Pacific Community Resource Center et al v. The new and old City of Glendale et al

Filing 55

OPINION AND ORDER: Denying Motion for Summary Judgment 34 ; Granting Motion to Dismiss 46 for Failure to State a Claim; Granting Motion to Dismiss 12 for Failure to State a Claim; Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 19 ; Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 20 . Signed on 8/3/2017 by Judge Michael J. McShane. (Copy mailed to plaintiffs) (cp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PACIFIC COMMUNITY RESOURCE
CENTER et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civ. No. 6:17-cv-0066-MC
OPINION AND ORDER

CITY OF GLENDALE, OREGON et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________
MCSHANE, Judge:
Plaintiffs Michael Cassidy and Anthony Schlauch operated a seventeen room motel in the
City of Glendale’s commercial zone as long-term multi-family residential housing. They have
done so without obtaining an R-2 Certificate of Occupancy or a Conditional Use Permit as
required by city ordinance. As a consequence, the City assessed civil penalties on the motel’s

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property owner, Cow Creek Properties, LLC. In turn, Cow Creek Properties brought an eviction
complaint (Commercial FED) against Pacific Community Resource Center.
Plaintiffs Michael Cassidy, Anthony Schlauch and Pacific Community Resource Center
now bring this lawsuit alleging a violation of their due process rights and improper taking of
property. Plaintiffs have named as defendants: (1) the City of Glendale and fifteen current and
former city officials to include the mayor, council members, and city’s compliance officer; (2)
Ryan Kirchoff, the attorney who represented Cow Creek Properties in the underlying eviction
proceeding; and (3) three sitting Douglas County Circuit Court judges, Douglas County, and
State of Oregon for their actions in adjudicating over the multiple state proceedings.
Before this Court are four motions: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
34); Defendants Larry Caldwell and Allen King’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19
& 20); Defendants Douglas County Circuit Court Judges, Courts and State of Oregon’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 12); and Defendant Ryan Kirchoff’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46).
Because plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment fails to demonstrate how specific
facts entitle them to judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal district court from reviewing
either the constitutionality or legal correctness of a state court decision, Defendants Larry
Caldwell and Allen King’s Motion for Summary is GRANTED as is the Motion to Dismiss filed
by the State, the judges, and the courts. Judges and Courts are also entitled to Eleventh
Amendment and judicial immunity.
Because plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Ryan Kirchoff fall within the ORS 31.150(2)
anti-SLAPP provision, Defendant Ryan Kirchoff’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and those

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claims are stricken and dismissed. Kirchoff is awarded his attorney fees and costs pursuant to
ORS 31.152(3).
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies equally to the claims asserted against the
remaining defendants who have not yet been served or appeared, all remaining claims are
DISMISSED sua sponte without leave to amend.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2009 Pacific Community Resource Center entered in a performance contract to
purchase a motel located in the City of Glendale’s commercial zone at 127 Pacific Ave.,
Glendale, Oregon from Gary Martin and Cow Creek Properties, LLC. 2d Am. Compl. 5-7, ECF
No. 10. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff Cassidy approached the City of Glendale to obtain
permission to rent rooms to small businesses. The City agreed but did not require Pacific
Community to affect a change in the use and occupancy classification with the Douglas County
Building Department.
On or about September 11, 2011, plaintiff Cassidy approached the City with regard to
operating the motel as multi-family residential housing. Opinion and Order 3; ECF No. 108,
Pacific Community Resource Center, et al. v. City of Glendale, Oregon, et al., Case No. 6:13-cv1272-MC. He learned that to operate as multi-family residential housing it would be necessary
for the motel to obtain an R-2 Certificate of Occupancy or a Conditional Use Permit. Plaintiffs
alleged that the City responded by telling them that an R-2 certificate was not available to them
and that the City did not want their “kind of people” in town.
On or about October 21, 2011, the City sent a letter to Pacific Community indicating that
Pacific Community was in potential violation of ordinances regarding residential use in a

