CHAMBERS v. HUGHES et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE GENE E.K. PRATTER ON 4/22/13. 4/22/13 ENTERED AND COPIES MAILED TO PRO SE PETITIONER AND FAXED TO SUPERINTENDENT OF SCI GREENE. (jpd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION

JERRY A. CHAMBERS, SR.
v.

NO. 13-2017

RENEE CARDWELL HUGHES, et al.
MEMORANDUM

APRIL 19, 2013

PRATTER, J.

Jerry A. Chambers, Sr., a prisoner incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Greene, brings this pro se civil
rights action primarily based on his allegations that he was
wrongfully arrested and convicted of murder.

He names as

defendants the state judge who presided over his trial, several
lawyers appointed to represent him, and a doctor who testified
against him.

He also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis.

For

the following reasons, the Court will grant Mr. Chambers leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
I.

§

1915 (e) (2) (B) (i)

&

(ii).

FACTS

Mr. Chambers was arrested on August 17, 2003, and
subsequently charged with murder and related offenses.

At a

preliminary hearing on October 22, 2003, Dr. Ian Hood testified
about the victim's condition.

Mr. Chambers alleges that some or

all of Hood's testimony was fabricated.
Charles P. Mirarchi, III was appointed to represent Mr.
Chambers.

Mr. Chambers alleges that he sought to have Mirarchi

removed as counsel prior to trial, but that Judge Renee Cardwell
Hughes, who presided over his criminal case, would not allow it.
1

He further alleges that Judge Hughes "[stuck] him in a mental
hospital where they drug[ged]
took [him] to trial."

[him] against [his] will and then

(Compl. ~ II.D.)

Mr. Chambers was tried before a jury in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas.

He was convicted of murder, among other

things, and sentenced to death on May 26, 2005.
v. Chambers, 980 A.2d 35, 39 (Pa. 2009).

See Commonwealth

Mr. Chambers alleges

that his conviction is based on false evidence because Dr. Hood
and other witnesses testified falsely against him at trial.

He

also contends that Mirarchi was ineffective.
Mr. Chambers received new counsel on appeal, Jules Epstein.
Mr. Chambers was dissatisfied with Epstein's representation,
apparently because Epstein had testified on behalf of Mirarchi in
connection with disciplinary proceedings brought against
Mirarchi.

After losing his appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court, Mr. Chambers filed for post-conviction relief.

At some

point, Earl G. Kauffman was appointed to represent him in
connection with those proceedings, which appear to be ongoing.
See CP-51-CR-1101421-2003.

Mr. Chambers is also dissatisfied

with Kauffman's representation.
Mr. Chambers filed this action against Judge Hughes,
Mirarchi, Epstein, Kauffman, Dr. Hood, and an attorney named
Norman Scott, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated in various respects in the
course of his arrest, prosecution, and conviction.

He seeks

millions of dollars in damages, primarily based on his allegedly
2

wrongful conviction.·
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Chambers is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

because he has satisfied the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
1915.

Accordingly, 28

u.s.c.

§ 1915(e) (2) (B) applies.

That

provision requires the Court to dismiss the complaint if it is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune.
A complaint is frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory."
1085 (3d Cir. 1995).

Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim

under§ 1915(e) is governed by the same standard applicable to
motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the
complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted).

The Court may also consider matters of public record.

Buck v.

Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

If an

affirmative defense is obvious from the face of the complaint,
and if no development of the record is necessary, the Court may
dismiss any facially invalid claims sua sponte.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297

(3d Cir. 2002).

See Ray v.

As Mr. Chambers is

proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his allegations
liberally.

Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
3

2011) .
III. DISCUSSION
"[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]"

u.s.

477, 486-87 (1994)

Heck v. Humphrey, 512

(footnote and citation omitted).

To the

extent that Mr. Chamber's claims are predicated on alleged
constitutional deficiencies in his prosecution and/or
convictions, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983, because
the complaint reflects, and publicly available dockets confirm,
that those convictions have not been reversed or otherwise
invalidated.

Accordingly, Mr. Chambers's claims based on his

allegedly wrongful conviction are legally baseless and must be
dismissed. 1

1

Mr. Chambers's claims are legally frivolous for the
alternative reasons that (1) Judge Hughes is entitled to absolute
judicial immunity for acts taken in her judicial capacity, see
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000)
("[J]udges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary
damages arising from their judicial acts."); (2) Mr. Chambers's
attorneys are not state actors for purpose of § 1983, See Polk
Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) ("[A] public defender
does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding.") (footnote omitted); and (3) witnesses are entitled
to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 based on their
4

Mr. Chambers's false arrest and any related false
imprisonment claims also fail.

Mr. Chambers has failed to

describe how any of the named defendants are responsible for his
alleged false arrest and related detention.
claims are clearly time-barred.

In

§

In any event, his

1983 actions, federal

courts apply the statute of limitations governing personal injury
claims in the state where the cause of action arose.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).

Wallace v.

In Pennsylvania, where Mr.

Chambers's claims arose, the relevant statute of limitations is
two years.

See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§

5524.

Pursuant to the

prison mailbox rule, a prisoner's complaint is considered filed
at the time he or she hands it over to prison authorities for
forwarding to the Court.

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276

( 1988) .
Mr. Chambers's claims based on his false arrest accrued on
August 17, 2003, when the arrest occurred, see Montgomery v. De
Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998), and his false
imprisonment claims accrued by October 22, 2003, when he received
a preliminary hearing in state court, if not earlier.

See

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 ("[A] false imprisonment ends once the

testimony in court, see Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 s. Ct. 1497, 1505
(2012) ("[A] trial witness has absolute immunity [from suit under
§ 1983] with respect to any claim based on the witness'
testimony."); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir.
1992) ("[W]itness immunity applies to testimony given at pretrial
hearings as well as to trial testimony . . . . ") (footnote
omitted), abrogated on other grounds by, Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, ·507 U.S. 163
(1993).
5

victim becomes held pursuant to [legal] process - when, for
example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on
charges.")

(emphasis omitted).

As Mr. Chambers did not file this

action until April 11, 2013, when he handed his complaint over to
prison authorities for mailing, his claims are clearly timebarred.2
A district court should generally provide a pro se plaintiff
with leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114

(3d Cir. 2002).

Here, amendment would be futile because it is

apparent that Mr. Chambers's claims are barred by Heck and the
statute of limitations.

Accordingly, he will not be permitted to

file an amended complaint.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

An appropriate order

follows.

2

Nothing in the complaint suggests a basis for tolling.
6