A.S. et al v. WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE EDUARDO C. ROBRENO ON 4/10/2014. 4/11/2014 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED (kk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
A.S., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WILLIAM PENN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION
No. 13-2312

M E M O R A N D U M
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

April 10, 2014

Plaintiffs A.S., a minor student, and L.G., her parent
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), bring this against Defendant
William Penn School District (“the District”) alleging that the
District failed to provide A.S. with a free and appropriate
public education, in violation of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.
Plaintiffs also allege that they were denied an impartial due
process hearing, in violation of the IDEA and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District has moved to
dismiss the complaint, and the Court, after notice to the
parties and an opportunity to supplement, has treated that
motion as one for summary judgment, in accordance with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). For the reasons that follow, the

Court will grant the motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint in
its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
A.S. was enrolled as a student in the District from
September 2011 to November 2012. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 3; Hearing
Officer Decision ¶ 30, ECF No. 23-2. Due to concerns about
A.S.’s academic performance, the District conducted an
evaluation of her during the spring of 2012 and issued a final
Evaluation Report on May 25, 2012. Compl. ¶ 13; Hearing Officer
Decision ¶ 10. Among other findings, the Evaluation Report found
that A.S. met the eligibility criteria for a specific learning
disability in the areas of reading, written expression, and
math. Hearing Officer Decision ¶ 17.
In August 2012, A.S.’s parent was informed that the
District intended to place A.S. at a different elementary school
for the 2012-13 school year. Id. ¶ 23; Compl. ¶ 14. The parent
retained counsel in September 2012, and subsequently filed a
“stay put” complaint with the Office of Dispute Resolution
(“ODR”) to prevent the transfer from happening. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16,
19. After the “stay put” complaint was denied, allowing the
transfer to occur, the parent filed a complaint with the ODR
alleging that the District had denied A.S. a free and
appropriate public education by not timely and appropriately
evaluating her for a disability (the “FAPE Complaint”). Compl.
2

¶¶ 16-17; Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 10-1. On October 28,
2012, the parent amended the FAPE Complaint to add claims of
discrimination and other violations of the IDEA. ECF No. 15-4.
At around the same time, the parent also requested
that the District pay for an “Independent Educational
Evaluation” (“IEE”) of A.S., contending that the District’s
Evaluation Report was inadequate. The District rejected that
request and initiated its own due process hearing against the
parent to defend its report (the “IEE Complaint”). Compl. ¶ 21;
Hearing Officer Decision 2. Although the IEE Complaint had a
distinct case number from the FAPE Complaint filed by the
parent, as it constituted a separate action brought by the
District, the ODR assigned the two complaints to the same
Hearing Officer and they were consolidated into one due process
hearing. Hearing Officer Decision 2. On November 19, 2012, the
parties were notified that the due process hearing was scheduled
to occur on January 23-25, 2013. Id.
On the morning of January 17, 2013, Plaintiffs’
counsel sent the Hearing Officer an email stating that a “family
emergency” had developed and as a result the parent would be out
of the state during the hearing dates. ECF No. 31-2, at 2.
Counsel advised the Hearing Officer that she had given the
parent the option of either requesting a continuance of the
hearing, or withdrawing the complaint and refiling it at a later
3

date. A few hours later, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a second email
informing the Hearing Officer and the District that Plaintiffs
were moving to voluntarily dismiss the complaint because the
parent could not attend the hearing. See ECF No. 10-9.
The Hearing Officer responded that evening, and
explained that Plaintiffs could dismiss the FAPE Complaint but
not the IEE Complaint, which had been filed by the District. Id.
The Hearing Officer further noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel had
not actually requested a continuance. If Plaintiffs intended to
move for a continuance, the Hearing Officer indicated that the
motion “must explain what the emergency is and when the Parent
will be available for the hearing.” Id.
A few days later, on January 21, Plaintiffs’ counsel
sent another email. She reiterated Plaintiffs’ intent to
“voluntarily dismiss without prejudice [the] due process hearing
complaint due to exigent circumstances.” ECF No. 10-7. She also
asked that the hearing be continued in order to enable the
parent to participate. Id. She did not elaborate on the nature
of the “exigent circumstances,” however, nor did she specify
when the parent might be available.
That afternoon, the Hearing Officer responded with two
emails. First, he confirmed that the parent had withdrawn the
FAPE Complaint and formally dismissed the matter. ECF No. 10-8.
That email clearly stated at the top in bold letters: “This
4

