DOMINGUEZ v. YAHOO, INC.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED; ETC.. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MICHAEL M. BAYLSON ON 3/20/14. 3/20/14 ENTERED AND E-MAILED, MAILED.(jl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BILL H. DOMINGUEZ, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated,
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
March 20 , 2014
Surely, one of the unwelcome consequences of the digital age are unsolicited messages,
telephone calls, and emails. However, this phenomenon is not new. Unwelcome circumstances
have faced characters in literature and opera for centuries. Victims of circumstance are often
portrayed by Shakespeare – Hamlet, Othello, Shylock; and in opera, Verdi’s Don Carlos, who
without fault, loses his fiancée, Elisabeth of Valois, to his own father, King Phillip of Spain, who
marries Elisabeth to ensure peace with France.
In this case, Plaintiff Bill Dominguez is also a victim of circumstance. Plaintiff
purchased a cellular telephone and was assigned a phone number. The previous owner of the
telephone number had enrolled the number in a text message system of Defendant, Yahoo!, Inc.
(“Yahoo”). Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers, initiated this
class action lawsuit against Defendant, Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo”) to challenge Yahoo’s practice of
sending unsolicited text messages to cellular telephone numbers owned by individuals who never
consented to receive such text messages. He seeks statutory damages, treble damages, costs,
fees, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction on behalf of his claim. Is Yahoo responsible for
Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Yahoo on April 10, 2013. ECF 1. Plaintiff alleges
that Yahoo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), enacted by Congress in
1991. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that “[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Yahoo served its Answer to the Complaint on June 10, 2013. On June 18, 2013, Yahoo
filed this Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 14, and a Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF
15. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on June 26,
2013. ECF 19. Yahoo submitted its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on
July 3, 2013, which it amended the same day. ECF 22-23.
On August 16, 2013, this Court issued an Order instructing Yahoo to produce certain
categories of documents and setting a schedule for supplemental briefing in response to Yahoo’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 28. On December 20, 2013, following discovery, Plaintiff
filed his Opposition to Yahoo’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 39. Plaintiff also included
a Response to Yahoo’s Statement of Undisputed Facts. ECF 39-2. Yahoo filed its Reply to
Plaintiff’s Opposition on February 27, 2014. ECF 47. On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Sur
Reply in Support of his Opposition. ECF 53.
This Court held oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment and related briefing
on March 11, 2014.
The Parties’ Contentions
A. Yahoo’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Yahoo does not dispute that Plaintiff received text messages solely because a Yahoo
subscriber, who previously used the same mobile phone number that was subsequently assigned
to Plaintiff, affirmatively signed up to receive text messages each time he received an email in
his Yahoo email inbox. Yahoo argues that the TCPA only prohibits unsolicited automated
telemarketing and bulk communications sent via an Automatic Telephone Dialing System
(“ATDS”), which means a system that has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to
be called using a random or sequential number generator, and dials those numbers. 47 U.S.C. §
Yahoo contends that its system is not an ATDS because the system lacks the capacity to
store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.
Yahoo also disputes that the messages it sent fall within the purview of the TCPA, which
was intended to regulate the sending of unsolicited advertisements or bulk communication, not
messages forwarded at the request of a user. Yahoo asks this court to conclude that the TCPA
does not apply to the present facts because the notifications were specifically requested, and sent
to the mobile phone number provided by a Yahoo email account user at the user’s request and
only once the user had received an email.
B. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
To begin, Plaintiff points out that Yahoo does not dispute that Plaintiff himself never
solicited the text messages that he received from Yahoo, and he argues that consent must be
given from the current subscriber, not a previous owner of the telephone number.
Plaintiff then disputes Yahoo’s contention that its system is not an ATDS. Plaintiff
argues that courts must look to the system’s capacities, not the way in which it is actually used,
and argues that the capacities of Yahoo’s system fall within the statutory definition. ECF 39
(Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) at 13 (citing Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569
F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006)).
In support of his position, Plaintiff relies on the Declaration of Randall Snyder, a
purported expert in the fields of wireline and wireless telecommunications networking
technology, 1 and the deposition testimony of Yahoo’s corporate representative, Mr.
Gopalkrishna. ECF 39 (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) (citing Snyder Decl.;
Gopalkrishna Dep. 52:8-15, 53:4-54:8, 70:14-73:17, 94:20-95:13).
