Strubel v. SAIF Corporation et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court denies plaintiff's petition to proceed IFP 2 and dismisses this action, with prejudice. Signed on 4/10/2020 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (Mailed to Pro Se party on 4/10/2020.) (ck)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION

JACK ALFRED STRUBEL, JR.,

Civ. No. 6:18-cv-00881-AA
ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff,
v.
SAIF CORPORATION and CHEMEKETA
COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
AIKEN, District Judge.
The Court has twice previously dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without
prejudice because the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish this
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. (docs. 10 and 16) In screening
plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court found that
plaintiff failed to allege either a federal cause of action or diversity between the
parties. The Court also outlined other deficiencies but granted plaintiff leave to file
an amended complaint.

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As part of a previous order, the Court partially granted plaintiff’s request for
appointment of pro bono counsel. Counsel was appointed for the limited purpose of
reviewing the case with plaintiff and discuss his options to proceed. (doc. 11) That
appointment occurred and was been completed. (doc. 12) Plaintiff subsequently
filed a notice styled as “Opinions and Regulations.” (doc. 15) In the interest of
fairness, the Court construed that document as an amended complaint.

After

considering this filing, the Court again found that plaintiff had failed to adequately
plead a claim against defendants, but again granted him leave to file a second
amended complaint. In response, plaintiff filed a document titled “Work Related
Injury; No Medical Attentional 6 Years and Waiting.” (doc. 17)
The Court construes the latest filing as a second amended complaint and
finds that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice at this time.
As noted in previous orders, plaintiff has alleged in his filings that he
suffered an injury in the course of his employment with defendant Chemeketa
Community College (“CCC”) and then tried to access state provided worker's
compensation benefits.
granted benefits.

It is unclear from his filings whether he was denied or

Plaintiff alleged that he was only examined by one doctor

provided by defendant, SAIF Corporation ("SAIF''). Plaintiff then requested to be
seen by a second doctor, but the request was denied.
First, plaintiff does not identify any valid cause of action against either
defendant. He refers to “28 U.S.C. § 163.275 COERCION” but there is not federal
statue that matches the citation. There is Oregon criminal statute dealing with

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coercion that can be found under a similar citation. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275.
This statute does not create a civil right of action. Otherwise his filing is a seeming
recitation of facts surrounding a worker’s compensation claim.1
Alternatively, this action is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Court takes notice of court records regarding previous litigation in state court in
Worker’s Compensation Board (“WCB”) Case No. 15-02810, and the Oregon Court of
Appeals’ decision in Case No. A165503.
Reviewing the WCB opinion, it appears that plaintiff suffered injuries, as
outlined in his initial complaint, in 2013, for which SAIF accepted some injuries and
denied claims on others. Plaintiff appealed the denial, and in November 30, 2015,
agreed to Disputed Claim Settlement (“DCS”) which was approved by an Oregon
state ALJ. On December 29, 2015, plaintiff requested review of the proposed final
order, and, on review, the WCB remanded the case to the ALJ for consideration of
the claims. At a hearing before the ALJ plaintiff made claims strikingly like those
in this case and cited to the Oregon criminal statute for coercion. The ALJ denied
setting aside the DCS, and WCB later affirmed that decision. See In the Matter of
the Compensation of JACK A. STRUBEL, Claimant 69 Van Natta 1140 (2017).

In his original civil cover sheet and complaint, plaintiff identified medical
malpractice and a claim that his constitutional rights were violated when he was
allowed “only one doctor.” (doc. 1) Throughout all his filings, he has not alleged any
facts which would give rise to liability on the part of CCC. The allegations
consistently show only that his injury occurred while working for the college.
1

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Plaintiff then filed an appeal with the Oregon Court of Appeals. The COA
ordered his appeal dismissed on its own motion on January 22, 2018 and the
appellate judgment issued on May 30, 2018.
As mentioned in the previous orders, the Court now finds that this action is
one of the rare cases governed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which bars federal
courts, other than the U.S. Supreme Court, from hearing cases aimed at correcting
state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923);
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983).
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005), the Supreme Court substantially limited the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The
Supreme Court clarified that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases of
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commence and inviting district court review and rejection
of those judgments.” Id. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517.
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars litigation of a claim in federal district
court only when a federal plaintiff asserts an allegedly erroneous decision by a state
court as a legal wrong and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that
decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). The doctrine also bars
litigation of an issue that is “inextricably intertwined” with a “forbidden de facto
appeal” from a state court decision. Id. at 1158. An issue is inextricably intertwined
with a forbidden de facto appeal if the relief requested in the federal action would,

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in effect, reverse or void the state court decision. Fontana Empire Cir., LLC v. City
of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Charchenko v. City of
Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Here, plaintiff lost in a state court proceeding before the WCB, and that the
Oregon Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal of that decision. The allegations at
the core of this lawsuit focus on the deficiencies in the worker’s compensation
proceedings and show that this action seeks review and rejection of the state court
verdict.
The Court has twice allowed plaintiff to attempt plead allegations that show
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims or that that plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has not done so. The
Court notes again that it appointed temporary pro bono counsel in this case and
plaintiff has yet file an adequate complaint.
Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff’s petition to proceed IFP and dismisses
this action, with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this action is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this -10th day of April, 2020.
_____
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/s/Ann Aiken
_________________________
ANN AIKEN
United States District Judge

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