PRANGE et al v. ALFA LAVAL, INC. et al

Filing 293

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDUARDO C. ROBRENO ON 2/1/12. 2/2/12 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED, E-MAILED.(mbh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LOIS JEAN CONNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

JAMES H. PRANGE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

JAMES W. STONE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALFA LAVAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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CONSOLIDATED UNDER
MDL-875

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CONSOLIDATED UNDER
MDL-875

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CONSOLIDATED UNDER
MDL-875

Transferred from the Central
District of California
(Case No. 09-02317)
E.D. PA CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:09-CV-67099-ER

Transferred from the Central
District of California
(Case No. 09-06698)
E.D. PA CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:09-CV-91848-ER

Transferred from the Northern
District of California
(Case No. 09-02327)
E.D. PA CIVIL ACTION NO.
2:09-CV-93726-ER

M E M O R A N D U M
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

FEBRUARY 1, 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
BACKGROUND ............................................... 5
II. LEGAL STANDARD ........................................... 8
III. DISCUSSION ............................................... 9
A.
Products-Liability Theories Under Maritime Law....... 9
B.
Defendants’ Liability Under Maritime Law............ 11
C.
Plaintiffs’ Arguments............................... 22
D.
Application......................................... 25
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................. 26
Before the Court are Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment1 in the above-captioned cases, all of which are
part of MDL-875, the consolidated asbestos products liability
multidistrict litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Defendants move for
summary judgment on the ground that they are not liable for
injuries caused by asbestos products, such as insulation,
gaskets, and packing, that were incorporated into their products

1

The following Defendants have moved for summary
judgment in the above-captioned cases: General Electric Company
(Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. 09-67099); Armstrong
International, Inc., Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation, Warren
Pumps, L.L.C., Crane Company, and CBS Corporation (Stone v. Alfa
Laval, Inc., No. 09-93726); IMO Industries, Inc., General
Electric Company, Buffalo Pumps, Inc., Foster Wheeler, L.L.C.,
Warren Pumps, L.L.C., and Crane Company (Prange v. Alfa Laval,
Inc., No. 09-91848).
2

or used as replacement parts, but which they did not manufacture
or distribute.2
Having determined that the instant cases are governed
by maritime law,3 see Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. 09-67099,

2

Indeed, as asbestos litigation has evolved, and the
major manufacturing defendants have declared bankruptcy, the
litigation has moved away from the manufacturers of asbestos,
and defendants in the cases now pending before this Court are
typically those that manufactured so-called “bare-metal”
products that contained or were later encapsulated in asbestos.
Although litigants often refer to the defense raised
herein as the “bare-metal defense,” it is more properly
understood, as explained below, as a challenge to a plaintiff’s
prima facie case to prove duty or causation.
3

The Court has now considered and ruled upon the six
issues most frequently litigated under maritime law. First, in
Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D. Pa. 2011)
(Robreno, J.), the Court addressed the maritime jurisdiction
test for determining whether maritime law or state law applies
to a given claim. Second, in Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co., 739
F. Supp. 2d 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Robreno, J.), the Court
addressed the standard for removal of a case from state court to
federal court on grounds of the government contractor defense
set forth in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
512 (1988). Third, with its decisions in Faddish v. General
Electric Co., No. 09-70626, 2010 WL 4146108 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20,
2010) (Robreno, J.) (granting summary judgment) and Willis v. BW
IP International Inc., No. 09-91449, 2011 WL 3818515 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2011) (Robreno, J.) (denying summary judgment), the
Court addressed the proofs necessary for obtaining or surviving
summary judgment on the basis of the government contractor
defense. Fourth, the Court has clarified the standard for
product identification evidence necessary to establish causation
under maritime law. See, e.g., Prange v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No.
09-91848, 2011 WL 4912828 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011) (Robreno,
J.). Fifth, the Court clarified that the sophisticated user
defense has not been recognized under maritime law and that
summary judgment will not be granted in this MDL litigation on
that basis. Id. Sixth, with the decision set forth herein, the
3

