Thompson v. Inman
Filing
87
Opinion and Order signed on 05/09/2024 by Magistrate Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 82 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant on liability under Plaintiff's conversion claim. However, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the amount of his damages. (Deposited in outgoing mail to pro se party on 05/09/2024.) (bd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
RANDY THOMPSON,
Case No. 6:22-cv-01665-MK
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION AND
ORDER
WALKER P. INMAN, III,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
KASUBHAI, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Randy Thompson, a resident of Oregon, brings this diversity action against
Defendant Walker Inman, a resident of Georgia, alleging conversion. ECF No. 1. Both parties
are proceeding pro se. Plaintiff now moves the Court for summary judgment. ECF No. 82. For
the reasons below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Page 1 — OPINION & ORDER
BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2020, Plaintiff reported a burglary at his home in Lincoln City,
Oregon. Pl. Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 82-3. The door to Plaintiff’s art studio had been forcibly
entered, and Plaintiff’s two-door brown filing cabinet was stolen. Id. Several items of value
within the studio—including a safe, guitar, loose money, and credit cards—were not stolen, and
Plaintiff’s main residence and another building at the home were not entered. Id.
Plaintiff reported that the only copy of a book and movie manuscript entitled “Escape
From the Hill,” associated contracts, and three prototypes for original inventions were contained
in the stolen filing cabinet. Id. Plaintiff reported that Defendant was one of only two people who
knew about the location of the manuscript that he believed was the specific target of the
burglary. Id.
Plaintiff “found out [Defendant] was responsible for the burglary, theft and conversion of
my personal property when he started bragging about it and taunting me with stolen personal
property in emails and on social media.” Thompson Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 83. On May 5, 2022,
Defendant emailed Plaintiff, noting “I have all the case files as I have hard drives that contain all
case files.” Pl. Mot. Ex. A6, ECF No. 82-9. Attached to the email are images of some of the
allegedly stolen items. Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs.,
Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is
Page 2 — OPINION & ORDER
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the
authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all
reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved
against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court notes that the motion was
unopposed by Defendant, who failed to file response. Nevertheless, an unopposed motion for
summary judgment does not automatically entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law. In
such cases, summary judgment should not be granted “where the movant’s papers are
insufficient to support that motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact.” Henry
v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, for the reasons explained below,
Plaintiff’s motion and evidence support his motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability for conversion, but he lacks evidence to support his resulting damages. 1
1
Plaintiff’s motion also includes argument related to Rule 37, but Plaintiff has not formally moved
the Court for Rule 37 sanctions. See Local Rule 7-1(b). Moreover, because Defendant did not
respond to Plaintiff’s motion and has therefore presented no evidence in opposition to this motion,
the Court has not been called upon to rely on any information or discovery from Defendant that
might be subject to such sanctions. Accordingly, the Court does not address these arguments.
Page 3 — OPINION & ORDER
I.
Conversion
“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so
seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to
pay the other the full value of the chattel.” Mustola v. Toddy, 253 Or. 658, 663-53 (1963)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965)). “The principal concern in
a conversion claim is whether the defendant exercised intentional control over the chattel in a
manner ‘inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights.’” Marquard v. New Penn Fin., LLC, 2017 WL
4227685, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 2017) (quoting Naas v. Lucas, 86 Or. App. 406, 409 (1987)).
In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the
actor to pay the full value, the following factors are important:
‘(a) The extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control;
‘(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other's right of
control;
‘(c) the actor's good faith;
‘(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other's right of
control;
‘(e) the harm done to the chattel;
‘(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.’
Mustola, 253 Or. at 663-64.
Here, Plaintiff has presented uncontroverted evidence that Defendant was one of only
two people Plaintiff was aware of that knew what was in the filing cabinet taken from his art
studio. The uncontroverted record suggests that the contents of the filing cabinet were the target
of the burglary because many other items of value were not stolen and the art studio was the only
building entered. Plaintiff has also presented evidence that Defendant had told another
individual, Jon Paul Chevalier, that Plaintiff had certain items in his “Lincoln City house” and
asked Mr. Chevalier to help him burglarize the home to retrieve them. Chevalier Dep. 24:127:12, ECF No. 82-30. There is also uncontroverted evidence that, in the years following the
burglary, Defendant posted images of some of the stolen items on his Facebook page and
Page 4 — OPINION & ORDER
emailed Plaintiff regarding the same. Pl. Mot. Exs. A3, A6, A9, ECF Nos. 82-6, 82-9, 82-12.
