MaryKay Rauenzahn on October 8, 2013, in Eugene, OR. Tr.
26. On December 9, 2013, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 8. On June 15,
2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs subsequent request for review, making the ALJ's
decision the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Tr. 1. This appeal followed.
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
A plaintiff is disabled ifhe is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ... " 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(l)(A). "Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining
whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." Keyser v.
Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
(DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (SSI); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). Each step is
potentially dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4). The five-step sequential process asks the
I
I
l
\
following series of questions:
1. Is the claimant performing "substantial gainful activity?" 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(1); 416.920(a)(4)(1). This activity is work involving significant
l
"
I
1
I
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay or profit. 20 C.F .R.
§§ 404.1510; 416.910. If the claimant is performing such work, she is not
disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(1);
416.920(a)(4)(1).If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, the
analysis proceeds to step two.
2. Is the claimant's impairment "severe" under the Commissioner's regulations? 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Unless expected to result in death,
an impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a); 416.921(a).
This impairment must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous
period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509; 416.909. If the claimant does
not have a severe impairment, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);
416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis proceeds
to step three.
3. Does the claimant's severe impairment "meet or equal" one or more of the
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, then the
claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the
impairment does not meet or equal one or more of the listed impairments, the
analysis proceeds beyond step three. At that point, the ALJ must evaluate medical
and other relevant evidence to assess and determine the claimant's "residual
functional capacity" ("RFC"). This is an assessment of work-related activities that
the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any
limitations imposed by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e);
404.1545(b)-(c); 416.920(e); 416.945(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the
claimant's RFC, the analysis proceeds to step four.
4. Can the claimant perform his or her "past relevant work" with this RFC
assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his or her
past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
5. Considering the claimant's RFC and age, education, and work experience, is the
claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v); 404.1560(c); 416.960(c). If the
claimant cannot perform such work, he or she is disabled. ld.
Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. at 953; see also
Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). The Commissioner bears the burden of
I
I
i
ll
J
proof at step five. Tackett, 180 F .3d at 1100. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,
"taking into consideration the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience." Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566; 416.966 (describing "work which exists in the
national economy"). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the Commissioner proves that the
claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy,
the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54; Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099.
THE ALJ'S FINDINGS
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiffs claim by performing the five-step sequential analysis. At
step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") after
his alleged onset date of May 24, 2011. Tr. 13. Despite this finding, the ALJ noted there had
been no significant change in Plaintiffs income since before the alleged onset date, and
Plaintiffs pre-reduction earnings reflected an ability to perform work at an SGA level. Id. At
step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative
disc disease with left-side radiculopathy, bilateral inguinal hernias, osteoarthritis in the MTP
joints of the bilateral feet, and obesity. Tr. 14. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiffs
impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment because no treating or
examining physician documented medical findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of the
listed impairments. Id.
The ALJ then assessed Plaintiffs RFC and determined that Plaintiff has the capacity to
lift, carry, and push/pull up to twenty-five pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. Id.
Plaintiff can stand/walk for four hours and sit for four hours in an eight hour workday with
normal breaks, but will require the freedom to change positions every 30 minutes while
'l
l
I
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
remaining on task. Id. Plaintiff cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but is able to perform
all other postural activities on at least an occasional basis. Id. Additionally, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff should not ambulate over uneven terrain or be exposed to unprotected heights. Id. The
ALJ determined that Plaintiffs RFC did not preclude him from performing his past work as an
artistic glassblower. Tr. 20. For this reason, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled, as defined by
the Social Security Act. Tr. 21.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if the decision is based on
proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation
and internal quotations omitted). In reviewing the Commissioner's alleged errors, this court
must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner's]
conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Variable interpretations
of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is rational. Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we
must defer to the ALJ's conclusion. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (citing Andrews v. Shala/a, 53
F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). A reviewing court, however, "cannot affirm the
Commissioner's decision on a ground that the Administration did not invoke in making its
decision." Stout v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). Finally, a
court may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless. Id. at 1055-56.
\
I
l
i
J
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
l
"[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the
agency's determination." Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly rejecting Plaintiffs testimony at the
second step of the credibility analysis; (2) improperly rejecting the opinions of treating and
examining medical sources; and (3) posing an invalid hypothetical to the vocational expert.
I.
