WILSON v. RIU HOTELS & RESORTS (RIUSA II, S.A.)

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION SIGNED BY HONORABLE MICHAEL M. BAYLSON ON 7/29/11. 7/29/11 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(ti, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RITA SCHIAVONE WILSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RIU HOTELS & RESORTS (RIUSA II, S.A.),
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 10-7144

MEMORANDUM ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Baylson, J.
I.

July 29, 2011

Introduction
On December 7, 2010, Plaintiff Rita Schiavone Wilson (“Plaintiff”) instituted an action

against Defendant, RIU Hotels & Resorts,1 to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly
sustained as the result of a “slip and fall” on Defendant's premises in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico.
(Compl., ECF No. 1.) Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper
Service and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.2 (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10.) For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion.
II.

Factual Background and Procedural History
The Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in ruling on a

12(b)(2) motion. Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendant Riusa II is a

1

Defendant is properly known as Riusa II, S.A., hereinafter “Riusa II” (Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 10, at 3.)
2

The Court will not address Riusa II’s claim that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed for insufficient service of process because of the conclusion that this Court does not
have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.
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foreign corporation, headquartered in Mallorca, Spain. (Id. ¶ 2.) Riusa II owns and manages
hotel and resort properties, including Riu Palace Cabo San Lucas Hotel (“Riu Palace”), located in
Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, where the incident precipitating the instant action took place. (Id. ¶¶ 4,
9.)
Ms. Wilson asserts in her brief that she booked a vacation at Riu Palace online, through a
website operated by travel agency Apple Vacations. (Pl.’s Resp. Br., ECF No. 12, at 2.) She
checked in at Riu Palace on December 7, 2008.
A few days later, on December 11, Ms. Wilson slipped and fell in the bathtub/shower in
her hotel room. (Compl. ¶ 8.) As a result of the fall, Ms. Wilson injured her ribcage, lower
back, right hip, and leg. (Id. ¶ 16.) Ms. Wilson contends that Riusa II was negligent in creating
or allowing a slippery and dangerous condition to exist in the bathtub/shower of her hotel room.
(Id. ¶ 15.) She brought this premises liability claim against Riusa II on December 7, 2010.
On May 2, 2011, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Improper Service and Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction. Defendant filed two Affidavits of Marta Cerdan Bonnemaison, Associate
General Counsel for Riusa II, in support of its motion.3 (ECF No. 10-1.) Plaintiff filed a
response brief in opposition to the Motion on May 20, 2011. Plaintiff did not submit any
supporting affidavits. Defendant submitted a reply brief in further support of its motion on April
20, 2011. (Def.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 14.)
III.

Basis of Federal Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

3

Only one affidavit of Bonnemaison is related to the personal jurisdiction issue,
hereinafter “Bonnemaison Aff.”
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because the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and the
parties are citizens of different states. Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania and Defendant is a
Spanish corporation with headquarters in Mallorca, Spain. (Compl. ¶¶ 1,2.)
IV.

Parties' Contentions
Defendant contends that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it as a nonresident

corporation with limited Pennsylvania contacts, and that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of
establishing the requisite jurisdictional facts in this case. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5-8.) Riusa II
posits that there is no basis for specific jurisdiction because Plaintiff's claim does not arise from
any activities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; rather, it is based on Plaintiff's slip and fall
in Mexico. (Id. at 7.) Riusa II also argues that it is a foreign company targeting international
clientele, and that the company has not engaged in continuous and systematic activities in
Pennsylvania sufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. (Id. at 3, 9.)
Plaintiff responds that Riusa II has met the minimum threshold of contact with
Pennsylvania to permit this Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5.)
She contends that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Riusa II because Defendant
deliberately targeted Pennsylvania in marketing Riu Palace, one of its hotels. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff
cites three jurisdictional contacts which she maintains establish jurisdiction: Defendant's
distribution of brochures, which include a toll-free telephone number, to travel agencies within
Pennsylvania; Defendant's provision of marketing materials to travel agency Apple Vacations for
use on its website; and Defendant's maintenance of a website (www.riu.com), accessible to
Pennsylvania residents. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff argues that these contacts are a but-for cause of her
injuries. (Id. at 7.) Further, she maintains that because Riusa II is unable to present a compelling
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case that litigation in the state would be unreasonable and unfair, this Court can maintain the
present action. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff implies that general jurisdiction also exists over Riusa II by
asserting that the company engaged in systematic and continuous contact with the
Commonwealth. (Id. at 5.)
Riusa II counters Plaintiff's argument that Defendant deliberately targeted the
Commonwealth by asserting that the contacts cited by the Plaintiff were in fact directed more
generally towards United States, and not towards Pennsylvania in particular. (Def.’s Reply Br. at
2.) Further, Riusa II maintains that marketing activities of travel agencies do not establish that
Defendant itself deliberately targeted the forum state. (Id. at 3.)
V.

Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction is proper by
“affidavits or other competent evidence.” Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324,
329 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1285, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996)).
When the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction. O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004)). The
plaintiff presents a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by “establishing with
reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Mellon
Bank East (PSFS), Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Provident
Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987)).
In ruling on a 12(b)(2) motion, the Court is required to take all of plaintiff's allegations as
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true and to resolve all factual disputes in plaintiff's favor. Metcalfe, 566 F.3d at 329 (quoting
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, "at no
point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant's Rule
12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Once the motion is made,
plaintiff must respond with actual proofs, not mere allegations." Time Share Vacation Club v.
Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 68 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) authorizes a federal district court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent permitted by the law of the state
where that court sits. Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. To determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is appropriate, the court engages in a two-part
inquiry. Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 155 (3d. Cir
2010). First, the law of the forum state must provide a statutory basis for exercising jurisdiction
over the defendant. Id. Second, the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum state in order to comport with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. In
Pennsylvania, where this Court sits, the long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction to the fullest
extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b).
Therefore, this two-step process collapses into one step.
The "minimum contacts" required for personal jurisdiction may be either "specific or
"general." Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 414 nn. 8-9
(1984). "[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 'issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.'" Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
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Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966)).4 In contrast, general
jurisdiction is appropriate where the defendant's "continuous and systematic" contacts with the
forum state "render them essentially at home in the forum state." Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at
2851. General jurisdiction can exist over matters unrelated to the defendant's forum-based
activities. Metcalfe, 556 F.3d at 334.
VI.

Discussion
Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case that either specific or

general personal jurisdiction exists over Riusa II. Bare allegations are not sufficient to make a
prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction is proper. Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at
68. Plaintiff did not allege any jurisdictional contacts that would establish personal jurisdiction
in her Complaint. In the face of Defendant's jurisdictional challenge, supported by competent
evidence, Plaintiff has not supported the averments in her brief that Riusa II had sufficient
minimum contacts with Pennsylvania with affidavits or other proof. "References in a brief,
unsupported by affidavit, are not properly before the Court as 'facts' evidencing contact for
jurisdictional purposes." Peek v. Golden Nugget Hotel & Casino, 806 F. Supp. 555, 558 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (Bartle, J.).
Evaluating the allegations in Plaintiff's brief, while recognizing that they are unsupported,
it appears that even if this Court were to consider these unsupported allegations as true, the
contacts cited by Plaintiff are insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. Plaintiff's vague allegations do not establish either that Riusa II deliberately targeted
4

In Goodyear Dunlop, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina state court
lacked personal jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of a United States parent company in a
wrongful death action arising from a bus accident in France.
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the Commonwealth, as required for specific jurisdiction, or that the company maintained
systematic and continuous contact with Pennsylvania such that the exercise of general
jurisdiction is warranted.
A.

