Johnson v. Harrison et al

Filing 10

Order: These deficiencies cannot be cured through amendment, and this action is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 06/04/2018 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (jw)(copy of order mailed to plaintiff)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON

DANIEL STEPHEN JOHNSON,

Case No. 6: 18-cv-00738-JR

Plaintiff,

ORDER

V.

THOMAS L. HARRISON, et al.,
Defendants.

AIKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff, a federal inmate appearing pro se, files this civil rights action and applies to
proceed in forma pauperis. However, plaintiff's Complaint is deficient and must be dismissed.
In federal court, dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim "is proper only
if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would
entitle him to relief." Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The court must
construe pro se pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff "the benefit of any doubt." Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). "Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can

cure" defects in the complaint, "a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's

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deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep 't of

Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Plaintiff purports to allege numerous claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against law
enforcement officers from the City of Toledo and several prosecutors. Plaintiff also purports to
bring civil rights claims against agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a foreign-nongovernmental organization, and several of its members. However, the alleged actions giving rise
to plaintiffs claims occurred in 2013 and 2014 and are barred by the relevant statute of
limitations, because the events in question occurred more than two years before plaintiff filed
suit. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Huynh v. Chase

Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (complaint may be dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds so long as the running of the limitation period is apparent on the face of the
complaint).
Further, absolute immunity generally shields prosecutors from suit under§ 1983 if the
claims are related to conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process." Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). The prosecutors' alleged actions in this case reflect prosecutorial
decisions intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Milstein v.

Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) (absolute prosecutorial immunity "covers the
knowing use of false testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious
prosecution").
More significantly, plaintiffs claims implicate the validity of charges against him and his
recent convictions in federal court and are barred by the Heck rule. See United States v. Johnson,
Case No. 6:14-cr-00482-MC; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Heck rule bars

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damages claims implicating the unconstitutionality or validity of a conviction or sentence unless
the conviction or sentence was invalidated or the proceedings otherwise terminated in the
plaintiffs favor. Id. at 486-87. Specifically, "a state prisoner's§ 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target
of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if
success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). Essentially, plaintiff alleges that
defendants conspired to bring criminal charges against him and to secure his presence in the
United States to face those charges. Accordingly, Heck bars these claims.
Finally, to the extent plaintiff challenges his removal from Cambodia, it is well
established that the manner of his removal did not implicate jurisdiction over him. "The power of
a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the
court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction."' Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952) (citing Ker v. Illinois, 199 U.S. 436, 440 (1886)); see also id. ("There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will.").
These deficiencies cannot be cured through amendment, and this action is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

4- day of June, 2018.
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

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ORDER