TALLEY v. SOUTHEAST PA TRANS, et al
Filing
99
MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDUARDO C. ROBRENO ON 11/10/2016. 11/10/2016 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PLAINTIFF AND E-MAILED.(nds)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIC J. TALLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 93-3060
M E M O R A N D U M
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.
November 10, 2016
In the early 1990s, pro se plaintiff Eric Talley
(“Plaintiff” or “Talley”) filed numerous lawsuits in this
District complaining that his former employer, Defendant
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (“SEPTA”),
wrongfully terminated his employment as a conductor and then
entered into a conspiracy with the United Transportation Union
(“UTU”), SEPTA’s public employee union, to block Talley’s union
activities.1
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons
that follow, the Court will deny this motion.
1
These lawsuits include Civil Action Nos. 93-0050, 932857, 93-3060, 93-4314, 94-5574, 94-5576, 94-5840, 95-2148, 957955, 98-1205, 98-6776.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to his passing, this case was before the
Honorable Herbert J. Hutton.2 In a related case, Judge Hutton
described the pertinent facts of Talley’s lawsuits as follows:
Talley claims he was subject to two separate
disciplinary proceedings. The first was in early
March, 1991, and resulted in a fifteen day suspension,
later reduced to five days. The second proceeding, in
September of 1992, culminated in Talley’s termination.
SEPTA maintains that it terminated Talley because he
failed to complete his work assignment at the
Philadelphia Suburban Station and was instead doing
non-SEPTA activities on an entirely different train
platform. SEPTA argues that Talley’s conduct was in
violation of his job description, pursuant to the
employee handbook, and that his subsequent remedies
are governed by the UTU–SEPTA collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”).
Talley properly grieved both of his suspensions to
UTU. The union took Talley’s grievance to a hearing.
According to SEPTA, Talley’s appeals before the
Special Board of Adjustment, the third layer of the
CBA appeal process, are still pending. Notwithstanding
the ongoing grievance procedures, Talley filed a 150
page pro se complaint [on January 6, 1993] against
SEPTA and its officers.
Talley v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 93-0050, 1993 WL 184028, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1993) (“Talley I”).
Talley filed his initial complaint in this case, No.
93-3060, on June 8, 1993. ECF No. 1. Judge Hutton summarized the
procedural history of this case as follows:
2
The case was reassigned to the Honorable Eduardo C.
Robreno on September 21, 2016.
2
The defendants moved to dismiss Talley’s January 6,
1993 complaint, arguing that his federal action was
barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Agreeing with the defendants that the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, the Court, after converting the defendants’
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,
entered final judgment in favor of the defendants.
On June 8, 1993, the plaintiff filed another action in
this Court against the moving defendants and UTU based
upon his discharge. On June 21, 1993, he filed an
amended
complaint,
which
did
not
contain
any
additional counts or parties. In his seven-count
complaint, Talley again challenges the substantive and
procedural propriety of his discharge. He seeks to
allege
causes
of
action
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment, the Railway Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, 1985 and 1988, and Pennsylvania’s Administrative
Agency Law.
On July 15, 1993, the moving defendants filed their
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). They raised three arguments in support of
their motion to dismiss: (1) the plaintiff’s claims
are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) the
plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies; (3) the plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relie[f] may be granted. By Order
dated October 15, 1993, this Court converted the
moving defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. Neither the plaintiff nor the moving
defendants accepted this Court’s invitation to file
supplemental briefs or other papers.
ECF No. 17.3
On November 30, 1993, Judge Hutton granted the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this case on the
basis that “there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
3
This memorandum and order was published as Talley v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., et al., No. 93-3060, 1993 WL 496702 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 30, 1993) (“Talley II”).
3
whether the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative
remedies,” and therefore “the Court’s final judgment in Talley I
bars Talley’s present action against the moving defendants.” Id.
at *4.
On December 10, 1993, Talley moved for a rehearing and
injunctive relief. ECF No. 18. Subsequently, he moved in the
nature of a writ of mandamus to compel SEPTA to reinstate his
employment. ECF No. 19. The Court denied both of these motions
in a memorandum and order dated February 25, 1994, finding that
“[t]here has been no intervening change of law as to the issues
decided by this Court in its November 30, 1993 Memorandum and
Order and the [plaintiff] has not offered ‘new evidence’ that
was previously unavailable.”4 ECF No. 28.
