Roblin v. Newmar Corporation et al

Filing 22

Opinion and Order: Granting FCCCs Motion to Dismiss 6 . FCCC is dismissed from the case. Signed on 7/10/2018 by Judge Michael J. McShane. (cp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
ROBERT ROBLIN,
Plaintiff,

No. 6:17-cv-01902-MC

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

NEWMAR CORPORATION
and FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM
CHASSIS CORPORATION,
Defendants.
__________________________________
MCSHANE, Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Roblin brings this federal and state law action for breach of express
warranty against Newmar Corp. (“Newmar”) and Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (“FCCC”).
The case comes before the Court on FCCC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
At issue is whether the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over FCCC pursuant to Oregon’s
long-arm statute would comport with due process. The Court concludes that it would not. Mr.
Roblin fails to show that FCCC is at home in Oregon and therefore subject to general personal
jurisdiction. He also fails to show that FCCC purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in Oregon, which would allow for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. The
motion is therefore GRANTED and FCCC is DISMISSED from the case without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Roblin is a Washington resident who purchased a Recreational Vehicle (“RV”) from
non-party Guaranty RV in Junction City, Oregon in October 2015. When Mr. Roblin began
experiencing mechanical and service-related issues with his RV, he filed the instant action
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against Newmar and FCCC for violations of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301, Oregon Lemon Law Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.400 et. seq., and Oregon
Consumer Warranty Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 72.8100 et. seq.
The RV Mr. Roblin purchased was manufactured by Newmar and incorporated a chassis
manufactured by FCCC. Newmar is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business
in Indiana. It manufactures RVs which sometimes incorporate chassis purchased from FCCC.
Newmar is not a subject of the present motion and will remain as a defendant in the lawsuit.
FCCC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina. FCCC
designs and manufactures custom chassis for RVs, which it then sells to RV manufacturing
clients, including Newmar. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of non-party Daimler Trucks North
America LLC (“Daimler”), but has its own President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”).
The FCCC chassis in Mr. Roblin’s RV came with an express warranty, which requires,
inter alia, that all necessary inspections and repairs be completed at an FCCC “authorized repair
location.” There are eight such locations in Oregon. Mr. Roblin has, on at least one occasion,
serviced his RV at an Oregon repair center.

These FCCC-authorized service centers use

Freightliner branding, carry Freightliner parts, and communicate with FCCC directly regarding
procurement of parts and some repairs. FCCC’s website also boasts that chassis owners “have
access to the industry’s largest network, comprised of more than 450 Freightliner-branded
service centers throughout North America,” and lists eight authorized locations in Oregon.
FCCC represents that the authorized service centers are independently owned and
operated, and that it does not have any “direct contracts” with the service centers. It also
represents that it has never delivered, sold, designed, or manufactured any good or product in
Oregon; transacted business in Oregon; been licensed to do business in Oregon; paid taxes in

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Oregon; made any contracts in Oregon; owned, used, possessed, leased, or rented any real estate
in Oregon; had any directors, officers, or employees based in Oregon; or directed any advertising
or marketing efforts to residents or businesses in Oregon.
DISCUSSION
FCCC moves the Court to dismiss it from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, a district
court must apply the law of the state in which it sits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Panvasion
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Oregon law authorizes personal
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See
Or. R. Civ. P. 4L. To comport with the requirements of due process, a court may only exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if that defendant has sufficient “minimum
contacts” with the forum state, such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not “offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s minimum contacts may
be established through a showing of either general or specific jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v.
Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Since Mr. Roblin alleges both bases
for personal jurisdiction over FCCC, the Court addresses each in turn.
I. General Personal Jurisdiction.
Mr. Roblin first argues that FCCC is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Oregon.
A defendant is subject to general jurisdiction if its contacts with the forum state are “so
continuous and systemic as to render it essentially at home there.” Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 127 (2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In general, a corporate defendant will
satisfy this standard only if it is incorporated or has its principle place of business in the forum

