BOLDEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT IS GRANTED. THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED ON OR BEFORE 11/1/11. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE RONALD L. BUCKWALTER ON 10/18/11. 10/19/11 ENTERED AND E-MAILED.(jl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARY BELINDA BOLDEN, Administratrix for
Shawn Lamont Bolden, Deceased,
:
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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PENNSYLVANIA BUREAU OF PRISONS, and :
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, CAPTAIN THOMAS :
DOMAN, CAPTAIN J. JOHNSON, CAPTAIN
:
JEROME STRICKLAND, CAPTAIN WILLIAMS, :
CORRECTIONS OFFICER BURTON,
:
CORRECTIONS OFFICER S. GREEN,
:
CORRECTIONS OFFICER VITO MANISCALO, :
CORRECTIONS OFFICER PATRICIA
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ROBINSON, CORRECTIONS OFFICER COMER :
RUCKER, CORRECTIONS OFFICER SMITH,
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CORRECTIONS [OFFICER] WALTERS, and
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CORRECTIONS OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-10,
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individually and in their official capacities,
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Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 11-0467
MEMORANDUM
BUCKWALTER, S.J.
October 18, 2011
Currently pending before the Court are the following: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”),1 Jerome Strickland, J. Johnson,
Thomas Dohman, Vito Maniscalo, “Burton,” Comer Rucker, Patricia Robinson, Captain
Williams, Corrections Officer Smith, and Corrections Officer S. Green (collectively
“Defendants”); and (2) a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint filed by
Plaintiff Mary Belinda Bolden. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is denied
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Defendant DOC states that it is incorrectly identified in the Amended Complaint as the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Prisons. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3 n.1.)
without prejudice and the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is granted.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff’s son, Shawn Lamont Bolden, was an inmate at the Pennsylvania State
Correctional Institute at Graterford (“Graterford”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) According to the facts
alleged in the Amended Complaint, Mr. Bolden was in Graterford’s dining hall on January 25,
2009, when he was attacked without cause or justification by all of the individually named
Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 33.) These Defendants assaulted Mr. Bolden with their fists, boots,
nightsticks, and flash lights before dragging him back to his cell, where they continued to beat
him. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Bolden died as a result of the severe injuries he
sustained during the attack, and that several of the officers responsible for his death were
transferred to other facilities in order to conceal their wrongdoing. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.)
On behalf of her son, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint in this Court on January 24, 2011.
Several months later, Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed an Amended Complaint on July 26,
2011. The Amended Complaint includes the following seven counts: (i) violations of Plaintiff’s
decedent’s civil rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) assault and battery; (iii) negligence and gross negligence; (iv) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; (v) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (vi) violation of
the Wrongful Death Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8301; and (vii) violation of the Probate Estates and
Fiduciary Code, 20 Pa. C.S. §§ 3372, 3373 and 42 Pa. C.S. § 8302 (“the Survival Act”). (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 46-73.) The moving Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint on August 4, 2011. Rather than directly respond to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint on September 13, 2011. Plaintiff
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contends that the Second Amended Complaint would correct the alleged pleading deficiencies
that are the subject of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Pl.’s Mot. Amend ¶ 10.) Finally,
Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on September 22, 2011. Both
Motions are now ripe for the Court’s consideration.
II.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. at 555. It emphasized that it would not require a “heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
In the subsequent case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court
enunciated two fundamental principles applicable to a court’s review of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. First, it noted that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
at 1949. Thus, although “[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 1950.
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Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal has altered some of the
fundamental underpinnings of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review. Arner v. PGT Trucking,
Inc., No. Civ.A.09-0565, 2010 WL 1052953, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2010); Spence v.
Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.08-0626, 2008 WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15,
2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and need not contain detailed factual allegations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Further, the
court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
Finally, the court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2002).
B.
Motion for Leave to Amend
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), a party may seek the court’s leave to
amend a pleading, and the court should freely grant such leave “when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “absent undue or
substantial prejudice, an amendment should be allowed under Rule 15(a) unless ‘denial [can] be
grounded in bad faith or dilatory motive, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to
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cure deficiency by amendments previously allowed or futility of amendment.’” Lundy v.
Adamar of N.J., Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Bechtel v. Robinson, 886
F.2d 644, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1989)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1)2 and 12(b)(6). Their Motion consists of three separate arguments. First,
Defendants contend that the suits against them in their official capacities are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5-6.) Second, they argue that the
Amended Complaint contains insufficient factual allegations of wrongdoing. (Id. at 6-9.)
