UNZICKER v. A.W. CHESTERTON COMPANY et al
Filing
182
MEMORANDUM. ( SIGNED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE ON 5/31/12. ) 6/1/12 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(gn, ) Modified on 6/1/2012 (gn, ).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEONARD UNZICKER
v.
A.W. CHESTERSTON COMPANY, et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
MDL-875
PA-ED Case No. 11-cv-66288
MEMORANDUM
DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE, USMJ
MAY 31, 2012
Before the Court, and resolved by our order of May 25, 21012 (Doc. 179), are the “Motion
for Sanctions” (Doc. No. 136) (“Sanctions Mot.”) and “Motion for Protective Order Concerning
Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice” (Doc. No. 137) (“Mot. Protect.”) filed by General
Electric Company (“GE”). The motion for protective order has been granted and Plaintiff’s April 18,
2012 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition notice has been quashed. However, pursuant to the parties’
earlier agreement and our February 17, 2012 order, GE shall produce a turbine witness pursuant to
the parties’ agreement under the original November 14, 2011 deposition notice. (See 01-MD-875,
Doc. No. 8453.)
Further, the motion for sanctions has been granted, and the unverified
“supplemental” interrogatory answers, which are the subject of that motion, have been struck. By this
memorandum, we now set out our explanation for the issuance of the May 25, 2012 order.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case is one of approximately 630 cases remaining in MDL-875 in which Cascino
Vaughan Law Offices (“CVLO”) is acting as plaintiffs’ counsel. It was referred to us by Judge
Robreno on June 9, 2011. Mr. Unzicker was a career pipe fitter who testified that he worked on or
around GE motors and controllers but could not say with particularity when or where he did so. (Mot.
Protect., Exh. A, pp. 10-11, 14.) He alleges that exposure to GE and other asbestos containing
products caused his lung cancer and non-malignant asbestos disease. (Sanctions Mot., Exh. A.,
Answer 3.) During discovery, he provided verified answers to GE’s interrogatories (signed on
September 14, 2011.) (Sanctions Mot., Exh. A.) He sat for deposition on October 4, 2011. (Id., Exh.
B.) In this discovery, he stated that he had never filed a lawsuit other than the current one and denied
knowledge of any statements which were relevant to this current lawsuit.1 (Id., Exh. A, Answers 14
& 29.) He failed to identify any co-workers in his answers (Id., Answer 20), and identified fewer than
ten by name at his deposition.2 (Id., Exh. B., pp. 7-11.) He also disclosed ten relevant jobsites in his
verified interrogatories. (Id., Exh. A, Answers 17 & 18.)3
On November 14, 2011, CVLO noticed the deposition of a “turbine witness” to discuss GE’s
land-based steam turbines at the relevant jobsites pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6.) (Mot. Protect.
Ex I.) GE objected to the notice claiming, inter alia, that the topics in the notice were overly broad
and that there was no evidence that Mr. Unzicker had ever worked around any GE products. (Id.,
1
Interrogatory 14 provides: “[s]tate whether you have ever filed a lawsuit for personal
injury or a claim for social security disability benefits” and Interrogatory 29 provides “[s]tate
whether you . . . know of the existence of any statements . . . from or by any person . . . which
has or claims to have knowledge concerning the matter alleged in the complaint, or who was or
claims to have been a witness to any part of the exposure alleged by you.” (Sanctions Mot., Exh.
A, Questions 14 & 29.) Plaintiff objected to Interrogatory 29, citing work product and attorneyclient privilege, but then stated that “[s]ubject to, and without waiving, the objection, Plaintiff
does not know of any.” (Id. Question 29.)
2
Interrogatory 20 provides: “[f]or each product identified in Interrogatory 19 [relating to
products to which Mr. Unzicker alleged exposure] identify . . . your coworkers, including persons
who worked with you or at the same job site, with knowledge that the product was on the
particular job site” or “with knowledge that you actually worked with the particular product.”