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state. Id. at 137-38. Under certain circumstances, however, the contacts of a parent company,
independently at home in the forum state, may be imputed to a non-resident subsidiary. Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2001). Such contacts may only be imputed if the
defendant subsidiary is an “alter ego” of the parent. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1072-73
(9th Cir. 2015). This requires (1) that there be such “unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist” and (2) that treatment of the two entities
as separate identities “would result in fraud or injustice.” Id. at 1073. This is a high bar and a
parent-subsidiary relationship, even combined with “total ownership and shared management
personnel,” is insufficient to permit the imputation of a parent company’s contacts. Id.
Here, there is no evidence that FCCC has sufficient contacts to support general
jurisdiction in Oregon. As Mr. Roblin acknowledges, FCCC is neither incorporated in Oregon
nor does it have its principle place of business in the state. There is also no evidence that FCCC
is otherwise “at home” in Oregon or an “alter ego” of its Oregon-based parent company,
Daimler. Although FCCC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Daimler and sometimes held out as a
brand of its parent company, Mr. Roblin fails to show that the two companies disregard their
respective corporate formalities and FCCC presents uncontroverted evidence that each employs
its own President and CEO. On these facts, it would be inconsistent with due process for the
Court to exercise general jurisdiction over FCCC.
Mr. Roblin nevertheless requests that the Court allow jurisdictional discovery to clarify
whether FCCC is an alter ego of Daimler. A grant of jurisdictional discovery is within a district
court’s discretion and requires “more than a hunch that [discovery] might yield jurisdictionally
relevant facts.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008). As noted above,
Mr. Roblin offers little more than bare assertions that Daimler controls FCCC—there is no

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evidence to suggest that Daimler “dictates every facet of [FCCC’s] business.” Ranza, 793 F.3d
at 1074. His request for jurisdictional discovery is therefore denied.
II. Specific Personal Jurisdiction.
Mr. Roblin also argues that FCCC is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Oregon.
In the Ninth Circuit, courts apply a three-part test to determine whether the exercise of specific
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate:
(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform
some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forumrelated activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play
and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation and quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing the first two elements of the test, after which the burden shifts to the
defendant to “present a compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be
reasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewic, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). “[I]f the plaintiff fails at
the first step,” however, “the jurisdictional inquiry ends.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016.
With respect to the first element, which examines the nature of a defendant’s contacts
with the forum state, the Ninth Circuit generally analyzes cases sounding in tort and contract
differently. Doe v. Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001). As relevant here, cases sounding
in contract are analyzed under a “purposeful availment” standard. Id. The purposeful availment
standard focuses on “whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum are attributable to his own
actions or are solely the actions of the plaintiff.” Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191,
1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Specifically, to have purposefully availed itself of conducting activities in
the forum, a defendant must have “performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or

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promotes the transaction of business within the forum state.” Sher v. Johnson, 9111 F.2d 1357,
1362 (9th Cir. 1990). This focus on the “affirmative conduct of the defendant is designed to
ensure that the defendant is not haled into court as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated
contacts.” Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990).
A showing that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state “typically consists of the defendant’s actions in the forum,” such as
“executing a contract there” or conducting “other business” within the state. Schwarzenegger,
374 F.3d at 802. The formation of a single contract with a resident of the forum state is “not,
standing alone, sufficient to create jurisdiction.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016 (citing Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478) (emphasis added).

Instead, the contract must arise from a

defendant’s solicitation of business in the forum state, McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
222-23 (1957), or otherwise give rise to or reflect a “substantial connection” with the state and
create “continuing obligations” between the defendant and a resident of the forum, Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 475-76. It is these circumstances surrounding a contractual relationship,
including “prior negotiations[,] contemplated future consequences, . . . the terms of the
contract[,] . . . and the parties’ actual course of dealing,” which dictate whether a defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 479.
In Burger King, for example, the Supreme Court found jurisdiction where the defendant
entered a contract with a forum-state resident and negotiated a “carefully structured 20-year
relationship that envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with [plaintiff] in [the forum
state].” 471 U.S. at 480. In doing so, it was careful to distinguish the defendant’s repeated
contacts arising out of this deliberately-structured arrangement from “single or occasional acts”
of a “nature and quality” reflecting only “attenuated affiliation with the forum.” Id. at 475 n.18