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commercial zone. Pacific Community communicated with the City Council multiple times to
discuss zoning compliance alternatives, but the two parties were unable to reach an agreement.
On or about December 3, 2011, plaintiff Cassidy received notice for a zoning ordinance
violation from the City of Glendale. Cassidy contested this violation but was ultimately
convicted at trial before a state circuit court judge on or about May 10, 2012, for operating the
motel as multi-family residential housing without first obtaining an R-2 Certificate of Occupancy
or a Conditional Use Permit.
Pacific Community then attempted to obtain an R-2 Certificate of Occupancy by
initiating a series of inspections with the State Fire Marshall. The first inspection (February 24,
2012), resulted in a report identifying eleven deficiencies. A subsequent inspection on May 10,
2012, resulted in a report showing that ten deficiencies were resolved and that the only remaining
deficiency “was failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy” (COO). On May 11, 2012, Pacific
Community approached the City to acquire a COO sign-off. City officials refused to provide
plaintiffs with this sign-off. As a result, Douglas County did not issue the R-2 COO to plaintiffs.
On April 9, 2012 while Pacific Community was working to obtain an R-2 Certificate of
Occupancy, the City Council unanimously adopted ordinance GMO 03-2012 which removed
multi-family residential housing from the permitted uses in the City’s commercial zone. 2d Am.
Compl. 6, ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged the removal of “multi-family housing”
under GMO 03-2012 through the Land Use Board of Appeals. See Cassidy v. City of Glendale,
OR. LAND USE BD. OF APP. No. 2012-033 (Oct. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/luba/pages/2012opinions.aspx.
Between May 11, 2012, and January 21, 2013, plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a COO
through Douglas County. On January 21, 2013, the City of Glendale issued plaintiffs a notice of

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building code civil penalty for violation of Oregon Structural Specialty Code (OSSC) § 111.1 Use
and occupancy. On August 22, 2013, Cow Creek received an invoice stating the civil penalties
balance amounted to $30,000. By September 16, 2013, this balance had increased to $65,000.
Prior federal court litigation against City of Glendale
This is the second federal lawsuit that plaintiffs Pacific Community Resource Center and
Michael Cassidy have filed against the City of Glendale. The first lawsuit is styled: Pacific
Community Resource Center, et al. v. City of Glendale, Oregon, et al., Case No. 6:13-cv-1272MC. The prior lawsuit, filed July 25, 2013, also named as defendants: Fred Jensen acting as
Mayor; Betty Stanfil acting as City Manager; and the six individual City Council Members.
In the prior federal lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged violation of federal and state fair
housing laws, and violations of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment “substantive due process”
rights and Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection” rights. The claims were based on the City
of Glendale’s alleged discriminatory obstruction of Pacific Community’s efforts to obtain a
conditional use permit, selective enforcement of certificate of occupancy requirements, and the
City’s adoption of ordinance GMO 03-2012. Opinion and Order 2-5; ECF No. 108, 6:13-cv1272-MC. Because of the gravity of the factual allegations against the city regarding
discriminatory intent, the court provided pro bono counsel for plaintiffs. Those factual
allegations were not born out at trial.
On February 5, 2015, at a hearing on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiffs withdrew their due process claim. Subsequently, there was a five-day jury trial where
judgment was entered in favor of all defendants on the remaining claims. Judgment on the jury
verdict was entered on March 23, 2015. Plaintiffs appealed the jury verdict to the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals where the appeal is pending as of the time of this Opinion and Order.