2011 WL 3101810 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011) (Robreno, J.), the
Court now considers whether, under maritime law, Defendants are
liable for injuries caused by asbestos products manufactured by
others but used with Defendants’ products.4

Court now considers the availability and scope of the so-called
“bare-metal” defense under maritime law.
In addition, with the decision concurrently released
in Donn v. A.W. Chesterton, Co., No. 10-62071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1,
2012) (Robreno, J.), the Court has ruled upon the threshold
issues of its jurisdiction over, and the justiciability of,
claims against government contractors arising as a result of
exposure to asbestos supplied to the military pursuant to a
government procurement contract. In doing so, the Court has
declined to extend the protection of the government contractor
defense set forth in Boyle beyond its current parameters.
4

In cases where related claims are consolidated for
pre-trial purposes in a single transferee court, see 28 U.S.C. §
1407(a), the transferee court applies the substantive state law
that the transferor court would have applied had there been no
venue change. See, e.g., De George v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F.
App’x 15, 16 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 639 (1964)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1068 (2010).
When state law is unsettled and the Court is unable to predict
its resolution with reasonable certainty, the Court typically
remands to the transferor court for a ruling under the
particular state’s law. See, e.g., Faddish v. CBS Corp., No. 0970626, 2010 WL 4159238, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010) (Robreno,
J.). But where, as here, a defense arises under federal law and
the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the
transferee court typically applies the law of the circuit in
which it sits, that is, Third Circuit law. See, e.g., Oil Field
Cases, 673 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362-63 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Robreno,
J.). The law of a transferor forum “merits close consideration,
but does not have stare decisis effect” on the transferee court.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171,
1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); see also Federal Judicial Center,
Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.132, at 222 (4th ed. 2004)
(“Where the claim or defense arises under federal law, however,
the transferee judge should consider whether to apply the law of
4

I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that Robert Conner, James Prange,

and James Stone (“Decedents”) developed mesothelioma as a result
of exposure to Defendants’ asbestos-containing products while
working on vessels operated by the U.S. Navy. Specifically, Mr.
Conner alleges he was exposed to asbestos products used with
General Electric Company’s (“GE’s”) turbines while he served in
the U.S. Navy from 1962 to 1971 aboard the U.S.S. Yorktown. GE
manufactured marine turbines that required exterior insulation,
which likely would have contained asbestos, and that required
asbestos-containing gaskets to seal the turbines to adjoining
equipment and piping. In some instances, GE originally supplied
gaskets to the Navy along with its turbines.
Mr. Prange alleges he was exposed to asbestos used
with products manufactured by IMO Industries (“IMO”), GE,
Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (“Buffalo”), Foster Wheeler, L.L.C. (“Foster
Wheeler”), Warren Pumps, L.L.C., (“Warren”), and Crane Co.
(“Crane”), while serving in the U.S. Navy from 1965 to 1969
the transferee circuit or that of the transferor court’s circuit
. . . .”).
In at least one instance, this Court has considered
and ruled on whether a manufacturer is liable under maritime law
for asbestos products it did not manufacture or distribute. See,
e.g., Delatte v. A.W. Chesterton Co., No. 09-69578 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 28, 2011) (Robreno, J.) (order granting summary judgment on
failure-to-warn claim), ECF No. 241. In any event, the Court
writes today to clarify the issue under maritime law and to
guide future litigants before this Court.
5

aboard the U.S.S. Pollux and U.S.S. Delta. Defendants
manufactured turbines, pumps, boilers, and valves that used and,
in some cases, were originally distributed with, asbestoscontaining insulation, packing, gaskets, and other products.
Mr. Stone alleges he was exposed to asbestos used with
products manufactured by Crane, Westinghouse, Warren Pumps, and
Armstrong International while serving as a boiler tender in the
U.S. Navy from 1959 to 1976 aboard various naval vessels.
Defendants manufactured valves, blowers, condensers, and steam
traps that used and, in some cases, were designed to be used
with, asbestos-containing insulation, gaskets, packing, and
other products.
Plaintiffs have not, however, proffered evidence that
Defendants manufactured or distributed the particular asbestos
components and replacement parts to which Decedents were
exposed. Instead, they argue that Defendants are liable for the
intended and foreseeable use of asbestos parts in their original
products.5