C. Yahoo’s Reply
In Reply, Yahoo contends that Mr. Snyder’s opinion does not create a material factual
dispute because he merely states a legal conclusion that the Email SMS Service is an ATDS, and
that conclusion is based on an illogical interpretation of the statute. Yahoo specifically takes
issue with Mr. Snyder’s interpretation of the term “sequential” (Mr. Synder defines the term to
mean that messages are sent “one at a time” as opposed to all at once), his misunderstanding that
the statute concerns sequential sending of text messages as opposed to the generation of
telephone numbers, and his acknowledgement, in deposition testimony, that, based on his
interpretation of the statutory language, every text message system currently in existence sends
messages sequentially. Moreover, Yahoo argues, Mr. Snyder has not reviewed any of the
messages sent via the Email SMS 2 Service or the software or programming used by the Email
SMS Service, but only reviewed the written specifications that Mr. Snyder admitted may differ
from the way in which the system actually works.
Mr. Snyder has been retained as a testifying or consulting expert in 65 cases regarding cellular technology,
including 41 cases regarding text messaging technology, and 33 cases regarding the TCPA and associated
regulations. Snyder Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff also submitted to this Court a Notice containing Supplemental Authority in
support of his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, in which the Southern District of California relied on a
declaration offered by Mr. Snyder regarding Yahoo’s text messaging service. ECF 46 (containing Memorandum of
Law Denying Motion for Summary Judgment, Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 13cv0041 (Feb. 3, 2014 S.D. Cal.)).
Mr. Snyder did admit in his deposition that the technology at issue in Sherman is different from that at issue in the
present litigation. Declaration of Justin A. Barton in Support of Def.’s Reply to Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1
(Snyder Dep.) at 136:17-137:4.
SMS is an acronym for “short message service,” or what is more commonly referred to as text messaging.
Yahoo also argues that this Court should not credit Mr. Snyder’s opinions because they
are driven by his own personal interest, since his wife is the named plaintiff in a class action
lawsuit related to his son’s receipt of a single, unsolicited text message from a recycled phone
number. ECF 47 (Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.) at 12 (citing Snyder Tr. 45:1250:15). Yahoo contends that his wife’s class action would be directly undermined if this Court
rejects Mr. Snyder’s conclusions here. Lastly, Yahoo argues that Mr. Snyder lacks credibility
because he is personally interested in fighting against “spam” text messages and earns 80-90% of
his income from testifying in TCPA cases. Id. at 13 (citing Snyder Tr. 52-:14-53:17, 75:4-8,
D. Plaintiff’s Sur Reply
Plaintiff submitted a short Sur Reply arguing that the testimony from Yahoo’s own
witness shows that the Email SMS Service is an ATDS, responding to Yahoo’s arguments
regarding the definition of the term “sequential,” and defending the validity of the Snyder
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue
is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is
“material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular
issue at trial, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
After the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party’s response must, “by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule [ ] set out specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails
to rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the
light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
The TCPA prohibits any person from making:
any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made
with the prior express consent of the called party) using any
[ATDS] . . .
(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone
service . . . or any service for which the called party is charged for
the call . . . .
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 3
As the Third Circuit explained, “Congress passed the TCPA to protect individual
consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted calls.” Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727
F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 740,
181 L. Ed. 2d 881 (2012)).
Yahoo “assume[s] without conceding for purposes of this motion that a text message constitutes a ‘call’ within the
meaning of the TCPA.” ECF 14 (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.) at 6. Federal courts have made clear that the TCPA
applies to text messages as well as voice calls. Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C. Rcd.
15391 (2012) and Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)).
The parties disputes relate to two issues: first, whether Yahoo’s Email SMS Service
meets the statute’s definition of an “ATDS,” and second, whether the messages sent to Plaintiff
constitute advertisements such that they are covered by the statute.
The statute defines an ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or
produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B)
to dial such numbers.” Id. § 227(a)(1).
The Ninth Circuit clarified that when a court evaluates the issue of whether equipment is
an ATDS, “the statute’s clear language mandates that the focus must be on whether the
equipment has the capacity ‘to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random
or sequential number generator.’” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951
(2009) (emphasis in original). The court continued: “[A] system need not actually store,
produce, or call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it need only have the
capacity to do so.” 4 Id.
