Lacy v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 17

Opinion and Order. For the reasons given above, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. Signed on 3/7/2025 by Magistrate Judge Andrew D. Hallman. (ecp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MELISSA L., 1
v.

No. 6:24-cv-608-HL
Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
HALLMAN, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Melissa L. brings this action under the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Social Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405. For the following reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

1

In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of
the nongovernmental party in this case.
1 – OPINION & ORDER

STANDARD OF REVIEW
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides for judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s
disability determinations: “The court shall have power to enter ... a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” The court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is
based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence means only
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1150 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s]
conclusion.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). “Where the evidence as a
whole can support either a grant or a denial, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the
ALJ’s.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court “must uphold the
ALJ’s decision where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation”). “[A]
reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
2007) (quotation omitted).
BACKGROUND
I.

Plaintiff’s Application
Plaintiff alleges disability based on the combined effects of her arthritis, scoliosis,

psoriasis, a broken tailbone, and mental health symptoms stemming from bipolar, anxiety,

2 – OPINION & ORDER

depression, and PTSD Tr. 274. 2 At the time of Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, March 11, 2020, she
was 38 years old. Tr. 273. Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on April 28, 2021, alleging disability
beginning March 11, 2020. Tr. 256-63. Her applications were denied initially and on
reconsideration. Tr. 143-52, 159-66. Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing, which was held
on June 20, 2023 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) B. Hobbs. Tr. 36-62. Plaintiff
withdrew her request for a hearing on the Title II claim, so the ALJ considered only Plaintiff’s
Title XVI claim for SSI. Tr. 28-29. Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing, represented by
counsel. Tr. 36-62. On July 24, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claims. Tr.
17-35. Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review, which was denied on February 8, 2024. Tr. 17. Plaintiff then sought review before this Court. 3
II.

Sequential Disability Process
The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v.

Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must
demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person
is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At
step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful
activity”; if so, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b),
416.920(b).
2

Citations to “Tr.” are to the Administrative Record, ECF No. 7.

3

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636. ECF 1.
3 – OPINION & ORDER

At step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A severe impairment is one “which significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If
not, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the impairments meet or equal “one
of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to
preclude substantial gainful activity.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the
claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the analysis proceeds. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at
141. At this point, the Commissioner must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to
determine the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), an assessment of work-related
activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any
limitations his impairments impose. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(b)-(c), 416.920(e),
416.945(b)-(c).
At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can perform “past
relevant work.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant
can work, he is not disabled; if he cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5.
Finally, at step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 142; 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966.

4 – OPINION & ORDER

III.

The ALJ’s Decision
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since March 11, 2020, the alleged onset date. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the
following severe, medically determinable impairments: left knee arthritis; bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome; obesity; psoriasis vulgaris; psoriatic arthropathy; bipolar II; generalized anxiety
disorder; and recurrent major depressive disorder. Tr. 23. At step three, the ALJ found no
impairment met or equaled the severity of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. Tr. 23. The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), as
follows:
to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except she can occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. She can frequently stoop, but only occasionally knee, crouch, or crawl.
She can frequently handle or finger with the bilateral upper extremities. She can
tolerate no wetness/humidity or extreme cold (as rated by the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles). She can understand, remember, and carry out simple routine
instructions involving no more than occasional interaction with co-workers,
supervisors, or the public. She can deal with occasional changes in a routine work
setting.
Tr. 24-25.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 27. At step
five the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform, such as marker, housekeeping cleaner, and mail clerk. Tr. 28. The ALJ
therefore found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 29.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ committed three harmful errors. She contends the ALJ erred by
(1) discounting her subjective symptom testimony without a clear and convincing reason for

5 – OPINION & ORDER

doing so, (2) rejecting lay witness testimony without a germane reason, and (3) improperly
evaluating the medical opinion of Cynthia Dreyer, M.D. For the reasons that follow, the Court
finds the ALJ did not err, and affirms.
I.

Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected her subjective symptom testimony.

Pl.’s Opening Br. at 3-9. This Court disagrees.
A.

