HARRISON v. MEGABUS NORTHEAST LLC
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE CYNTHIA M. RUFE ON 10/8/13. 10/9/13 ENTERED AND E-MAILED, MAILED.(jl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
LINDA HARRISON,
:
Plaintiff
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-5017
:
v.
:
:
MEGABUS NORTHEAST, LLC,
:
d/b/a MEGABUS.COM
:
____________________________________ :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rufe, J.
October 8, 2013
Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Defendant, alleging that she was descending a
staircase as a passenger on a Megabus when, due to the driver’s negligence, the bus suddenly and
unexpectedly jolted, causing her to fall down the stairs and suffer injuries. Before the Court is
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 28, 2010, Plaintiff and several of her relatives were passengers on the upper
deck of a Megabus traveling from New York to Philadelphia.1 This was Plaintiff’s first ride on a
Megabus.2 Plaintiff remembers being in heavy traffic for much of the trip, and especially as the
bus got closer to Philadelphia.3
At some point during the trip, possibly after the bus had entered the city of Philadelphia,
but while the bus was still on a highway,4 Plaintiff attempted to descend the stairs from the upper
1
2
Linda Harrison Dep. 36:18; 37:12-15; 39:6-8.
Linda Harrison Dep. 40: 4-6 [Doc. No. 17, Ex. A].
3
Harrison Dep. 40:16-41:1.
4
Harrison Dep. 41:2-24.
deck to the lower deck so that she could use the restroom. Plaintiff testified that the bus was
stopping and starting as she walked the short distance from her seat to the stairs, and she needed
to hold on to the back of the seats as she walked.5 The bus had been consistently jerking and
jolting for a long time before her fall.6 She could see the heavy traffic through the window.7
Other passengers confirm that the bus was in notably congested, stop-and-go traffic for some
time before the fall occurred.8
Plaintiff paused at the top of the stairs to wait for a safe moment to proceed.9 But as she
took a step, the bus jerked and she lost her balance.10 After her fall, her right ankle and toe
became swollen, and her ankle was discolored.11 A few days later, she began experiencing right
hip and lower back pain.12
Plaintiff testified that, in her opinion, the driver was driving too fast for conditions,
although she was not exceeding 55 mph on the highway due to the volume of traffic.13 Her niece
also testified that the driver was driving too fast for conditions.14
5
Harrison Dep. 42:24-44:15.
6
Harrison Dep. 43:10-22.
7
Harrison Dep. 43:4-9.
8
Portia Green Dep. 9:1-12 [Doc. No. 17, Ex. C]; Elaine Horne Dep. 8:9-13 [Doc. No. 17, Ex. D]. Portia
Green is Plaintiff’s daughter and Elaine Horne is Plaintiff’s sister.
9
Harrison Dep. 44:18-45:6.
10
Harrison Dep. 21:22-22:20.
11
Harrison Dep. 19:20-22, 48:3-20.
12
Harrison Dep. 20:4-19.
13
Harrison Dep. 42:7-23.
14
Rachel Horne Dep. 12:13-23 [Doc. No. 17, Ex. E].
2
The bus driver, Stephanie Clark, testified that she sometimes would make an
announcement asking passengers to remain in their seats in especially congested driving
conditions, especially in Manhattan, but she did not think the driving conditions on the day of
Plaintiff’s injury warranted such an announcement.15 She testified that the traffic that day was
heavy, requiring some alternating of braking and accelerating, but not abnormally so.16 Ms.
Clark was not aware that Plaintiff had fallen until after the bus arrived at the station and the
passengers had disembarked,17 and as Plaintiff and the other witnesses were also unclear as to the
physical location of the bus at the time of her fall, Ms. Clark was not able to testify as to the
specific traffic conditions at the time Plaintiff fell.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court may grant summary judgment only if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.18 A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the suit, given the
applicable substantive law.19 A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence
presented “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”20 A
party asserting a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to materials in the
15
Stephanie Clark Dep. 36:22-25; 37:19-25; 39:2-5; 43:6-15 [Doc. No. 17, Ex. F; Doc. No. 22, Ex. 9].
16
Clark Dep. 20:4-8 and 13-15.
