NIXON v. DELAWARE TITLE LOANS, INC. et al

Filing 17

ORDER THAT DEFTS' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS GRANTED. PARTIES SHALL PROCEED TO ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL STAY THIS CASE PENDING COMPLETION OF ARBITRATION. THE CLERK OF COURT SHALL PLACE THIS CASE IN SUSPENSE, ETC. SIGNED BY HONORABLE JOEL H. SLOMSKY ON 5/23/13. 5/23/13 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONNELL L. NIXON,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-7005

v.
DELAWARE TITLE LOANS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
Slomsky, J.
I.

May 23, 2013

INTRODUCTION
Between December 1, 2009 and May 20, 2011, Plaintiff Donnell L. Nixon received five

loans from Defendant Delaware Title Loans, Inc. (“DTL”). DTL secured each loan in two ways.
DTL would place a lien on Plaintiff’s vehicle, a 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe, and also take title to the
Tahoe as collateral. In late 2011, Plaintiff defaulted on the fifth loan. After the default, he sent
three letters to DTL disputing DTL’s right to maintain a lien on his vehicle and expressing his
desire to arbitrate DTL’s right to collect on the defaulted loan. DTL did not respond to the
letters.
On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a Complaint against three
Defendants: DTL, Community Loans of America, Inc. (“CLA”), and Robert Reich. Plaintiff
contends that CLA is the parent company of DTL, and that Reich is the owner and president of
DTL and CLA. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two claims: (1) a violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and (2) usury in
violation of Pennsylvania law, 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 201, 408, 501–04.

1

On March 1, 2013, after waiving service of the Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 3), which is presently before the Court.
Defendants seek to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims in accordance with an arbitration
clause in the agreements controlling Plaintiff’s loan. Plaintiff does not dispute that arbitration is
warranted as to CLA or Reich, and the Motion will be granted as to those two Defendants as
unopposed.1 For reasons that follow, the Court will also grant the Motion as to DTL.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Plaintiff’s Loans

DTL is a Delaware corporation that makes secured loans to consumer borrowers. (Doc.
No. 1 at 1–2.) Interest rates on the loans are often in excess of 300%.2 (Id. at 2.) DTL holds as
collateral title to the borrower’s automobile. (Id.) For borrowers residing in Pennsylvania, DTL
also records a lien on the vehicle with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (Id.)
When a Pennsylvania borrower defaults on his loan, DTL retains the right to foreclose on the
collateral through self-help repossession of the borrower’s car. (Id. at 3.)
1

As discussed infra, Plaintiff argues here that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because
DTL breached the arbitration provision. He contends that he sent three letters to DTL attempting
to initiate arbitration before filing this lawsuit, each of which DTL ignored, and that DTL’s
refusal to participate in arbitration constitutes a breach of the arbitration clause. During the April
3, 2013 hearing held on this Motion, counsel for Defendants noted that Plaintiff’s argument only
applies to DTL because he did not send letters to CLA or Reich. In effect, Defendant’s position
is that the Motion is unopposed as to those two Defendants. Defendants reiterated this position
in their post-hearing Supplemental Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 14 at 1–2 n.2). Plaintiff did
not address this argument in his Supplemental Memorandum of Law, nor did he mention CLA or
Reich at all. (Doc. No. 15.) Consequently, the Court will consider Defendants’ Motion to be
unopposed as to Defendants CLA and Reich.
2

Although these interest rates are excessive, the rates are permissible under Delaware law
because Delaware does not have a usury statute. See Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d
616, 622 (3d Cir. 2009). Though the rates may be usurious under Pennsylvania law, as discussed
infra, a district court analyzing the validity of an arbitration agreement does not consider the
merits of the claims giving rise to the controversy. Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 386 (3d
Cir. 2007).
2