Specific Jurisdiction

The exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate in cases where the plaintiff's claim
arises from the defendant's jurisdictional contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. The Third
Circuit has developed a three-part analysis to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists.
O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 318. First, "the defendant must have purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum." Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958)). To satisfy this step, the defendant needs to have purposeful contact with the
forum, although physical entry into the forum is not required. Id. Second, the litigation must
arise out of or relate to at least one such contact. Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). A
"meaningful link" must exist "between a legal obligation that arose in the forum and the
substance of the plaintiff's claims." Id. at 324. Lastly, the court may consider whether "the
exercise of jurisdiction otherwise 'comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)); see also Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The burden shifts to the defendant once the requisite
"minimum contacts" have been established to present a compelling case that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable. O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 324.
Plaintiff does not allege any facts in her Complaint that would permit this court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over Riusa II. She does not allege in her Complaint that Defendant
has had any purposeful contact with Pennsylvania. Accordingly, she does not allege that her
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claim is at all related to Defendant's contact with the Commonwealth.
In her brief, however, which the Court repeats is unsupported by evidence, Plaintiff
asserts that Riusa II has deliberately targeted the forum such that specific jurisdiction is
appropriate, and avers that her claim arises out of three of Riusa II's Pennsylvania contacts.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Riusa II purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within Pennsylvania by distributing brochures to travel agencies within the
Commonwealth; providing marketing materials to one travel agency in particular, Apple
Vacations, for use on that company's website; and through Riusa II's maintenance of it's own
website, www.riu.com, which is accessible to Pennsylvania citizens. (Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 6-7.) The
Court will evaluate each of Plaintiff's assertions.
First, Plaintiff avers that Riusa II provided brochures, which list a toll-free telephone
number, to travel agencies within Pennsylvania. (Id. at 6.) Although Riusa II maintains and
promotes a toll-free telephone number, Plaintiff does not assert in her brief that she ever utilized
it. Plaintiff's claim, therefore, cannot arise from the existence of the toll-free number, and this
contact cannot factor into the court's specific jurisdiction analysis. See Cody v. Tyler Place, No.
05-CV-02271, 2007 WL 2022086, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July, 10, 2007) (Gardner, J.) (refusing to
consider newspaper advertisements which plaintiff did not read or rely upon in its specific
jurisdiction analysis).
Plaintiff does maintain that she relied on Defendant's printed brochures in making her
decision to stay at Riu Palace, but the presence of these brochures at travel agencies within
Pennsylvania does not establish specific personal jurisdiction over Riusa II. "Typically,
contractual or advertising contacts with the forum state will not give rise to specific personal
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jurisdiction over defendants charged with tortious injury occurring outside of the state." Id. at *5.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that advertisements must be directed to a particular forum
in order to establish jurisdiction. Id.; see Hlavac v. DGG Props., No. Civ. A. 04-6112, 2005 WL
839158, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2005) (Yohn, J.) (noting that "defendant's advertising must
specifically target local residents" for the Court to assert specific jurisdiction); Zameska v.
Seguros ING Commercial Am., S.A. de C.V., No. Civ. A. 04-1895, 2005 WL 525561 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 3, 2005) (Bartle, J.) (holding that advertisements in national newspapers and magazines are
insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
In Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inns, Inc., Judge VanArtsdalen concluded that specific
personal jurisdiction did not exist over a New Jersey hotel for a premises liability claim brought
by Pennsylvania residents. 759 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Pa 1991). Although Beach Terrace
directly mailed promotional brochures to over 1,000 Pennsylvania residents, the hotel sent
brochures to potential customers along the east coast from Canada to Maryland. Id. at 266. The
Court determined that specific jurisdiction was inappropriate because defendant's advertising
efforts were not "clearly aimed clearly aimed at inducing Pennsylvania residents to travel to its
facility." Id. at 269. Judge VanArtsdalen distinguished the facts of Beach Terrace from another
case, Busch v. Sea World of Ohio, in which extensive print, television, and radio ads, combined
with the distribution of discount coupons in Pennsylvania, gave rise to specific jurisdiction. Id.
at 269 (citing Busch v. Sea World of Ohio, 95 F.R.D. 336 (W.D. Pa 1982)).
Here, Plaintiff has an even weaker argument that specific jurisdiction exists over Riusa II
based on the company's marketing efforts than the plaintiff in Wims. In Wims, the court held
that no personal jurisdiction existed over a hotel in neighboring New Jersey after defendant
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directly mailed brochures to Pennsylvania citizens. Here, Defendant is a foreign corporation
operating a hotel in Mexico, and Plaintiff has not asserted that the company directly mailed