Credibility
Plaintiff contends that at the second step of the credibility analysis, the ALJ failed to
articulate a clear and convincing reason for rejecting his testimony regarding the extent and
severity of his impairments. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. The
ALJ' s credibility findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasoning. Reddick v. Chafer,
157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the plaintiff
is malingering, the ALJ's reason for rejecting the plaintiffs testimony must be "clear and
convincing." Id. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence
undermines the plaintiffs complaints. Id. The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be
substantial. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 724; See also Holohan v. Massinari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th
Cir. 2001 ). While an ALJ cannot reject the severity of subjective complaints solely on the lack
of objective medical evidence; the ALJ may nonetheless look to the medical record for
inconsistencies. See Morgan v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir.
1999).
The ALJ considered the entire case record and provided legally sufficient reasons as to
why Plaintiffs statements concerning intensity, persistence, and the limiting effects of his
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
symptoms were not entirely credible. First, the ALJ found Plaintiffs subjective symptom
testimony to be inconsistent with the statements he made to medical providers and with objective
medical findings. Tr. 16, 18. The following examples support this finding.
On January 10, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a left L3-L4 microdiscectomy performed by
Erik Hauck, M.D., to treat his multilevel degenerative disc disease. Tr. 15. Plaintiff reported to
Dr. Hauck that he felt much improved after the procedure. Tr. 16. Dr. Hauck noted that
Plaintiffs left leg weakness was essentially resolved and he was able to walk unassisted within
three to four weeks post-microdiscectomy. Id. In August 2012, approximately seven months
later, Dr. Hauck reported that Plaintiff continued to show improvement, was able to squat almost
fully on only his left leg, his straight leg raise ("SLR") test was negative, and his muscle mass
was almost normal again. Id. Despite these recorded improvements, Plaintiff testified at the
hearing that his symptoms returned one week after surgery. Tr. 19.
Additionally, Plaintiff testified that his left leg had atrophied to the point of being half the
size of his right and that he still experiences pain in those leg muscles. Tr. 18, 58-9. Plaintiff
further testified that he needed to use crutches periodically due to intermittent left leg weakness.
Tr. 18. However, the ALJ noted that no medical records support his atrophy claims and no
significant leg weakness was documented on post-operative physical exams. On August 30,
2012, Dr. Hauck documented that Plaintiff had "rebuilt his quadriceps muscle quite well[,] his
reflex has recovered, and overall, he has improved." Tr. 349. Examining doctor, Raymond
Nolan, M.D., noted that Plaintiff had normal muscle tone and no evidence of atrophy. Tr. 323.
Moreover, the crutches were not prescribed by any medical provider. Tr. 18. Post-operative
treatment notes state that Plaintiff was using a front-wheeled walker for a "couple of weeks" and
then a cane "for awhile, just for his comfort level." Tr. 351. On February 10, 2012, treatment
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
l
J
notes indicated that Plaintiff was no longer using any walking aids, and he made a statement to
his doctor that the "buckling of his left leg that he used to experience prior to his surgery, he is
not experiencing now." Id. In June, 2013, over a year later, Dr. Dodson indicated that Plaintiffs
gait was essentially normal. Tr. 353. Overall, the ALJ was more persuaded by Plaintiffs
statements made in pursuit of medical treatment than those made in pursuit of disability benefits.
Tr. 19. The ALJ adequately identified the portions of Plaintiffs testimony that she found not
credible and also identified the medical evidence that undermined Plaintiffs testimony.
In addition to the inconsistencies just discussed, the ALJ provided further reasoning as to
why she found Plaintiffs symptom testimony less than credible. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
continues to work as a glassblower. Tr. 31. Plaintiffs 2013 profit/loss statement showed yearto-date earnings of $23,000 with $17,000+ in expenses. Tr. 13. The ALJ determined that
Plaintiffs pre-reduction earnings, averaged out by $45 per glass piece, resulted in an average
monthly production of more than 40 glass pieces per month. Tr. 18. This monthly average is
equivalent to Plaintiffs production rate prior to the alleged onset date. Id. Therefore, the ALJ
found Plaintiffs ongoing, significant, and predominantly unchanged work activities undermined
his asserted inability to perform work-related activities. Tr. 18, 19. The ALJ also determined
that Plaintiffs testimony regarding his daily activities suggested a higher functional capacity
than alleged. Tr. 18. Finally, The ALJ found Plaintiffs choice to attend a weeklong church
conference in Maui during September, 2013, rather than schedule a hearing in this matter,
discredited his assertions of chronic, disabling symptoms. Tr. 19.