Legal Standards

The ALJ is responsible for evaluating symptom testimony. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL
5180304, at *1 (Oct. 25, 2017). There is a two-step process for evaluating a claimant’s testimony
about the severity and limiting effect of his symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
Cir. 2009). First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of one or more
impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptoms.
Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The claimant need not show that the
impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptoms, but only show
that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptoms. Id.
Second, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the
symptoms. Id. The ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony “only by offering specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. Thus, the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony that
they do not credit and must explain what evidence undermines the testimony. Holohan v.
Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). In other words, the “clear and convincing”
standard requires an ALJ to “show [their] work.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir.
2022).

6 – OPINION & ORDER

General findings are insufficient to support an adverse determination; the ALJ must rely
on substantial evidence. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208. To discredit a plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the degree of impairment, the ALJ must make a “determination with findings
sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit
claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). The question is
not whether ALJ’s rationale convinces the court, but whether their rationale “is clear enough that
it has the power to convince.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499.
B.

Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she could not work because of issues
with her hands, inability to stand for more than ten to fifteen minutes, and issues working with
other people. Tr. 51. She lived with her husband and her father and provided “a little bit of care”
for her father. Tr. 44. She experienced numbness, aching, cramping, and swelling in her hands.
Tr. 44. She could hold onto objects for only a couple of minutes at a time. Tr. 44-45. She had
dropped dishes. Tr. 45. She sometimes woke with excruciating pain and was unable to move her
hands for ten or fifteen minutes. Tr. 45. She also had issues with her left knee; she was
sometimes unable to bend or pivot the knee. Tr. 45-46. She wore braces and elevated her knee
because of swelling. Tr. 46. She had been prescribed Methotrexate for psoriatic arthritis but was
recently switched to Cosentyx due to elevated liver enzymes. Tr. 46-47. The Cosentyx had
helped her psoriasis but not her psoriatic pain. Tr. 47. She experienced pustular psoriasis flares
that caused swelling in her legs, feet, and ankles, and she was “pretty much in bed” until the
swelling went down. Tr. 47. She also had plaque psoriasis that caused plaques from the bottom
of her feet to her scalp. Tr. 47-48. They cracked and bled. Tr. 48. She spent her days cleaning as

7 – OPINION & ORDER

much as she was able and mostly sitting in a recliner, reading or watching television with her
father. Tr. 51-52.
Describing her mental health symptoms, Plaintiff testified to anxiety, anger, and manic
episodes despite medication. Tr. 49. When describing her manic episodes, she stated, “My sleep
isn’t regular. Like sometimes I’ll stay up for three or four days and then I’ll sleep for like a week
or my mood, I’ll be fine and two minutes later I’ll be ranting, raving not even knowing I
switched.” Tr. 49-50. Her anxiety usually turned into anger, which she did not know how to
handle. Tr. 50. She stated, “I’ve never really been good around people and when it’s like at a
grocery store and there’s a lot of people I tend to freak out then.” Tr. 50.
In written testimony, she reported that she experienced pain in her lower back, knees,
hands, and skin. Tr. 337. She could not stand for more than fifteen to twenty minutes at a time.
Tr. 306, 329. She could lift no more than fifteen pounds. Tr. 306, 334. She could not “do
anything with small objects” due to hand pain. Tr. 306; see also Tr. 329. She had swelling in the
legs, ankles, and feet during psoriasis flares. Tr. 306; see also Tr. 329. She had anxiety when she
“ha[d] to deal with people.” Tr. 306. She experienced “a lot of anger” and sometimes could not
get out of bed “for days” due to depression. Tr. 306. She took oil baths twice a day. Tr. 307, 330.
She was able to prepare simple meals. Tr. 308, 331. She typically stayed at home and watched
television daily. Tr. 310, 333. She struggled to maintain concentration to complete tasks. Tr. 334,
338. Her sleep was erratic and impacted by pain, racing thoughts, and depression. Tr. 330. She
had difficulty with buttons and zippers. Tr. 330. She had been fired in the past because of
problems getting along with others and physical altercations at work. Tr. 311, 334.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptoms, but her “statements concerning the

8 – OPINION & ORDER

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” Tr.
25. Specifically, the ALJ discussed the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s improvement with
treatment, and her activities of daily living when discounting her subjective symptom testimony.
Tr. 25-26. This Court addresses each rationale in turn.
C.