From the mid-2000s until June 2011, Yahoo offered its email account holders the option
to sign up for a program that allowed customers to register a mobile telephone number to which
Yahoo would send an SMS or text message to the customer when he or she received an email.
ECF 14 at 2. The parties largely agree on the basic functions of the system Yahoo used to send
these text message, or what the parties refer to as the Email SMS Service. That system
automatically converted email messages into a truncated format, accessed the appropriate user’s
telephone number from a stored list, and automatically sent the text message to the customer’s
Recently, courts and commentators have observed that many modern technological devices, including
smartphones, could store or produce numbers and dial such numbers without human intervention if outfitted with the
requisite software. Thus, they have drawn a distinction between a system’s present capacity (as currently designed)
and its potential capacity. See Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., No. C12-0576RSL, 2014 WL 494862, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 7, 2014); Hunt v. 21st Mortg. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-2697-WMA, 2013 WL 5230061, at *4 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 17, 2013); 1 Data Sec. & Privacy Law § 9:69 (2013).
mobile device. Id. at 3; Gopalkrishna Dep. 52:8-15, 72:20-73:13. 5 Mr. Ajay Gopalkrishna is
employed by Yahoo as the Senior Product Manager for Yahoo! Mail Anti-Spam and Delivery,
through which he has personal knowledge and/or information regarding Yahoo’s Email SMS
System. Gopalkrishna Decl. ¶ 1. The Email SMS Service also included a queuing program that
would order and store outgoing text messages. Gopalkrishna Dep. 98:2-7.
The parties do dispute, however, whether the system’s capabilities fall within the
statutory definition of an ATDS. Yahoo argues that Plaintiff has not shown that its system could
or did have the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers. Further,
Yahoo offers the Declaration of Ajay Gopalkrishna as evidence that its system did not in fact
have that capacity. ECF 14-1 (“Gopalkrishna Decl.”). In his Declaration, Mr. Gopalkrishna
asserts that “[t]he servers and systems affiliated with the Email SMS Service did not have the
capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential
number generator, and to call those numbers.” Id. ¶ 13.
Yahoo contends that Mr. Gopalkrishna’s testimony demonstrates that Yahoo’s Email
SMS System does not constitute an ATDS under the TCPA, because a system that does not have
the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called by using a random or sequential
generator cannot satisfy the statutory definition.
Plaintiff tries to dispute Mr. Gopalkrishna’s Declaration, by alleging that he contradicted
his Declaration in deposition testimony and by submitting their own expert Declaration from Mr.
Randall A. Snyder. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Gopalkrishna’s deposition testimony undercuts the
conclusions in his Declaration because he testified that the system does store cellular telephone
numbers; the system sends text messages to those cellular telephone numbers automatically, or in
Plaintiff attached a transcript of Mr. Gopalkrishna’s Deposition, which took place on October 18, 2013. This
transcript does not appear to have been designated with an exhibit number, but the Court will refer to the transcript
in this memorandum as “Gopalkrishna Dep.”
other words, without human intervention; and that the system uses a queuing program to control
the order in which text messages will be sent and to manage and backlog in sending messages.
ECF 50 (Pl.’s Sur Reply) at 3. Plaintiff also relies on Mr. Snyder’s conclusion that “the
equipment used by the Defendant has the capacity to store or produce cellular telephone numbers
to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, or from a list of telephone
numbers.” ECF 39-9 (“Snyder Decl.”) ¶ 64.
The Court addressed each of these points – the alleged contradiction between Mr.
Gopalkrishna’s deposition testimony and his Declaration as well as Mr. Snyder’s conclusion – at
There, the Court asked Plaintiff’s counsel to cite to a portion of Mr. Gopalkrishna’s
deposition testimony that contradicted his conclusion that the Yahoo Email SMS Service “did
not have the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator, and to call those numbers.” To be sure, Plaintiff’s counsel did cite
portions of the testimony wherein Mr. Gopalkrishna acknowledges that the system stores cellular
telephone numbers, Gopalkrishna Dep. 52:8-15; that the system sent text messages to those
numbers without human intervention, id. 72:20-73:13; and that the system employs a queue
program for text messages, id. 98:2-7. Yahoo does not dispute that its system operated in this
function, nor does Mr. Gopalkrishna’s Declaration present a contrary description of the system’s
However, these acknowledgements do not resolve the crux of the issue: whether the
system had the capacity to “use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce
telephone numbers and then send a text message to those numbers” as required by the TCPA.
