Mora-Contreras et al v. Peters et al

Filing 78

OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint (ECF No. 69 ). The Court has already provided Plaintiffs with two opportunities to amend their complaint, and therefore the Court dismisses this case with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 4/30/2020 by Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. (gw) (Main Document 78 replaced on 4/30/2020) (eo).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RAFAEL MORA-CONTRERAS and
SHANE STAGGS,

Case No. 6:18-cv-00678-SB
OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
COLETTE PETERS; DOUG YANCEY;
MEGHAN LEDDY; ZACHARY GOULD;
CRAIG PRINS; JERRY PLANTE; JEREMY
NOFZIGER; and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Rafael Mora-Contreras (“Mora-Contreras”) and Shane Staggs (“Staggs”) (together,
“Plaintiffs”) bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Colette Peters (“Peters”), the
director of the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”), and several ODOC employees
(collectively, “Defendants”) violated their constitutional rights. Now before the Court is
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and all parties

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have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. For
the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND1
In 2016, ODOC employees opened an investigation following an increase in drug-related
deaths and a riot involving approximately 200 individuals in custody at the Oregon State
Penitentiary (“OSP”). Plaintiffs, both in OSP custody when the investigations began, allege that
Defendants violated their constitutional rights during the investigation by “using solitary
confinement, fabrication of evidence, and other means to punish inmates without due process.”
(Sec. Am. Compl. (“SAC”) at 1, ECF No. 65.)
ANALYSIS
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epstein Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th
Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
///

The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and
construes those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs for the purpose of reviewing
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.
2019) (holding that at the pleading stage, “[a]ll factual allegations are accepted as true, and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).
1

PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER

II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Procedural Background

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ amended complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed
to state: (i) a due process claim, where Plaintiffs did not allege that they were denied the required
procedural due process protections in connection with any disciplinary proceedings and did not
allege that solitary confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship that implicates a
liberty interest; (ii) an Eighth Amendment claim in light of longstanding precedent holding that
solitary confinement does not violate the Eighth Amendment; or (iii) an equal protection claim
because Plaintiffs did not allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants acted with an intent
or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiffs based upon their membership in a protected class.
(Findings & Recommendation (“F&R”) at 3-20, ECF No. 40; Order at 1-3, ECF No. 51.) The
Court also held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment retaliation claims, because Plaintiffs’ right not to serve as informants, and to refuse
to provide false information to prison officials, was not clearly established at the time of the
alleged offense. (F&R at 20-22.) The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended
complaint. (Order at 3.)
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, newly alleging that: (1) the cells in OSP’s
segregation units provided minimal ventilation, individuals suffered from intense heat, and the
fans were loud (SAC ¶ 19); (2) individuals in segregation were not provided time outside for
fresh air or sunlight, and the cell windows were painted over to block sunlight (SAC ¶ 20); (3)
individuals in segregation were not provided exercise equipment or meaningful physical
recreation (SAC ¶ 21); (4) Staggs was denied a shower after being exposed to pepper spray used
on another individual (SAC ¶ 59); (5) on information and belief, defendant Yancey did not like
Mora-Contreras because of his influence amongst Latinx individuals in custody (SAC ¶ 28); and
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(6) defendant Yancey subjected Staggs to strip searches and made crude comments and racist
jokes. (SAC ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs seek damages and attorney’s fees and costs (SAC ¶ 62), and Staggs
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (SAC ¶¶ 90-91.)
B.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. (Defs.’ Mot., ECF
No. 69.) The parties acknowledge that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended
complaint, and Plaintiffs’ response thereto, largely mirror the parties’ prior briefing on
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Plaintiffs note that they have repeated
certain arguments in response to the second motion to dismiss, despite the Court’s rejection of
those arguments in its earlier opinion, to preserve the arguments for appeal. (Pls.’ Resp. at 2,
ECF No. 72.) The Court does not revisit all of the issues addressed in its earlier opinion, but
incorporates that opinion by reference and addresses herein Plaintiffs’ new allegations.
1.

