CRAIG v. COLLINS et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. SIGNED BY HONORABLE TIMOTHY J. SAVAGE ON 9/17/2013. 9/18/2013 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(tomg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TAHMIR CRAIG

:
:
v.
:
:
NELSON COLLINS, ANITA AMARO, :
MICHAEL JAY, JOSEPH RYAN, THE :
CITY OF CHESTER and THE
:
COUNTY OF DELAWARE
:

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 13-1873

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Savage, J.

September 17, 2013

In this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the dispositive issue is
whether the defendant police officers had probable cause to arrest and detain the
plaintiff Tahmir Craig on murder charges that were dismissed six months later. We
conclude that they did. Thus, because the defendants are not liable under § 1983 for
false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, they are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
In his complaint, Craig named six defendants: Captain Anita Amaro and
Detective Nelson Collins of the Chester City Police Department; Lieutenant Joseph
Ryan and Detective Michael Jay of the Delaware County Criminal Investigation Division;
the City of Chester; and Delaware County. Craig contends that Collins and Jay falsely
arrested him for a murder he did not commit and failed to properly investigate the crime
before arresting him. He alleges that the defendants detained him for over six months
despite knowing that he did not commit the murder. His only claim against Amaro and
Ryan is that they did not investigate information provided to a police officer regarding

another possible suspect.1 Craig claims his unlawful arrest and detention were caused
by the municipal defendants’ failure to properly supervise, train and discipline their
employees.
Collins and Jay assert they had probable cause to arrest Craig, thus relieving
them of any liability. Amaro and Ryan contend that because they had no personal
involvement in the arrest or decision to prosecute Craig, there can be no supervisory
liability under § 1983. They also contend that they were not policymakers and cannot
be held liable under the municipal liability theory. The municipal defendants argue that
because Craig has not sufficiently alleged that they had a custom or policy concerning
the officers’ alleged conduct, Craig cannot maintain a Monell claim against them.
All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Because they raised factual
issues that were not alleged in the complaint, we converted their motions to ones for
summary judgment.

The parties had an opportunity to engage in discovery and

supplement the record.
In his four-page opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment,
Craig does not dispute any of the facts asserted by the defendants. His sole argument
is that while knowing that another suspect resembled the person in the video, the
Criminal Investigative Division was “dragging their [sic] feet” in the investigation of
Williams’ death.2 He also makes, for the first time, a vague assertion that the assigned

1

Compl. ¶ 30.

2

Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 2.
2

Delaware County assistant district attorney withheld “potential exculpatory evidence”
from Craig’s attorney once he asked for information regarding another suspect.3
Whether Craig has any constitutional claim stands or falls on whether the police
had probable cause to arrest him. If there was probable cause, as the defendants
argue, there is no basis for Craig’s constitutional claims and the defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Facts4
Devon Williams was murdered on May 28, 2012, in Chester, Pennsylvania.5
After conducting an investigation, Collins and Jay applied for a warrant to arrest Craig,
which was issued by a Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge on June 2, 2012. Craig
surrendered to police two days later.
According to Craig’s complaint, William Casey, a Chester police officer
dispatched to the scene of the crime shortly after the shooting, spoke to two witnesses.
3

“When Kramer asked McDonnell [the ADA] for more particular information regarding the
Stollens [another suspect] matter, she refused to give any more information regarding Stollens. Kramer
believed that McDonnell was withholding potential exculpatory evidence from him.” Resp. at 2. At oral
argument on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Craig’s counsel argued that the ADA was in
possession of “certain exculpatory evidence,” specifically knowledge of another suspect who may have
had a motive to kill the victim, which she chose to bury. Tr. 4:20-25; 8:15-9:9, Aug. 21, 2013. At the
same time, he emphasized that the ADA is not a defendant and he was not making any claims against
her. Tr. 41:13-14.
4