Finally, Defendants contend that the state law claims against them are barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. (Id. at 9-12.) Plaintiff has filed her Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint as a way of responding to the issues raised in Defendants’ Motion.3
Therefore, in addressing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court considers whether granting
Plaintiff leave to amend would cure the alleged defects.
A.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
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Rule 12(b)(1), which allows a defendant to move for dismissal when a court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, is the basis for Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity defense.
(Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4 (citing Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690,
693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).)
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Defendants note that Plaintiff failed to file a brief in support of her Motion in
accordance with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c). (Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n 3 n.1.) While it is
true that Plaintiff did not technically comply with the rule, the Motion itself includes several
paragraphs of factual averments and citations to legal authorities. Accordingly, the Court will
not deny the Motion for failure to include a brief.
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The Eleventh Amendment4 prohibits claims for damages against the DOC and its
employees sued in their official capacities. See Montilla v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No.
Civ.A.11–2218, 2011 WL 4467712, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2011) (“The Eleventh Amendment
bars claims for damages against the Department of Corrections.”); Dickerson v. SCI Graterford,
No. Civ.A.10-7177, 2011 WL 3862198, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2011) (“The Department of
Corrections (‘DOC’) is an executive agency of the Commonwealth and therefore shares in the
immunity from suits in federal court by private parties.”); id. (“A state agency or official working
in its official capacity is immune from suit in federal court.”). A plaintiff may, however, bring a
claim against a DOC employee in his or her individual capacity. See Robus v. Pa. Dept. of Corr.,
No. Civ.A.04-2175, 2006 WL 2060615, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2006) (“The Eleventh
Amendment requires the court to dismiss only the official-capacity claims.”).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claims against the DOC and the individual Defendants sued in their official capacities.
(Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 5-6.) Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint5 has
removed the DOC itself as a Defendant, but still names DOC corrections officers in both their
individual and official capacities. (Pl.’s Mot. Am., Ex. C.) Therefore, to the extent the proposed
Second Amended Complaint includes the official capacity claims, it is improperly pleaded.
Nevertheless, because this deficiency can be easily corrected – and because the Court is granting
4
The Eleventh Amendment states as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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The proposed Second Amended Complaint is attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiff’s
Motion.
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Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend – Plaintiff may file a revised Second Amended Complaint
to allege the § 1983 claims against the DOC Defendants solely in their individual capacities.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the § 1983 claims is therefore denied without prejudice. Should
the revised Second Amended Complaint fail to remove the official capacity claims, Defendants
may again move to dismiss.
B.
Whether Plaintiff has Sufficiently Alleged Wrongdoing on the Part of All
Defendants
Defendants contend that although a § 1983 claim may be brought against a state actor in
his or her individual capacity, Plaintiff has failed to specify what each Defendant did to violate
her son’s civil rights. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6-9.) As an initial matter, the Court
notes that the proposed Second Amended Complaint would significantly narrow both the number
of Defendants and the claims against each. Whereas the Amended Complaint asserts claims
against thirteen Defendants, including the DOC itself, the Second Amended Complaint names
seven individual Defendants, all of whom are corrections officers. (Pl.’s Mot. Am., Ex. C.) By
limiting the § 1983 claims to those who directly took part in the alleged beating, the Second
Amended Complaint would render moot Defendants’ request to dismiss any claim premised on a
theory of vicarious liability against superior officers such as Superintendent DiGuglielmo. (See
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 7 n.5.) In addition, the only cause of action under § 1983 listed
in the Second Amended Complaint is a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s decedent’s right to be
free from excessive force under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
(Pl.’s Mot. Am., Ex. C ¶¶ 30-33.) This change would eliminate the Amended Complaint’s more
vague allegations of Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. (See Am. Compl. ¶
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49.)
Taking into consideration the modifications Plaintiff intends to make when given leave to
amend, the Court finds that she has sufficiently stated a claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges that the
decedent was in the dining hall at Graterford on January 25, 2009 when, without provocation, he
was punched, kicked, and otherwise violently attacked by all of the individually named
Defendants.6 (Pl.’s Mot. Amend, Ex. C ¶ 18.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants dragged
the decedent to his cell where they continued to beat him, and that he died as a result of his
injuries. (Id. ¶ 19.) While the factual allegations are admittedly sparse,7 the Court finds that they
constitute “a short and plain statement of the claim” for excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.8 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
failure to allege wrongdoing is therefore denied.
C.