Objective Medical Evidence

An ALJ may reject a claimant’s symptom testimony if that testimony is contradicted by
evidence in the medical record. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161; see also Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498
(“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective
testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.”). While an ALJ may
also consider the lack of corroborating objective medical evidence as one factor in “determining
the severity of the claimant’s pain,” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857, they cannot reject subjective pain
testimony solely on that basis. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (the Commissioner “will not reject your statements about the
intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about the effect your symptoms have
on your ability to work solely because the available objective medical evidence does not
substantiate your statements”). In sum, “an ALJ cannot effectively render a claimant’s subjective
symptom testimony superfluous by demanding positive objective medical evidence ‘fully
corroborat[ing]’ every allegation within the subjective testimony.” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 498
(quoting Burch, 400 F.3rd at 681).
The ALJ reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s allegations of limitations stemming from her
knee and hand pain as inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. Conflict with objective
medical evidence is a sufficient basis for discounting a claimant’s testimony. Smartt, 53 F.4th at

9 – OPINION & ORDER

498; 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about hand and knee pain that
affected her strength and mobility. See Tr. 44-47. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged she experienced
numbness, aching, cramping, and swelling in her hands and had issues with her left knee; she
was sometimes unable to bend or pivot the knee. Tr. 44-47. She alleged that as a result she could
not stand for more than fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, lift more than fifteen pounds, or “do
anything with small objects.” Tr. 306, 329, 334. In contrast to Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ
cited medical records from June 2022 showing Plaintiff had a normal gait, normal range of
motion, and moved all extremities symmetrically. Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 1191-92, 1255). The ALJ
likewise noted that Plaintiff reported general body aches from psoriatic arthritis in October 2022,
but she presented as pleasant and in no acute distress. Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 1183-86). Regarding
Plaintiff’s hand pain, the ALJ relied on records from May 2023 showing normal musculoskeletal
function for her age, including normal strength and sensation, despite carpal tunnel syndrome
symptoms. Tr. 27 (citing Tr. 1294-99). These records all conflicted with or showed a lack of
support for Plaintiff’s allegations of more significant limitations and amount to substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her
physical symptoms.
The ALJ also cited substantial evidence of medical records conflicting with Plaintiff’s
testimony about limitations stemming from her mental health impairments. The ALJ weighed
Plaintiff’s complaints of manic symptoms and being uncomfortable around people against other,
contradictory evidence that undermined her allegations. Tr. 26, 68. For example, Plaintiff’s
counseling records from the relevant period indicate no abnormality in her appearance, motor
skills, attitude, mood, affect, thought content, memory, concentration, or cognitive function. Tr.
26 (citing Tr. 1317-18). The ALJ cited several other medical records showing Plaintiff was alert

10 – OPINION & ORDER

and oriented, with good eye contact, appropriate mood, and normal affect, speech, and thought
process. Tr. 23-24 (citing Tr. 1100, 1181, 1186, 1189,1192). The ALJ reasonably discounted
Plaintiff’s allegations of mental health symptoms, while still providing some limitations in her
ability to function socially in the RFC, providing substantial evidence in support of his decision
to do so.
The ALJ also reasonably relied on medical opinions that conflicted with Plaintiff’s
allegations when discounting her symptom testimony. Concerning Plaintiff’s physical
capabilities, the ALJ noted State agency medical consultant Thomas W. Davenport, M.D.,
determined that Plaintiff could sustain work at the light exertional level with manipulative
limitations that limited her to frequent (but not constant) handling and fingering bilaterally (Tr.
95-96). At the reconsideration level in March 2022, Ramona Bates, M.D., assessed that Plaintiff
could sustain light work, further restricted with postural limitations (frequent stooping and
occasional climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, and crawling), manipulative limitations
(frequent but not constant handling and fingering bilaterally), and environmental limitations (she
should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and wetness). Tr. 125-27. So too with the
medical opinions about Plaintiff’s mental health. State agency psychological consultants
assessed that Plaintiff could, sustain work involving “short and simple” instructions and no more
than occasional public contact. Tr. 27, 94-97, 123-28. The ALJ explained that his proposed
restriction to short and simple tasks deviated slightly from the “simple work-related decisions”
found in the prior ALJ decision, and updated his RFC by restricting Plaintiff to a range of simple
routine tasks. Tr. 27, compare Tr. 94- 97, 123-28 with Tr. 70. The ALJ reasonably incorporated
these medical consultants’ findings and opinions into his RFC—which Plaintiff does not
challenge on appeal—and they were further substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision

11 – OPINION & ORDER

to discount Plaintiff’s testimony to the extent it conflicted with those opinions. See Pl. Br., Tr.
24-25. 4
Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt a different interpretation of the record, but does not
undermine the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff particularly
challenges the ALJ’s considerations of her alleged hand pain and limitations flowing from that
pain. Pl. Reply at 4-5. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ relied on manipulative limitations
from medical opinions that predate her May 2023 nerve conduction study and carpal tunnel
diagnosis. Pl. Reply at 5. Plaintiff emphasizes that these medical records accord with Dr.
Dreyer’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s handling and fingering limitations. Id. But the ALJ
reasonably considered the nerve conduction study, contrasted it to other evidence suggesting
“normal” levels of strength and sensation, and discounted Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. Tr. 27.
Plaintiff’s arguments about these hand-related limitations are an effort to have this Court reweigh the evidence, which is beyond the scope of review. Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115
(9th Cir. 2021) (“We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
ALJ.”). Even when there are two reasonable interpretations—plaintiff’s and the ALJ’s—the
ALJ’s interpretation must prevail. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the [Commissioner’s]
conclusion that must be upheld.”). Against that backdrop, even though Plaintiff clearly interprets

4

The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony regarding her mental health
symptoms because it was inconsistent with her own statements about daily activities. Tr. 24. The
Court need not resolve whether the ALJ supported this basis with substantial evidence. Any error
in considering Plaintiff’s activities of daily living is harmless because the ALJ identified another
sufficient basis to discount her mental health symptom testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115
(holding ALJ’s error “harmless where the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for
disbelieving a claimant’s testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were supported by the
record”).
12 – OPINION & ORDER

the evidence differently, she has not (and cannot) establish error by simply advancing a different
interpretation of the medical evidence. The ALJ’s conclusion “showed his work,” and was
supported by substantial evidence, so the Court will not disturb it on this basis.
D.

Improvement with Treatment

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her psoriatic flairs in part because the
evidence demonstrated improvement with treatment. Tr. 26. An ALJ may also reject a
claimant’s symptom testimony if that testimony is contradicted by evidence of improvement in
the medical record. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. If the record shows a claimant’s symptoms
have improved with treatment, that improvement is “an important indicator of the intensity and
persistence of . . . symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). The Ninth Circuit has
held that “evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim
of disability.” Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017).
The medical records the ALJ cited showed medication helped Plaintiff’s psoriatic
symptoms, and this was a clear and convincing reason to discount her symptom testimony. The
ALJ noted that with appropriate medication, Plaintiff’s psoriatic skin condition improved
“dramatically.” Tr. 26, 1259. Plaintiff stopped taking her medication after seeing improvement,
which resulted in the return of psoriasis plaques in mid-2022. Tr. 26, 1257. After restarting her
medication, Plaintiff described that she felt “fine” and denied having any issues. Tr. 26, 1191.
Plaintiff’s clinical presentation likewise showed her as pleasant, alert, oriented, and in no acute
distress. Tr. 26, 1191-92. As a result of treatment, the “[p]soriasis has near completely resolved.”
Tr. 1279. During the hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged that she had not had a psoriatic flare in the
prior six months. Tr. 25, 47. The ALJ appropriately considered the evidence when he determined

13 – OPINION & ORDER

that Plaintiff’s symptoms were manageable with appropriate medications, and this was another
clear and convincing basis to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
II.

Lay Witness Testimony
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected lay witness testimony—a report

from Plaintiff’s partner—without providing germane reasons for doing so. Pl. Br. at 12-14. This
Court agrees, but finds the ALJ’s error was harmless.
A.