(Sanctions Mot., Exh. A, Question 20.)
3
Interrogatory 17 requests a list of “each and every job site at which you claim to have
worked with or around asbestos-containing products.” (Sanctions Mot., Exh. A Question 17.)
Interrogatory 18 requests the location of those jobs, the length of time worked at the job, and the
names and addresses of superiors and co-workers. (Id., Exh. A, Question 18.)
2
Exh. J.) CVLO then filed a motion to compel. (01-MDL-875 Doc. No. 8435.) We denied the motion
after being advised by the parties that they had reached a compromise and agreed to proceed with the
deposition. (01-MD-875, Doc. No. 8453.) The deposition was scheduled for April 10, 2012. (Id.)
On March 22, 2012, for reasons that are not clear to us, CVLO tendered a revised Rule 30(b)(6)
notice, which greatly expanded the scope of the original notice. (Mot. Protect., Exh. M.) GE again
objected based, inter alia, on its scope, lack of particularity, and lack of relevance to Mr. Unzicker’s
case. (Id., Exh. N.) GE did not, however, cancel the April 10, 2012 deposition. Regrettably, that
deposition did not go forward on April 10, 2012 as Mr. McCoy, CVLO counsel, was late in arriving
and GE, after a failed attempt to reach him by telephone, left the deposition site. After the court
intervened, the parties rescheduled the deposition for April 25, 2012, agreeing that it could be
completed after the April 20, 2012 close of fact discovery.
On April 18, 2012,4 two days before the close of discovery, CVLO served upon GE unverified
“supplemental” answers to GE’s interrogatories. (Sanctions Mot., Exh. C1, p. 14.)5 These unverified
answers, for the first time, identified, inter alia: (1) a list of approximately 180 deposition transcripts
allegedly containing statements relevant to Mr. Unzicker’s case6; (2) the names and addresses of over
800 new co-worker witnesses7; and (3) 17 new jobsites where Mr. Unzicker claims that he may have
4
The answers are dated April 13, 2012, but were transmitted by email to defense counsel
on April 18. (Exh. C1, p. 2.)
5
These unverified answers merely provided: “Client Verification to Follow.” (Sanctions
Mot., Exh. C1, p. 14.) CVLO has not provided us with any indication that these answers were
subsequently verified.
6
(Sanctions Mot., Exh. C1, Question & Supp. Answer 29.)
7
(Sanctions Mot., Ex C1, Question & Supp. Answer 20.)
3
been exposed to asbestos containing GE products.8 (See Sanctions Mot., Exh. C1.) Further, while
the “supplemental” answers, like the original verified answers, provided that Mr. Unzicker had not
filed any other lawsuit other than the current suit. (Sanctions Mot., Exh. C1, Answer 14.) A transcript
of Mr. Unzicker’s deposition from his l988 lawsuit was attached to the “supplemental” answers.
(Sanctions Mot., Exh. C3.)
On April 18, 2012, CVLO also served upon GE a new Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice for
the April 25, 2012 deposition. (Mot. Protect., Exh. C.) It was materially identical to the March 22,
2012 notice. (Id. See also Exh. M.) It is this notice that is the subject of this motion for protective
order. After GE received the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory answers, it objected to the
notice, withdrew its agreement to proffer a Rule 30(b)(6) turbine witness (Id., Exh. O.) and, on April
20, 2012, filed the current motions for sanctions and a protective order. (Sanctions Mot., Mot.
Protect.) Mr. Unzicker filed his combined response to both motions on April 30, 2012 (Doc. No.
143), and GE filed its reply on May 3, 2012. (Doc. No. 149.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Sanctions Motion
In response to GE’s Motion, CVLO argues that the service of Mr. Unzicker’s expanded and
unverified “supplemental” interrogatory answers two days before the end of discovery was timely
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) given that it was served before the end of discovery.9
While
8
In his verified answers, Mr. Unzicker alleged only ten jobsites. (Sanctions Mot., Exh.