5

Indeed, courts that have considered this issue have
recognized a distinction between the original asbestos component
parts and replacement parts. That is, some manufacturers
originally distributed their products together with asbestos
components, such as gaskets. However, over time, those original
components were replaced with asbestos parts not manufactured by
the original distributor. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Crane Co., No.
S177401, 2012 WL 88533, at *6 (Cal. Jan. 12, 2012).
6

Defendants moved for summary judgment on numerous
grounds, including lack of product identification and the
government contractor defense. They now assert that they are not
liable for injuries caused by asbestos products they did not
manufacture. As is typical in MDL 875 cases, the Court first
analyzed whether there was sufficient evidence of product
identification with respect to a finished product, such that
Plaintiffs could overcome summary judgment. The Court denied
summary judgment on product identification grounds because
Plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
exposure to the asbestos-containing products at issue was a
“substantial contributing factor” to Decedents’ injuries. See,
e.g., Prange v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. 09-91848 (E.D. Pa. July
22, 2011) (order denying summary judgment), ECF No. 269.
Likewise, in Conner and Stone, Magistrate Judges Strawbridge and
Rueter, respectively, recommended denial of Defendants’ motions
for summary judgment on product identification grounds, and
their recommendations were adopted.
Having denied summary judgment on product
identification grounds, the Court now turns to Defendants’
argument that, notwithstanding evidence of exposure to the
finished product, they are not liable for the injury-causing
asbestos insulation and replacement parts at issue.

7

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A motion
for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere
existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there
is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v.
Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A
fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence
might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
The Court will view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. “After making all reasonable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, there is a genuine
issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the
nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593
F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010). While the moving party bears the
initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the burden to the
nonmoving party who must “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
8

III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground
that, as a matter of law, they cannot be held liable for
injuries caused by asbestos components, such as insulation,
gaskets, and packing, that were incorporated into their products
or used as replacement parts, but which they did not manufacture
or distribute.6

A.

Products-Liability Theories Under Maritime Law
Products-liability theories, including strict products

liability, are well within maritime law. See, e.g., E. River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865
(1986); Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands
Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 123 (3d Cir. 1984). Absent a controlling
statute, maritime law is “developed by the judiciary” and is “an
amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those
rules, and newly created rules.” E. River Steamship, 476 U.S. at
864–65. Therefore, the Court will examine the development of
products-liability law, under both admiralty and state common
law, as it concerns the issue before the Court.

6

Although the parties’ original filings substantially
relied on California law, the Court, having subsequently ruled
that the case would be decided under maritime law, directed the
parties to file supplemental memoranda of law that address this
defense under maritime law. See Order, Oct. 25, 2011, ECF No.
230.
9

A manufacturer is liable for harm caused by a product
sold “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous.” See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). Liability for
defective products has grown into three distinct theories of
liability: manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects
based on inadequate warnings. See Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998) (“A product is defective when, at the
time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing
defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings.”).7 And a manufacturer is

7

For purposes of product-liability theory, a product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product
departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by
the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in
the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the instructions or warnings renders the product
not reasonably safe.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 (1998).
10

also liable for the harm resulting from the negligent failure to
warn of the risks created by its products. See id.

B.

Defendants’ Liability Under Maritime Law
In determining whether Defendant manufacturers are

liable under maritime law for injuries caused by asbestos parts
used with their products, whether in strict liability or
negligence, a plaintiff must establish causation with respect to
each defendant manufacturer. See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab.
Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005).
A plaintiff establishes causation under maritime law
by showing (1) that the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant’s
product and (2) that the product was a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiff’s injury. See id. (“Plaintiffs in products
liability cases under maritime law may proceed under both
negligence and strict liability theories. Under either theory, a
plaintiff must establish causation.”); Nelson v. A.W. Chesterton
Co., No. 10-69365, 2011 WL 6016982, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26,
2011) (Robreno, J.); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §
431, cmt. a (providing that actor’s negligent conduct is legal
cause of harm, in part, when his conduct is “substantial factor”
in bringing about harm). “‘Total failure to show that the defect
caused or contributed to the accident will foreclose as a matter
of law a finding of strict products liability.’” Nelson, 2011 WL
11