Pursuant to our Order dated May 30, 2013, which converted the motions to dismiss to motions
for summary judgment, defendants supplemented the record with additional documents. The additional
documents included the following: CID and Chester City investigation reports, the warrant to search
Craig’s home along with an affidavit of probable cause, the warrant for Craig’s arrest along with an
affidavit of probable cause, statements by two individuals who identified Craig from the newspaper photo,
statements by the victim’s girlfriend and an alibi witness, photos from the photo array, a still shot from the
video surveillance footage of a convenience store, two still shots from the video surveillance footage of
the incident, Craig’s signed statement refusing to answer any questions, event chronology sheet,
preliminary hearing transcript, the letter and materials sent to the FBI, the FBI examination report and the
state court docket sheet. The defendants have not contested the factual allegations as stated in the
complaint. Likewise, Craig has not disputed the facts asserted in the additional documents submitted by
the defendants. Hence, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
5

Chester City Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 3 (“Chester City Defs.’ Mot.”).
3

One witness observed the victim running toward the scene of the shooting. The other
saw a black male, wearing a white T-shirt and khaki pants, running away from the
scene. Casey was not given the height and weight of the fleeing man.
Collins and Jay, the detectives assigned to investigate the murder, retrieved a
surveillance video of the shooting from a nearby store. According to the investigation
report, undisputed by Craig, the video depicted a black male in a white T-shirt and tan
shorts chasing and firing at the victim, and then running away from the scene.6 Seeking
the public’s assistance in identifying the shooter, the detectives distributed a still photo
from the video to all local newspapers and television stations, which published the
photo.

A few hours later, the detectives received information from an anonymous

source that the subject in the photo was known as “Tahmir.”7

A records check

produced the name and address of Tahmir Craig and two pieces of photographic
identification of Craig. Comparing the photos of Craig to the still shot from the video
footage, the detectives concluded that the person in the photos resembled the shooter
in the video.
The day after the shooting, the detectives received a telephone call from
Mahoummad Zeinulaeewyn,8 the owner of a convenience store located across the
street from Craig’s home. He informed the officers that he believed the man in the
newspaper photograph was Craig, a patron of his store.9

A few hours later, the

6

Del. Cnty. Defs.’ Suppl. R. to Pending Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, at 4 (“Defs.’ Suppl. R.”); Compl. ¶¶

7

Chester City Defs.’ Mot. Ex. L, at 6; Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. B, at 6.

8

The defendants’ briefs refer to Zeinulaeewyn as Mr. Mohammed.

9

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. G, Prelim. Hr’g Tr. 53:19-23, Aug. 3, 2012.
4

13-16.

detectives received a call from Lee Jackson informing them that he believed that the
person in the circulated photo was Craig, whom he had known for over twenty years.10
Both Zeinulaeewyn and Jackson provided Craig’s home address, which matched the
one retrieved from the records check.
Acting on this information, Collins and Jay went to Craig’s address. After no one
answered there, they met with Zeinulaeewyn, who told them that Craig had been in his
store prior to their arrival, walked into his house, and had not been seen leaving.11
Zeinulaeewyn also reported that Craig’s mother and stepfather had been in his store
earlier that morning, reading the newspaper with the circulated photo. Craig’s mother
said that she needed a lawyer for her son.12 She asked Zeinulaeewyn if he had any
footage of Craig in the store on the day of the shooting to support a potential alibi.13
Zeinulaeewyn gave Collins and Jay video surveillance footage of his store from
the day of the shooting depicting a man wearing a white T-shirt and tan short pants.
Comparing the two videos, the detectives concluded that the subject in both videos was
wearing the same clothes and matched Craig’s description.

They did not ask

Zeinulaeewyn or anyone else to describe Craig’s height and build.14
On May 30, 2012, Collins and Jay applied for a search warrant. Based upon the
affidavit of probable cause, the warrant was approved by Magisterial District Judge

10

Chester City Defs.’ Mot. Ex. L, at 6.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Compl. ¶ 23.
5

Davis.15 The affidavit included the information from Zeinulaeewyn and Jackson that the
fleeing man in the photo was Craig and that the person in the footage at Zeinulaeewyn’s
store was wearing the same clothes as the man in the footage of the incident. Pursuant
to the warrant, the detectives searched Craig’s house the same day.