Legal standards

Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that the Secretary must
take into account.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1) (“In evaluating the intensity and persistence of your
symptoms, we consider all of the available evidence from your medical sources and nonmedical
sources about how your symptoms affect you.”). Under the 2017 regulations, the ALJ is not
“required to articulate how [they] considered evidence from nonmedical sources” using the same
criteria required for the evaluation of medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(d), 416.920c(d).
The ALJ must give reasons “germane to the witness” when discounting the testimony of
lay witnesses. Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694. 5 But the ALJ is not required “to discuss every
witness’s testimony on an individualized, witness-by-witness basis.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114,

5

Citing the revised regulations for medical source opinions and the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished
opinion in Fryer v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 17958630, at *3 n.1 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2022), the
Commissioner argues that the ALJ is no longer required to provide “germane reasons” for
discounting lay witness testimony. Def. Br. 8-9. The Ninth Circuit, in a recent unpublished
opinion, noted that it remains “an open question whether the new regulations affect the
longstanding requirement in the Ninth Circuit that an ALJ must give germane reasons for
rejecting lay witness testimony.” Jarrett v. O'Malley, No. 23-3565, 2024 WL 4707890, at *3 (9th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2024). Absent further guidance from the Ninth Circuit, this Court disagrees that the
new regulations provide a basis to reject the Ninth Circuit’s longstanding precedent concerning
“germane reasons.” See Donna B.S. v. O'Malley, No. 6:22-CV-1571-SI, 2024 WL 3534431, at
*7 (D. Or. July 25, 2024) (so holding).
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superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). If the ALJ gives valid germane reasons
for rejecting testimony from one witness, the ALJ may refer only to those reasons when rejecting
similar testimony by a different witness. Id. Additionally, where “lay witness testimony does not
describe any limitations not already described by the claimant, and the ALJ’s well-supported
reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the lay witness testimony,”
any error by the ALJ in failing to discuss the lay testimony is harmless. Id. at 1117, 1122.
B.

Analysis

The lay witness testimony in this case mirrored Plaintiff’s own testimony about her
symptoms. Plaintiff’s partner described mental and physical health-related limitations that
tracked Plaintiff’s own allegations. Compare Tr. 44-47 (Plaintiff’s testimony) with Tr. 298-304
(Plaintiff’s partner’s testimony).
The ALJ did not provide any reason, let alone a germane one, for disregarding Plaintiff’s
partner’s testimony, and therefore erred. Tr. 54. This error was harmless, however. As noted,
Plaintiff’s partner alleged similar limitations regarding Plaintiff’s mental and physical
limitations, and as discussed above, the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for concluding
that plaintiff’s testimony was unpersuasive. These reasons apply with equal force to the lay
witness testimony. Any error in rejecting the lay witness testimony was therefore harmless.
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1117, 1122.
III.

Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff also argues the ALJ did not properly consider Cynthia Dreyer, M.D.’s medical

opinion. Pl. Br., ECF No. 11 at 9-12. For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, ALJs are no
longer required to give deference to any medical opinion, including treating source opinions. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Instead, the agency considers several factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).

15 – OPINION & ORDER

These are: supportability, consistency, relationship to the claimant, specialization, and “other
factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). The “most important” factors in the evaluation process
are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).
Under this framework, the ALJ must “articulate ... how persuasive [they] find all of the
medical opinions” from each doctor or other source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). In doing so,
the ALJ is required to explain how supportability and consistency were considered and may
explain how the other factors were considered. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520c(b)(2). The supportability
and consistency factors require ALJs to consider the persuasiveness of a medical opinion based
on how “relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
medical source are to support her or her medical opinion,” and its consistency with other sources.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1-2). When two or more medical opinions or prior administrative
findings “about the same issue are both equally well-supported ... and consistent with the record
... but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is required to explain how the other factors were
considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3). “Even under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject
an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an
explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir.
2022).
In April 2023, Dr. Dreyer reported in a written statement that she had been treating
Plaintiff since June 2018 and currently saw her every one to three months. Tr. 1245. Plaintiff’s
diagnoses included psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis, both of which were lifelong conditions. Tr.
1245. Her symptoms included pain in her hands, knees, and back. Tr. 1246. Her treatment had
included Humira, Methotrexate, Taltz, and Cosentyx. Tr. 1247. Dr. Dreyer opined that Plaintiff
needed to rest for about twenty minutes after an hour of labor. Tr. 1246. She was unable to walk

