Strong v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

Filing 15

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (3) is denied in case 6:16-cv-01498-MC. Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (3) is denied in case 6:16-cv-01499-MC. Signed on 8/11/2016 by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MARY STRONG,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 6:16-cv-01498-MC (Lead Case)
Case No. 6:16-cv-01499-MC (Trailing Case)
ORDER

V.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN
MORTGAGE CORP. et al.,
Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding prose, has submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction styled as an "Application" for the same. ECF No. 2. Plaintiffs claims in
this case arise out of a $182,000 mortgage loan she secured in 2005 for her "principal residence,"
located at 2559 NW Monterey Pines Drive in Bend, Oregon, 97701. 1

PREVIOUS LITIGATION
Plaintiffs claims are nearly identical actions to those of Civ. Nos. 6:15-cv-1536 and
6:15-cv-1966, 6:16-cv-233, and 6:16-cv-33 l. In those cases, Plaintiffs claims arose out of a
different principle residence, located at 65510 Old Bend Redmond Highway in Bend, Oregon,

1

I note that in Plaintiff's complaint in the Member Case, she apparently uses a form filing and has failed to populate
the "(Subject Property)" field of that form. This is similar to errors in other form filings used in previous cases, such
as that found in one of Plaintiffs previous applications for the same relief for which she now applies here. Civ. No.
6:15-cv-1966-MC, ECF No. 3 at 3. After listing the address of the separate property at issue in that case, the error in
that form filing read as follows: "the real property ... which is more specifically described as [legal description of
real property]." Id

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

97701. Plaintiff secured a $364,000 refinance loan for that property and subsequently defaulted
on that loan. ECF No. 9-1. After hearing oral argument and carefully considering Plaintiff's
various contentions in her first two cases, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims brought
under the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act for failure to state
a claim and, due to various defects in Plaintiff's other claims in that case, this Court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state law claims. See 6: 16-cv-15 36
at ECF No. 41. Plaintiff appealed that dismissal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at ECF
No.47.
Now Plaintiff has redirected her claims at other entities regarding a different property and
a different mortgage. This Court has consolidated the cases sua sponte based on common issues
of law and fact and in order to avoid additional unnecessary cost and delay under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 42(a). See ECF No. 8.
As she has done in her prior actions, Plaintiff has applied, in the Member Case, for a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief. Member Case, ECF
No. 3. I note that this is the identical form application used in those cases.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction "must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The mere possibility of
irreparable harm is not enough. Rather, the plaintiff must establish such harm is likely. Alliance

for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). The standards for issuing a
temporary restraining order are similar to those required for a preliminary injunction. Lockheed

Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The

2

OPINION AND ORDER

court's decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction is not a ruling on the merits. See Sierra

On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984).
Because Plaintiff does not demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits of her
claims, her Application, ECF No. 3, is DENIED. This conclusion is not a ruling on the merits of
Plaintiffs claims. Sierra On-Line, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1422.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this _il_ day of August, 2016.

Michael J. Mc Shane
United States District Judge

3 - OPINION AND ORDER