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City of Glendale sues to foreclose in state court
After the conclusion of the federal trial, on April 9, 2015, the City of Glendale brought an
action in Douglas County Circuit Court, State of Oregon, to foreclose on a lien. City of Glendale
v. Cow Creek Properties, LLC, et al., 15-CV-08731. City’s MSJ 3-4; ECF No 19. In that action,
plaintiff Michael Cassidy (who was not a party to that state action) filed 12 motions, to include a
Motion to Intervene, all of which were denied by the Douglas County Circuit Court. City’s MSJ,
Ex. 7; ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs Cassidy, Schlauch, and “All Other Occupants” appealed to the
Oregon Court of Appeals, citing in part a “six year lack of Procedural Due Process by the City
and local courts. City’s MSJ Ex. 8, ECF No. 19. The Court of Appeals ultimately denied their
petition.
Cow Creek Properties, LLC sues Pacific Community Resource Center
On February 2, 2017, Cow Creek Properties, LLC brought an action against Pacific
Community to confirm an arbitration award and request that judgment be entered on their behalf
in Cow Creek Properties, LLC v. Pacific Community Resource Center, an Oregon Non-Profit
Corporation, 17-CV-04422. City’s MSJ Ex. 9; ECF No. 19. Michael Cassidy’s motion to
intervene in that matter was denied by the Douglas County Circuit Court. City’s MSJ Ex. 10;
ECF No. 19. In response, Michael Cassidy and Anthony Schlauch raised again the issue of due
process. City’s MSJ Ex. 11, p. 1; ECF No. 19. After judgment was entered against Pacific
Community Resource Center, Cassidy and Schlauch appealed the matter to the Oregon Court of
Appeals, raising the issue that they were denied due process on the inability to obtain counsel
due to poverty. City’s MSJ Ex. 12, p. 10; ECF No. 19. The Oregon Court of Appeals has since
dismissed the appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

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I. Motion for Summary Judgment, Rule 56(c)
The court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is
“genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Rivera v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. The
court reviews evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). When the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)).
II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual allegations
allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “the mere possibility
of misconduct.” Id. at 678.
While considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material
fact as true and construe in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burget v. Lokelani
Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). When a plaintiff appears pro se,
the court must construe the allegations liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.

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See Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations
omitted). However, the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend
should be granted unless the court “determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995).
III. Special Motion to Strike pursuant to ORS 31.150
A special motion to strike under ORS 31.150 is treated “as a motion to dismiss under
ORCP 21A and requires the Court to enter a ‘judgment of dismissal without prejudice.’”
Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Oregon law); ORS 31.150(1).
In making a determination on a motion to strike, “the Court shall consider pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
ORS 31.150(4). “A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike made under ORS
31.150 shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.” ORS 31.152(3).
DISCUSSION
I. Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Defendants Larry Caldwell and Allen King move for summary judgment on the basis of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “stands for the relatively
straightforward principle that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto
appeals from state court judgments.” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010).
The doctrine prohibits federal district courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over suits
“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Federal district courts
“may exercise only original jurisdiction; they may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state

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court decisions.” Dubinka v. Judges of Sup. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 2005). As a result,
“no matter how erroneous or unconstitutional the state court judgment may be, the Supreme
Court of the United States is the only federal court that could have jurisdiction to review a state
court judgment.” Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2002).
The doctrine also precludes a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over
general constitutional challenges that are “inextricably intertwined” with claims asserted in state
court. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983); Doe & Associates Law
Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (A district court cannot be called
upon to review a state court decision.).
A. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of due process rights and
improper taking of property by several defendants. 2d Am. Compl. 7-8, ECF No. 10. The
allegations against the City and City Officials’ stem from the foreclosure and eviction actions in
municipal and state courts where the City successfully sought relief from the courts. The
allegations made specifically against various judges, courts, and the State of Oregon, challenge
prior adverse court rulings against Plaintiffs by judges in state court proceedings. 1 2d Amend.
Compl. ¶s 8-10; ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs allege the Judges were “not following the law” and
“ruling in absentia with no adjudication on the merits.” Id.
The plaintiffs here are looking to use the federal district court to collaterally attack the
rulings of the state courts. The Second Amended Complaint asks this Court to review and
second-guess the state court decisions. Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal

1

City of Glendale v. Cow Creek Properties, LLC, et al., Case No. 15-cv-08731, Douglas County
Circuit Court.
9 – OPINION AND ORDER

district court from reviewing either the constitutionality or legal correctness of a state court
decision, plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed.
II. State Judges and Courts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity
In addition to raising the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Defendant Judges move to dismiss
the allegations arguing: (1) the Eleventh Amendment of the United State Constitution provides
immunity for the Judges as state officials acting in their official capacity and for the courts; and
(2) the Judges and courts are protected from suit by judicial immunity. Judges’ Mot. 3; ECF No.
12.
A. Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides in part that:
“[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States,” precludes and bars suits
brought against state, state agencies, and state instrumentalities by a state’s own citizens. Puerto
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). Under the
Eleventh Amendment, a state is immune from suit under state or federal law by private parties in
federal court unless the state has expressly waived it or Congress has validly abrogated that
immunity. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64-68 (1996). A state waives its sovereign
immunity by expressly consenting to be sued in a particular action. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 673 (1974). Here State of Oregon has not consented to this suit or waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
To the extent that the Second Amended Complaint alleges a § 1983 civil rights violation,
Eleventh Amendment immunity operates to bar such suits against the state of Oregon, its
agencies, and its officials acting in their official capacities. Edelman, supra, 415 U.S. 651

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(enactment of § 1983 was not intended to overcome a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity);
Center for Legal Studies, Inc. v. Lindley, 64 F.Supp2d 970, 978 (D. Or. 1999) (“state officials
sued in their official capacities, arms of the state, and the state itself, are not persons within the
meaning of § 1983 and therefore are not liable under § 1983.”). Here Plaintiffs’ allegations are
against individual Judges for their actions taken in their official capacity as Judges. See, 2d
Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 7-10, and pgs. 7 & 11; ECF No. 10. Because state employees acting in their
official capacities are immune from suit, the allegations against Randolf Garrison, Kathleen
Johnson, and Frances Burge are dismissed with prejudice.
Because the Courts themselves are agencies of the State of Oregon, they are immune as
well from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. See Thompson v. City of Los
Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs’ claims against the Oregon state courts
are dismissed.
B. Judicial immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from lawsuits based upon judicial acts taken within the
jurisdiction of their courts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v.
Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The “doctrine of judicial immunity is
supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of
judgment vital to judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability.”
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993). While a judicial officer’s errors
may be corrected on appeal, a judge and their decisions should not be exposed to collateral
litigation by unsatisfied litigants.
Whether a judge was performing acts protected by judicial immunity is determined by
analyzing four factors: (1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the location where the

11 – OPINION AND ORDER

events at issue occurred; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the
judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the
judge in his or her official capacity. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.
1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1005 (1999).
Here the actions complained of involve judicial rulings on motions. Such actions are
within the normal scope of judicial activity and they arise directly out dispute with a judge acting
in his or her official capacity. The rulings were on cases pending before the court and occurred
in the course of the litigation of those cases. This is basic judicial decision-making. This is what
we expect judges to do without fear of lawsuit.
Because all four factors are met, the Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
Plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant Judges and Courts are dismissed.
III. Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statue, ORS 31.150
Defendant Ryan Kirchoff has moved for an order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims against
him for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) and ORS 31.150, et seq. Plaintiffs’ allegations against Kirchoff identify him as the
attorney who represented Gary Martin in the underlying cases in Douglas County Circuit Court.
Kirchoff admits as much, submitting a declaration identifying himself as an attorney duly
licensed in the State of Oregon and legal counsel for Gary Martin and Cow Creek Properties,
LLC. Decl. Kirchoff; ECF No. 47. On behalf of his clients, Kirchoff filed actions in Douglas
County Circuit Court, Case No.’s 16-LT-05482and 17-cv-04422. The first action was an
Eviction Complaint (Commercial FED) against Pacific Community Resource Center. The second
action was filed for a Confirmation of Arbitration Award and Request for Judgment against
Pacific Community Resource Center.