email pertains to ODR # 3519-1213AS only.” Id. Second, he
addressed the request for a continuance, which he interpreted to
be in reference to the remaining IEE Complaint. ECF No. 10-9. He
explained that counsel’s email failed to comply with his
instructions, as it did not describe the emergency or say when
the parent would be available. Concluding that “[i]t is
insufficient for the Parent to simply announce that there is an
emergency that precludes participating during any of the three
hearing dates that were scheduled over two months ago without
saying what that emergency is or estimating when that emergency
will be over,” the Hearing Officer denied the request for a
continuance, but granted Plaintiffs leave to file a new request
that complied with his instructions. Id.
Plaintiffs’ counsel responded the next day, January
22, 2013 (the day before the scheduled hearing), but did not
provide any more details regarding the parent’s family
emergency. She explained that she could not offer a date that
the parent would be available for another hearing, and that she
“believe[d] she ha[d] complied with the Hearing Officer’s
request to know the nature of the parents [sic] emergency: It
was a family emergency.” ECF No. 10-10 (emphasis in original).
Counsel also objected to what she perceived to be the Hearing
Officer’s decision to “bifurcate” the two matters, stating that
the parent did not “want the two hearings separated since the
5

Hearing Officer has scheduled them to [be] conducted together.”
Id.
The Hearing Officer replied that evening, explaining
that no hearing on the FAPE Complaint would be held because it
had been dismissed, but that oral argument would proceed as
scheduled on the IEE Complaint. He stated that “[c]ounsel for
both parties are expected to be present even if the Parent
himself cannot attend,” and he explained that it was not within
his power to grant an indefinite continuance of the proceeding.
Id. Nonetheless, he indicated that he would entertain a renewed
continuance request at the hearing and that Plaintiffs’ counsel
should be prepared “to answer questions about when the Parent
may be able to attend a hearing in the future.” Id.
The due process hearing on the District’s IEE
Complaint began as scheduled the next morning, on January 23,
2013. Hearing Officer Decision 1. Neither the parent nor
Plaintiffs’ counsel attended. At the start of the hearing, the
Hearing Officer again considered Plaintiffs’ written motion for
a continuance and heard the District’s renewed objection to the
motion. Id. at 3. He denied the motion for the same reasons
expressed previously, and the hearing then proceeded without the
parent or counsel in attendance. Id. Based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, which included both parties’
documentary evidence but only the District’s witnesses, the
6

Hearing Officer concluded that the District’s Evaluation Report
was appropriate and that the parent was not entitled to an IEE
at public expense. Id. at 11.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action on April 29, 2013.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to strike Plaintiffs’
complaint, as well as a motion for sanctions. After Plaintiffs
failed to respond to either motion, the Court held a hearing on
October 8, 2013. Then, pursuant to a Court order, Plaintiffs
filed a nunc pro tunc motion for extension of time to respond
and attached a proposed response. Upon consideration of the
parties’ submissions, the Court gave notice that it intends to
treat Defendant’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(d). Order, Feb. 12, 2014, ECF No. 25. Both parties filed
supplemental submissions and the motion is now ripe for
resolution.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A motion
for summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere
existence’ of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there
is a genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v.
Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
7

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A
fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence
might affect the outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
The Court will view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. “After making all reasonable
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, there is a genuine
issue of material fact if a reasonable jury could find for the
nonmoving party.” Pignataro v. Port Auth., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d
Cir. 2010). While the moving party bears the initial burden of
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, meeting
this obligation shifts the burden to the nonmoving party who
must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs make two primary assertions in their
complaint. First, they say that the District’s treatment of A.S.
deprived her of a free and appropriate public education and
violated various other provisions of the IDEA. Second, they
contend that, by conducting the due process hearing ex parte,
the Hearing Officer violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights and
failed to provide an impartial hearing as required by the IDEA.
8