They seized

nothing.
That same day, Collins and Jay interviewed Kerie Hahn, the victim’s girlfriend,
who related that she had witnessed an altercation between the victim and some men in
a car a few days prior to the incident. From a photo array, she identified Craig as one of
the persons in the car who exchanged confrontational words with the victim.
On May 31, 2012, Zeinulaeewyn and Jackson confirmed that Craig was the
person in the circulated photograph.

They provided written statements to the

detectives. Each picked Craig out of a photo array.
Three days after the shooting, an unidentified individual stopped Chester Police
Officer Mark Barag, claiming he had information regarding the shooting.

By his

account, the victim had been feuding with a drug dealer called “Diddy” whom the victim
had chased with a gun the day before the murder. 16 According to this individual, Diddy
retaliated against the victim by getting another drug dealer associate from Delaware to
shoot him.17 The informant urged Barag to check the video surveillance on May 27,
2012, to verify the chase story. The informant did not profess to have witnessed the
shooting. Nor did he identify the shooter.

15

Chester City Defs.’ Mot. Ex. M.

16

Compl. ¶¶ 24-26.

17

Id. ¶ 29.
6

According to the complaint and not denied by the defendants, Barag relayed the
information to Collins, Jay, Amaro and Ryan. Craig claims they never pursued this
information.18 However, according to the investigation report, the contents of which
Craig has not disputed, the detectives unsuccessfully attempted to locate Diddy, Diddy’s
girlfriend and her brother.19 Because we view the facts in favor of Craig, we shall
assume that the detectives did not pursue the lead.
On June 2, 2012, Collins and Jay applied for a warrant for Craig’s arrest. The
supporting affidavit of probable cause, signed by both detectives, stated that the subject
in the footage from Zeinulaeewyn’s store was wearing the same clothing as the shooter
captured in the footage of the incident.

It also summarized the interviews of

Zeinulaeewyn and Jackson, who identified the subject in the circulated photograph as
Craig and picked him out of a photo array. The complaint was approved by a deputy
district attorney. Based upon the probable cause affidavit, Magisterial District Judge
Seaton issued an arrest warrant.20
On June 4, 2012, Craig surrendered to the police and was charged with first and
third degree murder, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, possession of an
instrument of crime, and carrying a firearm without a license.21 He was held without bail
in Delaware County Prison.

18

Id. ¶ 30.

19

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. A at 4.

20

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. B.

21

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. K.
7

On August 3, 2012, a preliminary hearing was held before Magisterial District
Judge Davis.22 The Commonwealth called Officer Casey, Jackson and Zeinulaeewyn.
It also introduced eight exhibits, including the footage of the incident, the circulated
newspaper photo, the photo array signed by Zeinulaeewyn and Jackson, and Craig’s
Facebook photograph.

The video of the incident was played as part of the

Commonwealth’s case. Finding that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie
case on all charges, Judge Davis bound the case over for trial.23
The detectives continued their investigation into 2013. On January 30, 2013, Jay
requested

assistance

in

conducting

facial

recognition,

and

forensic

and

photogrammetric analyses from the Pennsylvania State Police and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.24 On March 12, 2013, Craig submitted to a height measurement, which
determined that he was 5’5½” tall. In a report dated March 15, 2013 and sent on March
19, 2013, the FBI opined that the individual depicted in the footage of the incident was
approximately 5’11½” – six inches taller than Craig.

The report noted differences

between the individual in the incident footage and Craig’s photographs. At the same
time, it cautioned that Craig “could not be eliminated as being the questioned individual
based on the facial comparison.”25

22

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. G.

23

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. G at 71.

24

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. H.