17
Clark Dep. 26:4-29:9. Plaintiff used the back staircase on the bus, which cannot be seen from the
driver’s seat. Clark Dep. 45:3-9, 48:9-11.
18
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
19
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
20
Id.
3
record or showing that the materials cited do not contain admissible evidence to support the
fact.21 In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court does not weigh the evidence or
make credibility determinations; “the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”22
III.
DISCUSSION
To succeed on a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff must show that: 1)
Defendant owed a duty of care; 2) Defendant breached that duty; 3) the breach resulted in injury;
and 4) Plaintiff suffered actual damage.23 As Plaintiff notes, common carriers, such as Megabus,
owe passengers the highest duty of care.24 Plaintiff argues that Megabus breached its duty of care
by operating the bus in an unreasonable manner or by failing to warn passengers of a dangerous
condition. Megabus argues that the bus was operated in a safe and reasonable manner, and that
there was no duty to warn passengers that the bus might lurch or jerk in traffic.
When an injury is allegedly caused by the jerking, lurching, or sudden braking of a
common carrier, showing that the bus jerked or braked
suddenly or violently is not sufficient, of itself, to establish negligence in its
operation. There must be a showing of additional facts and circumstances from
which it clearly appears that the movement of the [vehicle] was so unusual and
extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger's reasonable anticipation, and nothing
short of evidence that the allegedly unusual movement had an extraordinarily
disturbing effect upon other passengers, or evidence of an accident, the manner of
the occurrence of which or the effect of which upon the injured person inherently
21
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
22
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
23
Estate of Zimmerman v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 168 F.3d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1999).
24
Connolly v. Phila. Transp. Co., 216 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1966).
4
establishes the unusual character of the jolt or jerk, will suffice.25
Here, the parties dispute whether the bus was traveling too fast for the existing traffic
conditions. Plaintiff admits that the driver was not exceeding the posted speed limit, but both
Plaintiff and her niece testified to repeated acceleration and hard braking by the bus driver, and
point to this as evidence that the bus was traveling too fast for existing traffic conditions.26
However, other than these subjective impressions, Plaintiff points to no evidence of excessive
speed sufficient to indicate negligent operation of the bus.27 Moreover, although the
appropriateness of the driver’s speed might, in other circumstances, create a triable issue of fact,
under the facts of this case such a dispute is not material, because Plaintiff has admitted that she
could (and did) reasonably anticipate that the bus might accelerate or decelerate suddenly while
she was descending the stairs. She, and relatives traveling with her, testified that the stop-and-go
traffic, and concomitant acceleration and braking by the driver, had been occurring for an
extended period of time preceding Plaintiff’s fall. Plaintiff testified that she could see the heavy
traffic through the window as she moved toward the stairs, that she held the seat-backs for
25
Id.
26
The bus driver was not asked about the speed at which she was driving in her deposition, but she
admitted needing to alternately accelerate and decelerate in response to traffic conditions
27
See Young v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-CV-1239, 2000 W L 33119425, at * 2 (E.D. Pa.,
Dec. 22, 2000) (“Compare Zager v. Pittsburgh Rys., 165 A.2d 30, 31 (Pa.1960) (affirming finding of no negligence
despite evidence that trolley car was going ‘pretty fast’ when its driver suddenly slammed on the brakes) and Smith
v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 175 A.2d 844, 845 (Pa.1961) (affirming finding of no negligence despite evidence that
‘motorman started the car real fast,’ causing plaintiff to fall to the floor) with Connolly, 216 A.2d 60 (Pa.1966)
(affirming finding of negligence where plaintiff presented evidence that bus traveled at an excessive rate of speed in
a congested area of traffic while swerving and cutting in front of other vehicles) and Tucker v. Pittsburgh Rys., 37
A.2d 547 (Pa.1944) (affirming finding of negligence where plaintiff presented evidence of street car’s ‘abnormal
acceleration’ to ‘five times the usual speed’ in ‘approaching, rounding and stopping on the curve’); cf. Schilling v.
Pittsburgh Rys., 145 A.2d 688, 690-91 (Pa.1958) (holding that trial court properly excluded testimony regarding
speed of trolley car where ‘witness was unable to testify as to speed in terms of miles per hour but only as to whether
the speed was unusual or excessive’”).
