HEINS v. ALAN RITCHEY, INC.

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION. SIGNED BY HONORABLE MICHAEL M. BAYLSON ON 6/12/2014. 6/12/2014 ENTERED AND COPIES E-MAILED.(kp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Robert C. Heins,
Plaintiff,
v.
Alan Ritchey, Inc.,
Defendant.

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CIVIL CASE

NO. 13-2798

MEMORANDUM RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Baylson, J.
I.

June 12, 2014

Introduction
This lawsuit concerns Plaintiff Robert Heins’s claim that Defendant Alan Ritchey

terminated his employment based on his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 21, 2013. ECF 1. Defendant filed its Answer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint on July 25, 2013. ECF 10. On April 18, 2014, Defendant filed the present
Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). ECF 18. Plaintiff filed his Response in
Opposition to the Motion on May 15, 2014. ECF 21. Defendant filed a Reply in Support of its
Motion on May 22, 2014. ECF 23.
II.

Background
The following facts are not in dispute unless otherwise noted. Defendant is a multi-

industry company that provided various services to government, industrial, agricultural, energy,
and transportation clients across the United States. ECF 18 (the Motion), Ex. 2 (Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts) ¶ 1 [hereinafter “Statement of Undisputed Facts”]. During the
relevant time period, and until December 2011, Defendant held a contract with the United States

Postal Service (“USPS”) in which it acted as a processor of USPS mail transport equipment. Id.
¶ 2.
Defendant employed Plaintiff as the Plant Manager of Defendant’s Mail Transportation
Equipment Services Center (“MTESC”) in Levittown, Pennsylvania (the “Philadelphia Plant”).
Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant hired Plaintiff around December 1998, at which time Plaintiff was 57
years old. Id. ¶ 6.
USPS, Defendant’s only customer for the mail transport equipment business line, paid
Defendant based on the number of pallets it processed. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Moreover, the contract
obligated Defendant to perform various tasks such as inventory checks and issuing placards with
bar code information to each pallet for billing purposes. Id. ¶¶ 10-14. USPS personnel,
including David Rose, the head of the USPS MTESC division, had consistent oversight and
communication with the Philadelphia Plant, and certain USPS employees had a physical
presence at the Philadelphia Plant. Id. ¶¶ 14-16.
As Plant Manager, Plaintiff had a number of responsibilities, including: (1) ensuring the
accuracy of inventory, inventory checks, and data collection through the Philadelphia Plant; (2)
ensuring that personnel and plant complied with Defendant’s and USPS’s policies; (3)
overseeing the Philadelphia Plant’s 250 employees; (4) meeting production and quality targets;
(5) developing plans for efficient use of materials and personnel; (6) overseeing the process of
issuing placards to pallets; and (7) ensuring the timeliness of the loading and unloading process.
Id. ¶¶ 18-21.
Around December 2009 or January 2010, the Philadelphia Plant relocated to a new,
larger building in response to representations made by USPS that the plant would be receiving
higher volume. Id. ¶ 22. At this time, Richard Stroup held the position of CEO of Defendant

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and acted as Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. Id. ¶ 23. The change in location coincided with
USPS’s revision of a number of its policies and procedures and USPS’s decision to begin
processing some of its own product. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27-28. Immediately after the relocation, the
Philadelphia Plant began to lose money. Id. ¶ 28.
The Philadelphia Plant continued to lose money until Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment on August 30, 2010. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. Between the relocation and Plaintiff’s
termination, Mr. Rose and other USPS personnel sent a number of emails to Mr. Stroup,
regarding incidents of non-compliance with the USPS procedures. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33, 35-37, 39-41.
The parties do dispute the nature of those communications from Mr. Rose and the reasons
for Mr. Stroup’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. Defendant describes the series of
communications from Mr. Rose as “complaints.” See, e.g., id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff relies on testimony
from Mr. Rose in which he states that he had no concerns about deficiencies in Plaintiff’s job
performance; Plaintiff did nothing wrong in his role as Plant Manager; and that emails sent by
him do not necessarily indicate that there was a problem, but rather just an issue to be addressed.
ECF 21 (P.’s Resp. in Opp’n to the Motion), Ex. 1 (Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts) ¶
30-31, 33, 36-37 [hereinafter “Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts”]. Defendant also points
to other performance issues, including incorrect inventory results, Statement of Undisputed Facts
¶ 35, an issue where certain pallets were being scanned out of the plant’s inventory but not
loaded onto trucks, id. ¶ 36, placards being printed for payment but not being attached to any
pallet, id. ¶ 39, 43, the untimely unloading of trailers, id. ¶ 33, and general issues with a lack of
supervision of shift managers, id. ¶ 42. To dispute the import of those supposed performance
issues, Plaintiff relies on his own deposition where he testified that the relocation of the factory
caused some discrepancy in inventory counts, but that he brought many of them to Mr. Stroup’s