25

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. J at 3.
8

On March 20, 2013, one day after receiving the FBI report, the Delaware County
District Attorney’s Office moved for a nolle prosequi of criminal charges against Craig,
which was granted on the same day. Craig was released on March 21, 2013.26
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Judgment will be entered against a party who fails to
sufficiently establish any element essential to that party’s case and who bears the
ultimate burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In examining the motion, we draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.
InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2003).
The initial burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of material fact
falls on the moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the moving party has met its
burden, the nonmoving party must counter with “‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986) (citation and emphasis omitted). Thus, “[w]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Discussion
Craig predicates his constitutional claim against the individual defendants on
three theories: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; and (3) malicious prosecution. In

26

Defs.’ Suppl. R. Ex. K.
9

essence, he claims that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest, detain and
prosecute him.27
False Arrest and False Imprisonment
False arrest and false imprisonment causes of action are intertwined. A false
arrest claim is “grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
seizures.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). A false
imprisonment cause of action derives from the Fourteenth Amendment bar against a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142
(1979). False imprisonment is the detention of one without legal process. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). An arrest lacking probable cause provides a claim
under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on the detention arising out of that false or
illegal arrest, implicating the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable
seizures. Groman, 47 F.3d at 636. Thus, both claims rest on a lack of probable cause
for the arrest.
To establish a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and false imprisonment,
Craig must prove that Collins and Jay lacked probable cause to arrest him. Groman, 47
F.3d at 636; Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). The issue is
not his innocence or guilt.28 Rather, it is whether there was probable cause to arrest

27

In paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Complaint, Craig asserts that the arrest and detention were
“carried out unlawfully, intentionally and maliciously, without just or probable cause.” He has proffered no
evidence to support this conclusory statement.
28

As the Supreme Court has stated, “the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will
be arrested.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). In Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), the
Supreme Court considered whether the mistaken arrest of one person (for whom no probable cause to
arrest existed) based upon the misidentification of that person as a second person (for whom probable
cause to arrest existed) violated the Constitution. The Court concluded it did not, writing that “[w]hen the
police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the
10

him. See Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005); Dowling, 855 F.2d
at 141 (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest or misuse of
the criminal process is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense
but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested
had committed the offense.”). In sum, there can be no claim for false arrest or false
imprisonment where the arrest was based on probable cause. Groman, 47 F.3d at 636
(citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 143-44).
Here, Collins and Jay did not make the call on probable cause. They left that
determination to a detached issuing judicial authority.

They presented the facts

garnered from their investigation to the magisterial judge who decided there was
probable cause to arrest Craig.
Reliance on an arrest warrant does not always provide a shield against a false
arrest claim. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). Where the warrant
was issued on the basis of an affidavit that knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, contained material false statements or omitted material
facts necessary to the probable cause determination, it may not justify an arrest and is
deemed inadequate.

Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87) (internal quotations omitted); see also Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If after deleting the false statements and adding the
omitted material facts there is no probable cause, the warrant is deemed illegal and

first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.” Id. at 802; see also Johnson v. Miller, 680
F.2d 39, 42 (7th Cir. 1982) (police officers’ mistaken arrests of a white woman pursuant to an arrest
warrant for an African American woman did not violate the Constitution).
11

invalid. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. In that case, the officer is vulnerable to a false arrest
claim.
Absent false statements or material omissions in the affidavit of probable cause,
there is no basis for causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment predicated
on lack of probable cause. Craig has made no argument nor presented any evidence
that the police falsified any information or omitted material information that created a
falsehood in the affidavit.29 Instead, he attacks the thoroughness and efficiency of the
police investigation. His attack is not premised on a constitutional violation, but rather
on negligence. 30

