Page et al v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corporation

Filing 38

OPINION AND ORDER: Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 35 is DENIED. Signed on 2/12/2019 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (ck)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION

TATYANA PAGE and ROBERT PINARD,

Case No. 6: 16-cv-00888-AA
OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

AIKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Tatyana Page and Robert Pinard allege that defendant RoundPoint Mortgage
Servicing Corporation violated federal and state law when processing their application for loss
mitigation programs in connection with the foreclosure of their residential home loan. In June
2017, this Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 12) in part, with respect
to plaintiffs' federal law claims and one theory of liability for plaintiffs' state law claims. Now,
defendant asserts that plaintiffs' remaining claims $hould be dismissed because defendant's
compliance with federal law exempts defendant from the state laws at issue. For the reasons stated
below, defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 35) is DENIED.

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is well known to the parties and will not be reproduced
here.
In May 2016, plaintiffs filed this action asserting that defendant violated federal regulations
promulgated under the Real Estate Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., and
state regulations promulgated under Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act ("UTPA"),
ORS 646.605 et seq. Plaintiffs' RESPA claims alleged that defendant (1) failed to timely notify
plaintiffs that it had received their loss mitigation application and failed to state in writing whether
the application was complete or incomplete, in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41 (b)(2)(i), and (2)
failed to timely evaluate plaintiffs' complete loss mitigation evaluation and provide a specific
notice of approval or denial, in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.4l(c) and (d). Comp!. ,i 14.
Plaintiffs' UTPA claims alleged that defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices by
(1) violating the RESPA regulations, in violation of OAR 137-020-0805(5); (2) misrepresenting
material info1mation regarding a loan modification, in violation of OAR 137-020-0805(3); and (3)
failing to deal with plaintiffs in good faith, in violation of OAR 137-020-0800(2). Comp!. ,i 21.
In June 2017, the Comt granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, in patt.
Opinion & Order (doc. 20). The Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the
RESPA claims, ruling that plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant
committed the alleged RESPA violations. Id. at 10, 13. Accordingly, the Court also concluded
that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' UTPA claim for defendant's
alleged RESPA violations. Id. at 15 n. 13. The Court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment with respect to plaintiffs' UTPA claims for material misrepresentation and failing to deal
in good faith. Id. at 18.

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER

LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed but early
enough not to delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Analysis under Rule 12(c) is substantially
identical to analysis under Rule l 2(b)( 6) because, under both rules, a comt must determine whether
the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy." Pit River
Tribe v. Bureau ofLand lvfgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, "[a] judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all
allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving patty is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Owens v. Kaiser Found Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation
marks omitted). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the non-conclusory 'factual
content' [of the complaint]," and reasonable inferences from that content, "must be plausibly
suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." 1'vfoss v. US. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

"A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[O]nce
a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the allegations of the non-moving
party are credited as true, whereas those allegations of the moving party which have been denied
are deemed false for purposes of the motion. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &
Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper
when the moving patty clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of
fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that this Court's grant of summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs'
RESP A claim entitles it to immunity from the UTPA claim under ORS 646.612(1 ), which provides
that the UTPA does not apply to "[c]onduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute
administered by a federal, state or local government agency." Defendant asserts that plaintiffs
cannot rely on defendant's conduct in processing plaintiffs' applications to state a claim under the
UTPA because the Court found on summary judgment that defendant had complied with all the
RESP A regulations that plaintiffs had alleged defendant violated.
Under ORS 646.612(1 ), mere compliance with other laws will not immunize a defendant
from liability under the UTPA. Instead, Oregon coutts have interpreted the provision to exempt
"only conduct that is mandated by otherlaws." Hinds v. Paul's Auto Werkstatt, Inc., 107 Or. App.
63, 67 (1991) (emphasis in original).

Courts have, therefore, emphasized that the statute

immunizes a defendant from liability when the conduct mandated by other laws is the conduct that
allegedly violated the UTPA. Ratheberger v. Ja,nes Hemenway, Inc., 355 Or. 404, 410-11 (2003)
(concluding that, although an Oregon law required defendants to give plaintiffs a disclosure form,
plaintiffs' UTPA claim based on defendants' "representation that [they] would fulfill ce1tain
fiduciary duties identified on the statutory disclosure form and [their] subsequent failure to do so"
was not barred by ORS 646.612(1) because "[n]o statute required [defendants] to breach [their]
fiduciary duty to plaintiffs or act in any manner that was inconsistent with that duty" (emphasis
omitted)).
As mentioned, plaintiffs' UTPA claim alleged that defendant engaged in unfair trade
practices in three ways: (I) by violating RESP A's application processing and notice requirements,
(2) by misrepresenting material info1mation regarding loan modification, and (3) by failing to deal

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER

with plaintiffs in good faith. At summary judgment, the Comi concluded that plaintiffs failed to
establish that defendant's conduct in processing the loan modification application violated RESPA
and granted pmiial summary judgment on the first theory of liability supporting plaintiffs' UTPA
claim. Only the conduct underlying plaintiffs' misrepresentation and good faith theories is at issue
at this stage.
In the Complaint (doc. 1), plaintiffs allege that defendant misrepresented material
information regarding their loan modification application by "making statements and sending
written communications to plaintiffs that led them to believe the January 14th trustee's sale would
be canceled or postponed" and that defendant failed to deal with them in good faith by "secretly
complet[ing] a trustee sale foreclosure during the time it was telling plaintiffs that their application
was being considered." Comp!.,, 20, 21.
Defendant does not point to any RESPA provisions or regulations that required defendant
to engage in that conduct. Although, under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c) and (d), defendant could not
evaluate plaintiffs' application or decide whether to accept or deny it until defendant received a
complete application, RESPA did not require defendant to foreclose on plaintiffs' home while
plaintiffs' application was pending or to make statements that led plaintiffs to believe that a
complete application would stop the foreclosure sale. Therefore, the conduct that plaintiffs allege
gives rise to their UTPA claim is not conduct mandated by a federal statute or rules, and ORS
646.612(1) does not bar the claim.

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 35)
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

-~ i'l/l
/
Dated this _V_day of February 2019.

alU{ flt

Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER

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