16 – OPINION & ORDER

a city block without rest or significant pain. Tr. 1247. She could sit for ten minutes at a time and
three hours total in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 1247. She could stand/walk for five minutes at a
time and three hours total in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 1247. She needed a job that permitted
shifting positions at will from sitting, standing, or walking. Tr. 1247. She would need to take an
unscheduled twenty-minute break every hour during an eight-hour workday. Tr. 1248. She could
lift/carry no more than ten pounds occasionally. Tr. 1248. She could perform bilateral handling
and fingering for up to 5% of an eight-hour workday. Tr. 1248. She would need to take a break
after using her hands to perform handling or fingering activities. Tr. 1248. She would be absent
more than four workdays per month because of her conditions. Tr. 1249.
The ALJ considered Dr. Dreyer’s medical opinion and rejected it as unpersuasive. Tr. 27.
The ALJ found Dr. Dreyer’s opinion largely “align[ed] with the claimant’s subjective
complaints, but diverge[d] significantly from the claimant’s recent clinical presentation.” Id.
The ALJ adequately discussed the strength of the evidence underlying Dr. Dreyer’s
opinions in the record and its inconsistency with other evidence when finding it unpersuasive. Tr.
27. The ALJ specifically highlighted Dr. Dreyer’s opinion that Plaintiff’s “chronic pain
symptoms render her physically incapable of sustaining even sedentary tasks – as she would be
unable to sit, stand, or walk for a full 8-hour workday.” Tr. 27. The ALJ discounted Dr. Dreyer’s
opinion because its extreme limitations were not supported by her own treatment records. Tr. 27.
The ALJ started by noting that several of Dr. Dreyer’s opinions conflicted with her own
observations. For example, Dr. Dreyer’s records show that she modified Plaintiff’s medication
regimen as necessary, which improved her skin condition “dramatically.” Tr. 26-27 (citing Tr.
1251-60). With the right medication, Plaintiff’s psoriasis reportedly felt “fine” and she denied
having any issues. Tr. 26, 1191. The ALJ also discussed how Dr. Dreyer’s opined limitations

17 – OPINION & ORDER

conflicted with other record evidence. For example, medical records showed that Plaintiff’s
psoriasis improved with treatment, and that by January 2023, Plaintiff had a normal gait and
normal range of motion of the extremities with no edema. Tr. 26 (citing Tr. 1012, 1181). The
ALJ reasonably found these several normal findings and lack of objective medical evidence
undermined Dr. Dreyer’s assessment of extreme limitations. In doing so, the ALJ sufficiently
considered the supportability and consistency of Dr. Dreyer’s medical opinion when concluding
it was poorly supported by explanation and objective medical evidence. 6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

)/J

DATED this 7th day of March, 2025.

__________________________________
ANDREW HALLMAN
United States Magistrate Judge

6

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Dreyer’s opinion runs afoul of the Ninth
Circuit’s expectation that ALJs analyze a claimant’s disability for the full adjudicatory period,
rather than just at one particular moment in time. Pl. Br.at 10-11 (citing Smith v. Kijakazi, 14
F.4th 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2021)). In short, Plaintiff argues it was error to rely on medical
records from 2022-23, even though she alleged disability beginning March 11, 2020. Id. Dr.
Dreyer’s opinion was written in April of 2023, however, and she phrases her limitations in the
present tense. Tr. 1248-49. It was reasonable for the ALJ to compare these opinions to Plaintiff’s
other recent medical records. See Tr. 26-27. Nor does Plaintiff identify what pre-2022 evidence
the ALJ ought to have specifically considered. See Pl. Br at 10-11. The Court therefore finds no
error in the ALJ’s reliance on records from this period.
18 – OPINION & ORDER