Between December 1, 2009 and May 20, 2011, Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident,
received five loans from DTL. (Id. at 16, 20, 25, 30, 36.) The first loan was made on December
1, 2009 for $1,050 at a 299.28% Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”). (Id. at 5, 16.) The second
loan was made on January 28, 2010 for $1,600 at a 357.06% APR. (Id. at 5, 20.) The third loan
was made on March 19, 2010 for $1,552.03 at a 362.26% APR. (Id. at 5, 25.) On this loan
Plaintiff received $1,000 and refinanced $552.03 of prior debt. (Id.) The fourth loan was made
on October 21, 2010 for $1,409.56 at a 360.32% APR. (Id. at 6, 30.) This loan was used to
refinance the remaining debt on the third loan. (Id.) The fifth loan was made on May 20, 2011
for $605 at a 362.6% APR. (Id. at 6, 36.) Plaintiff made payments of $745 on this loan. (Id. at
6.) These payments were applied to interest. (Id.) At the end of 2011, Plaintiff defaulted on the
loan.3
For each of the five loans, Plaintiff signed a “Loan Agreement, Promissory Note and
Security Agreement” (“Loan Agreement”). (Id. at 16–38.) Each contract provides as follows:
To secure the BORROWER’S obligations under this Agreement, BORROWER
hereby grants to LENDER a security interest in the Motor Vehicle described
above (“Vehicle”), all accessories and accessions to the Vehicle, and all proceeds
related thereto, including all insurance proceeds or refunds of insurance premiums
related to the Vehicle (all such property referred to as “Collateral”).
BORROWER agrees to provide a valid unencumbered certificate title to the
Vehicle and to pay any amounts paid by LENDER to the Department of Motor
Vehicles associated with the recording of LENDER’S security interest, as
itemized above, and that such amounts are non-refundable. BORROWER further
agrees to reimburse LENDER upon its request for any costs incurred by LENDER
in enforcing its rights against the Collateral.
(Id. at 16, 20, 25, 30, 36.) To comply with this term in each contract, Plaintiff provided DTL
information about the year, make, model, Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”), and license

3

Although it is not clear from the Complaint or the parties’ memoranda of law, it appears that
only the fifth loan is in default.
3

plate number of his vehicle, a 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe. DTL used this information to record a lien
on the vehicle. (Id. at 16, 20, 25, 30, 36.)
Each Loan Agreement also contains a provision entitled “Lender’s Rights in the Event of
Default,” which provides:
LENDER may, at its option, and without notice or demand, do any one or more of
the following: (a) declare the whole outstanding balance due under this
Agreement due and payable at once and proceed to collect it; (b) foreclose upon
its lien and liquidate any Collateral securing this Agreement according to law,
including by using self-help repossession; (c) exercise all other rights, powers and
remedies given by law; and (d) recover from BORROWER all charges, costs and
expenses, including all collection costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred or
paid by the LENDER in exercising any right, power or remedy provided by this
Agreement or by law.
(Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37.) To date, DTL has not enforced its right to repossess Plaintiff’s Vehicle
or taken any other action permitted in this paragraph covering “Lender’s Rights in the Event of
Default.” (Id. at 6.)
B.

Arbitration Provision

The Loan Agreements also have an “Arbitration Provision” which “describes when and
how a Claim . . . may be arbitrated.” (Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37.) A subsection of the Arbitration
Provision is entitled “Governing Law” and provides:
This Arbitration Provision is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§
et seq. [sic] (the “FAA”) and not by any state arbitration law. The arbitrator must
apply applicable substantive law consistent with the FAA and applicable statutes
of limitations and claims of privilege recognized by law. The arbitrator is
authorized to award all remedies permitted by the substantive law that would
apply if the action were pending in court. At the time of request of either party,
the arbitrator must provide a brief written explanation of the basis of the award.
(Id. at 18, 22, 27, 32, 38.) The Arbitration Provision explains how arbitration is initiated:
How Arbitration Is Started: Either you [the borrower] or we [DTL] may require
any Claim to be arbitrated. Arbitration is started by giving written notice to the
other party of the intent to start or to compel arbitration. This notice may be
given before or after a lawsuit has been started over the Claim or with respect to
other Claim [sic] brought later in the lawsuit.
4

(Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37.)
Under the loan agreements, the term “Claim” “means any claim, dispute, or controversy
between you [the borrower] and us [DTL] that in any way arises from or relates to this
Agreement or the Vehicle (excluding either party’s right to file and maintain a claim in an
appropriate small claims court) securing this Agreement.” (Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37.) The term
“Claim” excludes:
(i) [DTL’s] right to enforce our security interest and to obtain possession of the
Collateral by seeking replevin judgment or by using self-help, provided such an
action seeks only possession of the Collateral and not a personal monetary
judgment against you, or (ii) any individual action in court by one party that is
limited to preventing the other party from using a self-help remedy and that does
not involve a request for damages or monetary relief of any kind.
(Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37.) A borrower may opt out of the Arbitration Provision pursuant to the
following language:
Your Right to Reject: If you don’t want this Arbitration Provision to apply,
you [the borrower] may reject it by mailing us [DTL] a written rejection
notice . . . . A rejection notice is only effective if it is signed by all Borrowers
and cosigners and if we receive it within fifteen (15) days after the date of this
Agreement. If you reject this Arbitration Provision, that will not affect any
other provision of this Agreement or the status of your Agreement. If you
don’t reject this Arbitration Provision, it will be effective as of the date of this
Agreement.
(Id. at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff did not mail DTL a written rejection of
the Arbitration Provision.
C.

History of Litigation

As stated above, at the end of 2011, Plaintiff defaulted on his fifth loan. (Id. at 6.) On
July 26, 2012, Plaintiff’s attorney faxed a letter to DTL’s attorney stating: “Mr. Nixon disputes
Delaware Title Loans’ lien on the title to his automobile. Mr. Nixon’s loan is paid off, and his
title should be returned to him.” (Doc. No. 6-2 at 1.) The letter cited the language in paragraph
13(c) of the Arbitration Provision (“[e]ither you or we may require any Claim to be arbitrated.
5

Arbitration is started by giving written notice to the other party of the intent to . . . compel
arbitration”). (Id.) The letter also stated: “This letter is Mr. Nixon’s notice to compel Delaware
Title Loans to arbitrate its right to maintain a lien on the title to his car. Mr. Nixon chooses
the AAA [(American Arbitration Association)] as his arbitration administrator and desires the
arbitration hearing to be held in his home town of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.” (Id. (emphasis in
original).) DTL did not respond to this letter. (Doc. No. 6 at 5.)
On August 27, 2012, Plaintiff’s attorney faxed a second letter to DTL’s attorney. (Doc.
No. 6-2 at 4.) Plaintiff’s second letter essentially made the same demands as the July 26, 2012
letter, including a notice to compel arbitration. (Id.) DTL did not respond to this letter. (Doc.
No. 6 at 6.) On November 12, 2012, Plaintiff’s attorney faxed a third letter to DTL’s attorney.
(Doc. No. 6-2 at 7.) The third letter also included a notice to compel arbitration, and raised for
the first time a dispute with the interest rate charged on the loan. (Id.) DTL did not respond to
this letter either. (Doc. No. 6 at 6.)
On December 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed the Complaint with this Court against DTL, CLA,
and Reich. (Doc. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) for collection of unlawful debt, and usury in violation of 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 201,
408, 501–04.
On March 1, 2013, Defendants filed the Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
Proceedings (Doc. No. 3-2), citing the Arbitration Provision in the Loan Agreement. Defendants
argue that the Court must stay proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration. (Doc. No. 3-2 at
4–13.) On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 6),
arguing that the Arbitration Provision is void. Plaintiff contends that because DTL failed to
initiate arbitration after receiving his letters disputing DTL’s right to collect on the defaulted loan

6

or maintain a lien on his vehicle, DTL breached the Arbitration Provision, rendering it
unenforceable. (Id. at 9.)
On March 25, 2013, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. No. 9). On
April 3, 2013, with leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. No. 12). On April 3,
2013, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. On April 9, 2013, Supplemental Memoranda were
filed by the parties (Doc. Nos. 14, 15). The matter is now ripe for the Court to determine
whether the motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings should be granted. In deciding
this Motion, the Court has considered the items filed of record and the arguments of counsel at
the April 3, 2013 hearing.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Federal Arbitration Act:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3. The issue before a district court on a motion to compel arbitration is whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists. Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d
Cir. 1997).
When analyzing whether parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement, a district
court must determine: (1) “whether there was an agreement to arbitrate;” and (2) “whether the
agreement is valid.” Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 386 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Great W.
Mortgage Corp., 110 F.3d at 228). In conducting this inquiry, the court does not consider the
merits of the claims at issue. Id. The standard of review on a motion to compel arbitration is the