Plaintiff states that Defendant “taunted” him about the stolen items. Thompson Aff. ¶ 5. Plaintiff
demanded the return of the items for several years but was unable to recover them from
Defendant. Id. ¶ 6.
On the record before the Court, no reasonable juror applying the required factors could
find in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff has thus produced sufficient evidence to establish the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his conversion claim. He has therefore carried
his burden at summary judgment, obligating Defendant to identify facts showing a genuine issue
for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Defendant filed no response identifying such facts and
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim.
II.
Damages
Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on his requested damages, which include the
value of the converted property and emotional distress damages. However, Plaintiff’s motion and
supporting evidence do not establish an absence of a genuine issue of fact on these damages.
A.
Value of Converted Property
In Oregon, the measure of damages for the conversion of personal property is the
reasonable market value of the goods converted at the time and place of conversion[.]” Hall v.
Work, 223 Or. 347, 357, 354 P.2d 837 (1960).
Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, included as an exhibit to his motion, note that he intends to
prove the value of the stolen property with, among other things, “the interest of the Inman truelife story and those paid for interviews by CBS and the Dr. Phil show and rolling stone magazine
that each paid 250,000.00 for interviews through limited copy right material,” as well as expert
testimony.” Pl. Mot. Ex. A20 at 7-11, ECF No. 82-23.
Page 5 — OPINION & ORDER
However, although this exhibit reveals what Plaintiff intends to use to prove damages, the
record does not contain that evidence. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence in the summary
judgment record to support the value of the converted property. Without such evidence, Plaintiff
has not carried his burden to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the issue
of damages for the value of the converted property.
B.
Emotional Distress Damages
Plaintiff also seeks emotional distress damages resulting from the alleged conversion.
Under Oregon law, “[m]ental suffering is not compensable in the ordinary trespass or conversion
action.” Douglas v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 251 Or. 310 (1968). However, there is an exception
to that rule where emotional distress is a common and predictable result under the circumstances
of the kind of conversion involved.” Mooney v. Johnson Cattle Co., 291 Or. 709, 716. As
clarified later by the Oregon Court of Appeals “it is the kind of interest invaded that, as a policy
matter, is believed to be of sufficient importance to merit protection from emotional impact, that
is critical.” Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co., 60 Or. App. 70, 74–75, 652 P.2d 852, 854 (1982). Most
relevant to the circumstances in this case, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that emotional
distress damages may be awarded “against a defendant for entering the plaintiff’s home and
removing personal property without permission and in plain disregard of plaintiff’s rights.”
Fredeen v. Stride, 269 Or. 369, 3 (1974) (citing Douglas, 251 Or. at 317).
Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Defendant or somebody that he hired
entered Plaintiff’s home in order to remove Plaintiff’s property. Defendant also repeatedly
emailed and “taunted” Plaintiff regarding the stolen property. In light of these circumstances, the
conversion at issue here is of a type where emotional distress would be a common and
Page 6 — OPINION & ORDER
predictable result and involved the kind of interest of sufficient importance to merit protection
from emotional impact. Thus, emotional distress damages are recoverable under Oregon law.
However, there is no evidence in the record from which the Court could ascertain the
amount of emotional damages owed. Plaintiff seeks $200,000 in emotional distress damages but
offers no evidence in support. Even if there were evidence in the record regarding Plaintiff’s
alleged emotional distress, “the amount of damages that a party sustains is ordinarily a factual
issue for the trier of fact.” Horton v. Oregon Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 244–45, 376 P.3d
998, 1041 (2016). The amount of Plaintiff’s emotional damages are a quintessential question of
fact and the Court cannot resolve this on summary judgment. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of his damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. Specifically, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant
on liability under Plaintiff’s conversion claim. However, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary
judgment on the amount of his damages.
DATED this 9th day of May 2024.
s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 7 — OPINION & ORDER
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