6016982, at *1 (quoting Stark v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
21 F. App’x 371, 376 (6th Cir. 2001)). In the context of a claim
for negligent failure to warn, this principle is considered in
terms of a manufacturer’s duty to warn about the hazards
inherent in its own products. E.g., O’Neil, 2012 WL 88533, at
*8.
The Sixth Circuit, the only federal court of appeals
to consider this issue, confirmed that a manufacturer is not
liable for asbestos-containing components and replacement parts
it did not manufacture or distribute. See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod.
Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005); Stark v. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 21 F. App’x 371 (6th Cir. 2001) (not
precedential).
In Stark, the plaintiff, a merchant seaman, brought an
action against defendant maritime equipment manufacturers
seeking relief from injuries allegedly stemming from exposure to
the defendants’ asbestos-containing products. The plaintiff
alleged that he inhaled asbestos fibers while working in the
boiler and engine rooms. Regarding the claims against the boiler
manufacturers, the plaintiff claimed, in part, that he was
exposed to asbestos contained in products attached to the
boilers. But the court refused to hold the defendant
manufacturers liable for asbestos products they neither

12

manufactured nor distributed and affirmed summary judgment for
defendants. Id. at 381.
And in Lindstrom, the leading admiralty case, a
merchant seaman, Lindstrom, filed a complaint against various
defendant manufacturers for compensation for mesothelioma, a
condition which he claimed to have developed as a result of
exposure to asbestos components used in the defendants’
products. Lindstrom asserted products liability claims of design
and manufacturing defects.
The Lindstrom court affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to multiple defendants because a
manufacturer cannot be responsible for a third party’s asbestos
products. See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 495, 496, 497. Lindstrom
claimed that he was exposed to asbestos while replacing gaskets
on pumps manufactured by Coffin Turbo Pump, Inc. But, as
Lindstrom testified, the replacement gaskets themselves were not
manufactured by Coffin Turbo. The court affirmed summary
judgment and held, “Coffin Turbo cannot be held responsible for
the asbestos contained in another product.” Id. at 496.
Furthermore, Lindstrom alleged exposure to asbestos packing that
was attached to water pumps manufactured by Ingersoll Rand
Company. The asbestos packing, however, was not manufactured by
Ingersoll Rand. The court, again, held that Ingersoll Rand could
not be held responsible for asbestos-containing material
13

attached to Ingersoll Rand’s products post-manufacture. Id. at
497.
A number of state courts, and at least one federal
court, that have considered this issue have similarly held that
a defendant manufacturer is not liable for a third party’s
asbestos products when the defendant is not part of the “chain
of distribution” of the asbestos product.8 See Surre v. Foster
Wheeler, L.L.C., No. 07-9431, 2011 WL 6382545, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 2011) (refusing to hold boiler manufacturer liable for
failure to warn when manufacturer “did not place into the stream
of commerce the asbestos to which [the plaintiff] was exposed”);
O’Neil, 2012 WL 88533, at *5-7; Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery
Co., Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing
to hold manufacturers liable under California law in part
because manufacturers “not a part of the manufacturing or
marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective products that
caused the injury in question” (internal quotation and editorial
marks removed)); Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493,

8

This principle is sometimes stated in terms of the
“stream of commerce.” See, e.g., Taylor v. Elliott
Turbomachinery Co., Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 414, 422 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2009).
14

495 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d
127, 137-38 (Wash. 2008) (en banc).9
The Washington state cases are instructive here. In
Simonetta, a former Navy mechanist brought negligence and strict
liability claims against Viad Corporation, the successor
corporation to the manufacturer of an evaporator used to
desalinize water on a ship. The evaporator required use of
asbestos-containing parts to function. The asbestos to which the
mechanist was exposed, however, was not manufactured, provided,
9