7

same as the standard of review on a motion for summary judgment. Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v.
Stockbridge Fabrics Co., Ltd., 636 F.2d 51, 54 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980). “Only when there is no
genuine issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement should the court decide as a
matter of law that the parties did or did not enter into such an agreement.” Id. at 54.
A written arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “The effect
of [9 U.S.C. § 2] is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
Federal courts strongly favor arbitration, and the text of the FAA “reflects an emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown,
132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per
curiam)). “[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25.
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Defendant Was Under No Obligation To Initiate Arbitration As A Remedy
For Plaintiff’s Default On A Loan

Plaintiff contends that DTL’s right to collect on his defaulted loan through self-help
repossession or otherwise (DTL’s “collection claim”) is the original “claim” at issue in this
litigation. (Doc. No. 6 at 4–6.) He characterizes his RICO and usury claims alleged in the
Complaint as “counterclaims” to DTL’s “collection claim.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff is mistaken,
however, in this characterization. Plaintiff’s RICO and usury claims are not counterclaims —

8

they are the original claims upon which Plaintiff has chosen to sue DTL in this Court, and which
DTL now seeks to arbitrate.
As stated above, the provision in the Loan Agreement defining “LENDER’s Rights in the
Event of Default” provides as follows:
LENDER may, at its option, and without notice or demand, do any one or more of
the following: (a) declare the whole outstanding balance due under this
Agreement due and payable at once and proceed to collect it; (b) foreclose upon
its lien and liquidate any Collateral securing this Agreement according to law,
including by using self-help repossession; (c) exercise all other rights, powers and
remedies given by law; and (d) recover from BORROWER all charges, costs and
expenses, including all collection costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred or
paid by the LENDER in exercising any right, power or remedy provided by this
Agreement or by law.
(Doc. No. 1 at 37 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff defaulted on the fifth loan at the end of 2011,
triggering DTL’s right to take action under the default provision. (Id. at 6.) Because the
provision includes the language that DTL “may, at its option . . . do any one or more of the
following . . . ” DTL was not required to exercise any of its rights under this provision, and
Plaintiff cannot force DTL to invoke its rights or initiate an arbitration proceeding to enforce its
rights. Though DTL had the right to repossess Plaintiff’s car or pursue any other right listed, it
was under no obligation to do so. Simply put, under the circumstances here, the right to initiate
an arbitration proceeding as a means to collect the debt owed by Plaintiff is a path that DTL
could have chosen, but was not required to pursue.
Moreover, DTL’s right to maintain a lien on Plaintiff’s car is not a “Claim” under the
express terms of the Loan Agreement, and DTL cannot be forced in the first instance to arbitrate
the legitimacy of the lien. (Id. at 37.) In a case involving Plaintiff’s counsel and DTL regarding
the same contract provisions in dispute here, the Third Circuit found that “[t]he contract’s
arbitration clause requires both parties to arbitrate any disputes, but there is a significant
exception to the parties’ requirement to arbitrate. DTL, the lender, is not required to enter
9

arbitration before seeking repossession of the vehicle through judicial process or self-help.”
Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, DTL’s right to maintain a lien on the car was challenged by Plaintiff in the three
letters sent to DTL. Although the provision of the Loan Agreement on “How Arbitration is
Started” permits a “Claim” to be arbitrated, specifically excluded from the term “Claim” is
DTL’s “right to enforce [its] security interest and to obtain possession of the Collateral by
seeking a replevin judgment or by using self help . . . .” (Doc. No. 1 at 37.) Consequently,
arbitration cannot be compelled over a dispute on the validity of the lien.
Finally, even if Plaintiff had the right to initiate arbitration on the collection claim, his
three letters to DTL were not sufficient to require arbitration. The July 26, 2012 letter to DTL
states: “This letter is Mr. Nixon’s notice to compel Delaware Title Loans to arbitrate its right to
maintain a lien on the title to his car. Mr. Nixon chooses the AAA as his arbitration
administrator and desires the arbitration hearing to be held in his home town of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.” (Doc. No. 6-2 at 1 (emphasis in original).) Although the Arbitration Agreement
provides that “[a]rbitration is started by giving written notice to the other party of the intent to
start or to compel arbitration” (Doc. No. 1 at 17, 21, 26, 31, 37), Plaintiff’s letters were not
sufficient to initiate arbitration. As noted above, DTL could not be forced to begin an arbitration
proceding over the lien, and merely giving notice of an intent to compel arbitration in writing to
an opposing party does not initiate an arbitration proceeding. Plaintiff may initiate the
proceeding himself and pay a filing fee with the arbitrator.4 DTL can then present any defenses

4

The Arbitration Provision provides that “[a]rbitration of a Claim must comply with . . . the
applicable rules of the arbitration Administrator.” (Doc. No. 1 at 37.) Under the AAA’s rules
governing consumer arbitration:

10

it has before the arbitrator. But the three letters sent to DTL did not commence an arbitration
proceeding.
B.

Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc. Does Not Support Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff argues that DTL has breached the arbitration agreement by not filing for
arbitration after receiving the three letters, and relies on Brown v. Dillard’s, Inc., 430 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2005), in support of this position. In Brown, Dillard’s fired Brown, who thereafter
alleged that the termination was wrongful. Id. at 1008. Brown then filed a notice of intent to
arbitrate with the AAA, including a short description of the nature of the dispute, and paid her
share of the arbitration fee. Id. The AAA sent notices to Dillard’s requesting that it pay the
filing fee and participate in the arbitration, but Dillard’s ignored the communications from the
AAA. Id. at 1008–09. Brown tried repeatedly to discuss the arbitration with Dillard’s. Id. at
1009. Later, on a conference call with a representative in Dillard’s legal department, the
representative told Brown that Dillard’s refused to participate in the arbitration because her
claims were meritless. Id.
Unsuccessful in her repeated attempts to participate in arbitration, Brown filed a lawsuit
in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Dillard’s alleging twelve causes of action. Id.
Dillard’s removed the case to federal court and then moved to compel arbitration. Id. The
district court denied Dillard’s motion. Id.

The filing party (the “claimant”) must notify the other party (the “respondent”), in
writing, that it wishes to arbitrate a dispute. This notification is referred to as the
“demand” for arbitration. . . . The claimant must also send two copies of the
demand to the AAA at the time it sends the demand to the respondent. . . . The
claimant must also send the appropriate administrative fees and deposits.
(Doc. No. 9 at 8.)

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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that Dillard’s
had breached the arbitration agreement, rendering it unenforceable. Id. at 1010. The court
reasoned that “when an employer enters into an arbitration agreement with its employees, it must
itself participate in properly initiated arbitration proceedings or forego its right to compel
arbitration.” Id. at 1006.
Brown is distinguishable from this case. First, Brown’s alleged unlawful termination was
a claim that belonged to her, not Dillard’s. Here, the “collection claim” Plaintiff attempted to
arbitrate belongs to DTL, not Plaintiff, and the legitimacy of DTL’s lien on Plaintiff’s vehicle
cannot be compelled to arbitration under the express terms of the contract. Second, Brown
initiated an arbitration by filing a notice of intent to arbitrate with the AAA and describing her
dispute with Dillard’s. She also paid her share of the arbitration filing fee. Here, Plaintiff did not
file a notice of intent to arbitrate with AAA and did not pay an arbitration filing fee. He merely
sent three letters to DTL stating that he intended to arbitrate the “collection claim.” This was
insufficient to initiate an arbitration. Thus, Brown is inapposite to the facts at issue here.
V.

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings will be granted as

unopposed as to Defendants CLA and Robert Reich. It will also be granted as to Defendant DTL
in accordance with the Opinion above.
An appropriate Order follows.

12

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONNELL L. NIXON,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-7005

v.
DELAWARE TITLE LOANS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of May 2013, upon consideration of Defendants’ Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 3), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Doc.
No. 6), Defendants’ Reply in Further Support of the Motion (Doc. No. 9), Plaintiff’s Sur Reply in
Opposition (Doc. No. 12), the arguments of counsel at the hearing held on April 3, 2012,
Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion (Doc. No. 14), Plaintiff’s
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 15), and in accordance with the Opinion of
the Court issued this day, it is ORDERED as follows:
1.

Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED.

2.

The parties shall proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the written
Arbitration Agreement.

3.

The Clerk of Court shall STAY this case pending completion of arbitration.

4.

The Clerk of Court shall place this case in SUSPENSE.

5.

Counsel for the parties shall notify the Court in writing about the status of this
matter every thirty (30) days.
BY THE COURT:

/ s/ J oel H. S l om sk y
JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.