brochures to potential customers in the Commonwealth. Further, Plaintiff has not asserted that
Riusa II specifically targeted Pennsylvania residents by providing brochures to travel agencies
specifically within the Commonwealth or the region. It is unknown whether Riusa II distributed
brochures locally or to travel agencies nation-wide. Without evidence that Defendant sought to
attract Pennsylvania residents in particular to its resorts, the mere provision of brochures to a
third party within Pennsylvania is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over Riusa II.
Second, Plaintiff asserts in her brief that specific jurisdiction is appropriate because Riusa
II furnished marketing materials to travel agency Apple Vacations, for use on that company's
website. (Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 7.) In her brief, Plaintiff maintains that she booked her vacation at
Riu Palace through the Apple Vacations website, although she does not specify what information
Riusa II provided to the travel agency. (Id.) Like Plaintiff's first averment, that Riusa II provided
information to a travel agency in the United States for promotional purposes does not establish
specific jurisdiction over Riusa II. Regardless of whether this information is disseminated
through paper, as with the brochures, or electronically through a website, Plaintiff needs to
demonstrate that Riusa II specifically targeted this forum, which she has not done. Plaintiff
admits in her brief that the Apple Vacations website is available beyond Pennsylvania to other
U.S. citizens. (Id.) Without information establishing, for example, that Riusa II worked with a
regional branch of Apple Vacations to market the site to Pennsylvania, that Riusa II gave
information for use on the Apple Vacations, is insufficient to support the exercise of specific
jurisdiction.
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Third, Plaintiff asserts that Riusa II deliberately targeted Pennsylvania by maintaining an
English-language website that is accessible to Pennsylvania citizens. (Id. at 6-7.) However,
Plaintiff does not maintain that she ever visited this website, and argues in her brief that she
decided to stay at Defendant's resort only as a result of viewing Riusa II's brochures and the
marketing materials on the Apple Vacations website provided by Riusa II. (Id. at 7.) Therefore,
this Court cannot conclude that specific jurisdiction is appropriate based on Defendant's website,
although the website factors into the Court's general jurisdiction analysis. See Cody, 2007 WL
2022086, at *6.
Plaintiff relies on O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel in asserting that specific jurisdiction is
warranted because her injuries (and, therefore, her claim) arise out of Defendant's marketing
activities in the Pennsylvania. She notes that but-for the brochures and marketing information
that Riusa II supplied to travel agencies within Pennsylvania, she would never have stayed at Riu
Palace, and never would have been injured from her slip-and-fall in the shower. This reliance is
misplaced.
In O'Connor, the plaintiff was injured after getting a massage at his hotel in Barbados.
496 F.3d at 316. He entered into a contract with the hotel for spa services prior to his arrival, as
a result of receiving a brochure featuring such services, and engaging in a series of phone calls
with the hotel's staff. Id. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's claims "directly and closely
relate[d] to a continuing contractual obligation that arose in Pennsylvania," and held that there
was personal jurisdiction over the foreign hotel. Id. at 323.
O'Connor does not stand for the proposition that the specific jurisdiction can be
established through any contact that is a but-for cause of the claim. The Third Circuit in
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O'Connor noted "specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more direct causal connection than
that provided by the but-for test." 496 F.3d at 323. The Third Circuit ultimately determined that
the causal connection between the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's contact with the forum
must be "intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo proportional and personal jurisdiction
reasonably foreseeable." Id.
In Lingo v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., a Pennsylvania citizen brought a suit against a
Las Vegas hotel after a slip-and-fall in the hotel shower. No. 10-7032, 2011 WL 2621396, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 1, 2011) (Surrick, J.). Judge Surrick rejected the plaintiff's argument that specific
jurisdiction was appropriate, pursuant to O'Connor, because her claim arose from defendant's
promotional mailings to her in Pennsylvania. Id. at *4. Judge Surrick easily distinguished the
facts of O'Connor from the case at hand. "Plaintiff's claim here does not arise out of any
contract entered into in Pennsylvania. The fact that Defendants sent Plaintiff an advertising
mailer does not make Defendants subject to specific jurisdiction in Pennsylvania for any and all
personal injuries that Plaintiff may sustain on Defendants' premises in Nevada. . . . The links in
the chain of causation between Defendants' contacts and the asserted injury are too remote to find
specific jurisdiction." Id.
Likewise, in the instant case there was no contractual obligation formed in Pennsylvania
prior to Plaintiff's injury as there was in O'Connor, and Plaintiff does not allege to have had
contact with the resort prior to her arrival. Further, as in Lingo, Riusa II never directly mailed
information to Plaintiff to market its resort, instead providing information to third-party travel
agencies. Although Plaintiff alleges that Riusa II's Pennsylvania contacts are a but-for cause of
her injuries, this does not automatically trigger jurisdiction, and in this case the causal connection
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between Defendant's Pennsylvania contacts and Plaintiff's claim is too tenuous to support a
finding of specific jurisdiction over Riusa II.
B.