29

At oral argument, Craig’s counsel argued that the affidavit was misleading in describing how
the identification of Craig from the newspaper photograph actually occurred. Tr. 40:4-6, Aug. 21, 2013
(Q: “There are no false statements; correct? A: “Well, only potentially the misleading statement of how Mr.
Craig was identified.”) He stated that the newspaper printed two photos on the front page, one from the
surveillance footage of the incident and the other of Craig’s actual photo identification. Tr. 30:10-23;
33:11-34:3.
In a declaration filed later on the day of oral argument, counsel admitted he had been mistaken.
Aff. (Doc. No. 17) The front page of the newspaper depicted one photograph of the person captured in
the video surveillance. In other words, the only “misleading” piece of information counsel contested in the
affidavit of probable cause was not misleading or false.
30

Negligence “is not actionable as a due process deprivation of a civil right.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at
789 n.5 (citation omitted); see also Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir.
2007) (plaintiff “must show that [defendant's] failure to investigate was intentional or reckless, thereby
shocking the conscience” because negligently failing to investigate further does not violate due process);
Wilson v. Lawrence Cnty., Mo., 260 F.3d 946, 955 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nly reckless or intentional failure to
investigate other leads offends a defendant’s due process rights,” however, a negligent failure to
investigate does not violate due process); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992)
(distinguishing between police officer’s negligent failure to follow up on exonerative leads with situation
where police officer “knowingly and willfully ignored substantial exculpatory evidence . . . [and]
deliberately looked the other way in the face of exonerative evidence indicating he arrested the wrong
man”); cf. Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2007) (denying qualified immunity
on motion for summary judgment because defendant police officers “acted intentionally in hiding
exculpatory evidence,” which coupled with other evidence demonstrated an “intentional violation of, or
deliberate indifference to, [the plaintiff]’s constitutional rights”). Indeed, even allegations of gross
negligence do not state a due process violation. Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir.
2007).
Here, there is no evidence that the detectives’ acts—or their failure to act—rose to the level of
either intentional or reckless conduct, nor did they shock the conscience.
12

Craig does not dispute any of the facts recited in the affidavit supporting the
arrest warrant.31 He does not challenge the arrest warrant, either in his complaint or in
his opposition brief. Instead, his complaint reiterates and relies upon the facts recited in
the affidavit of probable cause. He makes no claim and has presented no evidence that
the warrant was facially invalid or that the affidavit does not make out probable cause.
Typically, the question of whether the police had probable cause is one of fact for
the jury. Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Patzig v.
O’Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)); Groman, 47 F.3d at 635. However, we may
conclude that probable cause existed as a matter of law if the evidence, viewed in favor
of the non-moving party, “reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding.”
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sherwood v.
Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)); Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d
782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000). In other words, if a reasonable jury could not conclude that
there was a lack of probable cause, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
The identification of an individual as the perpetrator of a crime by a comparison
of photographs may establish probable cause for an arrest. United States v. Scheets,
188 F.3d 829, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding probable cause to arrest where police
31

At oral argument, Craig’s counsel asserted that he is not disputing the contents of the affidavit
that was attached to the application for an arrest warrant. Tr. 3:16-19, Aug. 21, 2013. Mr. Oxman stated
as follows:
A. Well, I’m not disputing what the officers said. If we’re talking truly about the Fourth
Amendment issues in terms of unlawful arrest and detention, obviously since the arrest of Mr.
Craig was issued by a warrant from a magistrate, those issues are off the table. I think that the
only issue regarding this case surviving is the issue of malicious prosecution, which is a separate
issue apart from the unlawful arrest and detention.
...
Q: You’re saying that because there was an arrest warrant issued on the basis of
probable cause that there is really no claim for false arrest nor a claim for false imprisonment,
however, there remains a malicious prosecution claim. Is that what you’re saying?
A. Yes.
Tr. 4:1-17.
13