Sovereign Immunity
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Defendants argue that this allegation is insufficient because it groups them together
“without any differentiation as to their individual actions.” (Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n 5.) Because
Plaintiff is alleging that all the individual Defendants harmed the decedent in the same manner,
the Court finds nothing improper about the way the claims are phrased.
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On the other hand, given the nature of the lawsuit, it is not surprising that there is a
limited factual record at this stage of the litigation. This case concerns events that occurred
within the confines of a prison – an institution not readily accessible to the public – and Mr.
Bolden, who would have been an important source for the information used to support Plaintiff’s
claims, is deceased. Plaintiff has stated that she has hired an investigator to gather additional
facts relevant to this action. (Pl.’s Mot. Amend ¶ 9.)
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“The central question in a claim of excessive force is whether the prison official applied
force ‘in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.’” Wesley v. Hollis, No. Civ.A.03-3130, 2007 WL 1655483, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 6,
2007) (quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002)). Here, Plaintiff expressly
alleges that the force used against her son was exercised maliciously and without justification.
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-36; Pl.’s Mot. Am., Ex. C, ¶¶ 23-26.)
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The DOC is an agency of the Commonwealth and is therefore governed by 1 Pa. C.S. §
2310, which codifies the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310; see also Wesley v.
Hollis, No. Civ.A.03-3130, 2007 WL 1655483, at *14 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2007). Sovereign
immunity “protects the Commonwealth and Commonwealth parties from suit unless the cause of
action falls within one of several statutory exceptions, or the individual’s conduct falls outside
the scope of his employment.” Wesley, 2007 WL 1655483, at *14 (citing Savage v. Judge, No.
Civ.A.05-2551, 2007 WL 29283, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2006)).9 An employee’s conduct falls
within the scope of employment when it: “(1) is the kind that the employee is employed to
perform; (2) occurs substantially within the job’s authorized time and space limits; (3) is
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve the employer; and (4) if force was used by the
employee against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the employer.” Savage, 2007
WL 29283, at *5 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228).
Both the Amended Complaint and the proposed Second Amended Complaint include
state law claims for assault and battery, negligence and gross negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, as well as claims arising under Pennsylvania’s Wrongful Death statute and
Survival Act.10 Defendants argue that even in the proposed Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that the conduct giving rise to these claims was committed within the scope of
9
The statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity are as follows: (1) vehicle liability; (2)
medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4)
Commonwealth real estate, highways, and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous
conditions; (6) care, custody, or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard
activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b).
10
The Second Amended Complaint eliminates the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
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Defendants’ employment. (Defs.’ Resp. Opp’n 6.) According to Defendants, because none of
these claims fall within any of the exceptions listed in 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522, they are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Id.)
While it is true that Plaintiff’s state law claims are not included among § 8522’s
exceptions to sovereign immunity, it is unclear at this stage of the litigation whether Defendants’
conduct fell within the scope of their employment. Defendants are correct that the language of
the proposed Second Amended Complaint – which explicitly states that Defendants were acting
in the course and scope of their employment during all relevant times – would indicate that
sovereign immunity applies. On the other hand, the actual conduct described in the Second
Amended Complaint – the malicious beating of Plaintiff’s decedent without cause or justification
– is not consistent with the duties Defendants were employed to perform. See Wesley, 2007 WL
1655483, at *15 (“Where the alleged intentional tort was unprovoked, unnecessary or unjustified
by security concerns or penological goals, courts have ruled that such conduct does not, as a
matter of law, fall within the scope of employment.”).
Because the literal language in the pleadings conflicts with the nature of Plaintiff’s
allegations, the Court cannot determine with certainty whether the state law claims in the
proposed Second Amended Complaint are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
Court therefore denies without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and grants Plaintiff
leave to file a revised Second Amended Complaint and specify whether she is alleging
Defendants acted within the scope of their employment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts
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in the proposed Second Amended Complaint to support claims against Defendants under the
Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, there are other deficiencies in the proposed
Second Amended Complaint that render it insufficient as pleaded. First, it includes claims
against Defendants in their official capacities, which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Second, with respect to Plaintiff’s state law claims, the language used in the proposed Second
Amended Complaint fails to allege unambiguously that Defendants were acting outside the scope
of their employment and therefore unprotected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Therefore, while the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff must file a revised Second Amended Complaint in accordance with the
findings contained in this Memorandum. Finally, because the Court is granting Plaintiff leave to
amend, it denies without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. If Defendants believe that
the pleadings are still deficient after Plaintiff has had the opportunity to amend, they may again
move to dismiss.
An appropriate Order follows.
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