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The Oregon legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute, ORS 31.150 to ORS 31.155, to
create a procedure “for expeditiously dismissing unfounded lawsuits attacking certain types of
public speech” through special motions to strike, or anti-SLAPP motions.” Schwern v. Plunkett,
845 F.3d 1241, 1243 (2017). In response, a defendant in federal court may file a special motion
to strike under an applicable anti-SLAPP statute. Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206
(9th Cir. 2005). Analysis of a special motion to strike is a two-step process. The defendant has
the initial burden to show that the challenged statement is within one of the categories of civil
action described in ORS 31.150(2). Gardner, supra, 563 F.3d at 986. If the defendant meets the
initial burden, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff in the action to establish that there is
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to
support a prima facie case. ORS 31.150(3). Plaintiffs here have not responded to Kirchoff’s
Motion nor have they met their burden to show that there is a probability that plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.
The alleged actions complained of by plaintiffs arise out Kirchoff’s representation as
counsel for Gary Martin and Cow Creek Properties, LLC in judicial proceeding in Douglas
County Circuit Court as contemplated in ORS 31.150(2). Because plaintiffs’ claims against
defendant Kirchoff fall within the ORS 31.150(2) 2 anti-SLAPP provision, those claims are

2

ORS 31.150(2) states:
“A special motion to strike may be made under this section against any claim in a civil action
that arises out of:
(a) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other document submitted, in a
legislative, executive or judicial proceeding or other proceeding authorized by law;
(b) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other document submitted, in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or
judicial body or other proceeding authorized by law;
* * *”
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stricken and dismissed. Kirchoff is awarded his attorney fees and costs pursuant to ORS
31.152(3).
IV. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment which reads in its entirety:
“As Mr. Howry stated in his MSJ, there are no real questions of fact. What he left
out is that those facts entitle us to relief sought in this action.”
Pl.s’ MSJ 6; ECF No. 34.
Because plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment fails to demonstrate how specific facts
entitle them to judgment as a matter of law, plaintiff’s motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, this Court rules as follows:
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) is DENIED.
Defendants Douglas County Circuit Court Judges, Courts and State of Oregon’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. Defendants Randolf Garrison, Kathleen Johnson,
Frances Burge, Douglas County Oregon and State of Oregon are dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants Larry Caldwell and Allen King’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
19 & 20) is GRANTED. Defendants Larry Caldwell and Allen King are dismissed with
prejudice.
Defendant Ryan Kirchoff’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46) is GRANTED. Defendant
Kirchoff is dismissed and awarded his attorney fees and costs pursuant to ORS 31.152(3).
There remain fourteen individual defendants who have not been served and who have yet
to make an appearance in this case. They include the City of Glendale itself, as well as thirteen
current or former city officials. The claims against them mirror those against Larry Caldwell and
Allen King. The attorneys representing Caldwell and King also represent the defendants who

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have yet to appear and the court can assume that the same motion for summary judgement would
be argued on their behalf.
Because of the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiffs’ claims against
Larry Caldwell and Allen King, former officials with the City of Glendale, are to be dismissed.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies equally to the claims asserted against the 14 defendants
who have not yet appeared. Because it would be a waste of not only judicial resources, but the
time and the resources of the parties to have the remaining 14 defendants appear and file similar
motions (along with response briefs and replies) all remaining claims are dismissed sua sponte.
Although this dismissal of the remaining defendants is sua sponte, such dismissal is appropriate
when a complaint is clearly inadequate and plaintiffs “cannot possibly win relief.” See Sparling
v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1998)(quoting Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d
359, 362 (9th Cir. 1981). All remaining claims are DISMISSED.
Because the complaint does not state a claim for relief that can reasonably be corrected
through amendment, providing plaintiffs leave to amend would be futile. The dismissal of all
claims is with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2017.

s/ Michael J. McShane
Michael J. McShane
United States District Judge

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