BAILEY v. HALEY et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS. SIGNED BY HONORABLE PETRESE B. TUCKER ON 3/22/2012; 3/23/2012 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(tomg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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TORI BAILEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
LYNDA M. HALEY, CAROL NAVON,
JOEL A. JOHNSON & THE
MONTGOMERY COUNTY HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 11-cv-01153

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Tucker, J.

March ___, 2012

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Lynda M. Haley (“Haley”), Carol Navon
(“Navon”), Joel A. Johnson (“Johnson”), and the Montgomery County Housing Authority (the
“MCHA”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 12)
and Plaintiff Tori Bailey’s (“Plaintiff” or “Bailey”) Response thereto (Doc. 15.) Upon
consideration of the parties’ motions with briefs and exhibits, this Court will grant Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
I.

FACTS

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arises out of the allegation that Defendants, acting under
color of state law, violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by terminating her Section 8 subsidized housing
benefits without due process of law. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 65-68.) The relevant facts are as
follows.
In the spring of 2010, Plaintiff became involved in a relationship with a former boyfriend
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of one Jessica Ford (“Ms. Ford”), causing a dispute between the two women. (Am. Compl. ¶¶
17-18.) On or about April 14, 2010, a physical altercation broke out between the two women
and criminal assault charges were subsequently filed against Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-27.)
As a result, Plaintiff received a letter dated July 21, 2010, from the MCHA informing her that her
Section 8 benefits were being terminated pursuant to 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551 and 982.552 for
engaging in violent criminal behavior. (Mot. for TRO, Ex. C.) On August 31, 2010, an
administrative hearing was conducted at Plaintiff’s request to contest the termination of her
benefits. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.) At the hearing, Plaintiff and a witness for Plaintiff testified
that Plaintiff indeed engaged in physical violence toward Ms. Ford, although Plaintiff claimed
she did so only in self-defense. (Mot. for TRO, Ex. D at 18-36, 47-48.) Detective James
Angelucci from the Norristown Police Department testified that Plaintiff was the aggressor in the
altercation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) The MCHA declined to subpoena Ms. Ford to testify. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 51.)
The hearing officer, Mark W. Voigt, Esq., finding that Plaintiff engaged in violent criminal
conduct, terminated her benefits. Plaintiff received notice of such termination via a letter dated
October 25, 2010, stating that the decision was “final,” and silent on Plaintiff’s right to appeal
such decision. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55-58.) Plaintiff did, however, receive verbal notice of her right
to appeal any decision resulting from the hearing while being sworn in prior to her testimony.
(Mot. for TRO, Ex. D at 6-7.) Plaintiff stopped receiving Section 8 benefits as of December 1,
2010. In March 2011, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct as a summary offense, and
all other criminal charges concerning the altercation with Ms. Ford were dropped. (Am. Compl.
¶ 32.)
On March 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, which was amended on May 4, 2011.
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The Amended Complaint contains one count, for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants violated her due process rights by: (1) providing insufficient notice of the events
giving rise to the termination of her Section 8 benefits; (2) terminating her benefits solely on the
basis of uncorroborated hearsay evidence and failing to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (3) relying on evidence outside of the record to
make a decision; (4) placing the burden of proof on Plaintiff to prove that her benefits should not
be terminated, rather than placing the burden of proof on the MCHA; (5) misleading Plaintiff
with respect to her appellate rights by stating in the transmittal letter that the decision was
“final,” without also informing her that she could appeal to the Court of Common Pleas; and (6)
failing to ensure the neutrality of the hearing officer. (Am. Compl. ¶ 68.) On May 18, 2011,
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6)
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and to view them in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384
(3d Cir. 1994). A complaint should be dismissed only if the alleged facts, taken as true, fail to
state a claim. See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2000).
The question is whether the claimant can prove any set of facts consistent with his or her
allegations that will entitle him or her to relief, not whether that person will ultimately prevail.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 173
(3d Cir. 2000).
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While a court will accept well-pled allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it
will not accept bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping
legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132
F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original). In
Twombly, the Court made clear that it would not require a “heightened fact pleading of
specifics,” but only “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at
570. A “pleader is required to ‘set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his
claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.’” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1
F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court revisited the requirements for surviving a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). In Iqbal, the Court made
clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements [will] not suffice” to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at
1949. “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief [will] survive[] a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 1950.
In light of the decision in Iqbal, the Third Circuit set forth a two-part analysis to be
applied by district courts when presented with a 12(b)(6) motion. First, the court must separate
the legal elements and factual allegations of the claim, with the well-pleaded facts accepted as
true but the legal conclusions disregarded. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11
(3d Cir. 2009). Second, the court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint
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demonstrate that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 211 (citation omitted). If
the court can only infer the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint must be dismissed
because it has alleged, but has failed to show, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Plaintiff’s Due Process Rights were not Violated1

1.