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attention, who told Plaintiff to “do the best [he could.]” Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts
¶ 35, 38. Moreover, Plaintiff argues, Mr. Rose testified that similar inventory issues occurred at
all of Defendant’s other MTESC plants as well. Id. ¶ 41. As for the placards, Plaintiff points to
testimony from Mr. Rose who stated that the placarding issue did not reflect negatively on the
Philadelphia Plant in the eyes of USPS. Id. ¶ 39. Finally, Plaintiff disputes that he had problems
with shift managers, stating that he had concerns about one shift manager, he brought those
concerns to Mr. Stroup, and Mr. Stroup refused to take corrective action. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff also
disputes Defendant’s statement that Mr. Stroup discussed these performance issues with him on
multiple occasions, Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 46, instead stating that Mr. Stroup never
told him his job was in jeopardy. 1 Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 46. Plaintiff further
states that he maintained excellent job performance ratings, Defendant never issued him a
disciplinary warning or write-up, and that Defendant gave Plaintiff a $42,500 bonus, months
after the Philadelphia Plant relocation. Id. ¶ 45.
As a general matter, Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s contention that he was terminated due
to lack of profitability or poor job performance. Plaintiff points to several explanations offered
by Defendant for Plaintiff’s termination as evidence of inconsistency. First, Plaintiff relies on
his Employment Status Form, which Defendant admits first listed “cost reduction” as the reason
for Plaintiff’s termination but was later changed to state that Plaintiff had been terminated for
“poor performance.” Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 53. Plaintiff then points to Defendant’s
position statement with the PHRC, where Defendant stated that it terminated Plaintiff because he
was mismanaging the Philadelphia Plant to the point that Defendant began receiving complaints

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Defendant counters by citing Mr. Stroup’s deposition where he testified that he did discuss
Plaintiff’s poor performance with him prior to his termination. ECF 23-1 (Resp. to Pl.’s
Counterstatement of Facts) ¶ 8 (citing Ex. C, Stroup Dep. at 40, 63-64).
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from USPS. Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 48 & Ex. H (Oct. 17, 2011 Letter).
Plaintiff also relies on an affidavit from Mr. Stroup, in which Mr. Stroup stated that Plaintiff was
terminated due to complaints from USPS. Id. ¶ 48 & Ex. K (Oct. 26, 2012 Affidavit of Richard
Stroup) ¶¶ 4-5 (“Complainant’s conduct resulted in complaints from the USPS and jeopardized
Respondent’s ability to be paid under the terms of its contract with the USPS.”). Plaintiff states
that it was not until Defendant answered interrogatories in this litigation, that it first offered lack
of profitability as the reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Id. ¶ 48.
The parties do not dispute that Larry Rentz replaced Plaintiff as the Plant Manager at the
Philadelphia Plant, although there is some dispute as to when Mr. Rentz assumed that position.
Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 54; Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 48. Mr. Rentz
was 48 years old at this time. Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 62. Defendants state, and
Plaintiffs dispute, that Mr. Rentz was chosen to replace Plaintiff because of his experience as a
Plant Manager in the MTESC in Long Island and his background in engineering, and in hope
that he could help implement automation at the Philadelphia Plant. Statement of Undisputed
Facts ¶¶ 59-60; Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 59-60.
The parties do not dispute that Defendant failed to win the MTESC contract in 2011 and
that the Philadelphia Plant closed in December 2001. Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 63.
III.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue
is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is
“material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
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A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular
issue at trial, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
After the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party’s response must, “by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule [ ] set out specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails
to rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the
light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
IV.