See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. f
(1965) (noting that section 402A applies to “any person engaged
in the business of selling” product causing harm); Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells
or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for
harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”); Am. Law of
Prods. Liab. 3d § 16:37 (2002) (requiring in strict-liability
case that plaintiff prove “defendant manufactured the product,
sold the product to the plaintiff, or in some other specified
manner placed the product in the stream of commerce”).
The New York Appellate Division, in a one-paragraph
opinion, upheld denial of summary judgment for a defendant
manufacturer of pumps used on Navy ships when an issue of fact
existed as to whether the defendant sometimes used asbestos
gaskets and packing with its products. Berkowitz v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). The court
went on to state, “Nor does it necessarily appear that [the
defendant] had no duty to warn concerning the dangers of
asbestos that it neither manufactured nor installed on its
pumps.” Id. The Court finds this opinion, without any
explanation as to the New York court’s reasoning, unconvincing,
especially in light of the authorities relied on herein. See
also Surre, 2011 WL 6382545, at *4 (“[Berkowitz] hardly stands
for the broad proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to warn
whenever it is foreseeable that its product will be used in
conjunction with a defective one.”).
15

or installed by Viad. The court viewed the asbestos-containing
components, not the evaporators, to be the harm-causing product.
Id. at 138 (describing Viad’s product as “the evaporator as
delivered by Viad to the [N]avy, sans asbestos insulation”). And
upon review of the Washington case law, the court concluded that
“our precedent does not support extending strict liability for
failure to warn to those outside the chain of distribution of a
product.” Id. at 137. Ultimately, the court refused to hold Viad
liable for failure to warn because it was not within the chain
of distribution of the dangerous products (the asbestos
components alone). Id. at 138.
In a companion case to Simonetta, the Washington
Supreme Court took the Simonetta holding one step further.
Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493 (Wash. 2008).
There, the court considered “whether under common law products
liability . . . the manufacturers were required to warn of the
danger of exposure to asbestos in packing and gaskets in their
products if they originally included in their products asbestoscontaining packing or gaskets manufactured by others.” Id. at
501. Braaten, a pipefitter aboard Navy ships, sued defendant
manufacturers after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma. The
manufacturers provided pumps and valves to the Navy to be used
aboard the ships, but the Navy insulated the products with
asbestos-containing insulation. None of the manufacturers
16

manufactured asbestos insulation. In some cases, however, the
original products contained asbestos components when delivered
to the Navy. Braaten claimed exposure to respirable asbestos
when he removed and replaced the asbestos insulation and sued
defendant manufacturers for failure to warn under strict
liability and negligence theories. But Braaten never installed,
worked on, or was exposed to asbestos from any new pumps.
The court began its analysis with the general
principle stated in Simonetta that, under Washington common law,
which adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second), “a
manufacturer does not have an obligation to warn of the dangers
of another manufacturer’s product.”10 Id. Braaten failed to show
that he was exposed to asbestos products manufactured by the
defendants, and the court, therefore, reinstated summary
judgment for the defendants. Id. at 504.
And in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of
California recently held that, under California law, a product
manufacturer generally is not liable in strict liability or
negligence for harm caused by a third party’s products. O’Neil,
2012 WL 88533, at *1. There, O’Neil, who formerly served on an
aircraft carrier, brought products liability claims against

10

As explained below, the Braaten court justified this
rule of law by consulting the policy underlying productsliability theory.
17

Crane Company and Warren Pumps, L.L.C., which manufactured
equipment used in the ship’s steam propulsion system. Pursuant
to Navy specifications, asbestos insulation, gaskets, and other
parts were used with the defendant manufacturer’s equipment,
some of which was originally supplied by the defendants. O’Neil,
however, worked aboard the ship twenty years after the
defendants supplied the equipment and original parts. There was
no evidence that the defendants made any of the replacement
parts to which O’Neil was exposed or, for that matter, that the
defendants manufactured or distributed asbestos products to
which O’Neil was exposed.
The court firmly held that the defendant manufacturers
were not liable for harm caused by asbestos products they did
not manufacture or distribute. O’Neil, 2012 WL 88533, at *5.
With regard to the plaintiff’s design-defect claim, the court
noted that “strict products liability in California has always
been premised on harm caused by deficiencies in the defendant’s
own product.” Id. Further, the “defective product . . . was the
asbestos insulation, not the pumps and valves to which it was
applied after defendants’ manufacture and delivery.” Id. at *7.
Similarly, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendants are strictly liable for failure to warn of
the hazards of the release of asbestos dust surrounding their
products. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants were under
18