Yahoo asserts that its service could not randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers,
but only sent messages to a user that had authorized them and only when that user received an
email. Plaintiff has not offered evidence to dispute Yahoo’s assertion.
Nor does Mr. Snyder’s Declaration raise a material dispute of fact. Mr. Snyder’s
definition of the term “sequence” or “sequential” fails to raise a material dispute of fact, since it
focuses on the manner in which text messages are sent, not the way in which the numbers are
Moreover, this Court finds the definition of “sequential number generation” offered by
Judge Lasnik of the Western District of Washington – “(for example) (111) 111-1111, (111)
111-1112, and so on” – to be persuasive. Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., Inc., No. C12-0576RSL,
2014 WL 494862, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2014).
Further, Mr. Snyder’s conclusion that
the equipment used by the Defendant has the capacity to store or
produce cellular telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator, or from a list of telephone numbers
cannot be relied on to dispute Mr. Gopalkrishna’s Declaration. Mr. Snyder conveniently added
the addition disjunctive phrase “or from a list of telephone numbers” to his declaration – a phrase
that appears nowhere in the statutory definition of an ATDS. Snyder Decl. ¶ 64 (emphasis
added). The inclusion of this additional phrase is misleading. Moreover, including this
additional language renders Mr. Snyder’s Declaration entirely unreliable on this point, since it
does not address the necessary inquiry here: whether Yahoo’s system constitutes an ATDS as
defined by the statute. 6
Mr. Snyder’s Declaration reflects a misunderstanding of the statutory requirements, which require more than
simply that the system store telephone numbers and send messages to those numbers without human intervention.
Mr. Snyder’s Declaration references the Ninth Circuit in Satterfield, which quoted from Mr. Snyder’s expert report
as follows: “[t]he use of stored numbers, randomly generated numbers or sequentially generated numbers used to
automatically originate calls is a technical difference without a perceived distinction.” Snyder Decl. ¶ 49 (quoting
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d at 951). This citation to Satterfield is deceptive. The Ninth Circuit,
in Satterfield, quoted Mr. Snyder’s report only to recount his opinions, which were in dispute, and specifically noted
As discussed above, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to show that Yahoo’s system
had the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate telephone numbers (as opposed to simply
storing telephone numbers), as required by the statutory definition of ATDS. The Court thus
finds that Yahoo did not send text messages to Plaintiff via an ATDS and, therefore, judgment
must be granted in favor of Yahoo.
2. Unsolicited Telemarketing
Because the Court finds that the Yahoo system is not an ATDS, it need not address
whether the text messages sent constituted “unsolicited telemarketing” of the type that Congress
sought to limit with the TCPA.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants Yahoo’s Motion for Summary Judgment. An
appropriate order follows.
O:\Caitlin\Civil\13-1887 (Dominguez)\2014.3.14 MoL on MSJ.docx
that Mr. Snyder’s report had not declared that the equipment had the requisite capacity. In fact, the court made clear
that the district court had not focused on the proper inquiry regarding the system’s capacity thus resulting in
conflicting testimony and a limited record, which prevented the circuit court from reversing the district court’s grant
of summary judgment and, instead, required a remand to the district court. The court did not adopt Mr. Snyder’s
views. Mr. Syder also states, in his Declaration, that “the FCC has held that prohibitions under the TCPA apply to
stored lists of telephone numbers as well as random or sequentially generated numbers.” Snyder Decl. ¶ 49; id. ¶ 61
(“The FCC has held that prohibitions under the TCPA apply to lists of telephone numbers as well as random or
sequentially generated numbers.” (citing Rules and Regs. Implementing Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG
Dkt. No. 02-278, Jan. 4, 2008 ¶¶ 12-14)). In light of the Ninth Circuit’s determination, in Satterfield, that the
statutory text of the TCPA regarding the definition of an ATDS is “clear and unambiguous,” we are not bound by
the FCC’s interpretation. 569 F.3d at 951; see Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 515 F.3d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Under Chevron, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ends and the plain meaning of the
statute governs the action.”). Even so, this Declaratory Ruling pertains to the unique characteristics of predictive
dialers, and there is no contention here that Yahoo’s Email SMS Service is a predictive dialer.
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