5
stability as she walked down the aisle, and that she waited briefly at the top of the stairs because
she was anticipating further jerking.
Additionally, a passenger who is standing or walking on a moving vehicle must
“recognize the inherent danger of loss of equilibrium”28 even in the absence of driver negligence.
“[I]t is not unusual for persons to lose their balance while standing or walking in a moving
[vehicle] if an ordinary or moderate jerk occurs. . . .”29 Plaintiff has put forth no evidence that
the jerking of the bus which caused her fall as she descended the stairs also had an
“extraordinarily disturbing” impact on seated passengers, which would support her claim of
negligence.30 Although Plaintiff’s niece and fellow passenger, Rachel Horne, testified that the
bus’s operation caused her to rock in her seat, courts have required evidence of more to find
negligent operation of a vehicle.31
Plaintiff also argues that the Megabus driver was negligent in failing to warn passengers
that the bus was in stop-and-go traffic and to advise that passengers should therefore remain in
their seats. Although neither party argues that the driver had a duty to warn imposed by statute,
regulation, or Megabus policies, Plaintiff points to the driver’s testimony that she would make
announcements advising passengers to remain seated in particularly heavy traffic. Regardless of
the driver’s usual practice, to succeed on a negligent failure to warn claim, the Plaintiff must
28
Mervine v. Aronomink Transp. Co., 35 A. 2d 255, 255-56 (Pa. 1944).
29
Hill v. West Penn. R. Co., 16 A.2d 527, 528 (Pa. 1940).
30
Connelly, 216 A.2d at 62.
31
See Watson v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 132 A.2d 718, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957) (finding negligence where
plaintiff was expelled from her seat by a streetcar’s jerk); cf Smith v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 175 A.2d 844, 846 (Pa.
1961) (finding no negligence where seated passengers were thrust back in their seats by a “violent jolt,” and
passengers testified that it was a rough and terrible ride, but only standing passengers fell).
6
establish that: 1) Defendant had reason to know of the danger; 2) Defendant had no reason to
believe that the passengers were aware of the danger; and 3) Defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care to inform passengers of the dangerous condition.32 If Plaintiff can establish these
elements, she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that she would have heeded such a
warning.33
Here, Plaintiff admits that the congested driving conditions were consistent and readily
apparent to the passengers, and moreover, as noted above, courts in Pennsylvania have held that
the inherent dangers of standing and walking (and, presumably, descending stairs) in moving
vehicles are readily apparent to passengers. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant was not
under a duty to issue a warning regarding the risks of descending the stairs on a moving bus in
heavy traffic, and Plaintiff is not entitled to a presumption that she would have heeded such a
warning.34 Given Plaintiff’s prior knowledge that the bus was accelerating and decelerating in
stop-and-go traffic and, in the absence of other evidence, the Court cannot infer that Defendant
had a duty to warn or that a warning by the driver would have deterred Plaintiff from descending
the stairs to use the restroom.35
IV.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that a trier of
32
Wolfe v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Overbeck v. Cates, 700
A.2d 970, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388).
33
Pavlik v. Lane Ltd. , 135 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir. 1998).
34
Pavlik , 135 F.3d at 881 (“one way the defendant can rebut this presumption [that an adequate warning
would have been heeded] is by demonstrating that the plaintiff was previously fully aware of the risk of bodily injury
posed . . .”)
35
Id.; see also Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 665 A. 2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 1995)
7
fact could not reasonably conclude that the movement of the bus was unusual, extraordinary, or
beyond Plaintiff’s reasonable expectation.36 On the contrary, the record evidence and testimony
indicate that Plaintiff did anticipate the possibility of the bus jerking while she was on the stairs,
and paused at the top of the stairs in an attempt to time her descent. Because Plaintiff cannot
show that a warning was necessary in light of obvious traffic conditions, that the movement of
the vehicle while she was descending the stairs was beyond her reasonable anticipation, or that
the accident itself demonstrates that the operation of the bus was negligent, the Court grants
summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
An appropriate Order follows.
36
Young v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., at *3.
8
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