Discussion
The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment against any person over age

forty. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). “Because the prohibition against age discrimination contained in
the ADEA is similar in text, tone, and purpose to that contained in Title VII, courts routinely
look to law developed under Title VII to guide an inquiry under ADEA.” Brewer v. Quaker
State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for the
employer). But a plaintiff must show age discrimination was the “but-for” cause of the adverse
action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (holding Title VII mixed-motive
theory does not apply to ADEA claims).
The burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973) is the appropriate analysis for summary judgment motions in cases alleging
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employment discrimination. 2 Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330. In order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of four elements: (1) he is older than
40; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and
(4) he was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to support the inference of age
discrimination. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir.) (reversing summary
judgment for the employer), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Texas Dept. of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981) (vacating reversal of judgment for the defendant
after a bench trial). The Defendant satisfies its burden of production by introducing evidence,
which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason
for the unfavorable employment decision. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)
(affirming grant of summary judgment for the employer). The defendant need not prove that the
tendered reason actually motivated its behavior because the ultimate burden of proving
intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff. Id.
If the defendant is able to come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its action, the plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by providing evidence from
which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the defendant’s articulated legitimate
reasons or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the defendant’s action. Id. at 764. “If the plaintiff

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A plaintiff can also prove age discrimination by direct evidence, but a plaintiff attempting to do
so “confronts a ‘high hurdle.’” Anderson v. CONRAIL, 297 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff admits,
however, that there is no direct evidence of age discrimination in this case. Resp. to Statement of
Undisputed Facts ¶ 64.
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produces sufficient evidence of pretext, he need not produce additional evidence of
discrimination beyond his prima facie case to proceed to trial.” Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731.
For purposes of this Motion only, Defendant has conceded that Plaintiff has presented an
issue of fact in support of his prima facie case for age discrimination. ECF 18-1 (Def.’s Mem. of
Law in Supp. of the Motion) at 7, n.1. Plaintiffs likewise concede that Defendants have offered a
non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff, although they argue that Defendant has
offered several, inconsistent explanations. Defendant’s explanation can be boiled down to a
contention that Defendant lost profit on its contract with the USPS because the Philadelphia
Plant, under Plaintiff’s supervision, failed to comply with USPS policies and procedures.
Plaintiff contends that he has offered sufficient evidence of pretext. He argues that the
record discredits Defendant’s proffered reasons, because (1) Defendant’s reason is implausible
and directly contradicted by the record, (2) Defendant’s articulated reasons for firing Plaintiff
have been inconsistent, (3) Defendant lacks credibility, and (4) Defendant treated Mr. Rentz,
Plaintiff’s replacement, differently, casting doubt on his proferred reason.
This Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the true motivation
behind Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. The parties dispute the
following factual issues: (1) whether and to what extent the Philadelphia Plant failed to comply
with USPS policies and procedures, (2) whether Defendant received complaints about the
Philadelphia Plant’s lack of compliance with those policies and procedures or Plaintiff’s job
performance, (3) whether Mr. Rose and other USPS employee’s communications with Mr.
Stroup constituted complaints or run-of-the-mill notifications, (4) whether, at the time,
Defendant attributed compliance issues and/or diminishing profits to Plaintiff’s job performance
or to the plant relocation, and (5) whether Defendant expressed any dissatisfaction to Plaintiff

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regarding his job performance. Based on the record, and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant’s proffered reason
for terminating Plaintiff’s employment lacks credibility and constitute mere pretext.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. An

appropriate order follows.
O:\Caitlin\Civil\13-2798 (Heinz)\2014.5.30 MoL on MSJ.docx

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