BOWEN v. PALAKOVICH et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM/ORDER THAT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (DOC. NO. 61) AND PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REPRODUCTION OF THE RECORD (DOC. NO. 62) ARE DENIED. SIGNED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE L. FELIPE RESTREPO ON 2/7/12. 2/7/12 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PETITIONER AND E-MAILED. (jpd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DWIGHT D. BOWEN
:
:
:
:
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v.
JOHN PALAKOVICH, et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 06-3378
MEMORANDUM/ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery (Doc. 61) and Petitioner’s Motion
for Reproduction of the Record (Doc. 62). To the extent that petitioner’s motions challenge
actions of the Pennsylvania correctional institutions, as noted in previous Orders in this case, it is
reiterated that “[t]he federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the administration of
which is acute interest to the States.” See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) (citing
Supreme Court cases); see, e.g., Herbert v. Greencards Office, 2006 WL 2077031, *2 (M.D. Pa.
July 24, 2006) (quoting Meachum). Furthermore, a habeas petition is generally not the
appropriate remedy to address claims involving prison conditions, and such claims are generally
more appropriately brought as a civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Dussan v.
United States, 2003 WL 22837728, *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003) (“A claim, if successful, that
would not entitle the prisoner to immediate or speedier release sounds not in habeas corpus, but
in civil rights.”); see, e.g., Miller v. Zimmerman, 1990 WL 72944, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1990)
(Pollak, J.) (civil rights action alleging that when prisoner was transferred to another prison,
employees “failed to ship his property to him”).
To the extent that petitioner’s motion requests discovery, including production of
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documents, the Supreme Court has stated that habeas petitioners are not automatically granted
discovery, and “[a] habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled
to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” United States v. Schwartz, 2012 WL 169694, *1
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012) (citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)). Under Rule 6 of
the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, a judge may authorize a party to conduct discovery, but only
“for good cause.” See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 6; see also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09; Levi v.
Holt, 192 Fed. Appx. 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2006) (decisions on discovery requests rest in the sound
discretion of the court); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1230 (1994); Schwartz, 2012 WL 169694, at *1; see also Gibbs v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 253, 25859 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1089 (1999). “A petitioner must provide specific
factual allegations from which the court may determine whether good cause exists to grant the
motion for discovery.” Id. (citing Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Thus, “bald assertions and conclusory allegations” are insufficient. Id. (quoting Mayberry, 821
F.2d at 185). Indeed, the Third Circuit has observed that a habeas petitioner’s request for
discovery “should be granted only ‘where specific allegations before the court show reason to
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is
. . . entitled to relief.’” Chambers v. Secretary Pa. DOC, 2011 WL 3792375, *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 26,
2011) (quoting Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Initially, it is noted that my recent Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 65)
found that the claims raised by petitioner in his habeas petition are time-barred, in addition to
being procedurally defaulted and otherwise waived, with the exception of two claims which
challenge the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent nature of petitioner’s guilty plea and a
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remaining claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea. See R&R filed 1/26/12 (Doc. 65). Petitioner’s motions (Docs. 61 and 62) fail to
make specific allegations which give the Court reason to believe that he may be able to
demonstrate through further discovery that he is entitled to relief. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09;
Chambers, 2011 WL 3792375, at *3. Other than bald assertions and conclusory allegations, see
Schwartz, 2012 WL 169694, at *1(citing Mayberry, 821 F.2d at 185), petitioner’s motions fail to
make specific factual allegations which adequately explain why good cause exists to grant
discovery or to order production of documents. See, e.g., id. at *2 (denying petitioner’s motion
for production of certain filings and transcripts where petitioner failed to “adequately explain[]
why good cause exists to order the government to provide him with [certain] transcripts he has
requested.”). Since petitioner has failed to establish “good cause,” his motions are denied.
Accordingly, AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2012, upon consideration of
Petitioner’s Motion for Discovery (Doc. 61) and Petitioner’s Motion for Reproduction of the
Record (Doc. 62), it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner’s motions (Docs. 61 and 62) are
DENIED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ L. Felipe Restrepo
L. FELIPE RESTREPO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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