Talley thereafter filed a motion for rehearing to
vacate certain orders, ECF No. 29, which Judge Hutton denied in
an order dated April 22, 1994, ECF No. 34. Undeterred, Talley
then filed a motion for declaratory judgment, a status quo
injunction, and a writ of mandamus compelling SEPTA to reinstate
Plaintiff. ECF No. 36. Judge Hutton denied all of these requests
4
This memorandum and order was published as Talley v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 93-3060, 1994 WL 59363 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
25, 1994). On the same day, Judge Hutton filed a memorandum and
order in a related case, noting similarly that “Talley’s
conclusory assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, SEPTA and
UTU have consistently maintained that they are willing to
arbitrate Talley’s grievance in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement.” Talley v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 934314, 1994 WL 59361 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1994) (“Talley III”).
4
in a memorandum and order dated August 5, 1994. ECF No. 45.
Talley filed a notice of appeal on August 9, 1994, ECF No. 47,
and then continued to file various motions designed to convince
Judge Hutton to reconsider his previous rulings. After Judge
Hutton denied these motions and granted Defendants’ cross-motion
for summary judgment on November 23, 1994, see ECF No. 61,
Talley filed another notice of appeal, ECF No. 62.
This case was formally closed on December 7, 1994. On
April 18, 1995, the Third Circuit affirmed the August 5, 1994
judgment of the district court. ECF No. 66. On August 30, 1996,
the Third Circuit affirmed the November 23, 1994 judgment of the
district court. ECF No. 73.
Following additional motion practice that lasted over
five years, Judge Hutton entered an order dated January 5, 2000
denying a motion that Talley filed on July 7, 1999 to alter or
amend judgment. ECF No. 91. Judge Hutton’s January 5, 2000,
order further provided as follows:
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that to protect the
integrity of the courts, and Defendants from further
harassment
by
frivolous
litigation
initiated
by
Talley, the Court issues the following injunctions:
(1) The Court enjoins Talley, or any entity acting on
his behalf, from filing any action in any court, state
or federal against Defendants named in the instant
action or related actions, without first obtaining
leave of this Court; (2) The Court enjoins Talley, or
any entity acting on his behalf, from filing any new
action or proceeding in any federal court, without
first obtaining leave of this Court; (3) The Court
enjoins Talley, or any entity acting on his behalf,
5
from filing any further papers in any case, either
pending or terminated, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, without first obtaining leave of this
Court; The Court ORDERS the clerk of court to refuse
to accept any submissions for filing except petitions
for leave of the court, unless such submissions for
filing are accompanied by an order of this Court
granted leave. In the event Talley succeeds in filing
papers in violation of this Order, upon such notice,
the clerk of court shall, under authority of this
Court’s Order, immediately and summarily strike the
pleadings or filings.
Leave of court shall be forthcoming upon Talley
demonstrating through a properly filed petition, that
the proposed filing: (1) can survive a challenge under
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12; (2) is not
barred by principles of claim or issue preclusion; (3)
is not repetitive or violative of a court order; and
(4) is in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.
The Court ORDERS Talley to attach a copy of this Order
and Injunction to any such petition for leave of
court.
ECF No. 91.
On September 10, 2004, Talley filed three petitions
for leave to challenge this injunction and the outcome of this
case generally. ECF Nos. 92, 93, 94. These motions were
evidently never addressed.5
On August 19, 2016, Talley filed a motion for leave to
file a petition for a writ of mandamus. ECF No. 95. On September
21, 2016, the Clerk of Court entered an order reassigning this
case from the late Judge Hutton’s docket to this Court’s docket.
ECF No. 96.
5
Judge Hutton passed away on April 8, 2007.
6
On September 28, 2016, this Court issued a rule for
Talley to show cause why Judge Hutton’s order dated January 5,
2000, enjoining him from, inter alia, filing any further papers
in this case, should not be enforced. ECF No. 97. The rule was
returnable at a hearing that the Court held on October 28, 2016.
II.
RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
A.
Legal Standard
[T]the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), authorizes
district courts to, among other things, restrict the
access to federal courts of parties who repeatedly
file frivolous litigation. The Third Circuit has
approved the issuance of “an injunction to require
litigants to obtain the approval of the court before
filing further complaints.” An injunction that limits
a party’s access to the court, however, “is an extreme
remedy which must be narrowly tailored and sparingly
used.”