A.) This number was raised to 27 jobsites in the unverified “supplemental” answers. (Sanctions
Mot., Ex. C1, Question & Supp. Answer 17.)
9
CVLO cites a one page opinion from the U.S. District Court of Oregon in which the
court allowed supplemental interrogatory answers five months after the original answers were
(continued...)
4
acknowledging the importance of keeping to the discovery deadlines in advancing this argument,
CVLO fails to acknowledge that the supplemental answers it served were unverified, contrary to the
clear requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) which states that “[e]ach interrogatory must . . . be
answered . . . fully in writing under oath.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) (emphasis added.) This
fundamental proposition is embodied in the August 4, 2011 Deposition Protocol which had been
rigorously negotiated by the parties and ordered by the court to apply to all CVLO MDL-875 cases.
(08-90330, Doc. No. 87, Exh. A.)10
It is for this reason that we struck these unverified
“supplemental” interrogatory answers.11
In Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566 (3rd Cir. 1974), the district court concluded, after a nonjury trial, that the defendant, Major Grenoble, was liable for the beating of the prison inmate plaintiff
given that he was in charge of the prison guards who where involved in the actual assault. Id. at 569.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish
that Grenoble had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in the unlawful acts of his subordinates. Id. at
9
(...continued)
served. Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Hansen, 130 F.R.D. 447, 448 (D. Or., 1990.) The fact
that this is the most persuasive case counsel could find shows the weakness of CVLO’s
argument. This case is clearly distinguishable since the court specifically noted that fact
discovery was on-going. Id.
10
In footnote four of the protocol, we concluded that “defense counsel is entitled to
verified answers to interrogatories and fact witness disclosures prior to the issuance of a notice of
deposition.” We explained that we did not anticipate that this would “be unduly burdensome
considering that, under Judge Reed’s Order of November 15, 2010, verified answers were to
have been [served] no later than February 21, 2011.”
11
While the unverified supplemental answers have been struck, Mr. Unzicker is permitted
to raise any claims that were set forth in his original verified answers to interrogatories or
disclosed during his deposition. Further, our ruling today is not meant to affect the manner in
which the parties may utilize Mr. Unzicker’s 1988 deposition transcript attached to the unverified
answers. (See Sanctions Mot., Exh. C3 & C4.)
5
570-72. While we recognize that this case arises out of a factual scenario quite distinct from our case,
its secondary holding is of significance here. Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a), the predecessor to Rule
33(b)(3), the Third Circuit held, as an independently sufficient basis for its ruling, that the district
court improperly relied upon Grenoble’s unverified interrogatory responses. Id. at 570, n.7. See also
U.S. v. $39,557.00, More or Less, in U.S. Currency, 683 F. Supp.2d 335, 340-341 (D.N.J. 2010)
(concluding that a party’s lack of compliance with Rule 33(b)(3) by, inter alia, failing to sign
interrogatory answers, was sufficient grounds to strike its claim); Villareal v. El Chile, Inc., 266
F.R.D. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (acknowledging that “[r]equiring a party to sign interrogatory
responses under oath serves the critical purpose of ensuring that the responding party attests to the
truth of the responses”); Tokarz v. TRG Columbus Development Venture, Ltd., 08-60190, 2008 WL
4533917, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2008) (holding that by failing to sign interrogatory answers, the party
was “deemed to have not responded at all” ); Overton v. City of Harvey, 29 F. Supp.2d 894, 901 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (striking as a summary judgment exhibit plaintiff's unverified answers to interrogatories
signed only by the attorney); Cabales v. U.S., 51 F.R.D. 498, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding that
unsigned, unverified interrogatory answers did not qualify as answers at all.)12 Mr. Unzicker has not
satisfied us that we should deviate from the protocol or this clear authority.
Having rested our determination of this motion upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Fed.