Based on those assertions, Plaintiffs bring claims under the
IDEA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. They ask that the Court either
award them compensatory damages, or remand the case with the
instruction that a new Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a
due process hearing.
The District contends that all of Plaintiffs’ claims
fail as a matter of law. First, it says that the claims arising
from the alleged denial of a free and appropriate public
education have not been exhausted because Plaintiffs voluntarily
withdrew the FAPE Complaint. As for the allegations regarding
the due process hearing, the District asserts that they fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court
addresses each contention in turn, using the summary judgment
standard outlined above.
A. Exhaustion
Before filing a civil action seeking relief available
under the IDEA, a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative
remedies available under that statute. Jeremy H. v. Mount
Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1415). As the Supreme Court has explained, allowing an
IDEA claim to proceed in federal court without requiring
exhaustion would not only
9

render superfluous most of the detailed
procedural
protections
outlined
in
the
statute, but, more important, it would also
run counter to Congress’ view that the needs
of
handicapped
children
are
best
accommodated by having the parents and the
local education agency work together to
formulate an individualized plan for each
handicapped child’s education.
Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12
(1984)). The administrative process “offers an opportunity for
state and local agencies,” as well as educational authorities
and medical personnel, “to exercise discretion and expertise in
fields in which they have substantial experience.” Id. at 779.
It also provides “a means to develop a complete factual record,”
id., and the Hearing Officer’s factual findings are accorded
substantial deference on appeal, see S.H. v. State-Operated Sch.
Dist., 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). For all of those
reasons, courts have strictly adhered to the rule that, except
in a few limited circumstances not applicable here, an aggrieved
party must “complete the administrative process before resorting
to federal court.” Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778.
Here, the record clearly establishes that Plaintiffs
voluntarily withdrew the FAPE Complaint against the District,
and the Hearing Officer never reached a decision on the merits
of the claims it asserted. Those claims include many of the
allegations raised in the instant Complaint; in particular, the
10

FAPE Complaint alleged that the District failed to comply with
the “child find” requirement and improperly removed A.S. from
her school, depriving her of a free and appropriate public
education. See ECF Nos. 10-3 & 10-8. Because those claims were
never addressed at the administrative level, they have not been
exhausted, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review them in
the first instance. Indeed, the only IDEA claim addressed in the
Hearing Officer’s decision is the assertion that Plaintiffs are
entitled to an IEE at public expense. Accordingly, the Court
will dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ substantive IDEA claims that do
not relate to the IEE issue.
B. The Due Process Hearing
Plaintiffs’ second assertion is that the due process
hearing regarding the IEE Complaint, the Complaint which did go
forward, did not comply with the procedural safeguards of the
IDEA and infringed Plaintiffs’ right to due process. Plaintiffs
do not directly challenge the substance of the Hearing Officer’s
decision denying an IEE at public expense. Instead, Plaintiffs
contend that the hearing should not have been conducted ex
parte, that the parent’s expert witness was denied an
opportunity to testify, and that the Hearing Officer was not
“fair and impartial” to Plaintiffs. See Compl. ¶ 2, 22-25. The
Court therefore construes Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the due

11

process hearing to be a procedural challenge to the Hearing
Officer’s decision regarding the IEE Complaint.
The IDEA requires that the parties involved in an IDEA
complaint “have an opportunity for an impartial due process
hearing.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A). Furthermore, both the IDEA
and Pennsylvania law impose specific procedural safeguards on
due process hearings, which include “the right to be accompanied
and advised by counsel” and “the right to present evidence and
confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses.” Id. § 1415(h); see also 22 Pa. Code § 14.162(i),
(l), (m). In addition to those statutorily enumerated
safeguards, “[d]ue process principles apply to quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings.” Kowenhoven v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
901 A.2d 1003, 1009-10 (Pa. 2006). Thus, in accordance with
those principles, “there must be notice, an opportunity to
present one’s cause, a proceeding appropriate to the character
of the particular case, and an adjudication of the same nature
as is present in other cases.” D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 2 A.3d 712, 720 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (quoting Petition
of Kariher, 131 A. 265, 270 (Pa. 1925)). Because “[t]he concept
of due process is a flexible one,” the specific safeguards
required may vary based upon the situation. Id. at 721.
It is beyond dispute that a due process hearing was
scheduled for January 23, 2013, and that Plaintiffs had ample
12