General Jurisdiction

A defendant must carry on "a continuous and systematic part of its business within [the]
Commonwealth" in order for general jurisdiction to exist. Provident Nat'l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437.
"Contacts are continuous and systematic if they are extensive and pervasive." Snyder v. Dolphin
Encounters, Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Brody, J.). Proof of general
jurisdiction must meet a "higher threshold" than specific jurisdiction which requires "extensive
and persuasive" factual allegations. Hlavac, 2005 WL 839158, at *3.
Plaintiff does not specifically argue that general personal jurisdiction exists over Riusa II.
She does, however, imply that general jurisdiction exists when she asserts that the Defendant
engaged in "continuous and systematic conduct within Pennsylvania," based on the three contacts
alleged in her brief: Riusa II's distribution of brochures to travel agencies, provision of marketing
materials to Apple Vacations, and maintenance of a website. (Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 5); see Provident
Nat'l Bank, 819 F.2d at 437.
Defendant argues that it does not have sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania to
warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7-9.) Defendant's uncontested
affidavit of Marta Cerdan Bonnemaison, Associate General Counsel for Riusa II, establishes that
Riusa II owns no property, manages no hotels, and has no employees in Pennsylvania.
(Bonnemaison Aff. ¶ 9.) Further, Riusa II does not maintain any bank accounts in Pennsylvania,
and has never been registered to conduct business within the state. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) Thus, the
traditional indicia supporting the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation are
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lacking. See Evers v. Coryn Group, No. 08-CV-6032, 2011 WL 1666900, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 3,
2011) (Ditter, J.) (holding that general jurisdiction was not present where the foreign corporation
had no office, employees, address, assets, property, or bank accounts in Pennsylvania).
Judge Ditter of this Court previously held that general jurisdiction did not exist over
foreign hotels based on the three types of contacts alleged by the Plaintiff. Johnson v. Summa
Corp. held that general jurisdiction did not exist over a Nevada hotel based on the maintenance
of a toll-free telephone number, the presence of brochures in travel agencies within the
Commonwealth, and direct mailing of a promotional brochure to the plaintiff. 632 F. Supp. 122,
126 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Although "extensive" advertising efforts in the forum is sometimes
considered continuous and substantial, in this case, Plaintiff's allegations do not establish that
Riusa II's advertising efforts were extensive, or that they were targeted towards Pennsylvania.
See Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (Huyett, J.)
(holding that Disney's marketing efforts, which included an extensive "Disney Salutes
Philadelphia" campaign did establish general jurisdiction over defendant); Snyder, 235 F. Supp.
2d at 437.
Maintenance of a website which allows users to reserve accommodations at Defendant's
resorts does not demonstrate that Riusa II has had systematic and continuous contact with
Pennsylvania. General jurisdiction "requires more than a recognition that a nonresident
corporation has an 'interactive' web site." Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis Int'l Hotels, No. 99-574,
1999 WL 718556, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999) (Bartle, J.). Further, Riusa II submitted
evidence that the company's website is accessible worldwide in multiple languages, and not
targeted at Pennsylvania. (Bonnemaison Aff. ¶ 6.) In sum, even if the Plaintiff were to
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substantiate her allegations regarding Riusa II's contacts with the Commonwealth, they fall short
of being "systematic and continuous," as required to establish general jurisdiction over
Defendant.
VII.

Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction in

Pennsylvania. Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend her complaint or to present evidence to
rebut the evidence presented by Defendant. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be
granted.
An appropriate Order will follow.
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