R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), we choose to take the opportunity to address the question of prejudice raised by
12
Judge Robreno, in this MDL, has ruled in a similar manner. Silver v. Foster Wheeler
LLC, 11-64218, 2012 WL 975876, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2012) (reiterating a prior holding
that “an unsworn declaration cannot be relied upon to defeat a motion for summary judgment”);
Deuber v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 10-78931, 2011 WL 6415339, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 2, 2011)
(citing Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 67 (3d Cir. 1989) and granting summary judgment
after finding that an unsworn expert report could not be relied upon to defeat summary
judgment.)
6
GE. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c) provides that a party who, inter alia, fails to timely supplement an earlier
response “is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence . . . unless the failure
was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1.) CVLO claims that their
supplementation was timely simply because it was served before the end of discovery. Under the
circumstances of this supplementation, we disagree.
This case was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
on March 21, 2011 (3:11-cv-00224, Doc. No. 13 (S.D. Il.).) (“Complaint”). By this filing, counsel
has certified to the court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), that “to the best of the [Plaintiff’s]
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . .
. the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (emphasis
added.) The Rule then requires the plaintiff and/or his counsel to have sufficiently investigated the
supporting facts relating to his claim and to certify “after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” that those facts provide evidentiary support for the claim or if “specifically so
identified” that the factual contentions will have support “after the reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint provides in its “General Allegations” that Mr. Unzicker
worked “as a pipe fitter at various job sites” and “was exposed to asbestos dust or fibers emanating
from the asbestos products and/or asbestos insulated equipment which was sold, manufactured,
mined, distributed, packaged, installed or otherwise placed into commerce by defendants [including
GE].” (See Complaint, p. 2, ¶6.)
7
The Complaint fails to identify, however, any specific GE products around which he worked
and only makes broad, general reference to locations where he worked and times when he may have
worked at those locations. These shortcomings raise significant questions about whether Mr.
Unzicker has the evidentiary support necessary to show a causal relationship between GE products
and his disease condition. It was under this circumstance that CVLO served upon defendants the
extensive supplemental discovery just two days before the close of discovery.
The Third Circuit has identified four factors that we must consider as we evaluate whether to
exclude evidence such as the untimely “supplemental” interrogatory answers:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the
excluded witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that party to
cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against
calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial
of the case or of other cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or
willfulness in failing to comply with the district court's order.
In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 721 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home
Ownership Ass’n., 559 F.2d 894, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977).)
It would be difficult to imagine a circumstance where an untimely, non-specific information
dump could be more prejudicial to defendants or more disruptive to the case management process
than what has occurred here. Clearly, GE could not be expected to undertake any form of sensible
due diligence with respect to the disclosure of some 800 alleged coworker witnesses, divulged two
days before the end of discovery, who might have information pertaining to the question of Mr.
Unzicker’s exposure. Similarly, GE could not reasonably be expected to undertake any due diligence
with respect to alleged exposures at 17 additional job sites where Mr. Unzicker may have been
exposed that are mentioned for the first time in the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory response.
8
Likewise, sorting through 180 deposition transcripts, in two days, cannot be considered compatible
with any kind of sensible approach to dealing with discovery in this case.
Finally, we note that CVLO, or its predecessor, the Law Offices of Michael P. Cascino, Ltd.,
acted as Unzicker’s counsel in what we understand to be an earlier 1988 asbestos case. Certainly it
would be expected that CVLO, not to mention its client, would have had knowledge of, or at least
some record of, the 1988 deposition transcript from that case which was among the materials
disclosed two days before the end of discovery.
Upon balancing the four factors, it is clear that, even if his “supplemental” interrogatory
answers had been verified, Mr. Unzicker would likely have been sanctioned by prohibiting the use
of the “supplemental” answers given the prejudice to GE. CVLO has failed to convince us that its
supplement was justified or should be excused.
B.
