LONG et al v. BRISTOL TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE RONALD L. BUCKWALTER ON 8/14/2012. 8/14/2012 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(sg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT C. LONG, SR. &
JANET V. LONG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BRISTOL TOWNSHIP, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION

NO. 10-1069

MEMORANDUM
BUCKWALTER, S. J.

August 14, 2012

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint of Plaintiffs
Robert C. Long, Sr. and Janet V. Long (“the Longs” or “Plaintiffs”). For the following reasons, the
Motion is denied with prejudice.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The factual background of this case is one familiar to all relevant parties and the Court. On

March 11, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint before this court, asserting violations of their
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See generally Doc. 1, Compl. (“Orig. Compl.”).)1
In addition to Bristol Township, also listed as Defendants in this initial Complaint were Bristol
Township officials Glenn M. Kucher, Wendy Margulies, Al Burgess, Ronald Marczak, Peggy
Horvath, Joseph Champey, John Gushue, Tina Davis, John Monahan, and Linda Tarlini. (See id.
¶¶ 6–17.) George and Susan Rosenberg—the Longs’ neighbors—were also originally listed as

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All internal citations to the record in this Memorandum reference Docket No.10-1069.

defendants in this action, but the parties stipulated to their dismissal on May 10, 2012. (See Doc.
No. 58, Joint Stipulation of Dismissal (“Rosenberg Stipulation”).) Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint
alleged: (1) deprivation of their procedural and substantive due process rights (Count I); (2)
deprivation of their equal protection rights (Count II); (3) a taking of their property (Count III); and
(4) a conspiracy to deprive them of their constitutional rights (Count IV). (See Compl. ¶¶ 43–69.)
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 9, 2012, and Plaintiffs responded in
opposition on May 4, 2012. (See Doc. No. 55, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.; Doc. No. 60, Pls.’ Mem.
Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Resp. Opp’n”).)
On July 11, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, in which it granted
in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. No. 61, 07/11/12
Mem. Op. & Order.) More specifically, the Court granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor
on Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and their taking of property claim under the Fifth Amendment and Pennsylvania state
law.2 (See id. at 9–18, 25–27.) The Court likewise held in its Memorandum Opinion and Order that
Defendants Marczak, Champey, and Gushue were judicially immune from all claims asserted against
them in their individual capacities, and that Defendants Davis, Monahan, and Tarlini were entitled
to qualified immunity for actions taken in their individual capacities. (See id. at 27–36.) The Court
also entered summary judgment on all claims asserted Defendant Marguiles in her individual
capacity on the basis that the Longs failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact as to her lack
of personal liability, and denied summary judgment as moot on all claims asserted against Defendant
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In their Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiffs withdrew the conspiracy claim set forth in their Complaint, and the Court therefore also
denied summary judgment on this point as moot.
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Horvath as she is since deceased. (See id. at 28 n.14, 34.) Finally, the Court also denied Plaintiffs’
request for punitive damages as to all § 1983 claims asserted against Bristol Township as an entity.
(Id. at 39.) As such, following the issuance of the Court’s July 11th Memorandum Opinion and
Order, the only remaining issues set to proceed to trial are Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment3 asserted against (1) Bristol Township as an entity, (2) the individuallynamed officers for actions taken in their official—not personal—capacities, and (3) Defendant Glenn
M. Kucher for actions taken in both his individual and official capacities. The Court also sustained
Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages to the extent it related to Plaintiffs’ claims against Kucher
in his individual capacity.
On July 23, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion seeking leave to amend their original
Complaint. (See Doc. No. 63, Pls.’ Mot. Amend. Compl. (“Pls.’ Mot. Amend Compl.”).) Plaintiffs
attached a copy of their proposed Amended Complaint to their Motion. The proffered rationale for
Plaintiffs’ requested amendment is stated as follows:
Based upon the Court’s decision and Order on the Motion for Summary Judgment
dismissing certain parties and claims, Plaintiffs seek the Court’s permission to file
an Amended Complaint clarifying the remaining claims against the Defendants and
correcting certain typographical errors.