Due Process Claims

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not
allege that they were denied any of the procedural protections required by Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and because Plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the sanctions they
received implicated a protected liberty interest. (F&R at 7-16.) Specifically, the Court recognized
that an individual in custody does not have a protected liberty interest in a minimum custody
status or other privileges absent an “atypical, significant deprivation” (Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 486 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)),
and that short-term placements in segregation and loss of privileges do not implicate a protected
liberty interest. See Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
“[p]risoners are entitled to certain due process protections when subject to disciplinary
sanctions[,]” and that “these procedural protections adhere only where the deprivation implicates
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a protected liberty interest—that is, where the conditions of confinement impose an ‘atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’”) (quoting
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that even a “concededly
punitive” transfer to less desirable housing conditions did not exceed prison officials’ authority
because it did “not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the individual’s]
indeterminate sentence”).
As in their amended complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege in the second amended complaint
that Defendants denied them any of the Wolff procedural protections prior to receiving
disciplinary sanctions.2 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a procedural due process
claim.
With respect to pleading deprivation of a liberty interest to support their procedural and
substantive due process claims, Plaintiffs newly allege in their second amended complaint that
the conditions of the segregated housing units included overheating, loud fans, and lack of
sunlight and recreation. (SAC ¶¶ 19-21.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the conditions in
OSP’s disciplinary segregation unit presented atypical and significant hardships compared to the
conditions in OSP’s administrative segregation unit, nor that the conditions in the segregation
units presented atypical and significant hardships compared to Plaintiffs’ experience in the
general population.3 See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that

2

Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Wolff “should be revisited and expanded.” (Pls.’ Resp. at

17.)
It is unclear if Mora-Contreras was housed in administrative segregation (“ASU”) only,
or also in disciplinary segregation (“DSU”), and how the conditions differed between the two
units. (See SAC ¶¶ 31, 36, alleging that on April 22, 2016, Mora-Contreras was placed “into
administrative segregation . . . for 68 days,” and that on April 22, 2016, Mora-Contreras was
“placed . . . in DSU[.]”) It is also unclear if Staggs was housed only in disciplinary segregation,
or also in administrative segregation. (Compare SAC ¶¶ 48, 50, 54, alleging that Staggs was
3

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the relevant test is whether the segregation is “materially different from those conditions
imposed on inmates in purely discretionary segregation” and finding “no allegation that
Plaintiff’s segregation in the [Special Housing Unit] was materially different from those
conditions imposed on inmates in purely discretionary segregation”)); see also Ramirez v.
Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a plaintiff must allege “whether the
challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative
segregation and protective custody,’ and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary
authority”) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87).
In Resnick, the plaintiff alleged that “in the [Special Housing Unit], recreational
opportunities and access to showers are limited; the mattress is flat and dirty; no pillow is
allowed; a prisoner cannot have access to the library; and half the time the food is cold.” Resnick,
213 F.3d at 448 n.3. Despite these allegations, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claims that the defendants placed him in segregation for refusing to “snitch,” because
“[h]e did not allege that conditions were different in administrative segregation, nor did he allege
the extent to which conditions were better in the general population.” Id.
Similarly here, Plaintiffs do not distinguish between the conditions in OSP’s disciplinary
segregation unit compared to its administrative segregation unit. Instead, Plaintiffs group
together all of the segregation units, and allege generally that all of the segregation units impose
similar “solitary confinement” conditions. (See SAC ¶¶ 17-18, “Solitary confinement takes
several forms in Oregon. The most common is disciplinary segregation in the Disciplinary
Segregation Unit (DSU), where people are sent via sanction for most basic rule violations. Often,