The Motion for Protective Order Concerning Plaintiff’s Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition
Notice
We now turn to the April 18, 2012, Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice, which is the notice at
issue in GE’s motion. CVLO first noticed the deposition of a turbine witness to discuss GE’s landbased steam turbines at ten jobsites on November 14, 2011. (Mot. Protect., Exh. I.) GE objected and
CVLO filed a motion to compel GE’s cooperation, which we denied on February 17, 2012 in light
of the parties agreement to depose the witness on April 10, 2012, subject to certain conditions of
which the court was not made aware. (01-MD-875, Doc. No. 8453.)13 On March 22, 2012, CVLO
13
CVLO’s contention that this order somehow negates GE’s arguments that the notice is
not reasonably particularized is wholly without merit. This order denied CVLO’s motion to
compel GE’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness due to the parties’ compromise and merely set forth the
deposition schedule agreed to by counsel.
9
tendered a revised Rule 30(b)(6) notice, which greatly expanded the scope of the original notice.14
GE again objected but did not seek to quash the notice. (Mot. Protect., Exh. J.) The deposition did
not go forward on that date and the parties rescheduled it for April 25, 2012. On April 18, 2012,
along with the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory responses, CVLO served on GE a further
notice which was virtually identical to the March 22, 2012 notice. (Sanctions Mot. Exh. C1.) After
receiving the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory responses, GE filed the two current motions
and refused to provide its Rule 30(b)(6) turbine witness.
The original November 14, 2011 deposition notice is entitled “Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition
of General Electric Corporation - Turbine Witness - issued 11/14/2011.” (Mot. Protect., Exh. I.) It
lists 24 subjects to be covered at the deposition “with respect to turbines erected or serviced by
deponent” at the listed jobsites for the years “1910 until 1990”, including such topics as sales and
customer service account representatives, contracts for erection and documentation of erections,
engineering files and specifications for asbestos materials, service work, material suppliers,
contractors hired for insulation work, the use and removal of asbestos materials, asbestos warnings
and protective measures, and communications with various safety agencies. (Id..)
The April 18, 2012 deposition notice is entitled “Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition of GE
Corporation [for] April 25, 2012.” (Id., Exh. C.) No longer is the notice limited to turbines. (Id.)
Rather, in addition to turbine specific subjects, the notice also lists the broader subjects of covered
or insulated electrical wire and cable, ballast, switching gear, motor winding, and arc shield “products
manufactured or sold by GE from 1950 to 1983”, “specifications for materials used in GE electrical
14
CVLO did reduce the number of jobsites to six after determining that no GE turbines
were present at the other four sites.
10
products from 1950 to 1983” and, “asbestos content of GE electrical products from 1950 to 1983.”
(Id..)
Regarding the GE products that would be relevant during the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition under
the April 18, 2012 deposition notice, Mr. Unzicker testified at his October 4, 2011 deposition that he
replaced GE motors and re-wired GE controllers but was unable to say exactly when or where he
performed such work. (Id., Exh. A, pp. 9-11, 13-14.) In his verified answers to GE’s interrogatories
(Sanctions Mot., Exh. A.) and during his deposition, Mr. Unzicker did not identify any other GE
products to which he alleges exposure, including turbines.15
As we recently reminded CVLO during a May 14, 2012 recorded telephone conference, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), requires that “[i]n its notice or subpoena, a party may name as a deponent a public
or private corporation . . . or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters
for examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) (emphasis added.) Even a cursory review of the April 18,
2012 notice demonstrates that it is seriously overbroad, unduly burdensome and fails to set out topics
with reasonable particularity. The notice seeks testimony regarding products Mr. Unzicker never
claimed to have worked around including covered or insulated electrical wires and cables, ballasts,
switching gear, motor windings, and arc shields. (Mot. Protect., Exh. C.) Further, the notice calls
for the production of a designee to provide information on electrical products for a thirty year period,
regardless of whether they contained asbestos or not. (Id.) It is clear that the notice is not reasonably
15
Until the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory responses, Mr. Unzicker did not with
any specificity allege that he worked around any GE turbines. Thus, the previous Rule 30(b)(6)
notices seem be unrelated to his allegations. Similarly, the date span of 1910 to 1990 appears
significantly overbroad. However, since GE and Mr. Unzicker agreed to a compromise and GE
agreed to provide a turbine witness for deposition pursuant to that compromise, we will limit our
discussion to the electrical products in the deposition notice at issue.