(See id. ¶ 5.) Defendants responded in opposition on July 25, 2012, thereby making this issue ripe

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In their original Complaint, Plaintiffs brought their equal protection claim under the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment, however, makes no reference to equal
protection, but rather provides that: “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Given Plaintiffs’ discussion and treatment of their
equal protection claim in their briefing, however, in its July 11th Memorandum Opinion and
Order the Court assumed that the Longs meant to base their equal protection claim on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth—rather than Thirteenth—Amendment.
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for the Court’s consideration. (See Doc. No. 64, Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n Pls.’ Leave Amend Compl.
(“Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n”).)
II.

DISCUSSION
Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its pleading once

prior to service of a response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). If, however, a responsive pleading has
already been filed, then a party may only amend its initial pleading “with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In deciding whether to grant leave
to amend, the court should do so “freely” and “when justice so requires.” Id.
“Nonetheless, a court is not required to grant leave to amend in every instance where leave
is sought.” Schutter v. Herskowitz, No. Civ.A.07-3823, 2008 WL 2726921, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 11,
2008). Rather, the grant or denial of leave to amend falls to the Court’s sound discretion. Id. (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also Washington v. Grace, Nos. Civ.A.08-1283 &
07-867, 2012 WL 398763, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2012). The exercise of this discretion, however,
must always be exercised “in a manner aimed at securing the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action[.]” Id. at *6 (internal string citation omitted). The Supreme Court has
provided several factors to assist the lower courts in making such a determination, including the
presence of: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and the potential futility of the
amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Particularly relevant to the present discussion are the futility, prejudice,
and undue delay factors.
In determining whether an amended pleading would be futile, the Third Circuit has stated
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that, generally, “[f]utility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation
omitted). An amendment is also considered futile if the amended claim would not withstand a
motion for summary judgment. Schutter, 2008 WL 2726921, at *8 (internal citations omitted). In
this case, Plaintiffs’ claims have already been the subject of prior adjudication by this Court. In
particular, the Court previously entered summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs’
procedural and substantive due process claims, held that all the Township officials—with the
exception of Defendant Kucher—were entitled to some form of immunity, and denied Plaintiffs’
request for punitive damages from Bristol Township. In their present Motion, Plaintiffs seek leave
to amend their Complaint in order to “clarify the remaining claims” and “correct certain
typographical errors.” (Pls.’ Mot. Amend. Compl. ¶ 5.) Rather than “clarify” the equal protection
claim which survives against the remaining Defendants, however, Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended
Complaint appears to be a mere reiteration of several of their initial claims against many alreadydismissed Defendants.
For example, in their proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs once again bring their claims
against Township officials Burgess, Marczak, Champey, Gushue, Davis, Monahan, and Tarlini in
both their individual and official capacities, despite the fact that the Court has already determined
that these individuals are immune from suit here for actions taken in their individual capacities. (See
Pls.’ Mot. Amend. Compl., Ex. B, Proposed Amended Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 9–17.) The
Longs likewise continue to pursue punitive damages against Bristol Township in their proposed
Amended Complaint, even though the Court denied their original request to do so in its July 11,
2012 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See id. ¶¶ 51(3), 55(3).)
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Furthermore, Count I of Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint reasserts that the named
Defendants violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.4 (See id. ¶¶ 42–51.) As previously
noted, however, the Court has already granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on these
claims. The filing of an amended pleading does not permit Plaintiffs to hit the “restart” button in
this litigation and reargue matters which have already been conclusively decided. As such, given
that a significant amount of Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint is a reiteration of matters
which have already been decided on the merits, the Court concludes that permitting the amendment
to go forward would be an exercise in futility.
As to Plaintiffs’ request to clarify its remaining equal protection claim in its Amended
Complaint, the Court finds that allowance of the amendment would prejudice Defendants and unduly
delay further adjudication of this case. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs assert their equal protection
claim against “all defendants” in their proposed Amended Complaint. (See id. at 11.) Officers