There is overwhelming evidence to support the ALJ' s credibility findings. The ALJ
identified clear and convincing reasons for why Plaintiffs testimony detracted from his
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
l
credibility and supported her reasoning with substantial evidence from the record. Therefore, the
ALJ made a legally sufficient credibility finding.
II.
Medical Evidence
Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of treating and examining
medical sources. An ALJ may properly reject a treating or examining physician's uncontradicted
medical opinion only for "clear and convincing reasons." Lester v. Chafer, 81 F.3d 821, 830-831
(9th Cir. 1995). When the treating or examining physician's opinion has been contradicted,
however, it may be rejected for "specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial
evidence in the record." Carmickle v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008). This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts, providing
an appropriate interpretation thereof, and making findings. See Mega/lanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d
74 7, 7 51 (9th Cir. 1989). An ALJ "need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a
treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical
findings." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). For the reasons stated herein,
the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for giving less weight to the opinions of Dr.
Dodson and Dr. Nolan.
a. Anthony Dodson, M.D.
The ALJ found that Dr. Dodson's treatment notes did not contain any objective findings
that would support the degree oflimitation identified in Dr. Dodson's completed questionnaire.
Tr. 19. Plaintiff established care with Dr. Dodson in December 2012. Tr. 16. In March 2013,
Plaintiff insisted that his pain levels were only partially controlled by his oxycodone medication
and he was unable to sustain more than six hours of work per day. Tr. 16, 358. Plaintiff
expressed to Dr. Dodson that there were also days when he felt incapable of working at all. Tr.
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
1
16, 358. Upon a physical examination, Dr. Dodson noted that Plaintiff continues to show pain in
the lower back, but this was "essentially unchanged from last visit," and his leg strength
appeared normal. Tr. 358. Dr. Dodson did not record any objective findings that support
Plaintiffs complaints of increased pain. Id In October 2013, Dr. Dodson responded to a
questionnaire sent to him by Plaintiffs representative. Tr. 374-77. Dr. Dodson checked a box
indicating that it was "medically probable that since May 2011, Mr. Herring [suffered]
increasing pain in his low back, left leg, and toes, as well as weakness and numbness in his left
leg ... " Tr. 375. Dr. Dodson provided no written comments following any of the checked
boxes to support his conclusions. Tr. 374-77.
The ALJ considered Dr. Dodson's medical opinion in reaching Plaintiffs RFC, but
ultimately gave his opinion little weight for the following reasons. First, the ALJ found that
records provided by Dr. Dodson did not contain objective findings that supported the degree of
limitation Plaintiff identified. Tr. 19. Second, Dr. Dodson failed to include any supportive
clinical findings or functional analysis of Plaintiffs work capacity to support his completed
checkbox questionnaire. Id Third, Dr. Dodson offered an opinion of Plaintiffs functioning
back to May 2011, even though he did not start treating Plaintiff until December 2012. Tr. 19,
16. Finally, Plaintiffs testimony and the medical opinion of treating physician, Dr. Hauck,
failed to support the severity of Dr. Dodson's findings. Id The ALJ provided an adequate
summary of the medical records from Dr. Dodson and properly determined that Dr. Dodson's
medical opinion was conclusory and unsupported by objective medical findings. The ALJ's
rejection of Dr. Dodson's opinion is clear, convincing, and supported by substantial evidence.
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
b. Raymond Nolan, M.D., Ph.D., P.C.
The ALJ considered and gave some weight to Dr. Nolan's medical opinion, but
ultimately found that that the totality of the evidentiary record warranted different limitations for
Plaintiffs RFC. Tr. 19. Plaintiff claims the ALJ made a reversible error by discounting critical
portions of Dr. Nolan's medical assessment. Pl. Br. at 12. Plaintiff argues the ALJ's RFC
determination was unsupported by evidence in the record and she conflated or confused
Plaintiffs plantar fasciitis with the osteoarthrosis in his MTP joints. Id. After review of both the
ALJ's decision and the examination notes from Dr. Nolan, there is no indication that any such
conflation or confusion existed when the ALJ made her findings. The ALJ provided clear and
convincing reasons for rejecting portions of Dr. Nolan's medical assessment and modifying
Plaintiffs RFC.