The Statement of Reasons for Notice of Termination was Sufficient
Plaintiff’s first due-process argument is that Defendants provided her with insufficient

notice of the events giving rise to the termination of her Section 8 benefits. Housing and Urban
Development regulations require that a termination notice: “(1) Contain a brief statement of
reasons for the decision [to terminate assistance]; (2) State that if the family does not agree with
the decision, the family may request an informal hearing on the decision; and (3) State the
deadline for the family to request an informal hearing.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(c)(2). On this
issue, Ervin v. Hous. Auth. of the Birmingham Dist., 281 Fed. Appx. 938 (11th Cir. 2008) is
instructive. The plaintiff in Ervin, like the Plaintiff here, alleged that a termination notice
provided insufficient notice of the reasons for the termination. 281 Fed. Appx. 938. Addressing
this argument, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a “statement of reasons” for termination of Section
8 benefits “must be sufficiently specific for it to enable an appellant to prepare rebuttal evidence
to introduce at his hearing appearance.” Id. at 941. The court held that the notice was sufficient

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At the outset, this Court notes that Defendants Haley, Nevon, and Johnson cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their
individual capacities because of the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. It is well established that judges and
prosecutors are immune from liability taken in the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial acts. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993). This immunity extends to include housing authority officials when advocating against a tenent in
administrative proceedings. See Perry v. Cty of Milwuakee Hous. Auth. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29009 (E.D. Wis. April 18,
2007) aff’d sub nom Perry v. Perez, 269 Fed. Appx. 589 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, Haley is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity for her role in Plaintiff’s termination hearing. This Court finds Plaintiff’s argument that Haley was acting as witness
rather than an advocate, and thus is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, to be without legal authority and factually
unconvincing in light of Haley’s role as demonstrated by the hearing transcript. Moreover, each individual defendant is entitled
to qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not allege facts showing that she suffered a violation of her constitutional rights, as
discussed herein. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

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when it indicated that Section 8 benefits would be terminated due to an unidentified family
member’s “‘[d]rug related activity . . . use of illegal drug sales and/or purchase.’” Id. The court
observed that the notice was adequate despite its failure to specify the individual alleged to
commit the illegal activity or the date of the offense. Id.
In this case, the notice letter provided a sufficient “statement of reasons” on a variety of
grounds. First, it was more detailed than the notice in Ervin as it specifically identified which
member of Plaintiff’s family was at issue. Second, given that Plaintiff had no prior criminal
record and was aware of the pending criminal charges against her for assault of Ms. Ford,
Plaintiff should have reasonably known what incident the letter was referring to and it thus
served the purpose of allowing her to prepare rebuttal evidence for her hearing. Indeed,
immediately prior to her termination hearing, Plaintiff stopped at the District Judge’s office to
pick up a document related to the criminal charges against her. Plaintiff was well aware of the
violent criminal activity in which she was involved, as well as the specific charges against her,
and thus had adequate opportunity to prepare for the termination hearing. Her lack-of-notice
argument is disingenuous and does not state a claim for a violation of due process.
2.

Plaintiff’s Hearsay Argument does Not State a Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff next alleges that the hearing officer erred by relying on uncorroborated hearsay

evidence of a biased witness, Ms. Ford, and failed to provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The rule on hearsay evidence in administrative
agency proceedings such as Plaintiff’s termination hearing is: “‘hearsay evidence, admitted
without objection, will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding of the
[hearing officer], if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of
fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.’” Zajac v. Altoona Hous. Auth., 626 A.2d 1271,
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1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1993) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In this case, Ms. Ford’s
hearsay statements, unobjected to and relied upon by the hearing officer, were corroborated by
competent evidence. Specifically, these statements were corroborated by an affidavit of probable
cause signed by Detective James Angelucci (“Detective Angelucci”) concerning the assault
charges filed against Plaintiff (Mot. for TRO, Ex. G); Detective Angelucci’s testimony that a
prima facie case was established against Plaintiff concerning such assault charges (Mot. for
TRO, Ex. E at 10); and admissions by Plaintiff and her witness at the termination hearing,
conceding that Plaintiff engaged in violent, physical activity with Ms. Ford (Mot. for TRO, Ex.
D 20-21, 48, 52.) Thus, the hearing officer’s findings were in line with the general rule
concerning hearsay in administrative agency hearings, and are supported by reliable evidence on
the record.2
As a wholly separate matter, Plaintiff’s claim that she was denied the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine witnesses is patently without merit as the hearing transcript
demonstrates that she clearly was advised of these rights at the beginning of her hearing. (Mot.
for TRO, Ex. D at 5-6.) Indeed, the hearing officer stated to Plaintiff at the outset “[y]ou may
cross-examine any witness the Housing Authority may present” (Mot. for TRO, Ex. D at 5) and
there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise.
3.