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In their original Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly alleged that Defendants violated their
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (See Compl. at 9.) In its July 11,
2012 Memorandum Opinion, the Court noted that the law is clear that the Fifth Amendment only
applies to actions taken by the federal government. (See 07/11/12 Mem. Op. & Order at 9 n.5.)
Given that Bristol Township is a local government entity not associated with the federal
government, the Court therefore found that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all
of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Township alleging a violation of their Fifth Amendment due
process rights. (See id.)
Despite being made aware of the mistaken basis of their original claim, Plaintiffs once
again reassert their procedural due process claim pursuant to the Fifth Amendment in their
proposed Amended Complaint. (See Am. Compl. at 9.) The Third Circuit has previously
recognized that “[a] District Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the
plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”
Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir. 1998). As such,
Plaintiffs’ failure to correct in their Amended Complaint the deficiencies present in the original
Complaint also weighs in favor of denying their request for leave to amend.
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Marguiles, Horvath, Burgess, Marczak, Champey, Gushue, Davis, Monahan, and Tarlini are no
longer defendants in this litigation, however, and permitting the Longs to re-assert their equal
protection claim against them would be unduly prejudicial and would unnecessarily prolong
resolution of this matter.
Moreover, the basis of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim in their proposed Amended
Complaint differs from the reasoning proffered and discussed during the prior summary judgment
stage of proceedings. More specifically, in their previously-filed Response in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Longs solely argued that summary judgment was
inappropriate on their equal protection claim because there was evidence in the record indicating that
the variance extension requests of other similarly situated land developers were granted, despite the
fact that they—just like the Longs—also had not adhered to the certain Township rules and
regulations. (See Pls.’ Resp. Opp’n at 17–18.) In Count II of their instant proposed Amended
Complaint discussing equal protection, Plaintiffs make no mention of these other similarly situated
land developers, but rather exclusively base their claims on the Township’s alleged different
treatment of their neighbors, the Rosenbergs. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52–55.) In this Count, the Longs
once again request the Court to award them equitable relief in the form of an Order compelling the
Rosenbergs to alter their property to adhere to existing zoning regulations. (See id. ¶ 55(4).)
Plaintiffs, however, appear to have somehow overlooked the fact that, on May 10, 2012, they entered
into a stipulation with the Defendants—by their own agreement and with no influence from the
Court—that agreed to the dismissal of the Rosenbergs as defendants in this matter. (See Rosenberg
Stipulation.) Thus, to the extent that the Longs presently attempt to use their Amended Complaint
to resurrect their claims against the Rosenbergs, the Court points them to the text of their own
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previously agreed-upon stipulation.
On the other hand, to the extent that the Longs seek to use the Township’s treatment of the
Rosenbergs as a new basis for their equal protection claim against the Township, the Court finds that
permitting the amendment to proceed on these grounds would result in unnecessary delay and undue
prejudice to the Township. First, the Court notes that, if it were to allow the amendment to proceed
solely on these grounds, the Township would need to conduct additional discovery and engage in
further motion practice to respond to Plaintiffs’ new argument. This would result in Defendants’
incurment of additional litigation costs, as well as the postponement of trial on these issues. Second,
even though prejudice to the plaintiff resulting from the denial of the amendment is not a factor put
forth by the Supreme Court in determining whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court
recognizes that the Longs themselves would not be prejudiced by denial of their requested Amended
Complaint because their equal protection claim against the Township is set to proceed to jury trial.
At trial, Plaintiffs are free to present any and all evidence—including the Township’s treatment of
their neighbors—indicating that they were denied equal protection of the laws.5 As such, this
consideration further weighs in favor of denying leave to amend in this case.
Finally, the Court notes that the “animating principle behind Rule 15 . . . is ‘to make
pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice’” and that the Court’s
discretion should be executed “in a manner aimed at securing the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination” of legal matters. Grace, 2012 WL 398763, at *6 (quoting Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.
of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964)) (further citation omitted). To grant the Plaintiffs

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All such evidence, of course, would need to adhere to the standards set forth by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
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leave to amend solely on the grounds that they have offered in their instant Motion would essentially
gut this “animating principle” of Rule 15. The basis of the Court’s decision to deny leave to amend
here is therefore further amplified when considered against the backdrop of the legal principles
enunciated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and corresponding Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Therefore, because the Longs’ Amended Complaint would be futile, unduly prejudicial, and
would unnecessarily further delay resolution of this matter, the Court denies their request for leave
to amend.
An appropriate Order follows.

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