a duty to warn because it was reasonably foreseeable that their
products would be used with asbestos insulation. Nevertheless,
the court held, “California law does not impose a duty to warn
about dangers arising entirely from another manufacturer’s
product, even if it is foreseeable that the products will be
used together.” Id. at *16. Accordingly, the Court refused to
hold the defendants strictly liable. Id. at *17.
And the O’Neil court conducted a similar analysis of
the plaintiff’s claim based on the defendants’ negligent failure
to warn. The court concluded that “expansion of the duty of care
as urged here would impose an obligation to compensate on those
whose products caused the plaintiffs no harm. To do so would
exceed the boundaries established over decades of product
liability law.” Id. at *19. Thus, as a matter of law, the court
refused to hold the defendants liable on the plaintiff’s strict
liability and negligence claims.
Finally, the policy motivating products-liability law
confirms that manufacturers in the chain of distribution can be
liable only for harm caused by their own products. Indeed,
products-liability theories rely on the principle that a party
in the chain of distribution of a harm-causing product should be
liable because that party is in the best position to absorb the
costs of liability into the cost of production:

19

On whatever theory, the justification for the strict
liability has been said to be that the seller, by
marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward
any member of the consuming public who may be injured
by it; that the public has the right to and does
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for
which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption
be placed upon those who market them, and be treated
as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
such products is entitled to the maximum of protection
at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to
afford it are those who market the products.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. c (1965) (emphasis
added).
And various courts that have considered the issue have
similarly noted that this policy weighs against holding
manufacturers liable for harm caused by asbestos products they
did not manufacture or distribute because those manufacturers
cannot account for the costs of liability created by the third
parties’ products. See O’Neil, 2012 WL 88533, at *17 (“It is
also unfair to require manufacturers of nondefective products to
shoulder a burden of liability when they derived no economic
benefit from the sale of the products that injured the
plaintiff.”); Taylor, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 424-25 (refusing to
hold manufacturer liable when manufacturer “not part of the
manufacturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective
products that caused the injury in question” (internal quotation
20

marks removed)); Simonetta, 197 P.3d at 138 & n.8 (refusing to
extend liability to manufacturers outside of chain of
distribution when manufacturers lacked control over type of
insulation Navy would choose and defendant derived no revenue
from asbestos-containing products); Braaten, 198 P.3d at 498
(refusing to hold manufacturer liable because “[t]he law
generally does not require a manufacturer to study and analyze
the products of others and warn users of the risks of those
products” (internal quotation marks removed)); see also Baughman
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1133 (4th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to hold automobile manufacturer liable for defective
tire it did not manufacture when manufacturer did not have
opportunity to inspect tire, did not benefit from sale of tire,
and did not represent to public that tire was its own); Rastelli
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 225-26 (N.Y.
1992) (refusing to hold tire manufacturer liable for defective
multipiece rim it did not manufacture when manufacturer had no
control over production of multipiece rim, had no role in
placing rim in chain of distribution, and derived no benefit
from its sale).
Therefore, this Court adopts Lindstrom and now holds
that, under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for harm
caused by, and owes no duty to warn of the hazards inherent in,
asbestos products that the manufacturer did not manufacture or
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distribute. This principle is consistent with the development of
products-liability law based on strict liability and negligence,
relevant state case law, the leading federal decisions, and
important policy considerations regarding the issue. A
plaintiff’s burden to prove a defendant’s product caused harm
remains the same in cases involving third-party asbestos
manufacturers as it would in other products-liability cases
based on strict liability and negligence.

C.