The Evidence Submitted Outside of the Record was Properly Accepted
Plaintiff further argues that the hearing officer violated her due process rights because he

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Further, the hearing officer is not named as an individual defendant in this case, nor could he be as he enjoys quasi-judicial
immunity. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978). Alternatively, even if a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action could be
maintained under Plaintiff’s inadequate training theory, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that the MCHA had a custom,
practice or policy of admitting hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings to the extent of causing constitutional injury; the
Supreme Court has noted that a pattern—and not merely one instance—of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate the “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights required to maintain a §
1983 action under the inadequate training theory. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997).
Thus, if Plaintiff has an issue with the use of hearsay evidence at her administrative hearing, the proper avenue is not a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action, but an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.

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considered evidence outside of the record in making his determination. This argument fails
because the evidence was immaterial to his decision. The hearing officer simply accepted
photographs of a witness for Plaintiff who falsely identified himself at the hearing as “Michael
Jones.” (Mot. for TRO, Ex. E ¶ 11.) At the hearing, Detective Angelucci questioned whether
this man was actually Raymond Cook, Plaintiff’s former boyfriend. The man falsely denied that
he was Raymond Cook, whom he stated was his brother. To establish that the man was indeed
Raymond Cook, Detective Angelucci submitted photographs of Raymond Cook to the hearing
officer. The hearing officer’s acceptance of these photographs—immaterial to his ultimate
decision and used only to clarify the identity of a witness testifying under a fraudulent name—
did not constitute a violation of due process.
4.

The Burden of Proof was Properly Placed on the MCHA
Plaintiff’s next argument is that her due process rights were violated because the hearing

officer placed the burden of proof at the hearing on her. This argument is patently without merit.
The hearing officer’s Decision concludes that the “MCHA has met its burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Tenant violated her obligations under the Program by
engaging in violent criminal activity.” (Mot. for TRO, Ex. E at 8.) This demonstrates that the
burden of proof was properly placed on the MCHA.
5.

Plaintiff was not Misled as to her Right to Appeal
Plaintiff further argues that she was misled as to her right to appeal, depriving her of due

process. Pennsylvania courts have found that there is no federal or local agency mandate
requiring administrative agencies to give notice to a party of his right to appeal, where such right
to appeal is duly published by the agency or the legislature. See Mogil v. Commw. of Pa.
Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 413 A.2d 480, 481 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (citing Walker v.
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Unemp’t Comp. Bd. of Review, 381 A.2d 1353 (1978)). The Pennsylvania Legislature clearly
sets forth the right to appeal from adjudication by a local agency such as the MCHA. 2
Pa.C.S.A. § 752 states that “[a]ny person aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has
a direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested
with jurisdiction of such appeals . . . .” Therefore, because the right to appeal was published by
the Pennsylvania Legislature, the MCHA was not required to give notice to Plaintiff of her right
to appeal the termination decision. Moreover, despite there being no requirement to do so, the
hearing officer provided oral notice at the hearing of Plaintiff’s right to appeal. (Mot. for TRO,
Ex. D at 6-7.) Thus, this argument is without merit.
6.

The Hearing was Conducted by an Appropriate and Neutral Hearing Officer
Lastly, and without the support of a single authority, Plaintiff alleges that the selection of

Mark W. Voigt, Esq. as her hearing officer violated her due process rights. Under federal
regulations, “[t]he hearing may be conducted by any person or persons designated by the
[Housing Authority], other than a person who made or approved the decision under review or a
subordinate of this person.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(4). Plaintiff has pleaded nothing to suggest
that the hearing officer did not satisfy these criteria. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
a violation of due process on this basis.
B.

Plaintiff has Failed to Plead that her Due Process Rights were Deprived due to an
Official Custom, Practice or Policy of the MCHA
As she must to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff asserts that the MCHA had

an administrative custom, practice or policy lacking in the proper instructions on due process
rights in conducting pre-termination hearings, and the MCHA failed to train its employees on
due process protections applicable in pre-termination hearings for Section 8 benefits. Having
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failed to state a claim for a violation of due process, Plaintiff cannot establish liability based
upon an alleged custom, practice or policy or failure to train. Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, this Court need not consider other issues raised
by the parties on this issue.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint will
be GRANTED.
An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Petrese B. Tucker
_______________________________
Hon. Petrese B. Tucker, U.S.D.J.

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