METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF DELAWARE AND EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND v. ELLIOT-LEWIS CORPORATION
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. SIGNED BY HONORABLE HARVEY BARTLE, III ON 8/16/2013. 8/16/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(amas)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS, SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF DELAWARE
AND EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND
v.
ELLIOT-LEWIS CORPORATION
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-1658
MEMORANDUM
Bartle, J.
August 16, 2013
Plaintiff Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters,
Southeastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of
Maryland ("union") has initiated this lawsuit against defendant
Elliot-Lewis Corporation ("employer") under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to vacate a portion of
an arbitration award.
The award was issued pursuant to a dispute
resolution procedure contained in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement.
The employer counterclaimed for
confirmation of the award.
Before the court are the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The following facts are undisputed.
Defendant employer
serves the function of labor broker at the Pennsylvania
Convention Center ("PCC").
It hires, schedules, and assigns
members of the various crafts to perform work for exhibitions and
contractors at the PCC.
Plaintiff union is one of six unions
that work with the PCC and represents carpenters employed by the
employer, who perform labor work for exhibitions at the PCC.
The union and the employer are parties to the
Philadelphia Exposition Service Contractors Association ("PESCA")
agreement as well as the Customer Satisfaction Agreement ("CSA")
between the PCC and various trade unions.
While the CSA
incorporates by reference the PESCA agreement, it also contains
the following:
The parties expressly agree that their
respective collective bargaining agreements
now in existence, insofar as such agreements
apply to work performed at the Convention
Center, are hereby amended by this Agreement
and that this Agreement shall supersede any
and all provisions of such collective
bargaining agreements to the extent
inconsistent herewith.
Section K of the CSA, entitled "Dispute Resolution Procedures,"
provides:
2. Resolution of Disputes Impacting Ongoing
Work. To ensure the resolution of any such
dispute with no disruption of work, the
parties acknowledge and agree that the PCCA,
through its designated representative, shall
have the authority to render an immediate
resolution of all such disputes of any nature
in the course of the planning for and
execution of a convention, trade show or
other event, including without limitation
jurisdictional disputes.
3. Appeal to Binding Arbitration. Once
resolved as set forth above, an aggrieved
party to a collective bargaining agreement
shall be entitled to appeal the resolution
pursuant to the dispute resolution procedures
contained in such party's collective
bargaining agreement, except for
jurisdictional disputes which shall be
resolved in accordance with the Expedited
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Jurisdictional Dispute Resolution Procedures
set forth below.
The Jurisdictional Dispute Resolution Procedures state:
4. Expedited Jurisdictional Dispute
Resolution Procedures. Once a jurisdictional
dispute has been resolved as set forth above,
an aggrieved party to a collective bargaining
agreement shall be entitled to appeal the
resolution pursuant to the following
procedures:
(a) All parties hereto agree that the appeal
of a jurisdictional dispute shall be
conducted by and between the affected Labor
Unions claiming jurisdiction over the work
and the assigning employer (the "Interested
Parties").
(b) Within twenty-four (24) hours of the
resolution of such dispute by the PCCA, any
Interested Party who disagrees with the
resolution may submit the dispute to the
Philadelphia Area Labor Management ("PALM")
Committee in a written request for mediation.
(c) Within forty-eight (48) hours of receipt
of the written request for mediation, PALM
shall communicate with the Interested Parties
to explore a resolution of the dispute and
shall communicate in writing to all
Interested Parties whether the dispute has
been resolved and, if resolved, the outcome.
(d) If the mediation process has not resolved
the dispute, any Interested Party may appeal
the dispute through binding arbitration to
one member of a standing arbitration panel.
The demand for arbitration shall be submitted
to the PCCA, with contemporaneous notice to
all Interested Parties, within twenty-four
(24) hours of receiving written notice from
PALM (...)
In May 2012, the PCC hosted a large convention which
featured the exhibition of medical and pharmaceutical machines,
some of which were large, sophisticated, and expensive.
Work on
the convention began on or around May 10, 2012 and concluded on
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or around May 26, 2012.
Before the show began, the show's
manager informed the PCC and the defendant employer that some
exhibitors had expressed concern about union carpenters uncrating
and recrating their medical and pharmaceutical machines.
The
exhibitors requested that they be allowed to use their own
employees to do so.
The employer acquiesced.
On May 22, 2012 the union filed a grievance against the
employer for violation of Article 10, Section 7 of the PESCA
Agreement.
The union claimed that the employer impermissibly
assigned work to non-union workers.
The parties met on May 30,
2012 to attempt to resolve the grievance.