In March 2012, Dr. Nolan performed a one-time administrative examination on Plaintiff.
Tr. 322. Dr. Nolan noted that Plaintiff was "[a]ble to go from sitting to standing without
difficulty, [and] able to walk on toes and heels." Id. Dr. Nolan also noted "[t]here is no
tenderness to palpation of the plantar surface of either foot. [Plaintiff] has prominent deformity
involving the right first MTP joint region and a more limited deformity on the left side at that
joint." Tr. 323. Dr. Nolan determined that Plaintiff should limit lifting and carrying to ten
pounds on a frequent basis, twenty pounds on occasion, should be able to sit for at least six hours
in an eight hour work day, and stand or walk at least two hours in an eight hour day. Id. During
periods when Plaintiff may experience a "flare" of arthritic pain in his MTP joints, Dr. Nolan
suggested Plaintiff should temporarily limit his standing or walking to less than one hour in an
eight hour work day. Id.
]
I
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
l
i
The ALJ did not reject Dr. Nolan's findings, but instead modified Plaintiffs RFC based
on the totality of the evidentiary record. Tr. 19. The ALJ increased the occasional weight limit
from 20 pounds to 25 pounds based on Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing. Id Plaintiff testified,
"The doctors told me not to lift, I think, more than 20 pounds at a time but, I mean, I suppose my
arms are, you know, strong enough I could probably lift more than that." Tr. 44. The ALJ's
reasoning for increasing the amount of weight that Plaintiff can lift on occasion is not only clear
and convincing, but adequately supported by Plaintiffs testimony.
The ALJ increased Plaintiffs total standing/walking in any given workday from two
hours to four hours. Tr. 19. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ' s reasoning for increasing his
standing/walking capacity is an error because she failed to consider Plaintiffs osteoarthritis. Pl.
Br. at 12. Plaintiffs argument is unconvincing because the ALJ did consider Plaintiffs
osteoarthritis when she noted "freedom to change positions throughout the workday would allow
[Plaintiff] to spend the majority of his workday in a seated position during times when he
experiences a flare up of foot pain." Tr. 19. The ALJ's assessment of Plaintiffs capacity to
stand/walk with the freedom to change positions is also supported by Plaintiffs testimony:
Q: So what if we gave you a stool and told you you could sit, stand, whatever you
wanted to? If it hurt you could stand up, if you hurt you could sit down, but you
just, you need to keep working there in that packaging job. Why couldn't you do
that?
A: Well, I suppose you could if you had enough orders, I suppose.
Tr. 39.
A: ... I walk to the store and then halfway back I've got to like sit down and take a
break because --Q: How far is the store?
A: Oh, I don't know. Four or five blocks, maybe.
Q: So you can go four [or] five blocks there, walk around the store, and make it
halfway back?
A: About halfway back, yeah ...
Tr. 40.
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
The ALJ has provided clear and convincing reasoning as to why she modified Dr.
Nolan's assessment of Plaintiffs work-related capacity, and her reasoning is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff failed to identify any reversible error.
III.
Hypothetical Question to the Vocational Expert
The Vocational Expert ("VE") testified that Plaintiff would be able to perform the work
of an artistic glassblower as generally and actually performed, and the ALJ agreed based on the
totality of the evidence. Tr. 20. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony
was an error because the hypothetical presented to the VE did not include all of Plaintiffs
limitations. Pl. Br. at 19. The ALJ' s hypothetical was proper because it contained all limitations
that the ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
When finding Plaintiffs residual functional capacity and presenting the hypothetical to
the VE, the ALJ was not required to include any opinion evidence that had been properly
discounted. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197. It is proper for an ALJ to limit a hypothetical to only those
restrictions found to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th
Cir.1989)). The ALJ is ultimately responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical testimony
and translating the plaintiffs impairments into concrete functional limitations. Stubbs-Danielson
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). There was no error in the ALJ's assessment of
Plaintiffs symptom testimony or the medical evidence presented in the record. It was proper for
the ALJ to limit the hypothetical and not include properly discounted evidence as discussed
above. Therefore, the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony in response to the hypothetical was
without error.
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
CONCLUSION
Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported
by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED and this case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this
I ];.,day
e
United States Magistrate Judge
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?