“placed in DSU” and “sent to DSU” with SAC ¶ 17, alleging that both Mora-Contreras and
Staggs were “placed in ASU/IMU prior to a hearing on their disciplinary sanction”).
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DSU is the first point of contact for solitary confinement in ODOC. Some inmates are transferred
to Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) or the Intensive Management Unit (IMU), or are
placed in ASU/IMU prior to a hearing on their disciplinary sanction, as Plaintiffs were.
Regardless of designation or type of segregation, solitary confinement in Oregon means
spending on average 23 hours in a 6-by-10-foot cell with no natural light or access to outdoors or
fresh air and limited opportunities to speak to people.”). Plaintiffs also fail to allege how the
conditions they faced in segregation were atypical or significant compared to the conditions they
experienced in the general population.
Specifically, Mora-Contreras alleges that he was placed in a hot, stuffy cell with no
sunlight, he suffered from intense heat during his stay in segregation from April to June because
the segregation unit lacked air conditioning, and the fans in the segregation unit were very loud.
(SAC ¶ 44.) Mora-Contreras does not allege that the general population units were airconditioned or less stuffy, nor that the fans in those units were quieter. Staggs, who was housed
in segregation during the winter months, does not complain of any temperature or sound issues,
but does allege that the correctional officers overused pepper spray and tasers in the segregation
unit. (SAC ¶ 59.) Staggs does not allege that correctional officers in the general population units
did not use pepper spray or tasers, and unfortunately, the Court is well aware based on other
pending federal cases that individuals in general population are regularly exposed to secondhand
pepper spray.4
///

4

Staggs may have been able to state an Eighth Amendment claim against an individual
defendant for refusing him a timely shower when he was exposed to secondhand pepper spray,
but even if Staggs has exhausted such a claim, he has not named any individual involved in that
incident as a defendant in this action.
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For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that their confinement to a
segregation unit imposed an atypical and significant hardship, and for that additional reason they
have failed to state a due process claim. See Resnick, 213 F.3d at 445, 448 n.3 (affirming
dismissal of retaliation claims where the plaintiff alleged conditions that were “‘within the range
of confinement to be normally expected’ by prison inmates ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life’” because the plaintiff “did not allege that conditions were different in
administrative segregation nor did he allege the extent to which conditions were better in the
general population”) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87); Lewis v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., No.
2:17-cv-01212-MC, 2018 WL 6059367, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2018) (dismissing due process
claims with prejudice where the plaintiff failed to “allege a protected liberty interest implicated
by his segregation, and further amendment would not cure this deficiency”); Remington v.
Myrick, No. 2:16-cv-01993-PK, 2017 WL 3319112, at *4-6 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2017) (dismissing
due process claims with prejudice where the plaintiff alleged that “constant noise and lighting” in
disciplinary segregation “made sleep difficult,” and noting that the plaintiff “was confined under
the same conditions as other inmates in DSU” and “[h]e does not allege that he suffered from
any personal characteristics that would have made conditions in DSU particularly difficult for
him”); see also Holloway v. Cohen, 61 F. App’x 435, 437 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court
properly dismissed [the plaintiff’s] substantive due process claim because [he] failed to allege
that his detention in administrative segregation constituted a deprivation of liberty that shocks
the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”) (citing Nunez
v. City of L.A., 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998)).
2.

Eighth Amendment Claims

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim on the ground the Court must
follow the “law of the land,” which has long held that “solitary confinement . . . is not itself
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unconstitutional.” Thomasson v. Premo, No. 14-01788-MO, 2017 WL 2403565, at *3 n.1 (D. Or.
June 2, 2017) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-25 (2005) and Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978)). (See F&R at 16-17.) Plaintiffs’ new allegations do not impact the Court’s
analysis.
Although the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ Eight Amendment claim, the undersigned
joins the growing number of federal judges who acknowledge the “research suggesting that the
conditions to which inmates in solitary confinement are subjected often lead to profound
psychological peril for the inmate, and as such, the use of solitary confinement itself may
implicate an Eighth Amendment violation.” Thomasson, 2017 WL 2403565, at *3 n.1; see also
Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)
(noting that “[a] punishment need not leave physical scars to be cruel and unusual[,]” and “we do
know that solitary confinement imprints on those that it clutches a wide range of psychological
scars”); Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246, 1247 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
petitioner “developed symptoms long associated with solitary confinement, namely severe
anxiety and depression, suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep
difficulty”); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Of course,
prison officials must have discretion to decide that in some instances temporary, solitary
confinement is a useful or necessary means to impose discipline and to protect prison employees
and other inmates. But research still confirms what this Court suggested over a century ago:
Years on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”); Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 35557 (4th Cir. 2019) (providing an overview of the literature and studies recognizing the
deleterious effects of solitary confinement); Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1175-77 (10th
Cir. 2018) (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) (concurring in judgment granting the defendant’s