officers compared a photograph of the perpetrator at the crime scene produced by a
surveillance camera with a photograph of the arrestee and the arrestee himself); Grimm
v. Churchill, 932 F.2d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When an officer has ‘received his
information from some person . . . who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the
truth,’ he has probable cause”)(citations omitted); Mears v. McCulley, 881 F. Supp. 2d
1305, 1321 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (finding probable cause to arrest where plaintiff was
mistakenly arrested after being identified by his uncle and aunt).
In this case, two persons identified Craig as the shooter depicted in the
photographs distributed in the local media.32 The witnesses were not anonymous and
both knew Craig. Zeinulaeewyn had seen Craig as a customer three to four times a day
for two years.33 Jackson had known Craig for more than twenty years and knew where
he lived. Both provided statements and picked Craig out of a photo array as the person
in the video.
Collins and Jay also reviewed the footage provided by the store owner. After
comparing it to the video surveillance of the day of the shooting, they believed that the
person in both videos was Craig. From these facts, a reasonable officer could conclude
that there was sufficient information that Craig was the shooter, leading the officers to
apply for an arrest warrant.
Collins and Jay presented the facts they developed in their investigation to the
District Attorney’s Office. After reviewing the criminal complaint and the affidavit, the

32

Compl. ¶ 19.

33

Prelim. Hr’g Tr. 49:1-11.
14

prosecutor authorized the application for an arrest warrant. A neutral magistrate then
determined there was probable cause to arrest Craig.
Rather than attacking the arrest warrant, Craig faults the investigation.

He

contends that the detectives “failed to take basic required investigative steps in
connection with establishing probable cause” and “failed to reasonably interview
witnesses readily available, investigate basic evidence, or otherwise inquire if the
plaintiff committed the crimes he was charged with before invoking the power of arrest
and detention.”34 A failure to consider reasonably discoverable exculpatory evidence
may constitute a constitutionally deficient investigation. In other words, a plaintiff can
prevail on a false arrest and false imprisonment claim by showing that the arresting
officer ignored exculpatory evidence. See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790 (holding a police
officer cannot simply ignore or omit exculpatory evidence in an affidavit of probable
cause supporting arrest); Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1228-29 (11th Cir.
2004) (holding that an officer may not “conduct an investigation in a biased fashion or
elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts”); BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th
Cir. 1986). On the other hand, a plaintiff cannot succeed by merely showing that the
police could have done a better job of investigating or failed to exhaust all leads after
they had enough information to establish probable cause.
“[A] police officer is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically
plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest,” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229
(quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997)), and has “no
general duty to investigate further after acquiring information sufficient to establish

34

Compl. ¶¶ 47-48.
15

probable cause.” BeVier, 806 F.2d at 127 n.1 (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d
432, 437-42 (7th Cir.1986)); Patterson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 99-CV-4792, 2000 WL
1020332, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2000) (“Once a police officer has discovered sufficient
facts to establish probable cause, the officer has no constitutional duty to further
investigate in hopes of finding exculpatory evidence.”); Porter v. Gray, No. 05-CV-231,
2007 WL 464694, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2007) (although police officer could have
performed “a more thorough investigation” of allegedly exculpatory evidence, including
contacting a person with knowledge of the events, “these arguable deficiencies do not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480,
484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he issue is not whether the information on which police officers
base their request for an arrest warrant resulted from a professionally executed
investigation; rather, the issue is whether that information would warrant a reasonable
person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested.”).
Here, Craig alleges that the officers failed to ask witnesses about the shooter’s
height and build, and to investigate the information provided to Barag regarding Diddy’s
retaliatory motives.

The unidentified informant did not claim that he had seen the

shooting or knew who did it.
Having the positive identifications from two witnesses, the video footage, the
victim’s girlfriend’s account of the recent altercation between the victim and Craig, the
detectives were not required to investigate further before presenting these facts to the
District Attorney for approval of an application for an arrest warrant and to a magistrate
judge to make a probable cause determination. Significantly, the magisterial district
16

judge had the opportunity to visually compare the person in the video footage of the
shooting with Craig who was sitting before him.
In his opposition, Craig contends, without providing any evidentiary basis, that
the assistant district attorney withheld detailed information about another suspect from
Craig’s criminal defense attorney. According to Craig, that information was “potential
exculpatory evidence” and should have been provided. The assistant district attorney is
not a defendant in this case. Nor is there any claim that she acted in concert with any of
the defendants prior to his arrest and detention.
Malicious Prosecution35
To succeed on his malicious prosecution claim, Craig must show that: (1) the
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing him to justice; and (5) he suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding. See Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2002).
Initiation of the proceeding without probable cause is an essential element of a
malicious prosecution claim.