Plaintiffs’ Arguments
Plaintiffs raise two arguments to hold manufacturers

liable for harm caused by asbestos products they did not
manufacture or distribute. First, Plaintiffs argue that under
the integrated-products doctrine the “products” at issue are
Defendants’ products together with the asbestos-containing
components and replacement parts supplied by third parties. But
their argument is not consistent with the law under this
doctrine. Indeed, the cases on which Plaintiffs rely, East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865
(1986), and Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 134
F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1998), do not support holding Defendants
liable here. The analysis in those cases concerned whether harm
was caused to a specific product itself or “other property” for
purposes of determining whether plaintiffs suffered purely
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economic loss. Here, however, there is no suggestion that the
asbestos-containing parts caused harm to Defendants’ products
themselves. Plaintiffs fail to show how these cases require the
Court to find that Defendants participated in the chain of
distribution of third parties’ asbestos-containing components
and replacement parts.
Indeed, even if the Court were to accept that
Defendants are component-part manufacturers, a component-part
manufacturer is “not liable for injuries caused by the finished
product into which the component is incorporated unless the
component itself was defective at the time it left the
manufacturer.” Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg., 798 F.2d
700, 715 (5th Cir. 1986) (Texas law); Taylor, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 429 (California law); see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) (finding
automobile manufacturer liable for injuries caused by third
party’s defective part that manufacturer incorporated into
finished automobile before sale); Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Prods. Liab. § 5 (1998) (providing that component-part
manufacturer is liable if component is defective or integration
of component into design of product creates harm-causing
defect). Here, there is no suggestion that Defendants’ products
were defective before their distribution or that Plaintiffs were

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exposed to the original asbestos parts manufactured or
distributed by Defendants.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have a duty
to warn of the hazards posed by the foreseeable uses of their
products. The Court has held that, as a matter of law,
Defendants do not owe a duty to warn under maritime law of the
hazards posed by products they did not manufacture or
distribute. See supra Part III.B.
Plaintiffs cite to Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342
F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964). In Noel, the Third Circuit held that,
under maritime law, a defendant airplane manufacturer had a duty
to warn an airline company of known dangers inherent in its
product after a design defect in the propeller system caused one
of its airplanes to crash in international waters. Noel is
inapposite because there, the manufacturer’s product——the
propeller system——caused the harm. Here, Defendants’ products
did not cause Plaintiffs’ harm.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on ContiCarriers & Terminals,
Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 593 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Mo. 1984), is
similarly misplaced. There, manufacturers of marine bearings
breached a duty to warn customers about the dangers of using dry
ice to shrink the bearings for installation, which was industry
practice. The failure to warn proximately caused the damage to

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the bearings. Plaintiffs here allege that asbestos-containing
components caused harm to Plaintiffs, not Defendants’ products.11
With these principles in mind, the Court will now
consider whether Plaintiffs carried their burden of proof with
respect to each manufacturer.

D.

Application
Having held as a matter of law that a manufacturer is

not liable for harm caused by the asbestos products that it did
not manufacture or distribute, Plaintiffs fail to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the
Defendants manufactured or distributed the asbestos products
that caused Decedents’ injuries. Plaintiffs acknowledge that
Defendants knew Navy sailors would be exposed to asbestos while
repairing and maintaining Defendants’ products; that the
products “required” asbestos insulation, gaskets, and packing;
that Defendants sometimes shipped their products with asbestos
components “already in place”; that Defendants supplied
asbestos-containing replacement parts; and that their products
required maintenance that would expose the sailors to asbestos11

Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants are under a
“continuing duty” to warn that arises when a manufacturer sells
a product it later learns is defective when sold misses the
issue. Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants’ products
caused Decedents’ harm, much less that Defendants owed them a
continuing duty after their products were distributed.
25

containing products. Pls.’ Supp. Br. on Bare-Metal Defense Under
Maritime Law 2-3, No. 09-67099, ECF No. 233. But, as is apparent
from Plaintiffs’ summary of the evidence of record, Plaintiffs
have not pointed to evidence of record to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Defendants manufactured or
distributed the asbestos products to which Decedents were
allegedly exposed. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ products-liability claims based on
strict liability and negligence.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. An appropriate order
will follow.

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