notice of that hearing date. At issue is whether the Hearing
Officer’s denial of the request for a continuance, which
Plaintiffs acknowledge occurred “days before” the scheduled
hearing date, resulted in a violation of due process or of the
IDEA’s procedural safeguards.
Under Pennsylvania law, special education hearing
officers have the authority to “regulate the course of hearings,
including the scheduling thereof . . . and the recessing,
reconvening, and the adjournment thereof.” Id. at 734 (quoting 1
Pa. Code § 35.187(1)). If a party desires a continuance of an
administrative hearing, the request generally must “be by motion
in writing, timely filed with the agency, stating the facts on
which the application rests.” Id. (quoting 1 Pa. Code §
31.15(b)). When such a motion is filed, “[t]he decision to grant
or deny a request for a continuance is within the sole
discretion of the hearing examiner.” Id.
This Court’s review of the denial of a continuance is
therefore “limited to determining whether the hearing examiner
abused his discretion.” Id. Under that deferential standard of
review, the Court must “abide by the agency’s decision absent
bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power.” Id. at
722 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The fact that a
reviewing court may have a different opinion is not sufficient
to interfere with the agency’s action and judicial discretion
13

may not be substituted for administrative discretion.” Id.
(quoting Giant Food Stores, LLC v. Dep’t of Health, 808 A.2d
299, 304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002)) (alteration omitted).
In D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a special
education hearing officer had abused his discretion by denying a
motion for a continuance. The parent in that case had twice
requested a continuance prior to the hearing date, but had not
filed a written motion to that effect. Id. at 735. At the
hearing, the parent explained that, in light of the hearing
officer’s decision to narrow the scope of the hearing, she did
“not have enough time to prepare” and wanted the proceeding to
be continued. Id. The hearing officer considered that argument,
but found the parent’s concerns about her ability to prepare “to
be unfounded” and denied the request. Id. The parent then
declined to participate in the hearing. Id. After warning the
parent that “her refusal to participate would result in
termination of the proceedings,” the hearing officer ended the
hearing and issued a decision dismissing the parent’s complaint
with prejudice for failure to meet her burden of proof. Id. at
719. On these facts, the D.Z. court found no abuse of discretion
in the hearing officer’s decision, explaining that “the Hearing
Officer did not deny [the parent] her right to fully participate
in the proceedings; rather, she declined an opportunity to do
14

so.” Id. at 735. The reviewing court also agreed with the
hearing officer that the parent had “ample opportunity to
prepare for the proceeding.” Id.
The D.Z. court distinguished the case from two other
cases in which Pennsylvania courts had concluded that an
administrative officer abused his discretion by denying a
continuance request. In Thomas v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 543 A.2d 600 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), the court
held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to
a claimant who could not attend a hearing because he was
incarcerated. Similarly, in Shegan v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 564 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), the court
held that an unemployment compensation referee should have
granted a continuance to allow the claimant to attend a job
interview out of state. The court in Shegan emphasized that the
request for a continuance was “based upon proper cause,” as it
would be contrary to the goals of the unemployment compensation
law to “penalize the unemployed who are actively seeking reemployment.” Id. at 1025 & n.5. The D.Z. court explained that,
unlike those cases – where the denial of the continuance
prevented the claimant from attending the hearing or presenting
evidence – the parent in D.Z. chose not to be heard. D.Z., 2
A.3d at 736. Accordingly, under the teachings of D.Z., it is
within a hearing officer’s discretion to deny a continuance if
15

the basis for the denial is proper and the decision does not
effectively bar the claimant from participating in the
administrative process.1
Here, the Hearing Officer denied the continuance
request because Plaintiffs repeatedly failed to specify the
reason for the request and did not give an estimate as to when
the parent would be available for a hearing. The Hearing Officer
provided a valid reason for requesting that information: without
it, the continuance would amount to an indefinite stay of
proceedings. The Hearing Officer was willing to entertain the
request for a continuance, if Plaintiffs could provide a valid
basis for their request – either some explanation of the
emergency that would justify the need for an indefinite delay,
or some indication of how long the emergency would last.
Plaintiffs provided neither. The Hearing Officer could therefore
identify no legitimate basis for a continuance, and denied the
request. Under these circumstances, that decision falls within
the Hearing Officer’s authority to regulate the scheduling of

