GIULIANI et al v. SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFT MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT JUDGE WILLIAM R. HOUSEHOLD, JR. IS GRANTED AND PLFFS' COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM IS DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE PARTIES SHALL PROMPTLY NOTIFY THE CLERK O F THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAS ENTERED AN ORDER DISMISSING PLFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFT HOUSEHOLDER. ( SIGNED BY HONORABLE THOMAS N. ONEILL, JR ON 1/24/12. ) 1/24/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(gn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD GIULIANI, SR., and
RICHARD GIULIANI, JR.
v.
SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP et al.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 10-7518

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs are property owners who claim that defendant Magisterial District Judge
William R. Householder Jr., along with defendants Springfield Township, its Board of
Commissioners and Zoning Hearing Board, the members thereof, the Township Manager and
Township Code Enforcement Officers “are responsible for engaging in an unremitting campaign
of harassment and discrimination, spanning the better part of fifteen years, aimed at divesting
Plaintiffs of every economically viable use of their property.” Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs allege, inter
alia, that Householder, who owns an adjoining property, lodged complaints against their property
and thereafter “unilaterally issued citations based on his own complaints and conducted the
evidentiary hearings and imposed fines, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of an impartial determination
of guilt or innocence.” Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs also allege that, sometime between their purchase
of their property in 1996 and Householder’s 1998 election as a District Justice, Householder,
then a detective, visited their property while they were cleaning up and asked what they were
doing. Compl. ¶¶ 45-49.
In January 2011, Householder filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against him.

On March 1, 2011, the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for
summary judgment. On May 16, 2011, I entered an Order denying both motions without
prejudice to their renewal on the existing papers pending pertinent discovery. Defendant
Householder took an appeal from my May 16 Order and on January 4, 2012 the Court of Appeals
remanded the case, ordering that the Court “consider whether Appellant Householder is entitled
to absolute judicial immunity based on the facts alleged in the complaint.” The Court of Appeals
further requested that the Court “address the status of the claims alleged against Householder in
his official capacity,” noting “that in the District Court, Plaintiffs claimed that the suit raised only
individual capacity claims against Householder, despite the statements in the complaint.” The
Court of Appeals further ordered that “if official capacity claims are indeed abandoned, the
claims should be dismissed.”
On January 13, 2012, I issued an Order requiring plaintiffs to file a statement informing
the Court as to whether or not they had abandoned their official capacity claims against
Householder. On January 19, 2012, plaintiffs filed a statement with the Court in which they
assert “that they have in fact abandoned any official capacity claims that they may have had in
this action against Defendant William R. Householder, Jr.” Dkt. No. 41. Accordingly, I will
dismiss plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against defendant Householder.
It remains for me to decide whether Householder, sued in his individual capacity, is
entitled to absolute judicial immunity. A judge will be subject to liability only when he has acted
in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). “A
judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be
liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Mireles
-2-

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991); see also Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir.
2000) (“The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit under section
1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.”). Whether an action is “judicial”
depends on “whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and . . . the expectation of
the parties, i.e. whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at
362.
Plaintiffs contend that judicial immunity does not apply to their claims against
Householder because “the Complaint emphasizes a concerted pattern of conduct apart from
official judicial acts” Dkt. No. 26 at 6. Householder counters that, apart from his alleged visit to
plaintiffs’ property in the late 1990’s, the only other actions that he is alleged in the Complaint to
have undertaken were undertaken solely in his role as a judge. I agree with Householder and
cannot characterize his role in the issuance of the complained of citations and fines as
nonjudicial. Indeed, in their Complaint plaintiffs themselves recognize that Householder “used
his position as District Justice” to enable the issuance of the complained of citations and fines.
Compl. ¶ 71; see Stump, 435 U.S. at 360 (declining to characterize judge’s “approval of [a]
petition as a nonjudicial act” where plaintiffs “themselves stated in their pleadings before the
District Court that Judge Stump was ‘clothed with the authority of the state’ at the time that he
approved the petition and that ‘he was acting as a county circuit court judge’”). To the extent
that plaintiffs claim that Householder should have recused himself from handling any matters
involving their property, Householder’s decision not to recuse himself is also protected by the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 Fed. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir.

-3-

2006) (“[A] judge’s decision not to recuse himself from a case in which he holds a personal
interest is itself an exercise of judicial authority protected by the doctrine of absolute
immunity.”). Judicial immunity applies to bar plaintiffs’ claims against Householder with
respect to his participation in the issuance of citations and fines against them even if, as alleged
by plaintiffs, the proximity of Householder’s own residence caused him to hold a bias against
industrial activity on plaintiffs’ property. Compl. ¶ 71. “The doctrine holds that judges with bad
intentions, as well as those with good intentions, are immune from suit.” Wallace v. Powell, No.
09-286, 2009 WL 4051974, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2009) I will grant Householder’s
motion to dismiss to the extent that it seeks to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims relevant to the citations
and fines issued against them.
Finally, although the protection of judicial immunity does not extend to cover the only
non-judicial act alleged against Householder, his alleged visit to plaintiffs’ property, I find that
any claims based on this event alone are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). “To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out ‘sufficient factual
matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009), quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
That Householder made an unannounced visit to plaintiffs’ property and asked “what they were
doing,” more than 12 years prior to the filing of plaintiffs’ Complaint, Compl. ¶¶ 46-48, is not
enough to support plaintiffs’ claims that their rights have been violated under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, that Householder participated in a conspiracy to violate their
constitutional rights or that he is liable for tortious interference under Pennsylvania law. “Where

-4-

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not ‘show[n]’–‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
AND NOW, this 24th day of January, 2012, it is ORDERED that the motion to dismiss
filed by Defendant Magisterial District Judge William R. Householder, Jr. is GRANTED and
plaintiffs’ complaint against him is DISMISSED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall promptly notify the Clerk of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the District Court has entered an Order
dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Householder.

s/Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.
THOMAS N. O'NEILL, JR., J.

-5-