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(citation and quotation marks omitted). For instance, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, the Court declined to find jurisdiction where the plaintiff unilaterally transported an
automobile manufactured by the defendant into the forum state. 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980).
The Court explained that, although the defendant “facilitated” automobile sales by authorizing
independent service centers in the forum state, this was merely a “collateral relation” with
insufficient “financial benefits” to generate jurisdiction. Id. As it later clarified, a plaintiff must
point to “additional conduct” evidencing a defendant’s intent to serve the forum market, such as
“designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing
the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
Here, Mr. Roblin fails at step one of the jurisdictional test. As he recognizes, the parties’
one-off unilateral contract is alone insufficient to create jurisdiction. He instead points to the
ongoing relationship contemplated by the warranty and FCCC’s attempt to facilitate that
relationship in Oregon by authorizing service locations and listing them on its website.1 The
agreement, consummated in Oregon solely by the unilateral act of Mr. Roblin and after FCCC
had placed its warrantied product into the stream of commerce, falls short of the “substantial
connection” contemplated in Burger King.

Indeed, whereas the defendant in Burger King

negotiated his contract with a forum-state corporation, entered a carefully structured 20-year
relationship with that corporation, and assented to a forum selection clause in their agreement,
Mr. Roblin’s agreement involved no negotiations, contemplated only a limited relationship, and

1

Mr. Roblin seems to imply that the service centers are agents of FCCC and that the Court may impute their Oregon
contacts to FCCC for the purpose of specific jurisdiction. The use of an agency theory to find specific jurisdiction
was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017).

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was in no way specific to Oregon or its residents. The relationship established by the warranty
was specific to the parties—neither of which reside in Oregon—and not the forum state.
The presence of independent authorized service centers in Oregon does not change the
jurisdictional calculus. As the Supreme Court noted in World-Wide Volkswagen, the unilateral
creation of a forum-state contact, even when coupled with a defendant’s authorization of
independent service centers, is insufficient to create jurisdiction. Although this Court is
sympathetic to Mr. Roblin’s argument that the existence and online listing of the service centers
acted as an enticement to people in Oregon who might be contemplating purchase of warrantied
FCCC products, there is little to suggest that FCCC sought to avail itself of the Oregon market
specifically.

The warranty makes no mention of Oregon and the uncontroverted evidence

reflects that the service centers, like FCCC’s products, exist in Oregon only by virtue of
decisions taken by entities other than FCCC. Defendant has no control over the service centers
and, as in World-Wide Volkswagen, they create only a “collateral relation” to Oregon. To find
otherwise would allow for jurisdiction over most automotive manufacturers—a result clearly at
odds with the Supreme Court’s stream of commerce precedent—who likewise authorize service
facilities, fulfil orders for parts, and offer informational materials on their websites.
Mr. Roblin attempts to distinguish World-Wide Volkswagen and its progeny because they
arise in the products liability context. He is right that, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit
generally distinguishes between tort and contract actions, but the Ninth Circuit has, on at least
one occasion, applied stream of commerce principles in the purposeful availment context, see
Holland Am. Line, Inc. v. Wartsila North Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2007), and, in
any event, the Court finds the stream of commerce precedent relevant to the facts of this case. It
makes sense, as a practical matter, to consider stream of commerce precedents because a

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warranty travels in the same manner as the product to which it is attached. In addition, at a
conceptual level, stream of commerce cases are not unique in their aversion to contacts created
by the unilateral act of a plaintiff—contract cases are equally focused on the defendants’
conduct. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). To wholesale disregard
relevant principles from these cases would be overly formalistic. The Court therefore finds that
it would be inconsistent with due process to exercise specific jurisdiction over FCCC.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, FCCC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
GRANTED and it is DISMISSED from the case without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of July, 2018.

/s/Michael J. McShane______
Michael J. McShane
United States District Judge

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