Unable to do so, the
employer sent a letter to the PALM committee containing the
union's grievance and requesting mediation of the dispute.
The
PALM process did not resolve the matter, and the employer
proceeded to arbitration by filing a demand with the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") on June 12, 2012.
The union then
submitted a letter to the AAA on June 27, 2012, in which it
asserted that the matter did not involve a jurisdictional dispute
and thus was not covered by the Expedited Jurisdictional Dispute
Resolution Procedures contained in the CSA.
The parties selected Stanley L. Aiges as the labor
arbitrator and on November 28, 2012, a hearing was held before
him.
2013.
Aiges issued his Arbitration Award/Opinion on February 25,
He concluded that the matter was a "jurisdictional
dispute" under the terms of the CSA and would thus be governed by
the Expedited Jurisdictional Dispute Resolution Procedures.
further ruled that the employer erred in not assigning the
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He
disputed work to the union's employees and directed the employer
to assign such work to the union in the future.
However, he
denied the union's request for monetary relief based on the CSA's
limitation on non-prospective relief.
in this court on March 29, 2013.
The union then filed suit
As noted above, both parties
have moved for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
A dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.
254 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
After reviewing the evidence, the court makes all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant.
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.,
385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).
When ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, we may only rely on admissible evidence.
See,
e.g., Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 95 (3d
Cir. 1999).
The standard of review for a labor arbitration award is
exceptionally narrow.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987); United Industrial Workers v. Gov't of the
Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993).
Courts are not
permitted to reconsider the merits of a labor arbitration award,
even if the award rests on errors of law or fact, due to the
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underlying federal policy that favors settling labor disputes by
arbitration.
Misco, 484 U.S. at 36.
As long as an award "draws
its essence" from the agreement being interpreted, the court is
required to uphold the award.
Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. UMW, 396
F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).
"An award draws its essence from a
collective bargaining agreement if its interpretation can in any
rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of
its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties'
intention."
Id. (citations omitted).
A court may not disturb
the award of an arbitrator "simply because it disagrees with the
arbitrator's construction of the contract... or because it
believes its interpretation of the contract is better..."
News
Am. Publ'ns, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918
F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990).
The union argues that the terms of the CSA clearly and
unambiguously limit "jurisdictional disputes" to disputes between
different unions, not to disputes between a union and an
employer.
According to the union, the parties' intent is clearly
evidenced by the fact that they used the word "unions" in the
plural as opposed to "union" in the singular.
The union further
contends that the arbitrator disregarded the clear language of
the CSA and essentially rewrote the agreement by using a "resultoriented approach" and erroneously relying on precedent from the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB").
The employer counters that the arbitrator's award did
not disregard the language of the CSA.
The employer maintains
that the arbitrator carefully considered both sides' arguments
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regarding the language of the agreement and its interplay with
the PESCA agreement.
According to the employer, the arbitrator
looked to the entire CSA, not just an isolated phrase, to
determine that its language did not limit the dispute procedure
to a dispute between two unions but encompasses the type of
dispute at issue here.
The employer cites two arbitration decisions involving
similar facts to support its position that "jurisdictional
dispute" encompasses the situation present here.
In those cases,
the arbitrators applied the Jurisdictional Dispute Resolution
Procedures despite the fact that, as here, the dispute was
between a union and an employer.
these precedents.
The arbitrator fully considered
Moreover, he considered the definitions
section of the CSA, which defines "Labor Unions" as "The Unions,
collectively and individually."
Finally, the arbitrator
considered NLRB precedent applying Section 10(k) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
The NLRB chose to interpret "jurisdictional
disputes" broadly, as defendant urges, and treat a dispute
between a union and an employer in the same manner as it treats a
dispute between two unions.
See Local 3, Intl. Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 266 NLRB 714
(1983).
The union meanwhile fails to point the court to any
authority that would support its position that "jurisdictional
dispute" is confined to disputes between labor unions.
Nor does
the union provide any authority for its argument that the
arbitrator's interpretation is so far outside the language of the
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CSA such that it fails to draw its essence from the agreement.
The union instead urges the court to second-guess the
arbitrator's reasonable interpretation of the CSA's language in
reaching his decision.
Given the narrow standard of review we must apply in
this case and the reasonableness of the decision reached by
Arbitrator Aiges, we conclude that the arbitration award indeed
draws its essence from the CSA.
the award.
As such, we decline to disturb
The motion of plaintiff Metropolitan Regional Council
of Carpenters, Southeastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and
Eastern Shore of Maryland for summary judgment will be denied and
the motion of defendant Elliot-Lewis Corporation for summary
judgment for confirmation of the arbitration award will be
granted.
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