Mallon v. Padova, 806 F. Supp. 1189, 1192–93 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(citations omitted) (quoting Abdul–Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d
329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Third Circuit has specified which
types of situations warrant the “sparing[] use[]” of an
injunction limiting court access:
[A] frivolous complaint is one thing; a continuing
abuse of process is another. In the case of the
latter, section 1915(d) alone is not an efficacious
remedy. When a district court is confronted with a
pattern of conduct from which it can only conclude
that a litigant is intentionally abusing the judicial
process and will continue to do so unless restrained,
we believe it is entitled to resort to its power of
injunction and contempt to protect its process.
*
*
*
7
[W]hen a district court concludes that a litigant has
abused the judicial process by filing a multitude of
frivolous § 1983 cases in a relatively brief period of
time and will continue to file such cases unless
restrained, we hold that the court may enter an
injunction directing that the litigant not file any
section 1983 claims without leave of court and that in
seeking leave of court, the litigant certify (1) that
the claims he wishes to present are new claims never
before raised and disposed of on the merits by any
federal courts, (2) that he believes the facts alleged
in his complaint to be true, and (3) that he knows of
no reason to believe his claims are foreclosed by
controlling law.
Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at 333. The Third Circuit endorses the use
of injunctions to address “the problems occasioned by pro se
litigants who persist in filing great numbers of frivolous
lawsuits” because these injunctions “strike[] a good balance
between the right of the litigant to access to the courts, the
right of parties to previous litigation to enjoy the repose of
res judicata, and the right of taxpayers not to have a frivolous
litigant become an unwarranted drain on their resources.” In re
Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1989).
B.
Discussion
In this Court’s view, Judge Hutton’s January 5, 2000,
order is precisely the sort envisaged by the Third Circuit in
Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at 333. Judge Hutton filed his order not
only over five years after the case was formally closed, but
also after the Third Circuit had twice affirmed Judge Hutton’s
8
final judgments in the case. As is apparent from the lengthy
docket, Talley had ample opportunity to be heard, and his
decision to file “a multitude of frivolous § 1983 cases in a
relatively brief period of time” can be understood only as “a
continuing abuse of process.” Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at 333.
Judge Hutton’s order is not only appropriate given the
circumstances of this case, but it is also properly tailored to
clearly state where, how, and exactly to what its restrictions
apply. Cf. In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d at 746 (modifying
injunction that was overbroad because it did “not clearly state
whether it enjoins appellant from filing any further documents
solely in matters related to this case, in matters in federal
court, or, for that matter, in any matter in any court
anywhere”).
Further, the Court finds that the claims contained
within Talley’s proposed petition are not any different from the
claims he has filed multiple times before. The rule to show
cause issued on September 28, 2016 specifically instructed
Talley to explain “how the proposed petition for a writ of
mandamus raises issues that are factually or legally distinct
from the issues raised in Plaintiff’s earlier filings in this
and all other cases he has filed challenging his discharge of
employment by his previous employer.” ECF No. 97. At the hearing
on this rule held on October 28, 2016, Talley repeatedly
9
asserted that Defendants had denied him access to administrative
remedies, and thus that he had been unable to exhaust those
remedies. However, Talley already litigated this question before
Judge Hutton over twenty years ago. At that time, Judge Hutton
concluded--more than once--that Talley was “barred from
relitigating the issue of whether his failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies prevented him from proceeding
in district court.” ECF No. 28; see also Talley III, 1994 WL
59361 at *1 (addressing Talley’s allegation “that SEPTA and the
UTU have repudiated the grievance procedure and that he should
not be required to exhaust his contractual remedies because it
would be futile to do so,” and concluding that “Talley is barred
from relitigating the exhaustion issue in the present case.”);
Talley II, 1993 WL 496702 at *4 (“The plaintiff was, of course,
a party to Talley I and had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the question of exhaustion. In Talley I, this Court
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and accordingly, he was precluded from
bringing suit in district court. That conclusion is controlling
in this case.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Talley’s motion does
not meet the criteria Judge Hutton outlined in order for Talley
to be granted leave of court. In particular, Talley has failed
to show that his proposed petition is “not repetitive” and “not
10
barred by principles of claim or issue preclusion.” ECF No. 91.
The Court is also skeptical that Talley’s proposed petition
would be able to “survive a challenge under the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12,” ECF No. 91, particularly in light of Judge
Hutton’s previous finding that “Talley’s conclusory assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding, SEPTA and UTU have consistently
maintained that they are willing to arbitrate Talley’s grievance
in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement,” Talley
III, 1994 WL 59361 at *3. Talley has failed to show that any new
evidence or intervening change in the law might alter this
finding.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enforce
Judge Hutton’s January 5, 2000, order and deny Talley’s motion
for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus.
An appropriate order follows.
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