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motion for summary judgment because precedent “compel[s] the outcome of this case,” but
citing studies addressing the effects of solitary confinement and recognizing the serious harms of
solitary confinement and noting that “[g]iven our society’s present understanding that prolonged
solitary confinement inflicts progressive brain injury, we cannot consider such prolonged,
unjustified confinement as anything other than extreme and atypical”); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854
F.3d 209, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging “the robust body of legal and scientific
authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term isolation
in solitary confinement”); Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that
the “serious psychological consequences of . . . quasi-solitary imprisonment [has] been
documented”); see also Reginald Dwayne Betts, Only Once I Thought About Suicide, 125 Yale
L.J. F. 222 (2016); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.
L. & Pol’y 325 (2006).
Our jurisprudence has not kept pace with the evolving science and social science
demonstrating that the solitary aspect of solitary confinement is cruel and unusual. This Court
agrees that the constitutionality of solitary confinement for any period of time beyond what the
United Nations has deemed to be torture is an important issue for appellate review. See Glossip
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Torture has called for a global ban on solitary confinement longer than 15 days.”).
3.

Equal Protection Claims

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims on the ground that Plaintiffs
failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against Plaintiffs based upon their membership in a protected class. (F&R at 18-19.)
The Court noted that Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants targeted them for reasons other than
their race (including because they were uncooperative in the drug investigation), and Plaintiffs
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have not alleged that Defendants targeted only non-white individuals in the drug investigation or
that Defendants treated similarly situated white individuals differently. See Cabrera v. Maddock,
No. 10-611, 2012 WL 3778827, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2012) (“Although it is clear that
Plaintiff believes the prisoners searched were targeted because of their race, the factual
allegations indicate that race may not have been a motivating factor. [The defendant] allegedly
told Plaintiff that the search was in response to an assault on prison guards, for the purpose of
discovering evidence of gang affiliation, and that thirty-one prisoners were targeted. Plaintiff’s
personal belief that the search was motivated by race by itself is not sufficient to state a claim.
The fact that Hispanics alone were targeted is significant. However, to state an equal protection
claim, an amended complaint . . . should provide enough circumstantial detail, such as statements
or specific conduct, to support his conclusion that race was a motivating factor in the search
rather than a coincidence.”) (citation omitted).
In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs add only that “[u]pon information and belief,
Mr. Mora-Contreras believed that Defendant Yancey did not like him because of his influence
among latinx inmates in ODOC.” (SAC ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs have not pled any facts to support MoraContreras’ belief that Yancey targeted him because of his race, and therefore they have failed to
state a plausible equal protection claim.5 See Hedlin v. San Mateo Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. C 064321 JSW (PR), 2007 WL 160950, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007) (“A prisoner alleging denial
of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on race or other suspect classification must
plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an
Plaintiffs also allege that solitary confinement is an “institution which arbitrarily
punishes people of color at greater rates” (SAC ¶ 78; Pls.’ Resp. at 24-25), which the Court
accepts as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion of dismiss, but Plaintiffs nevertheless fail
to state an equal protection claim here because they have not pled facts to support a plausible
claim that Defendants placed them in solitary confinement because they are persons of color.
5

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inference of discriminatory intent.”) (citing Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d
1022, 1026 (9th Cir.1998)); see also Solis v. City of Fresno, No. 1:11-CV-00053 AWI GSA,
2012 WL 868681, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff’s equal protection
claim because “[i]n the post-Twombly and Iqbal era, pleading on information and belief, without
more, is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim”).
4.

