Younis v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER. For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner's decision and REMANDS this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 3/10/2025 by Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. (gw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

LAUREL Y., 1

Case No. 6:23-cv-1908-SB
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Laurel Y. filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of Social Security’s
(“Commissioner”) denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405, and the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s
decision and remands this case for further proceedings.
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1

In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last
name of the non-governmental party in this case.
PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is
limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). “For
highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s entitlement to disability
benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is
usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for
that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)).
Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in reviewing social security
determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015).
First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).
Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at
1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is
harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or
that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency
explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see
also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest
[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the
error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded
on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.
2022))).
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PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND
I.

PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION
Plaintiff was born in June 1981 and was thirty-five years old on her application date. (Tr.

25, 427-37.) Plaintiff has more than a high school education, but no past relevant work
experience. (Id. at 25.) In her application, Plaintiff alleged disability due to Dercum’s disease,
severe muscle spasms and difficulty walking, trouble concentrating and memory problems,
polycystic kidney disease, fibromyalgia, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), dystonia,
anxiety and depression, panic attacks, and Raynaud’s syndrome. (Id. at 507.)
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration. (Id.
at 118, 132.) Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) appeared and testified at a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 22, 2018. (Id. at 90.) On
September 7, 2018, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Id. at 146.)
On May 29, 2020, the Appeals Council remanded the case for rehearing. (Id. at 162.) On August
26, 2021, Plaintiff appeared for her second hearing. (Id. at 60.) A third hearing was held on
March 2, 2023. (Id. at 39.)
On April 5, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff has not been under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from June 22, 2016, through the date of
decision. (Id. at 27.) On October 13, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s written decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.)
Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision.
II.

THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve]
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months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential
process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five
steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the
claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See
id. at 724-25.
The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.
Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any
of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of
proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d
1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is
disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954.
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff was disabled.

(Tr. 12-36.) At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 22, 2016, the application date. (Id. at 18.) At step two, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff suffered from the following medically determinable impairment: “Dercum’s
disease.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that
meets or medically equals a listed impairment. (Id. at 20.) The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), and determined that she could perform sedentary work “except no
PAGE 4 – OPINION AND ORDER

climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional balancing, crawling, stooping, crouching or
kneeling; and no exposure to extreme heat or colds.” (Id. at 21.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id. at 25.) At
step five, the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff can perform such as document preparer, assembler I, and marker II. (Id. at
26.) The ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. (Id. at 27.)
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the Court should reverse the ALJ’s opinion because he failed
adequately to consider the medical opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Paul Bilder (“Dr.
Bilder”), but they disagree about the scope of the remand. (Am. Pl.’s Br. at 17, ECF No. 14;
Def.’s Br. at 2-6, ECF No. 20; Pl.’s Reply at 1-4, ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff argues that the Court
should remand for the immediate payment of benefits because crediting Dr. Bilder’s opinion
“would require a finding of disability.” 2 (Pl.’s Reply at 4.) The Commissioner argues that
significant factual conflicts and ambiguities remain and the record therefore requires further
development. (Def.’s Br. at 3-5.)
I.

REMAND
A.

Applicable Law

“Generally when a court of appeals reverses an administrative determination, ‘the proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
2

In her opening brief, Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to provide legally
sufficient reasons for discounting other medical opinions. (Am. Pl.’s Br. at 8, 16.) In her reply,
however, Plaintiff focuses the credit-as-true analysis on Dr. Bilder’s opinion and does not argue
that the Commissioner waived any arguments by not responding to all of the arguments in
Plaintiff’s opening brief. (See Pl.’s Reply at 2.) The Court therefore focuses its analysis on
whether Plaintiff has satisfied the credit-as-true test with respect to Dr. Bilder’s opinion.
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explanation.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In
several cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of
discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when [the three-part creditas-true standard is] met.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations
omitted).
The credit-as-true standard is satisfied if: “(1) the record has been fully developed and
further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to
provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical
opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be
required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (citations omitted). Even when the creditas-true standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when
the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021.
B.

Analysis

The Court agrees with the parties that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons
for discounting Dr. Bilder’s medical opinion. (Am. Pl.’s Br. at 15-17; Def.’s

Br. at 2; Pl.’s

Reply at 2.) After reviewing the record, however, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that
conflicts and ambiguities in the record remain and therefore further proceedings are appropriate.
For example, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome
(“POTS”), PTSD, or headaches to be medically determinable impairments at step two, but Dr.
Bilder’s opinion suggests that Plaintiff suffered from all three. (Tr. 936, 1258, 1488-89, 1613,
1983.) Further proceedings will allow the ALJ to reconsider whether these impairments resulted
in any functional limitations.
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PAGE 6 – OPINION AND ORDER

Further, there are relevant conflicts between the record and Dr. Bilder’s opinion that the
ALJ must resolve. For example, Dr. Bilder opined that Plaintiff would be “impaired to such a
degree that she could not be expected to perform even simple work tasks . . . probably 100%” of
the work week. (Id. at 1220.) Dr. Bilder further reported that Plaintiff could not carry any amount
of weight occasionally or frequently; could only sit, stand, or walk for thirty minutes at a time;
could never climb, balance, stoop, bend, kneel, crouch, reach, handle, or feel; and could only
occasionally finger (i.e., use fine manipulation). (Id. at 1219.) These opinions are inconsistent
with other record evidence reflecting that Plaintiff could engage in daily activities such as
manage her own finances, drive, shop, and “build stuff on the computer” as a hobby, and with
medical records reflecting that Plaintiff was more capable than Dr. Bilder suggested. (Id. at 1881,
2119, 2205, 2218, 2272.) Accordingly, further proceedings would serve a “useful purpose” here.
Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020; see also Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1104-05 (affirming the district
court’s remand for further proceedings where conflicts and ambiguities were unresolved).
For these reasons, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision, but remands the case
for further proceedings so that the ALJ may reevaluate all of the medical opinions (including Dr.
Bilder’s opinion), reevaluate Plaintiff’s alleged impairments, and reformulate the RFC and seek
further VE testimony, if necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and
REMANDS this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2025.
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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