1

In both Thomas and Shegan, the party requesting the
continuance provided a specific reason for the request. Based on
that reason, the reviewing court determined the denial of the
request was an abuse of discretion. Here, on the other hand, the
parent stated only that there was a “family emergency,” and,
despite prompting from the Hearing Officer, he declined to
elaborate. A simple incantation to “family emergency” is
insufficient to inform the exercise of discretion by the Hearing
Officer.
16

hearings, see 1 Pa. Code § 35.187(1), and there is no evidence
that it reflects any “bad faith, fraud, capricious action or
abuse of power” on the part of the Hearing Officer, see D.Z., 2
A.3d at 722. While due process certainly commands that the
Hearing Officer consider the reason(s) for the continuance
request, this mandate dissipates when the parent fails to
provide any specific reason for it. As the court in D.Z.
explained, “due process standards do not guarantee a party a
right a continuance, even for good reason, if he fails to
request it in a timely fashion or in a manner consistent with
reasonable procedural rules.” 2 A.3d at 735 (citing Steadwell v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 463 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983)). Accordingly, under the circumstances presented here, the
Court concludes that the Hearing Officer did not abuse his
discretion in denying the request for a continuance.
After denying Plaintiffs’ request for a continuance,
the Hearing Officer conducted the hearing as scheduled on
January 23, 2013. Although Plaintiffs were not in attendance,
the Hearing Officer considered all of the evidence presented,
(which included the District’s witnesses and both parties’
documentary evidence), concluded that the District’s Evaluation
Report was proper, and issued a written decision denying
Plaintiffs’ request for an IEE at public expense. The Court

17

discerns no procedural error in those actions2 and, as discussed
above, Plaintiffs do not challenge the substance of the Hearing
Officer’s decision. The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims regarding the IEE Complaint and the due process hearing.3

2

The fact that the hearing was conducted ex parte does
not render it procedurally improper. Neither the IDEA nor state
law expressly bars ex parte due process hearings. Furthermore,
ex parte hearings are not a per se violation of due process
principles, and indeed are permitted in numerous situations,
depending on the circumstances. See, e.g., Miller v. City of
Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 374 (3d Cir. 1999) (permitting ex parte
emergency child custody hearings even when the parent is
available to participate); United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457,
470 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing when ex parte hearings are
appropriate); United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 332 (2d
Cir. 2004) (describing when evidence may be presented ex parte
in criminal matters).
In this case, the Hearing Officer’s decision to
conduct the hearing in the parent’s absence was specifically
permitted by ODR policy. The ODR’s “Special Education Dispute
Resolution Manual” provides that, if a party fails to appear,
the hearing officer must attempt to contact the absent party,
and then, “in his or her discretion, determine whether the
hearing should proceed in the absence of the party who does not
appear.” Office of Dispute Resolution, Pennsylvania Special
Education Dispute Resolution Manual § 507, available at odrpa.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Dispute-Resolution-Manual.pdf
(last visited April 3, 2014). If the hearing officer proceeds
with the hearing despite the absence of the parent, the Manual
requires that the hearing be closed to the public and that the
hearing officer state on the record “the circumstances known to
the hearing officer surrounding the party’s failure to appear.”
Id. Both of those steps were taken in this case. Compliance with
the Dispute Resolution Manual further demonstrates that the
Hearing Officer’s actions were not arbitrary or procedurally
irregular. See D.Z., 2 A.3d at 720 (explaining that due process
principles require “an adjudication of the same nature as is
present in other cases”).
3

Plaintiffs also suggest that the Hearing Officer was
not fair or impartial because, prior to the hearing, the
18

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In addition to their IDEA and constitutional claims,
Plaintiffs also seek recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending
that § 1983 “permits a suit for monetary damages against a
school district who under color of law deprives another
individual a right guaranteed by . . . the IDEA or Section 504.”
Compl. ¶ 39. That is no longer the law in this circuit. In A.W.
v. Jersey City Public Schools, the Third Circuit held in an en
banc decision that § 1983 is not available to remedy alleged
violations of the IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act. 486 F.3d 791,
803-05 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that

all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly,
the Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint in its entirety. An appropriate order will follow.

District emailed him a previous decision by a different Hearing
Officer that dismissed a different parent’s claims due to
current Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to disclose evidence in a
timely fashion. Assuming arguendo that the email was
procedurally improper, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that it
proved prejudicial to their case. See D.Z., 2 A.3d at 721
(“Demonstrable prejudice is a key factor in assessing whether
procedural due process was denied.”). The Hearing Officer ruled
against Plaintiffs because he found that the District’s
Evaluation Report was appropriate, not due to any failure to
disclose evidence. See Hearing Officer Decision 8-11.
19