Marasco, 318 F.3d at 521-22.

Because there was

probable cause to arrest him, Craig cannot prevail on his malicious prosecution claim.
35

To the extent Craig asserts a malicious prosecution claim under Pennsylvania law, a finding of
probable cause defeats the state claim. Under the Tort Claims Act, a municipal employee may be held
liable only when his or her conduct constitutes a “crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.”
42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8550. “Willful misconduct” means the state actor understood the actions he took were
illegal, yet chose to take them anyway. See Johnson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 06-CV-4826, 2008 WL
3927381, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2008). Conduct is “willful” when the state actor “intend[s] to bring
about the result that followed, or at least [was] aware that it was substantially certain to follow, such that
intent may be implied.” Id. (citing Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Craig does not allege that the detectives engaged in willful misconduct. At most, he asserts
sloppy and negligent conduct in conducting an investigation.
17

Based upon this undisputed evidence, viewed in Craig’s favor, a reasonable jury
could not find that the defendants did not have probable cause to arrest and detain
Craig. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Qualified Immunity
Collins and Jay are also entitled to qualified immunity. Based on the information
they possessed at the time of the arrest, it was reasonable for them to mistake the
existence of probable cause. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)
(“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some
cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and . . .
should not be personally liable.”); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (immunity
should be recognized where officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
whether there was probable cause to support a warrant).
Collins and Jay relied on an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.
Whether a police officer who applied for an arrest warrant is protected by qualified
immunity from liability under § 1983 depends upon whether “the warrant application is
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render [the] offic[ers’] belief in its existence
unreasonable[.]” Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45; see also Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing
Malley and stating that a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity where grounds for
probable cause stated in warrant application were objectively reasonable).

The

standard in determining the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the existence of
probable cause is “whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he therefore should not have applied

18

for the warrant under the conditions.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at
345).
We cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would have known that his affidavit
failed to establish probable cause based on the information Collins and Jay possessed
at the time they applied for the arrest warrant. Two persons identified the photograph of
the shooter distributed in the local media. Jackson stated that he knew Craig for more
than twenty years and knew where he lived. The store owner had seen Craig in his
store three to four times a week for the past two years. As Craig himself alleges, Collins
and Jay reviewed the footage provided by the store owner and compared it to the video
surveillance obtained on the day of the shooting. They believed that the subject in both
videos matched Craig’s description. They also believed the individual in the shooting
video was wearing similar clothes to the individual in the store video. Because the
detectives believed they had probable cause for an arrest and they did not misrepresent
or omit material facts in their affidavit, they were entitled to rely on a neutral magistrate’s
independent determination of probable cause.

Accordingly, they are protected by

qualified immunity.
Conclusion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Craig and drawing all
inferences in his favor, we conclude that the undisputed material facts could not lead a
reasonable jury to find a lack of probable cause. On the contrary, the uncontradicted
evidence establishes probable cause to arrest Craig.
A finding of probable cause is fatal to all of Craig’s federal claims.

He has

produced no evidence showing that the arrest warrant was issued without probable
19

cause. His complaints about the thoroughness of the police investigation do not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation. Absent a constitutional violation, there can be no
municipal liability.36 Furthermore, Craig produced no evidence to support his conclusory
claim of Monell liability. Therefore, all defendants are entitled to summary judgment as
a matter of law.

36

See Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 482 (3d
Cir. 2003) (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (“[F]or there to be
municipal liability, there still must be a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.”)).
20