First Amendment Claims

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims on the ground that even if they
have a First Amendment right not to serve as an informant or not to provide false testimony, that
right was not clearly established at the time of the events in question and therefore Defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity. (F&R at 20-22 (citing Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 81
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that “the First Amendment protects both a prisoner’s right not to serve as
an informant, and to refuse to provide false information to prison officials[,]” just as “citizens
enjoy a First Amendment right to refuse to provide false information to the government”); but
see Elliott v. Caballero, No. 19-cv-06005-PJH, 2020 WL 587198, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2020)
(“[P]laintiff has cited no cases and the court has not found caselaw indicating that refusing to
snitch is considered protected conduct for a retaliation claim[,]” and recognizing that the Ninth
Circuit has held that “‘there is no constitutional right not to snitch’”) (quoting United States v.
Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of qualified
immunity is “neither legally tenable nor prudentially sustainable” (Pls.’ Resp. at 8-9), and that
the Court should address the merits of their First Amendment claims. (Pls.’ Resp. at 11.)
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims are based on their allegations that Defendants tried to
compel each of them to provide false testimony, and then retaliated against them when they
refused. Mora-Contreras seeks only damages with respect to his First Amendment claim, because
he is no longer in ODOC custody and therefore his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
PAGE 12 – OPINION AND ORDER

are moot. (F&R at 4-7.) As the Court previously held, qualified immunity bars Mora-Contreras’
claim for damages.
Staggs also seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief on his First Amendment claim.
(SAC ¶¶ 90-91; see Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir.
1989) (“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to damage liability; it does not bar actions
for declaratory or injunctive relief.”) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)).
However, Staggs alleges that Yancey compelled him to provide false testimony, and retaliated
against him when he refused, and Staggs does not allege that any other defendant was involved
in, or aware of, Yancey’s actions.6 Accordingly, Staggs has not stated a First Amendment claim
against the other defendants. Furthermore, Staggs acknowledges that Yancey is no longer
employed by ODOC (SAC ¶ 5), and therefore Staggs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
against Yancey are moot.7 See Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir.
2017) (““[A] declaratory judgment merely adjudicating past violations of federal law—as
opposed to continuing or future violations of federal law—is not an appropriate exercise of
federal jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985)); Platt v. Inc. Vill. of
Southampton, 391 F. App’x 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is well-settled that ‘[a] plaintiff seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the [actual case or
controversy’s] injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the

6

In their response, Plaintiffs assert that defendant Plante also fabricated evidence against
Staggs (Pls.’ Resp. at 15), but the Second Amended Complaint does not include such allegations.
See SAC ¶¶ 54-55 (alleging only that Plante conducted the investigation of Staggs and was on
vacation while Staggs awaited a hearing).
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ requests for broad injunctive relief do not comply
with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Defs.’ Mot. at 3-4.) Plaintiffs argue that the
PLRA’s limits are unconstitutional. (Pls.’ Resp. at 6-8.) The Court need not reach the question in
light of its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
7

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future’”) (citation omitted); see also Cook v. Cashler, No. 11-637, 2013 WL 1213678, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief against a
prison hearing officer would be moot if the hearing officer had retired because the hearing
officer “is no longer in any position to affect plaintiff’s rights”); Hines v. Wise, No. 16-461, 2016
WL 7743035, at *10 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 5, 2016) (holding that an individual in custody’s claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against former officials “are moot and subject to dismissal”).
Qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claim for damages with respect to their First
Amendment claims, and Staggs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Therefore,
the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint (ECF No. 69). The Court has already provided Plaintiffs with two
opportunities to amend their complaint, and therefore the Court dismisses this case with
prejudice.8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2020.

STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge

8

See Lewis, 2018 WL 6059367, at *3 (dismissing section 1983 claims with prejudice
after providing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint); Remington, 2017 WL
3319112, at *6 (same).
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