11
limited to products and time frames relevant to Mr. Unzicker’s work history. See W.L. Gore &
Associates, Inc. v. Tetratec Corp., 89–3995, 1989 WL 144178, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1989)
(finding that plaintiffs’ document request regarding “all documents relating to waterproof, breathable
fabrics” was overbroad and too vague to be considered reasonably particular, regardless of whether
the defendant knew the meaning of those terms); Constable v. Teledyne Indust., S86-654, 1988 WL
492337, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 19, 1988) (concluding that a document request regarding “litigation
and/or claim files” was simply too general under Rule 30(b)(6).)
We have concluded that this notice must be quashed. Not withstanding this order, however,
in light of the GE’s previous agreement to provide a Rule 30(b)(6) witness on turbines, and our
February 17, 2012 order, GE must produce such a witness, per the parties’ previous agreement which
was based upon the November 14, 2011 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice.16
16
CVLO, in their response, does not provide any serious opposition to the allegations
discussed above. Their response deals almost exclusively with the argument that they could not
have disclosed any earlier than April 18, 2012 in the unverified “supplemental” answers that Mr.
Unzicker worked at the Abbott Power Plant, located at the University of Illinois. CVLO alleges
that Mr. Unzicker did not remember that he worked at the power plant until he saw the turbine
drawings and files produced by GE in November 2011 and February 2012, respectively. CVLO
does not, however, indicate why they could not have disclosed this epiphany earlier than two
days before the end of discovery. The Abbott Power Plant is not mentioned in any document
submitted to the court except in the list of relevant job sites attached as Exhibit C to the
unverified “supplemental” interrogatory responses. (Mot. Protect. Exh. C1.) The University of
Illinois, however, is listed as a relevant jobsite in all three Rule 30(b)(6) notices as well as in the
verified interrogatory answers. Moreover, GE agreed to provide a turbine witness to discuss
turbines at the listed jobsites, including the University of Illinois. As a result, we further
conclude that since the November 14, 2011 deposition notice and the verified interrogatory
answers list the University of Illinois as a relevant jobsite, and because the Abbott Power Plant is
located at the University of Illinois, the November 14, 2011 deposition notice encompasses the
turbines at the Abbott Power Plant and those turbines may be discussed during the deposition.
We are unwilling to re-open discovery on the Abbott Power Plant outside of the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition, however, especially since CVLO already has the turbine drawings and files from that
site. We also do not comment upon the impact of any testimony regarding the Abbott Power
(continued...)
12
III.
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Unzicker failed to verify his supplemental interrogatory answers before the end
of discovery, those unverified answers have been struck. However, even if the supplementary
answers had been verified we would have still been likely to strike them for being unduly prejudicial
to GE, in light of their expansive nature and their submission to GE two days before the end of
discovery. Therefore, GE’s motion for sanctions has been granted. Mr. Unzicker’s most recent Rule
30(b)(6) deposition notice does not set forth the topics to be discussed with reasonable particularity
as is required by the rule and is overbroad since it relates to products about which there is no evidence
of exposure to Mr. Unzicker. Thus, GE’s motion for protective order has been granted and the
deposition notice has been quashed. Nonetheless, pursuant to the parties’ agreement and our February
17, 2012 order, GE shall produce a turbine witness pursuant to the original November 14, 2011
deposition notice to discuss the relevant jobsites listed in that notice, including the Abbott Power
Plant.
An appropriate order was entered on May 25, 2011 (Doc. No. 179.)
BY THE COURT:
/s/ David R. Strawbridge
DAVID R. STRAWBRIDGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
16
(...continued)
Plant since the only allegation regarding that specific location within the University of Illinois
was in the unverified “supplemental” interrogatory responses, which have been struck.
13
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